DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

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The
De Sacramento Altaris
of William of Ockham

Edited by

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Latin Text and English Translation

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To
My Esteemed Professors

JOHN C. ROLFE and WALTON BROOKS MCDANIEL

of the University of Pennsylvania, who, by
their encouragement and assistance, have
helped to make this book possible

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PREFACE

The object of this edition is to provide a text of the De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham based on the examination of three manuscripts and three text editions. It is hoped that this most important work, which is now easily accessible to scholars, may lead to a re-examination of the philosophical, psychological, theological, and ecclesiastical problems of the stirring times of Ockham and his immediate successors. It is also hoped that this work may give rise to a renewed and careful study of Nominalism—its vitality, its influence in re-shaping philosophical systems, in developing new psychological procedures and theological doctrines, and in modifying ecclesiastical policies and political theories.

Literary style and finish have been made secondary to accuracy of translation. A rather literal translation may be expected to aid the reader to obtain the precise thought of the Latin text and to carry along important shades of meaning of words and of expressions.

The critical apparatus contains the various readings which may give rise to modifications of the meaning of a passage.

With few exceptions, for the sake of brevity, the notes on the text are limited to the citation of various writers and to the places where references are found.

I am under obligation to Professor John C. Rolfe, Ph.D., Lit.D., of the University of Pennsylvania, for

instruction and direction in the study of Palæography and Epigraphy, which have held me to a continued interest in these subjects.

For assistance and criticism in the preparation of the Latin text and the English translation, I am indebted to Professor Walton Brooks McDaniel, Ph.D., of the University of Pennsylvania, whose comprehensive knowledge of Latin was placed at my service; to Dr. Edwin F. Keever, while a graduate student of Harvard University, who shared with me his knowledge of the philosophy of the period of Ockham and acquaintance with the Latin abbreviations; and to my wife, Sarah Caroline Birch, for her knowledge of Latin abbreviations and of the Latin structure of the period, and for the untiring service rendered by her during the entire period of preparation of the text.

For his critical examination of the Latin text, for many discerning and scholarly suggestions relative to it, and for his keen, painstaking reading of the proof of the Latin text, I am indebted to my colleague, Jens Anderson Ness, Ph.D., Professor of Latin.

For many valuable suggestions and assistance in the preparation of the bibliography, I am indebted to my colleague, John O. Evjen, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Church History.

For the original suggestion of the need of a readily accessible and critical edition of Ockham's De Sacramento Altaris and for continued encouragement to complete the task, I am indebted to Professor Frank P. Manhart, D.D., LL.D., Dean of the Theological Seminary of Susquehanna University.

Miss Grace Prince, A.M., the librarian of Wittenberg College, and William H. Allen, bookseller, Philadelphia, have given valued assistance in locating and securing important books and material.

Acknowledgment should here be made of the uniform courtesy and assistance in securing access to the works of Ockham, rendered by the librarians of many institutions, including: Balliol College, Merton College; the Universities of Paris, Rouen, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Harvard, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Yale; Gettysburg Seminary; and the public libraries of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.

The librarians of the Universities of Munich and Venice, and of the Congressional Library of Washington, D. C., have at various times supplied valuable data.

Scholars interested in this text will join me in appreciation of the courage, taste, skill manifested by the Lutheran Literary Board in publishing this work, and in appreciation of the singular accuracy and care of its readers and compositors.

For valuable information about the birthplace of Ockham, the origin of his name, details of his life and activities, I am greatly indebted to The Rt. Hon. Mary, Countess of Lovelace, who is the present owner of Ockham Park.

To President Rees Edgar Tulloss, Ph.D., D.D., LL.D., of Wittenberg College, my thanks are due for encouragement, many necessary and valuable suggestions, and the leisure secured by release from full-time teaching and various extra-curricular activities.

As Harrison Scholar, at the University of Pennsylvania, 1905-1906, and as Harrison Fellow, 1906-1908, I shared in the benefits made possible by the generosity of the late Dr. Charles C. Harrison, former provost of the university, who established the George Leib Harrison Foundation in order to encourage scientific study and research.

A Latin text and an English translation based upon the text edition, Strassburg, 1491, were submitted in 1908 as a thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D., at the University of Pennsylvania.

T. Bruce Birch.

Wittenberg College,
Springfield, Ohio,
November 30, 1929.

INTRODUCTION

I. The Author, William of Ockham

William of Ockham was born late in the thirteenth century in the village of Ockham in the county of Surrey. His name, which is spelled in various ways, was taken from the name of his birthplace which is spelled Bocheham in Doomsday book. It is, however, spelled Ockham in an inscription of the year 1483, which is on an urn in the church at Ockham. Nothing is known of his parents or his early life.

Ockham's attention was early turned to Merton College which developed out of the "Domus Scolarium de Merton," which was established near Ockham at Malden in Surrey in 1264 "to support twenty scholars living at Oxford or wherever else a university may chance to flourish." In 1274 it was "moved from Malden to Oxford."

Ockham was a student at Merton College, Oxford, most probably from about 1312 to 1320. It is likely that he then became a member of the Franciscan order; for he was a Friar Minor.

Ockham received the degree of B.D. at Oxford after the completion of his thesis on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. He taught as a bachelor at Oxford until about 1323. There is no certain proof that he was a pupil of Duns Scotus, or that he was a student or a professor at the University of Paris.

It is not certain that he ever received the degree of

master or of doctor, for he is generally spoken of as the "Venerable Inceptor" (an inceptor at Oxford was one who did not go on to a Master's degree). However, the terms, inceptor, expositor, indagator, magister, professor, and doctor are associated with the name of Ockham. Ockham is also called: Venerable Preceptor, Doctor Subtilissimus, Unparalleled Doctor, Doctor Invincible, Singular Doctor, Author of Nominalism, and Father of the Nominals.

The academic advancement of Ockham may have been stopped by his engaging in the controversy concerning evangelical poverty. He was no doubt present at the chapter of the Franciscans at Perugia in 1322; though, perhaps, not as Provincial of England, as is frequently stated. He heard there the famous speech of Michael de Cesena, the General Minister of the Franciscan order, which set forth the position of the order relative to evangelical poverty and developed the bitter controversy between Cesena and Pope John XXII. This was the beginning of the revolt of the whole order, as distinguished from the Spirituals. In 1323, Bonagratia wrote a book against Pope John XXII, which supported the position of Cesena; but it was not until 1327 that he stated that Ockham was present when Cesena spoke against Pope John XXII in a convention of Friars Minors. But in a letter in 1323, Pope John instructed the Bishops of Ferrara and Bologna to inquire about the report that in a sermon at Bologna Ockham had upheld his conception of evangelical poverty in opposition to that of the Pope. If the report was correct, the Bishops were to

send Ockham "to Avignon within a month." Sullivan believes that Ockham would never "have opposed the Pope had that question of evangelical poverty not been raised."

In 1327, Pope John XXII issued a bull charging Ockham with having uttered "many erroneous and heretical opinions." DeWulf cites Ehrle as asserting that the Pope issued this statement relative to Ockham in 1329 and that "the process had nothing to do with the case of the Spirituals and the quarrel over evangelical poverty."

Ockham, Cesena, and Bonagratia did not feel safe in captivity at Avignon; therefore, on May 25th, 1328, they fled from Avignon. Ockham arrived at Pisa, where Louis IV of Bavaria received him. He accompanied Louis to his court at Munich in Bavaria. According to Trithemius, Ockham presented himself before Louis with these words: "O imperator, defende me gladio et ego defendam te verbo." Townsend cites these words: "Tu me defendas gladio, ego te defendam calamo." On May 28th, Pope John XXII sent a letter to all the princes and the bishops instructing them to seize Ockham and to return him for trial. On June 6th, he issued a bull telling of Ockham's escape, cited the heresies of Ockham and excommunicated him. On June 20th, the Pope issued a bull informing the archbishop of Milan and his associate bishops that Ockham had been excommunicated. In 1328 or 1329, the Pope sent letters containing like information to the archbishops in Germany, and the letter to the archibishop of Cologne was publicly read

in the cathedral on June 30th. On April 21st, 1329, the Pope published a bull similar to that of June 6th, 1328.

About June 11th, 1329, Ockham was condemned by the Minorite General Ode and the members of his order were instructed not to assist him. On April 1st, 1330, the Pope issued a bull instructing all ecclesiastics in Germany to seize Ockham. In a letter of July 31st, the Pope again charged Ockham with heresy, and submitted the writings of Ockham to certain doctors who found many heresies in them. On January 4th, 1331, John again issued a bull forbidding anyone to aid Ockham; for he was said to uphold the error of Marsiglio of Padua, who had been condemned for stating that "the emperor can depose the pope." Ockham and others were summoned to a general council to be held on May 10th. The bull and the summons were to be nailed to the door of the church at Avignon, and the heresies were to be reviewed even if the heretics were absent. In 1331, the Minorite General Geraldus opposed the errors of Ockham.

During 1331 and 1332, Ockham and his associates took advantage of the unpopularity of the view of Pope John XXII relative to the Beatific Vision. The controversy waxed warm. The Pope's view produced "a profound sensation in the Church, for it had been denied. Princes, clergymen, laity urged John to retract. He retracted." Ockham declared that John was "wholly ignorant in theology."

After the death of Pope John XXII, on December 4th, 1334, Ockham continued the controversy relative

to the imperial and the papal authority with Pope Benedict XII and Pope Clement VI. Both popes confirmed the excommunication of Emperor Louis. Pope Benedict confirmed the excommunication of Ockham. Ockham, however, continued to support Louis until the death of Louis on October 11th, 1347.

For about twenty years Ockham lived in the house of his order in Munich under the protection of Louis, in whose service Ockham and Marsiglio advocated political theories which anticipated those of the present.

When the crisis in the affairs of Louis IV arose in 1338, Ockham more earnestly continued his controversial writings. In July, the electors at Rense stated that Louis did not need confirmation of his election as emperor by the Pope. On August 8th, Louis declared that the action taken by the Pope was null and he appealed "from the Pope to a general council." Ockham wrote a defense of the claims of Louis and entered into a discussion of the nature of the authority of the emperor and the Pope.

In 1339, students were warned against the writings of Ockham, which had become popular. On December 29th, 1340, the University of Paris prohibited his teachings, and in a letter of May 10th, 1346, Clement refused to permit the masters and the scholars of the University of Paris to study the doctrines of Ockham. In 1348, the general chapter of the Augustinian order prohibited the reading of the works of Ockham under threat of excommunication.

Before Cesena died in 1342, he is said to have transferred the seal of his order and his claims to

leadership to Ockham, who became the nominal head of the order, and after the death of Bonagratia in 1347 he became the undisputed chief of a powerful minority.

As early as 1343, Clement VI sought a reconciliation with Ockham and his followers; but Ockham continued his opposition to the Pope, although Emperor Charles had made peace with the Pope. It is said that not until 1349 did he send "back the seal of the order to the orthodox General Minister" and profess a desire to become reconciled to the church. Sullivan states that in letters of November 29th, 1347, and June 8th, 1349, Clement again sought a reconciliation with Ockham on several conditions. Ockham "was to promise to believe as the Holy Catholic Church believed, was to declare heretical the statements that the Emperor could select, create and depose the pope, to obey the present pope and his successors, to renounce the heretical opinions of Louis of Bavaria and Michael of Cesena and to promise not to give help to the enemies of the Church. . . . Ockham rejected them at first and was cited to appear before the papal court. It is uncertain whether he ever agreed to them or not. . . . In 1348, he had already rejected almost the same demands." There is no documentary evidence that Ockham ever accepted the proposal and was absolved. Some writers insist that "he remained an excommunicated heretic." It is not generally believed that he became reconciled to the church before his death.

There are various opinions regarding the year of

his death and even the place of his burial. It is reasonably safe to believe that Ockham died in the convent of his order at Munich and was buried there. Earlier writers, and in particular Volumes I and II of the Analecta Franciscana, state that Ockham died on April 10, 1347, and was buried in Munich as the inscription on the tombstone in the Franciscan chapel at Munich indicates. Leidinger, of the Department of Manuscripts, Bayerische Staats-Bibliothek, Munich, states that the St. Francis Church of Munich, in which

Núm.o I.o



Ockham was buried, was pulled down in 1803 and that the tombstone no longer exists. He has, however, supplied a photographic copy of the inscription cited which was on the cover of the grave. The copy of the inscription is preserved in Cod. lat. 1755 I, page 34. (Monumenta ecclesiae Fratrum Minorum Monachii.)

In view of the document of Clement VI and the tract of Ockham treating of the election of Charles IV, recent conclusions lead to the belief that Ockham died April 10th, 1349, or at least not before the year 1349. Seeberg says that "some believe that the date of his death is as late as April, 1350, but 1349 is the most probable date."

II. The New Text

The new text is based upon the Balliol College, the Merton College, and the University of Rouen manuscripts, and the text editions of c. 1490, Paris; 1491, Strassburg; 1504, Venice.

The new text is based chiefly upon the Balliol manuscript and the 1491 text of Strassburg.

The Balliol College MS. 299 contains the entire text of the De Corpore Christi.

The Merton College MS. 137 is incomplete, ending with the words: "et per concilia," of Chapter XXXVI. It is much similar to the Balliol College MS.

The Rouen MS. 561 is quite unlike the other MSS., though the substance is much the same. It is a manuscript of the fifteenth century.

The text printed at Paris about 1490 contains the entire text of the De Sacramento Altaris. This text

is found in the library of the University of Minnesota.

The text printed at Strassburg in 1491 contains the entire text of the De Sacramento Altaris. This text is found in the libraries of the following institutions: the Universities of Columbia, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Pennsylvania, and Yale; and the libraries of the Andover-Harvard and the Gettysburg Theological Seminaries.

The text printed at Venice in 1504 contains the entire text of the De Sacramento Altaris. The text is found in the library of the University of Nebraska.

Many earlier writers looked for this treatise under two different titles: De Coena Domini and De Corpore Christi; but the problem of the title is now settled by this text.

The original text was based upon the lectures of Ockham, which were delivered at the University of Oxford. It was finished after the Epiphany of our Lord, as stated in the Colophon. No date fixes the year of its composition.

In preparing the present text, the 1514 edition of the Corpus Juris Canonici of Gratian was of the utmost service. This Corpus and the glosses made it possible to indicate the passages quoted by Ockham. The 1503 and the 1513 editions of the Sextus Liber Decretalium of Boniface VIII were also of assistance.

The manuscripts and the previous texts are full of Latin abbreviations, and for this reason this work has not been easily accessible to scholars. (Brampton has just recently published a full Latin text of the De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate of Ockham.) How



Reprint of a Photograph of a Page of the Manuscript of the De Corpore Christi of William of Ockham Which Is Used by the Courtesy of Dr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, Librarian of Balliol College, Oxford, England.

The reprint is a page of the Balliol College MS. 299, Oxford University, England. The Librarian of Balliol College provided the following quotation from the report of the examination of the manuscript by Dr. H. H. E. Craster of the Bodleian Literary: "Balliol MS. 299 is written in two hands which I should date on palæographic grounds about 1340-60. A note on an end fly-leaf gives evidence that the MS. was certainly written before 1368 and was then in Oxford, where it has ever since remained. The MS. was certainly written in England, and the presumption is that it was written at Oxford. An early reader has entered a few English sentences in the margins. On my dating it is almost if not quite contemporary with the Author, who died about 1349."

"The fly-leaves of the MS. contain four inscriptions recording the name of the former owner, William De Wilton, who was Chancellor in 1373-5. I fancy that the date of his death is not known."

The reprint shows some of the standard forms of Latin abbreviations in current use during the middle of the fourteenth century. It also shows the Latin word-order of the period.

ſbe ꝟuiua ⁊ ꝟuiuſum. ⁊ ipſe commedens ⁊ qui ꝓmedit. Itē beat⁹ Grego. ⁊ habet. j. q. j. multi. Polluim⁹ inquit panē. i. corp⁹ xp̄i quādo indigne accedim⁹ altare. Et his alijſq; pluribꝫ auctoritatibꝫ euidenter oſtendit corp⁹ xp̄i ſub ſpecie panis realiter ꝓtineri ⁊ quia illud a ꝓmordio fidei xp̄iāe oībus fidelibꝫ erat ꝑſpicuū ideo circa eiuſ ꝓfirmatōz nolo diuti⁹ immorari.

Capitulū. iij.

Q ſubſtantia panis conuertit in corp⁹ chriſti.

Wamuis in ſcri/

q ptura canonica exp̄eſſe tradat. q corpus xp̄i ſub ſpecie panis eſt fidelibꝫ ꝓrigendū. tamē q ſubſtātia panis in corpus xp̄i realiter ꝓuertit vel trāſubſtantiat. in canone biblie nō inuenit expreſſum. ſed hoc ſanctis patribꝫ credit diuinitus reuelatū vl auctoritatibꝫ biblie diligenti ⁊ ſolerti inquiſitōe. pbatū ⁊ ideo ad iſtā veritatē pbandā auctoritates ſanctoꝝ patz adduca. Uñ dicit Euſeb⁹ emiſſenus. ⁊ habet de ꝯſe. diſ. ij. q. corp⁹. Inuiſibilis ſacerdos viſibiles creaturas in ſubſtantiā corporis ſui ⁊ ſanguinis verbo ſuo ſecreta poteſtate ꝓuertit. Et ſubdit. quāta itaq; ꝯ celebranda bñficia vis diuine benedictionis operet. ⁊ qō nibi nouū ⁊ ꝓpoſſibile eſſe nō debeat q in xp̄i ſubſtātiā terrena ⁊ mortalia ꝓuertūt Itē Amb. ⁊ habetur de ꝯſe. diſ. ij. panis. Si tanta inquit vis eſt in ſermone dñi. vt inciꝑat eſſe qō nō erat. quanto magis opatorius eſt vt ſint q̄ erant. ⁊ in aliud ꝓmutent; ſic qō erat pānis ante ꝯſecratōz. iam eſt corp⁹ xp̄i poſt conſecrationē. Item extra de ſūma tri. ⁊ fi. catholica. firmiter. vbi dicit Inno. iij. in cōcilio generali Una eſt fideliū vniuerſal ecclēſia. extra quā null⁹ oīno ſaluat. In q̄ ipe idē ſacerdos eſt ⁊ ſacrificiū ihūs xp̄us cuiꝰ corpus ⁊ ſanguis in ſacramēto altaris ſub ſpecie panis ⁊ vini veraciter ꝓtinetur. trāſubſtātiatis pane in corp⁹ ⁊ vino in ſanguinē. diuina poteſtate. Itē extra de celeb. miſſaz. Uū martbe. Si tunc ꝙ oculos leuauit ad patrē cū ad corp⁹ exanime animaz lazari reuocauit. pbabili⁹ eſſe videt q tunc oculos leuauit ad patrē in celū cum panē ⁊ vinū in corp⁹ ⁊ ſanguinē ꝓprie ꝓmutauit. Et quibꝫ alijſq; ꝯplurimis ſanctoꝝ ⁊ doctoꝝ auctoritatibꝫ ꝓbat q ſubſtantia panis virtute diuina realiter ⁊ veraciter in ſubſtantiā corpis xp̄i trāſubſtantiat ꝓuertitur ſeu ꝓmutat. ſine tñ augmēto vl trāſmutatione ſubſtātiali corpis xp̄i.

Capitulū. iij.

Q ſubſtātia panis ꝓuertit in corp⁹ xp̄i nō in diuinitatē. nec in animā. nec in ſanguinē. nec in aliqō accidēs ſubſtātie.

Reducta conuer

p ſio ſeu trāſubſtātiatio panis ꝓpe accipiendo vocabula nō fit in animā xp̄i. nec in diuinitatē. nec in aliqō accidens ſubſtantie corpis xp̄i. nec in ſanguinem. ſed tñ in corpus chriſti. Quis impio ꝙuis large ſumendo hoc vocabulū cōuerſio vel trāſubſtātiatio. poſſet ꝓcedi q panis tranſubſtantiat in animā vel accidēs corporis chriſti vel ſanguinē. Q enim ſubſtantia panis in animā xp̄i vel diuinitatē nō conuertat doc. auctoritatibꝫ ꝓſuadetur. vnde dicit gloſa de conſe. diſt. ij. ſuper capl̄o. Quid ē xp̄z māducare Jn ſolā carnē panis conuertiz vinū in ſanguinez Itē magiſter ſentē. in libro. iij. diſt. xj. licet inquit ſub vtraq; ſpecie totus xp̄us ſumitur. tamē nō fit cōuerſio panis niſi in carnem. nec vini niſi in ſanguinē. Et quibꝫ auctoritatibꝫ claret q ſubſtantia panis exp̄ in ſolā carnē conuertit. nō in diuinitatē vl animā rōnalē vel ſanguinē trāſubſtātiat. nec per conſequēs in accidēs carnis nec animē. Sed hoc quidē verē eſt ꝓprie ſumendo hoc vocabulū ꝓuertit. Unde ſcienduz q in illud ꝓuertit vel trāſubſtātiat ſubſtātia panis. q̄d nō quia cōiunctū eſt materiā. ſz etiam ſi ab alijs eſſet ſeparatū ad prolationem verboꝝ ſacramētaliū a ſacerdote ſuper materia ꝓueniente cum intentione debita poteſtate diuina incipit eſſe ſub ſpecie panis. Huiuſmōi aūt eſt caro xp̄i. nō alia nec ſanguis nec aliud accidens inherens carni vel animē. nā ſi eſſet ania ſeparata a carne. quātūcunq; ſacerdos cū intētiōe ꝓferrz verba ſacramētalia ſuper materia cōueniēte. nō ibi inciperet eſſe aīa chriſti ſz caro tm̄. Similiē ſi ſanguis eſſet ſeparatus a carne. nō ibi inciperet eſſe ſanguis ſed caro tm̄. Et idē iudiciū eſt de aliꝭ accidēti/bꝫ

Reprint of a Photograph of a Page of the Text Entitled "Tractatus Venerabilis Inceptoris Guilhelmi Ockham de Sacramento Altaris," Which Is Used by the Courtesy of the University of Pennsylvania and of Professor Walton Brooks McDaniel, Ph.D., of the Latin Department of the University.

The reprint is a page of the edition which was published with the Quotlibeta Septem of Ockham at Agrigentum in 1491.

The reprint shows some of the standard forms of Latin abbreviations in current use during the late fifteenth century. It also shows the Latin word-order of the period.

This page was selected because it contains the shortest chapter of the book and therefore shows the captions of two chapters.

difficult it has been to study the works of Ockham is seen from the statements which follow.

W. J. Townsend, in *The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages,* states that "the works of Ockham have never been collected and published in an uniform edition. They are very scarce, and are carefully preserved in some of the great libraries of Europe. So difficult are they of access that Brucker, when he wrote his *History of Philosophy,* had not seen them, and even one so widely read as Sir James Mackintosh had not been able to consult them."

A. E. Taylor, Edinburgh, *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism,* p. 67, says: "How hard it is, for example, even to have copies of Duns Scotus or Ockham at hand. I know very little about Ockham for this reason. His works are simply not accessible to me, as I am too busy to go where I could get at them."

Martin Grabmann, Munich, *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism,* p. 145, says: "It is a very welcome fact that historical research is now turning with greater briskness to the history of Nominalism and is beginning to draw a faithful picture of this powerful intellectual movement from the laborious study of manuscripts difficult to decipher. . . . The philosophy of Nominalism contains much philosophic acumen and propounds difficulties which still agitate philosophic thought."

III. The Latin Problems

The treatise presents many items of interest to the teachers of Latin: orthography, peculiarities of syn-

tax, and the contributions of Scholastic Latin to the Latin vocabulary, especially to Latin and English philosophical and theological terminology. The Latin word-order of the first part of the text is that of the text of 1491. The Latin word-order of the second part of the text, the De Corpore Christi, is that of the Balliol MS. of 1340-1360. Differences in the word-order of the two centuries are quite apparent.

IV. The Influence of Ockham upon Luther

The influence of Ockham upon Luther was most profound. While in the University of Erfurt, Luther used Ockham's works as textbooks in philosophy. Melanchthon, in his Vita Lutheri, states that Luther "read Occam much and long and preferred his acumen to that of Thomas and Scotus."

In his *Table Talk* Luther states that "the Terminists is the name of a school in the universities to which I belong. They oppose Thomists, Scotists, and Albertinists, and are called also Occamists, from Occam their founder. . . . Occam is a wise and sensible man, who endeavored earnestly to amplify and explain the subject."

Luther, however, criticizes Ockham "as one who had no knowledge of spiritual temptations."

Luther refers to him as "Mein Meister Occam" and "Mein Lieber Meister Occam."

In the *Bekenntniss vom Abendmahl* Luther classes Ockham among the Sophists because of his views, but states that "he was correct in this matter."

Luther says that "they have condemned not only me, but Occam."

But in a most significant passage in the De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae, Luther refers to a discussion of the doctrine of the Real Presence of D'Ailly, whose view was similar to that of his teacher, Ockham. Luther states that "formerly, while I was gulping down the Scholastic theology, the Cardinal of Cambry (D'Ailly), in Book IV of his Sentences, gave me occasion to reflect, by contending very acutely that it would be far more probable, and fewer superfluous miracles would be required, if it were understood that true bread and true wine, and not their accidents alone, were on the altar."

A footnote in the present volume cites a long quotation from the original which shows what Luther read, and indicates that Ockham and his pupil, D'Ailly, were in full agreement upon many points. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy,* states that D'Ailly set forth "pure Occamistic teaching."

These few external proofs of Luther's indebtedness to Ockham do not compare in value with the internal evidence as seen in the writings of each. In *Young Luther,* Professor Fife has recently shown Luther's dependence upon Ockham.

A careful comparison of the *Bekenntniss vom Abendmahl,* 1528, with this treatise shows that many passages are similar in each treatise and that many of the conclusions of both authors are identical in meaning. The present text makes it possible for the first time for scholars in general to make a careful esti-

mate of the psychological, philosophical and theological indebtedness of Luther to Ockham.

Professor R. Seeberg, Berlin, *History of Dogma,* states that this tract influenced Luther very greatly, for it is the theoretical foundation of his doctrine of the Real Presence.

This new Latin text indicates very clearly that this tract had the most direct bearing and influence upon Luther's views of the doctrine of the Real Presence and the defense of his position as supported by psychology and philosophy. No other tract more ably, simply and practically applies psychology and philosophy to the formulation of theology than this tract of Ockham, upon which Luther draws so often.

Harnack, *History of Dogma,* states that Luther "called in the aid of Occam's Scholasticism . . . in order to establish the Christian faith in respect to the Doctrine of the Real Presence." There are many passages of the tract that deal with the doctrines of the Communicatio Idiomatum and of the Ubiquity of the body of Christ, and with circumscriptive and definitive presence in a place, as advocated by Luther.

A study of the present text aids in showing why Luther was a Nominalist, and how profoundly the philosophy of Ockham shaped the views of the Reformers and of the later philosophers.

Ockham was called the greatest Modernist of his day. Luther studied Ockham's writings, saw his strength and his weakness, and was thus assisted in developing his own constructive program which sufficiently blended progress and conservatism.

V. The Psychology and Philosophy of Ockham

Ockham was an important contributor to the Reformation and a forerunner of later philosophies of England and of Protestant Germany. This treatise provides abundant evidence of his theories.

1. Here is applied his theory of the sign, sense cognition, intuitive intellectual cognition, and abstract intellectual cognition, and his dualistic psychology of sense and of intellect.

2. Here is also seen applied his terministic philosophy, which influenced Luther and other Reformers in their conceptions of individuality, democracy, and the functions of faith and reason. They were thus led to contend against Aristotelian realism, and the ideas of solidarity and absolutism.

This text makes clear Ockham's use of vox, nomen, terminus, intentio, suppositio, substance, subject, quantity, quality, accidents, continuum, time, space, etc.

3. In this treatise Ockham applies the law of Parcimony—"Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora." Ockham did not believe in multiplying entities needlessly. This text supports the conclusion of Thorburn, as found in The Myth of Occam's Razor.

4. This treatise sets forth Ockham's view of the failure of reason, and the need and function of faith. He shows the relation between reason and faith, but insists that "God can act according to His arbitrary pleasure and can do that for good against reason and experience."

Sorley, *A History of English Philosophy*, p. 7, states

that at the hands of Ockham "the separation between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, was made complete. He admitted that there are probably arguments for the existence of God but maintained the final thesis that whatever transcends experience belongs to faith. In this way he broke with Scotism as well as with Thomism on a fundamental question."

5. Here is shown Ockham's exaltation of the Scriptures over the authority of the church. Taylor, *The Mediæval Mind,* Vol. II, states that "Occam asserted the verity of the Scriptures unqualifiedly."

6. Ockham here advocates absolute voluntarism, "for the will intervenes in the discursive operation of the understanding." He "also teaches the most entire self-determinism of volition." He "makes the Free Will of God the sovereign arbiter of moral good and evil. But if nothing is of itself morally good or evil, the study of nature can teach us nothing about morality; intelligence is powerless to instruct us on the requirements of the Divine Law."

Human reason of itself can not establish the spirituality or immortality of the soul.

7. Here he sets forth his philosophical views concerning point, line, surface, substance, subject, quantity, continuum, quality, accident, etc., as he uses these conceptions to justify the various doctrines brought out in the discussion of the Lord's Supper.

VI. The Influence of Ockham upon English and German Philosophy

1. The repeated uses of Ockham's Law of Parcimony, or of Ockham's Razor.

2. He influenced the subsequent political theories, as seen in the development of the social contract theory of government, popular sovereignty, and the inalienable and indestructible right of freedom.

3. He influenced the development of all subsequent philosophical and theological thought and is profoundly influencing present-day thought.

Townsend, *The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages,* quotes John Selden (born 1584) as stating "that his works were the best that had been written in former ages on the Ecclesiastical Power."

Kuno Fischer, *History of Modern Philosophy*, states that Ockham's philosophy was a "fore-runner of that empiricism and sensualism with which modern philosophy began its course in the native country of Occam."

Townsend affirms that "Occam and Locke join hands in the adoption of a principle which must lead to a philosophy of pure sensationalism. . . . He anticipated the teaching of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Condillac." He opened "the way for the extreme idealism of Berkeley on the one hand and for the scepticism of Hume on the other. . . . He taught a doctrine similar to Locke's, which defined sense and reflection as the sources of all knowledge."

Townsend also states that Ockham "was either the originator of the celebrated maxim, or enforced it more than any other Schoolman:—'There is nothing in the understanding that was not previously in the senses.' . . . Occam's view combined elements which were mediæval, and elements which were adopted by

the Reformation and modern philosophy. . . All metaphysicians are agreed that William of Occam, by denying the existence of the species which had been taught by Aristotle as the direct object of perception, and which he said interposed between the object and subject, took the same ground which has conferred immortality upon Reid and the Scotch school of Philosophy. There is also remarkable similarity, if not identity of view, between the theory of William of Occam—that substances can be known only through their attributes and that therefore substans can never be known by the understanding, but only by faith, and the celebrated doctrine of Locke upon the same subject."

R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Mediæval Thought and Learning,* states that "Ockham, in virtue of his greater conformity to the spirit of his day, not to speak of his eminence as a philosopher, unequalled among contemporaries and hardly surpassed by Thomas Aquinas or John Duns Scotus, handed down a light which was never suffered to be extinguished, and which served as a beacon to pioneers of reform like Wycliffe and Huss. In politics, as well as in some points of doctrine, Ockham may be greatly claimed as a precursor of the German reformers of the sixteenth century." He "left an unbroken line of successors until the enduring elements of his aim found a partial realism in the religious revolution of the sixteenth century."

Bishop Turner, the Catholic philosopher, says that Ockham "has been described as the first Protestant.

And, indeed, he defended in his controversial writings the principles subsequently invoked by the first reformers to justify the encroachments of the secular power. In philosophy, too, his whole attitude is one of protest against the prevailing realism, and against the belief that the study of philosophy can be of material aid to theological sciences. In an age when theism and spiritualism were universally taught as philosophical tenets, he protested, in the name of human reason, that belief in God and in the spirituality of the human soul has no foundation except in revelation."

Numerous references show that Ockham influenced the philosophy of Locke, Reid, Hamilton, and the Scotch philosophers.

Michalski, Cracow, asserts that Ockham wrote the De Sacramento Altaris in order to set forth and defend his new philosophy. Ockham realized that the then much discussed Lord's Supper provided the best opportunity for a pragmatic application of his Nominalistic philosophy in opposition to the Realism of the day. This treatise clearly states Ockham's reason for writing this text.

The pragmatism of C. S. Pierce and the Nominalistic pragmatism of William James are based upon Ockham's philosophy. The latter states that the discussion of the Lord's Supper afforded "the only pragmatic application of the substance-idea with which I am acquainted," and that in this discussion "the substance-notion breaks into life, then, with tremendous effect."

C. Delisle Burns, *Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XIV, and *Mind*, Oct. 1916, states that Ockham "seems to have had in his philosophy all the prestige of tradition and all the promise of a new beginning"; "for the difficulties which were once faced by William of Ockham still need discussion." He sees "obvious likeness between Ockham and Hume." He also says that "there are interesting parallels to be found between the ideas of Ockham and Mr. Bertrand Russell; sometimes there is even a close likeness between the actual sentences of the ninth question in the first book of Ockham's *Quotlibeta* and those in Mr. Russell's *Our Knowledge of the Eternal World*. . . . This question . . . has a close connection with his treatment of 'magnitude' in the De Sacramento Altaris."

James Lindsay, *The Monist*, states that "Occam had the merit to anticipate Kant" and "Descartes," and the "tendencies of modern empiricism," as well as "modern idealism."

W. M. Thorburn, *Mind*, July, 1918, states that Ockham "denies the reality of an Instant of Time, showing some anticipation of the doctrines associated with the names of Bergson and William James. . . . Few or no competent critics will question Mansel's judgment of Ockham, on page 4 of his Introduction to the *Rudiments of Aldrich:* 'The ablest writer on Logic whom the Schools have produced. . . . The Summa Totius Logicae of Occam is the most valuable contribution of the Middle Ages to the Logica Docens. His editor, Mark of Beneventum, said that if the gods used Logic, it would be the Logic of Occam.' "

M. Grabmann says: "Indeed, the basic researches of P. Duhem confront us with the fact that the Nominalist school of Ockham . . . is most intimately connected with the amazing anticipation of the scientific world-picture of a Copernicus and a Galileo. . . . The Medieval period has given us no scientific discussion and appraisal of William of Ockham, one of the most influential thinkers of the Middle Ages. . . . Great schools were formed: . . . that of Ockham, which is a prelude to modern Empiricism."

Pres. J. H. Ryan says: "The student of the history of mediæval philosophy, too, is well aware of the analysis of the inductive method made by Ockham and the disciples of his school. Without such preparatory studies the advance of science would certainly have been delayed for a long period."

J. S. Zybura says: "The precursors of modern natural science were philosophers of the School of Ockham."

Dr. Maréchal says: "The modern philosophers who preceded Kant and followed Duns Scotus and Ockham." (Quoted by Zybura.)

Ockham's discussion of "quantum" and "quanta" is well worth reading by the advocates of the modern "quanta theory." Equally interesting to the Neo-Realists is Ockham's discussion of realities and qualities.

All of the philosophical views stated above are developed in the De Sacramento Altaris. Many other views are likewise discussed in practical fashion; for all of his subtle skill and wealth of psychological,

philosophical, and theological knowledge is shown in this work as he defends himself from widespread criticism and the charge of heresy. In this work he sets forth and defends philosophical views which were to influence the thinking of the entire world and to change theological, philosophical, political, social, and other views of life.

VII. Ockham's Irony

This treatise has much light to throw upon this mooted question.

Rettberg, Baur, Lindsay, et al., have expressed their opinion that Ockham meant to be ironical when he refers to his belief in the Dogmas of the church. Rashdall, Erdmann, and Harnack agree with Geisler when he states "that Occam was really sincere in all his professions of respect for the Doctrines of the church."

R. Seeberg says that "the reader can not escape a painful impression when the talented author apologizes for his bold conclusions as harmless intellectual exercises."

Erdmann states that "this may seem strange to the Protestant, but to assert that no one could be in earnest in making such statements is to brand as rascals the most honest men of the various ages, who have made like declarations."

Rashdall asserts that Ockham was "unimpeachably orthodox on all questions except the authority of the Papacy and its relation to the Civil Power."

This treatise, more than any other work of Ockham,

dispells the charge of irony, for there is at the time he writes this treatise a ring of sincerity in all of his declarations of belief in the fundamental doctrines of the church.

VIII. Ockham and Marsiglio of Padua

It is apparent that a close relationship existed between Ockham and Marsiglio and that they mutually influenced the writings of each other. Pope Clement VI asserts that Ockham profoundly influenced Marsiglio in formulating many of his theories relative to the power and authority of the Pope. If they were not fellow teachers at the University of Paris, they were both at the court of Louis IV in Bavaria and were united in their efforts to defend the emperor during his controversy with Pope John XXII. Each in common aided in developing the political ideas which in dominant fashion shaped the political theories for the next two hundred years and are still vital in current political theories. Emerton states that "the distinction between them is that Ockham was primarily a philosopher trying to apply his general principles to human institutions, while Marsiglio was a trained physician and theologian without, so far as we can see, a definite philosophical system."

Previté-Orton, The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius, page xxiii, 1929, states: "Whereas supporters of the Papacy, and even opponents like Ockham, made principal use of the Canon Law, i.e. chiefly, though not wholly, papal decretals, in proving their case, Marsilius, far more explicitly than Dante before him, expressly

declines to consider the Canon Law as of any weight or as providing any evidence whatever, and indeed he denounces it as a chief abuse contrary to the nature of the State."

(Note: Quotations from various sources have been used rather than subjectively derived conclusions.)

IX. Works of Ockham in This Country

(Known to the author of this text)

1. Centiloquium theologicum M. Guilhelmi de Ockam; Lugduni, 1495: Univ. of Penna., Harvard, Andover-Harvard Theol. Seminary, Boston Public Library, Peabody Institute Library, Baltimore.
2. Compendium errorum Iohannis Papae XXII; Lugduni, 1494: Harvard, Andover-Harvard, Boston Public Library, Univ. of Penna., Yale, Nebraska, N. Y. Public Library, Episcopal Divinity School, Phila.
3. Dialogus inter clericum et militem super dignitate papali et regia, etc.; Lugduni, 1491: Univ. of Penna., Harvard, Columbia. 1494: Univ. of Penna., Yale, Harvard, Andover-Harvard, Boston Public Library; c. 1500: Nebraska.
4. A Dialogue betwene a knyght and a clerke concernynge the power spiritual and temporall; Thomas Berthelet, London, 1559: Harvard.
5. Defensorium (a paupertate Christi) contra Iohannem XXII; Venice, 1513: Boston Public Library, N. Y. Public Library.

6. Disputatio inter clericum et militem super potestate praelatis ecclesiae atque principibus terrarum commissa sub forma Dialogi; London, Thomas Berthelet, 15??: Johns Hopkins, Harvard.
7. Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super totam artem veterem edita per venerabilem inceptorem fratrem Guilhelmum de Occham cum quaestionibus Alberti parmi de Saxonia. Impressis prudentisimi uiri Benedicti Hectoris bononiensis artis impressoriae solertissimi Bononiaeque Impressa anno domini, 1496: Widener Branch of the Phila. Public Library.
8. Scriptum in primum librum sententiarum; Argenti, 1483: Univ. of Penna., Johns Hopkins, Yale.
9. Letterae F. Michaelis de Cezenae; 1331: Univ. of Penna., Harvard, Andover-Harvard, Boston Public Library.
10. Opus XC dierum; Lugduni, 1495: Univ. of Penna., Yale, Harvard, Andover-Harvard, Boston Public Library.
11. Philosophia naturalis Guilhelmi Occham; Romae, 1637: Univ. of Penna.
12. Quaestiones et decisiones in IV libros sententiarum; Lugduni, 1495: Univ. of Penna, Yale, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Andover-Harvard, Boston Public Library, Peabody Institute Library, Baltimore.

13. Quotlibeta septem; Argenti, 1491: Univ. of Penna., Gettysburg Theological Seminary, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Andover-Harvard; c. 1487: Nebraska.
14. Summaria seu epitomata CXXXIII Capitulorum operis; Lugduni, 1495: Harvard, Nebraska, Andover-Harvard.
15. Summulae in lib. physicorum adsunt; Svardis, Venice, 1506: Univ. of Penna., Nebraska.
16. Tabulae ad diversas huius operis magistri Guilhelmi de Ockam super quattuor libros sententiarum; Lugduni, 1495: Univ. of Penna., Harvard, Nebraska, Boston Public Library.
17. Tractatus logicae: Dudum me frater et amicae . . . Omnes loycae tractatores . . . Explicit loici Magistri Guilhelmi Ocham. MS. at the Univ. of Penna. Text; Paris, 1488: Harvard Atheneum Library.

    Summa totius logicae nuper correcta; Venetizis, per Lazarum de Svardis, 1508: Harvard Atheneum Library.

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[1] Seeberg, *Hist. of Doctrines*, trans. E. G. Hay, Vol. II., p. 191: "Subjective-substantively, or objectively: objective-imaginatively. The meaning of the terms is now just the reverse." Fleming, *The Vocabulary of Philosophy*, p. 354: "Subjective is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind."

Burns, *William of Ockham on Universals*, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, New Series, Vol. XIV., 1913-1914, note p. 76: "It is sufficiently well known that what we call objective was in the mediæval philosophy called subjective."

[2] Ratio is sometimes translated reason or ground, as seems best, in order to convey a very definite meaning.

TRACTATUS VENERABILIS INCEPTORIS GUILHELMI OCKHAM DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

THE TRACT OF THE VENERABLE INCEPTOR, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, CONCERNING THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

Tractatus quam gloriosus de sacramento altaris, et in primis de puncti, lineae, superficiei, corporis, quantitatis, qualitatis, et substantiae distinctione venerabilis Inceptoris Guilhelmi Ockham Anglici, sacrae theologiae magistri famosissimi, veritatum scrutatoris acerrimi, ordinis Fratrum Minorum. Incipit feliciter.

Circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi, sicut dicit glossa quaedam De Consecratione, Distinctione II., Capitulo 'In sacramentorum.' "Variae sunt opiniones. Una asserit quod illa substantia, quae fuit panis primo, postea est caro et sanguis Christi. Infra est, 'Panis est in altari,' et Capitulo 'Quia corpus.' Secunda opinio tenet, quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinit esse, et manent accidentia tantum, scilicet, sapor, color, pondus, et similia; et sub illis accidentibus incipit ibi esse corpus Christi. Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini, et in eodem loco et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi. Argumentum infra est, 'Ego.' Quaelibet tamen opinio fatetur ibi esse corpus Christi. Secunda opinio verior est, ut extra De Summa Trinitate, Capitulo 'Firmiter,' Una." Haec sunt verba glossae.

Ex qua apparet quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, ita quod substantia panis non manet sed tantum accidentia, quae prius erant in substantia

The very renowned tract of the Venerable Inceptor, William of Ockham, of England, a very famous teacher of sacred theology, a most discriminating investigator of realities, of the order of Friars Minor, concerning the sacrament of the altar and with special reference to the distinction of point, line, surface, body, quantity, quality, and substance. It begins auspiciously.

Concerning the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, as says a certain gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., Chapter, 'In sacramentorum.' "There are various opinions. One opinion asserts that that substance, which was bread at first, afterwards is the flesh and the blood of Christ. It is argued later in the Chapter, 'Panis est in altari,' and in the Chapter, 'Quia corpus.' The second opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of the wine ceases to be there, and only the accidents remain; namely, taste, color, and weight, and similar accidents; and under those accidents the body of Christ begins to be there. The third opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of the wine remains there, and that the body of Christ is in the same place and under the same species. It is argued later in the Chapter, 'Ego.' Each opinion, however, acknowledges that the body of Christ is there. The second opinion is more true, as in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate, Chapter, 'Firmiter,' Una." These are the words of the gloss.

From this it appears that the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so that the substance of the bread does not remain but only the accidents remain which were before in the substance

panis, manent. Et pro ista veritate dicitur extra De Summa Trinitate, 'Firmiter,' sicut allegat glossa praedicta: "Una est omnium fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur; in qua ipse idem sacerdos est et sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur, transsubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina."

Ad istius veritatis declarationem circa duo principaliter aliqua sunt quaerenda, ut patet; primo, circa illorum accidentium entitatem et distinctionem; secundo, circa ipsorum a subiecto separationem.

Quia autem communiter conceditur ab omnibus quod color, sapor, et huiusmodi qualitates sensibiles inter se realiter distinguuntur et etiam a substantia; ideo hoc supposito quaerenda sunt aliqua circa distinctionem istarum qualitatum a quantitate, figura, rectitudine, et huiusmodi, de quibus est magnum dubium, quomodo distinguantur.

Et quia non tantum ad theologiam sed etiam ad philosophiam pertinet ista consideratio, cum philosophiae sit rerum naturas et distinctiones earum cognoscere; ideo investigandum quid senserunt philosophi, et praecipue princeps philosophorum, Aristoteles, de ista materia, et etiam quid dicant theologi. Ut autem ordinatius procedam, quaeram primo de distinctione puncti, lineae, superficiei, et corporis; et postea de aliis.

of the bread. And in confirmation of this truth it is said in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate, 'Firmiter,' as the previous gloss asserts: "There is one universal church of all the faithful, outside of which no one at all is saved; in which the priest and the sacrifice are the very same, Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and of wine, since the bread is transubstantiated into body and the wine into blood by divine power."

With a view to the exposition of this truth, some questions must be asked about two points principally, as is obvious; first, about the entity and the distinction of those accidents; secondly, concerning the separation of them from a subject.

Moreover, since it is commonly conceded by all that color, taste, and sensible qualities of such a kind, are really distinguished from each other and also from substance; therefore, since this is conceded, some questions must be raised about the distinction of these qualities from quantity, figure, rectitude, and the like; concerning which there is great doubt as to how they may be distinguished.

And because this consideration pertains not only to theology but also to philosophy, since it may be the province of philosophy to come to know the natures of things and their distinctions; therefore, it is necessary to investigate what the philosophers have thought of this matter; and especially the prince of philosophers, Aristotle, and also what the theologians may say. But that I may proceed with more regard for logical order, I shall inquire first concerning the distinction of point, line, surface, and body; and afterwards of other matters.

PRIMO IGITUR QUAERO

Utrum punctus sit res absoluta distincta realiter a quantitate. Respondetur quod sic, quia terminus uniuscuiusque distinguitur ab illo cuius est terminus. Sed punctus est terminus lineae; ergo distinguitur realiter a linea, et per consequens eadem ratione a qualibet quantitate distinguitur realiter.

Contra omnis res positiva est substantia vel quantitas vel qualitas vel relatio, et sic de aliis praedicamentis. Sed punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, nec qualitas distincta a quantitate, nec relatio distincta a quantitate, et sic de aliis generibus respectivis; igitur punctus non est alia res a quantitate.

Pro ista quaestione et omnibus sequentibus de ista materia, praemitto unum, videlicet, quicquid dicam sub quacumque forma verborum, quod potest aliquo modo deduci contra quodcumque dictum in sacra scriptura vel sanctorum, vel contra determinationem et doctrinam Ecclesiae Romanae, vel contra sententiam doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum, non dicam asserendo, sed praecise recitando in persona illorum qui etiam opinionem tractandam tenent, sive illa opinio sit vera sive falsa, sive catholica, sive haeretica vel erronea. Unde si dicam talia verba 'dico,' 'dicendum' et consimilia, non in persona mea sed in persona taliter opinantium volo illa intelligi.

QUESTION I

Therefore, I ask, first, whether a point is an absolute thing really distinct from quantity. Which is answered affirmatively; for the terminus of every single thing is distinguished from that of which it is a terminus. But a point is a terminus of a line; therefore, it is really distinguished from a line, and consequently it is for the same reason really distinguished from any quantity.

On the contrary, every positive thing is substance or quantity or quality or relation, and so of the other categories. But a point is not a substance distinct from quantity, nor a quality distinct from quantity, nor a relation distinct from quantity, and so of other respective genera; therefore, a point is not a thing other than quantity.

Before answering this question and all following concerning this matter, I make in advance one statement; namely, that whatever I shall say under whatever form of words, which can in any mode be regarded as contrary to whatever has been said in Sacred Scripture or in the writings of the Saints, or contrary to the determination and the doctrine of the Roman Church, or contrary to the opinion of the Doctors approved by the church, I shall not say by affirming but by quoting precisely in the person of those who also hold the opinion to be discussed; whether that opinion be true or false, or Catholic, or heretical, or erroneous. Whence, if I shall use such words as "I say," "It must be said," and the like; I desire those words to be understood not as used by me personally but as used by those who hold such opinions.

Hoc praemisso circa quaestionem propositam sic procedam. Primo, ostendam quod punctus non est aliqua res positiva et absoluta distincta realiter a qualibet quantitate et maxime a linea. Secundo, ponam aliquas rationes et auctoritates ad probandum punctum esse aliam rem. Tertio, respondebo ad eas.

Primo, igitur probo quod punctus non est alia res a linea, qualibet quantitate; et primo, per rationes philosophicas; secundo, per auctoritates philosophorum; tertio, per rationes theologicas.

Iuxta primam viam arguo primo sic ostensive: si punctus sit alia res a quantitate, vel est substantia vel accidens; sed punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, nec accidens distinctum a quantitate; igitur punctus non est alia res a quantitate.

Maior est nota, minorem probo. Et primo primam partem; scilicet, quod punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, quia omnis substantia vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel substantia abstracta a materia. Sed manifestum est quod punctus non est materia nec forma nec compositum; nec est forma abstracta a materia, si punctus sit indivisibilis et nullo modo quantus, sicut ponitur ab adversariis; ergo et cetera.

Secundam partem probo sic; quod, scilicet, punctus non sit accidens indivisibile distinctum a quantitate. Primo sic: omne accidens absolutum positum est in aliquo subiecto sibi adaequato, ita quod illud accidens vel est totum in toto subiecto et in qualibet parte vel totum in toto et pars in parte vel est accidens indi-

With this understood, I shall proceed thus with respect to the question proposed. First, I shall show that a point is not some positive and absolute thing really distinct from any quantity and especially from a line. In the second place, I shall posit some reasons and passages to prove that a point is another thing. In the third place, I shall reply to these.

First, therefore, I prove that a point is not a thing other than a line, or any quantity; and in the first place, through philosophical reasons; in the second place, through passages of the philosophers; in the third place, through theological reasons.

According to the first way; I, first, argue ostensively thus: if a point be a thing other than quantity, it is either substance or accident; but a point is not substance distinct from quantity nor accident distinct from quantity; therefore, a point is not a thing other than quantity.

The major premise is known; the minor premise I prove. And, first, I prove the first part; namely, that a point is not a substance distinct from quantity; for every substance is either matter or form or a composite or substance abstracted from matter. But it is manifest that a point is not matter or form or a composite; nor is it form abstracted from matter, if a point be indivisible and in no way a quantum, as is posited by the opponents; therefore, et cetera.

I prove the second part thus; namely, that a point may not be an indivisible accident distinct from quantity. In the first place thus: every absolute accident is placed in any subject adequate to it, so that that accident is either a whole in a whole subject and in each part, or a whole in a whole and a part in a part

visibile habens subiectum indivisibile, sicut accidens spirituale est in anima intellectiva tamquam in subiecto suo primo et adaequato. Sed punctus nullo istorum trium modorum habet aut habere potest aliquod subiectum primum et adaequatum; ergo maior illius rationis per inductionem patet de omni accidente absoluto.

Prima pars minoris, videlicet, quod punctus non habet aliquod subiectum adaequatum ita quod sit totus in toto et in qualibet parte, patet. Quia accipio punctum terminantem lineam A et vocetur ille B, et accipio alium punctum correspondentem et vocetur C; tunc quaero aut B est in A tamquam in suo subiecto adaequato vel in subiecto ipsius, et sive sic sive sic sequitur, quod eadem ratione C erit in eodem subiecto adaequato.

Tunc arguo sic: quaecumque sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, non differunt nec situ nec loco; sed B et C distinguuntur vel distant loco et situ, ergo non sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato. Si dicatur quod B non est in tota linea A nec in subiecto ipsius lineae A, sed in parte ipsius lineae vel in parte subiecti; contra, si B non sit tamquam in subiecto adaequato in tota linea, nec in toto subiecto ipsius lineae; igitur est in parte tamquam in subiecto adaequato. Sit ista pars D; tunc arguo, B est in D tamquam in subiecto adaequato; igitur eadem ratione alius punctus correspondens ipsi B, ad quem ex alia parte terminatur D, erit in ipso D tamquam in subiecto adaequato, et vocetur ille punctus

or is an indivisible accident having an indivisible subject, as a spiritual accident is in the rational soul as if in its primary and adequate subject. But a point in none of these three modes has or can have any primary and adequate subject; therefore, the major premise of that syllogism is obvious through induction as regards any absolute accident.

The first part of the minor premise is obvious; namely, that a point does not have any adequate subject so that there may be a whole in a whole and in each part. For I take a point terminating the line A, and let that be called B; and I take another corresponding point, and let it be called C; then I ask whether B is in A, as if in its adequate subject or in the subject of itself; and it follows in either way, that C will be in the same adequate subject for the same reason.

Then I argue thus: whatever things are in the same adequate subject, they do not differ either in situation or in place; but B and C are distinguished or separate in place and in situation; therefore, they are not in the same adequate subject. If it be said that B is not in the whole line A, nor in the subject of the same line A, but in a part of the same line or in part of the subject (of the line); on the contrary, if B be not in the whole line as if in an adequate subject nor in the whole subject of the same line; then it is in a part as if in an adequate subject. Let that part be D; then I argue, B is in D as if in an adequate subject; therefore, for the same reason another point corresponding to the same B, at which D is terminated out of another part, will be in the same D as if in an adequate subject, and let that point be

E. Ex quo sequitur quod B et E sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, et per consequens non distant loco et situ, quod est manifestissime falsum. Sic igitur non potest punctus aliquis esse in aliquo divisibili quanto et tamquam in suo subiecto adaequato, ita quod sit totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte; tum quia tunc duo puncta illius divisibilis non distarent situ, quod est falsum; tum quia tunc punctus idem numero esset in alio et in alio situ, quod est falsum.

Si dicatur quod punctus est in aliqua parte divisibili sed illi parti non correspondet alius punctus in actu, nec potest sibi correspondere, quia illa pars non potest esse per se existens, sed tantum inexistens alteri.

Contra; quacumque parte demonstrata Deus potest eam de potentia absoluta separare ab alia parte et conservare eam per se existentem; igitur istam partem, quae est primum subiectum et adaequatum puncti, Deus potest conservare sine alia. Ponatur igitur in esse, tunc habebit alium punctum in actu, qui eadem ratione erit in illo subiecto tamquam in suo subiecto primo; quia non est maior ratio quod unus punctus terminans lineam sit in illa tota linea vel in illo toto subiecto illius lineae, quam alius punctus terminans eandem lineam; et per consequens ista duo puncta non distabunt situ; quia illa accidentia, quae sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, non distant situ. Praeterea punctus correspondens non est tantum in potentia quomodo futurum est in potentia; igitur est in rerum natura et per consequens habet aliud subiectum primum, et non potest dari

called E. From which it follows that B and E are in the same adequate subject; and consequently they are not separate in place and in situation, which is most manifestly false. So, therefore, there can not be any point in any divisible quantum, and as if in its adequate subject, so that a whole may be in a whole and a whole in each part; not only because two points of that divisible would not then be separate in situation, which is false; but also because a point the same numerically would then be in two situations, which is false.

If it be said that a point is in some divisible part but another point does not correspond actually to that part, it can not correspond to it, because that part can not be existent per se, but only non-existent to another.

On the contrary; whatever part is designated, God can of His absolute power separate it from another part and can preserve it existent per se; therefore, this part, which is the primary and adequate subject of a point, God can preserve without another. Therefore, let it be posited in being, then it will actually have another point, which will be for the same reason in that subject as if in its primary subject; for there is no greater reason that one point terminating a line may be in that whole line or in that whole subject of that line than for another point terminating the same line; and consequently these two points will not be separate in situation; for those accidents, which are in the same adequate subject, are not separate in situation. Moreover, a corresponding point is not merely potentially in whatever way it is about to be potentially; therefore, it is in the nature of things and consequently has another primary subject, and this can not

nisi linea vel subiectum lineae terminatae ad alium punctum; igitur ista duo puncta sunt in eodem subiecto primo et per consequens non distant situ, quod est falsum. Praeterea si esset in aliquo divisibili subiecto, tamquam in subiecto primo, tunc non distarent situ ab alia parte, nec plus distaret ab una parte quam ab alia.

Secunda pars minoris principalis probatur sic; scilicet, quod punctus non est totus in toto subiecto et pars in parte, quia punctus tunc esset quantus, et habetur propositum.

Tertia pars minoris illius, videlicet, quod non est in aliquo indivisibili tamquam in subiecto suo primo adaequato, patet; quia illud indivisibile vel esset substantia vel accidens. Non accidens, quia quaero in quo genere. Et patet quod non potest dari esse in alio genere a genere 'substantiae.'

Similiter quaerendum esset de subiecto illius accidentis, sicut de subiecto puncti. Nec est illud indivisibile substantia quia, si sit substantia, vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel substantia abstracta a materia; sed non est materia, quia omnis materia est divisibilis; nec est forma quia, si sit forma, vel est forma extensa et per consequens est divisibile, vel est forma inextensa et per consequens est anima intellectiva, quia sola anima intellectiva est inextensa; sed manifestum est quod non est anima intellectiva; ergo non est forma quae est altera pars compositi, nec est compositum, manifestum est; nec est forma abstracta a materia, manifestum est; igitur non est aliqua sub-

be granted unless a line or a subject of a line terminating at another point; therefore, these two points are in the same primary subject and consequently are not separate in situation, which is false. Moreover, if it were in some divisible subject, as if in a primary subject, then they would not be separate in situation from another part, nor could it be more separate from one part than from another.

The second principal part of the minor premise is thus proved; namely, that a point is not a whole in a whole subject and a part in a part; for a point would then be a quantum, and the thesis is established.

The third part of that minor premise; namely, that it is not in some indivisible as if in its primary and adequate subject, is obvious; because that indivisible would be either substance or accident. It is not accident; for I ask in what genus? And it is obvious that it can not be conceded to be in a genus other than the genus 'substance'.

Similarly, inquiry must be made concerning the subject of that accident, as about the subject of the point. Nor is that indivisible a substance; for, if it be a substance, it is either matter or form or a composite or a substance abstracted from matter; but it is not matter, since all matter is divisible; nor is it form; for, if it be form, it is either form extended and consequently is divisible or it is form non-extended and consequently is a rational soul; for the rational soul alone is non-extended; but it is manifest that it is not a rational soul; therefore, it is manifest that it is not form which is one part of a composite, nor is it a composite; and it is manifest that it is not form abstracted from matter; therefore, it is not some in-

stantia indivisibilis, quae possit esse primum subiectum et adaequatum puncti.

Praeterea, si in lapide sit aliqua substantia indivisibilis, quae possit esse primum subiectum et adaequatum puncti; accipio tunc istam substantiam, et quaero aut facit per se unum cum materia et forma lapidis aut non. Si sic, igitur esset aliqua substantia indivisibilis in lapide quae esset materia vel forma respectu materiae lapidis; quia quandocumque aliqua sunt diversarum rationum in genere 'substantiae' facientia per se unum; unum istorum est actus, reliquum vero potentia, et per consequens unum est materia et reliquum forma.

Sed impossibile est quod illud indivisibile est materia prima, quia materia prima est extensa. Si autem ista substantia indivisibilis non facit per se unum cum materia et forma lapidis, immo nec est pars lapidis et per consequens non potest esse pars lapidis nec per consequens potest esse pars alicuius substantiae.

Sed omnis substantia, quae non potest esse pars alicuius substantiae, est per se subsistens et per se in genere et specie, et per consequens ista substantia esset per se subsistens et per se in genere et specie, quod est falsum; relinquitur ergo quod nulla est substantia in lapide nisi materia vel forma vel compositum; sed omne tale est divisibile et habens partes realiter distinctas; ergo nullum eorum est indivisibile. Sic igitur patet, quod nec aliquod indivisibile nec aliquod divisibile potest esse primum subiectum et adaequatum ipsius puncti, si punctus sit quaedam res absoluta distincta realiter ab omni divisibili.

divisible substance, which may be able to be the primary and adequate subject of a point.

Moreover, if there be in a stone some indivisible substance which may be able to be the primary and adequate subject of a point; then I take this substance, and I ask whether or not it makes one per se with the matter and the form of the stone. If so, there would, therefore, be some indivisible substance in a stone which would be matter or form with respect to the matter of the stone; for whenever some making one per se are of diverse grounds in the genus 'substance,' one of these is act, the rest indeed power; and consequently one is matter and the rest form.

But it is impossible that that indivisible is primary matter, for primary matter is extended. But if this indivisible substance does not make one per se with the matter and the form of the stone, it is surely not part of the stone and consequently can not be part of the stone; and consequently can not be part of any substance.

But every substance, which can not be part of some substance, is subsistent per se and per se in a genus and in a species; and consequently this substance would be subsistent per se and per se in a genus and in a species, which is false; therefore, it remains that there is no substance in a stone except matter or form or a composite; but every such is divisible and possessed of parts really distinct; therefore, none of them is indivisible. So, therefore, it is obvious that neither any indivisible nor any divisible can be a primary and adequate subject of the same point, if a point be a certain absolute thing really distinct from every divisible.

Si dicatur ad rationem principalem quod maior est falsa; nam multa sunt accidentia, quae non sunt tota in toto et in qualibet parte nec tota in totis et partes in partibus, nec sunt accidentia indivisibilia habentia subiecta indivisibilia sed accidentia indivisibilia habentia subiecta divisibilia, et tamen non sunt in aliqua parte sed totum in toto, sicut tempus est in toto motu totius caeli et tamen non est in aliqua parte motus alicuius partis caeli. Similiter dupleitas est tota in toto duplo, et nec dupleitas nec aliqua pars eius est in parte dupli respectu eiusdem dimidii. Et ita videtur de multis aliis accidentibus, quod sunt in toto, et tamen nec ipsa, nec pars eorum, sunt in aliqua parte totius.

Sed ista responsio non sufficit. Primo, quia accipit falsum quod sunt aliqua accidentia indivisibilia existentia primo in aliquo divisibili et tamen in nulla eius parte; unde tempus non est aliquod accidens absolutum distinctum realiter a motu et a rebus permanentibus, existens subiective in toto motu et in nulla parte.

Secundo, non sufficit ista responsio, quia hoc dato adhuc stat argumentum, quia punctus non est tale accidens. Primo, quia nullum accidens existens in aliquo subiecto adaequato, sive sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte sive totum in toto et tamen in nulla parte, distat loco et situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto adaequato sibi, patet; quia color non distat a colore eiusdem subiecti. Similiter tempus, si sit aliud accidens, non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto adaequato sibi.

If it be said as regards the principle reason, that the major premise is false; now there are many accidents which are not wholes in a whole and in each part, nor wholes in wholes and parts in parts, nor are they indivisible accidents having indivisible subjects but indivisible accidents having divisible subjects; and yet they are not in any part but a whole in a whole, as time is in the whole movement of the whole heaven, and yet it is not any part of the movement of any part of heaven. Similarly, doubleness is a whole in a whole double, and neither doubleness nor any part of it is in a part of a double with respect to the same half. And it seems so of many other accidents, that they are in a whole; and yet neither they themselves nor a part of them are in any part of the whole.

But this reply does not suffice. First, because it accepts the fallacy that there are some indivisible accidents existing at first in some divisible and yet in no part of it; whence, time is not some absolute accident really distinct from motion and from permanent things, existing subjectively in a whole motion and in no part.

In the second place, this reply does not suffice; for, if this is granted, the argument still obtains; for a point is not such an accident. First; because it is obvious, that no accident existing in any adequate subject, whether it be a whole in a whole and a whole in each part or a whole in a whole and yet in no part, is separate in place and in situation from any accident existing in the same subject adequate to it; for color is not separate from the color of the same subject. Similarly, time, if it be another accident, is not separate in situation from some accident in the same

Similiter dupleitas non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto, tamquam sibi adaequato; et ita universaliter de omni accidente. Patet quod non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto sibi adaequato. Sed punctus distat situ a quolibet puncto illius quanti, cuius est punctus; igitur duo puncta non possunt esse in eodem subiecto primo et adaequato, quod tamen oporteret si punctus esset accidens indivisibile habens pro subiecto adaequato aliquod divisibile.

Tertio, nullum accidens distat situ a quacumque parte sui subiecti primi et adaequati, sicut albedo illius partis A non distat situ a quacumque parte ipsius A, quamvis distat situ ab alia parte componente cum A. Similiter si tempus vel dupleitas sit accidens distinctum realiter a duplo vel motu, manifestum est quod tempus non distat situ ab aliqua parte motus, nec dupleitas distat situ ab aliqua parte dupli; et ita de omni alio accidente. Sed demonstrato quocumque divisibili quod debet poni subiectum primum illius puncti, manifestum est quod istud distat situ ab alia parte istius divisibilis; ergo illud divisibile non est primum subiectum et adaequatum ipsius puncti.

Confirmatur ista ratio; quia, quando aliquod accidens est in aliquo subiecto primo et adaequato, illud accidens non plus distat situ ab una parte istius subiecti quam ab alia, patet inductive. Sed manifestum est

subject adequate to it. Similarly, doubleness is not separate in situation from some accident existing in the same subject, as if adequate to it; and so in general of every accident. It is obvious, that it is not separate in situation from some accident existing in the same subject adequate to it. But a point is separate in situation from each point of that quantum, of which it is a point; therefore, two points can not be in the same primary and adequate subject, which however would be necessary if a point were an indivisible accident having some divisible for an adequate subject.

In the third place, no accident is separate in situation from each part of its primary and adequate subject; as the whiteness of that part A is not separate in situation from each part of the same A, although it is separate in situation from another part joining with A.

Similarly, if time or doubleness be an accident really distinct from a double or motion, it is manifest that time is not separate in situation from some part of motion, nor is doubleness separate in situation from some part of a double; and so of every other accident. But if each divisible is designated on the ground that it ought to be considered the primary subject of that point, it is manifest that this is separate in situation from another part of this divisible; therefore, that divisible is not the primary and adequate subject of the same point.

This reason is confirmed; for, when any accident is in some primary and adequate subject, it is obvious by induction that that accident is not more separate in situation from one part of this subject than from another. But it is manifest that that point is more

quod ille punctus plus distat situ ab una parte illius divisibilis, quocumque demonstrato, quam ab alia; igitur illud divisibile non est primum subiectum istius puncti.

Ex quo patet quod punctus non est aliquod accidens absolutum distinctum realiter ab omni divisibili, habens pro subiecto primo et adaequato, quod scilicet est subiectum seipso sive per se et non per partem suam, aliquod divisibile.

Praeterea punctus continuans duas medietates, in quo est subiective, non potest dari quod plus in una medietate quam in alia, vel igitur in utraque; et tunc idem accidens numero esset in pluribus subiectis numero, quod est impossibile, vel in neutra; et per consequens in nullo subiective.

Si dicatur quod punctus sit in aliquo indivisibili subiecto sicut tactum est prius, hoc non valet sicut probatum est prius.

Et iterum probabo, quia esset aliquod indivisibile in divisibili subiecto, puta, in lapide. Dividatur ille lapis secundum illud indivisibile, et quaero, aut illud indivisibile manet aut non manet. Si sic; quaero ubi manet, aut cum utraque parte, aut in una et non in altera, aut separatim ab utraque. Primum non potest dari quia tunc aliqua substantia una numero esset in distinctis locis non facientibus unum, quod est impossibile naturaliter. Secundum non potest dari quia non est maior ratio quod non sit in una parte quam in alia. Similiter tertium non potest dari, quia tunc nihil existens per se vel in aliquo alio faceret per se unum; quorum utrumque patet esse falsum et impossibile.

separate in situation from one part of that divisible, whatever divisible is designated, than from another; therefore, that divisible is not the primary subject of this point.

From which it is obvious, that a point is not some absolute accident really distinct from every divisible, having some divisible for a primary and adequate subject; namely, that which is a subject in itself or per se and not through its own part.

Moreover, it can not be conceded that a point connecting two halves, in which it is subjectively, is in one half more than in the other, or, therefore, in both; and then an accident the same numerically would be in subjects several numerically, which is impossible, or in neither; and consequently in none subjectively.

If it be said that a point may be in some indivisible subject, as was mentioned before, this does not obtain, as was proved before.

And I shall prove it again; since some indivisible would be in a divisible subject, say, in a stone. Let that stone be divided in correspondence with that indivisible, and I ask, whether that indivisible remains or does not remain. If it remains; I ask, where it remains, whether with each part, or in one and not in the other, or separate from both. The first can not be conceded; for then some substance one numerically would be in distinct places which do not make one, which is impossible naturally. The second can not be conceded; for there is no greater reason that it be in one part than in another. Similarly, the third can not be conceded; since then nothing existing per se or in some other would make one per se; each of which is obviously false and impossible.

Secundo, principaliter arguo sic. Omnis res positiva et absoluta distincta realiter ab omni alia re non faciens per se unum, tamquam pars cum alia re, est per se in genere. Sed punctus, si sit talis res indivisibilis, non est pars alicuius divisibilis, nec faciens per se unum cum quocumque alio; igitur erit per se in aliquo praedicamento; sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc vel esset substantia vel quantitas vel qualitas, vel respectus, quorum quodlibet est falsum per ponentes talia indivisibilia.

Maior illius rationis est manifesta; quia quando sunt aliquae res secundum se totas distinctae, quarum neutra est pars alterius, non est maior ratio quod una illarum sit per se in aliquo praedicamento quam alia, sicut patet inductive.

Sed ad illud dicitur, quod punctus non est per se in genere sed tantum per reductionem, quia non est nisi terminus quantitatis.

Sed illa responsio non valet; primo, quia tunc linea non esset per se in genere 'quantitatis,' cum non sit nisi terminus quantitatis. Si dicatur quod linea non tantum est terminus quantitatis sed etiam quantitas, ideo per se est in genere. Punctus autem non est per se quantitas; ideo non est per se in genere 'quantitatis' sed tantum per reductionem. Hoc non valet; quia, si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, non tantum erit terminus quantitatis, sed erit una res absoluta distincta realiter secundum se totam ab omni alia re et per consequens erit per se in aliquo praedicamento.

Confirmatur; quia omnis res absoluta et permanens et per se una, non tantum una per aggregationem vel

In the second place, I argue principally thus. Every positive and absolute thing really distinct from every other thing not making one per se, as if a part with another thing, is per se in a genus. But a point, if it be such an indivisible thing, is not a part of any divisible, nor does it make one per se with any other; therefore, it will be per se in some category; but this is false, for then it would be either substance or quantity or quality or respect, any one of which is false according to those positing such indivisibles.

The major premise of that syllogism is manifest; for when there are some things distinct as regards themselves as wholes, of which neither is part of the other, there is no greater reason that one of them be per se in some category than for the other, as is obvious by induction.

But it is said in reply to this, that a point is not per se in a genus, but only through reduction; for it is not, unless a terminus of quantity.

But that reply does not obtain; first, because a line could not then be per se in the genus 'quantity,' since it may not be unless a terminus of quantity. If it be said that a line is not only a terminus of quantity but even a quantity; it is, therefore, per se in a genus. But a point is not per se a quantity; therefore, it is not per se in the genus 'quantity' but only through reduction. This does not obtain; for, if a point be such an indivisible thing, not only will it be a terminus of quantity, but it will be one absolute thing really distinct as regards itself as a whole from every other thing, and consequently will be per se in some category.

This is confirmed; for every thing absolute and permanent and one per se, not merely one through aggre-

ordinem, est per se in aliquo praedicamento vel est pars alicuius existentis per se in praedicamento. Patet illa inductive de omni re, nisi instes in proposito. Patet etiam quia, si illa maior negetur, perit omnis via ad probandum aliquam rem esse per se in genere; sic enim de aliis dicam quod aliquid non est per se in genere quia est terminus alicuius substantiae; sicut tu dicis, quod punctus non est per se in genere quia est terminus alicuius existentis per se in genere; patet igitur illa, quod omnis res per se una est per se in aliquo praedicamento vel pars alicuius existentis in praedicamento; sed punctus non est pars alicuius existentis per se in praedicamento, patet inductive; igitur punctus est per se in praedicamento, quod probatum est esse falsum. Ex quo sequitur quod punctus non est talis res indivisibilis.

Tertio arguo sic. Impossibile est quod sint infinitae res in actu secundum se totas distinctae, et quarum nulla sit pars alterius nec quae faciunt aliquod unum. Sed si punctus esset talis res indivisibilis, talia essent infinita in actu. Quia accipio lignum. Manifestum est secundum illos quod hic sunt infinitae lineae, quia non tot quin plures, et quaelibet illarum terminatur ad aliquem punctum in actu, quia alias nulla linea terminaretur ad aliquem punctum in actu. Et manifestum est quod secundum se tota distinguuntur, si sint indivisibilia; nec faciunt per se unum, cum non sint partes alicuius; igitur talia infinita erunt in actu quod est impossibile et contra omnem philosophiam. Relinquitur

gation or order, is per se in some category or is a part of something existing per se in a category. This is obvious by induction of every thing, unless you insist upon the proposition. It is also obvious; for, if that major premise be denied, every way of proving that some thing is per se in a genus is destroyed; for thus of other things I may say, that something is not per se in a genus because it is the terminus of any substance; as you say, that a point is not per se in a genus, for it is the terminus of something existing per se in a genus; therefore, this is obvious, that everything one per se is per se in some category or is part of something existing in a category; but it is obvious by induction that a point is not a part of something existing per se in a category; therefore, a point is per se in a category; which was proved to be false. From which it follows that a point is not such an indivisible thing.

In the third place, I argue thus. It is impossible that there may be things infinite actually, distinct as regards themselves as wholes, and of which none may be part of another, and which do not make some one. But if a point were such an indivisible thing, such would be infinite actually. For example, I take wood. It is manifest according to those writers that there are here infinite lines; for there are not just so many so that there could not be more, and each of them is terminated actually at some point; for otherwise no line could be terminated actually at some point. And it is manifest that they are distinguished as regards themselves as wholes, if they be indivisibles; nor do they make one per se, since they may not be parts of anything; therefore, such will be infinite actually, which is impossible and contrary to all philosophy. There-

igitur quod punctus non est talis res indivisibilis distincta realiter ab omni divisibili.

Quarto sic: per solam divisionem continui non causatur aliqua res positiva et absoluta. Dividatur igitur lignum, et quaero de punctis terminantibus, aut prius fuerunt aut non. Si sic, certum est quod non distabunt situ; punctus ergo fuit immediatus puncto, quod falsum est etiam secundum eos. Si non erant prius et nunc sunt; igitur generantur de novo, et per consequens per solam divisionem necessario generaretur aliqua res absoluta, quod falsum est.

Quinto, quia per solam unionem partium aquae vel alterius, cuius partes prius separatae, possunt continuare, non generatur aliqua res nova absoluta, nec absoluta corrumpitur. Sed si punctus esset talis res indivisibilis, necessario, quandocumque tales partes continuarentur, aliqua res absoluta corrumperetur; puta, ista duo puncta, quae prius terminabant duas lineas, et generaretur nova, scilicet, unus punctus continuans illas duas partes. Immo sequeretur quod infinitae res absolutae secundum se totas distinctas corrumperentur et infinitae generarentur, sicut deduci potest per tertiam rationem principalem prius factam; quae omnia sunt impossibilia, et per consequens punctus non est talis res indivisibilis.

Istam eandem conclusionem probo per rationes theologicas. Primo sic: omnem rem absolutam distinctam secundum se totam ab alia re absoluta, cuius non

fore, it remains that a point is not any such indivisible thing really distinct from every divisible.

In the fourth place thus: some thing positive and absolute is not caused through division only of a continuum. Let, therefore, wood be divided; and I ask about the terminating points, whether they were before or not. If they were, it is certain that they will not be separate in situation; therefore, a point was immediate to a point; which is false even according to those writers. If they were not before and now are; they are, therefore, generated de novo, and consequently some absolute thing necessarily would be generated through division alone, which is false.

In the fifth place; since they can become continuous through the union only of parts of water or of another, whose parts were separate before, some new absolute thing is not generated nor is an absolute corrupted. But if a point were such an indivisible thing, whenever such parts would become continuous, of necessity some absolute thing would be corrupted; say, these two points which before terminated two lines, and a new thing would be generated; namely, one point connecting those two parts. Indeed, it would follow that infinite, absolute things distinct as regards themselves as wholes would be corrupted, and infinites would be generated; as can be deduced through the third principal reason previously stated; all of which are impossible, and consequently a point is not such an indivisible thing.

I prove this same conclusion through theological reasons. First thus: every absolute thing distinct as regards itself as a whole from another absolute thing,

est subiectum nec effectus nec econverso, potest Deus creare sine ea.

Sed si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, linea secundum se totam distinguitur a puncto, manifestum est; quia linea non est pars puncti, nec punctus est pars lineae, nec etiam linea est subiectum puncti, sicut probatum est prius, nec econverso punctus est subiectum lineae, manifestum est. Nec etiam linea est causa puncti nec econverso; sicut patet discurrendo per omnia genera causarum; igitur potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta facere lineam sine omni puncto.

Tunc quaero, aut illa linea est finita aut infinita. Si sit finita et sine omni puncto, per consequens frustra ponitur punctus ad terminandum lineam, et tamen non propter aliud ponitur a sic ponentibus. Si autem linea illa non sit terminata nec finita, et est in rerum natura per casum; igitur est infinita, quod patet esse manifeste falsum, quia non propter hoc erit illa linea maior vel longior, quia ille punctus est separatus vel destructus; ergo nullo modo erit illa infinita quantumcumque omnia puncta destruantur. Praeterea si destruantur a Deo omnia puncta, conservata linea; quaero aut illa linea est continua, aut non. Si sic, et non per punctum quia non est per casum; igitur sine omni puncto est linea continua, et per consequens frustra ponitur ibi punctus. Si non sit continua, quaero aut aliqua pars eius sit continua et redit argumentum praecedens aut nulla pars est continua; ex quo sequitur quod est aliqua linea quae non componitur ex continuis quod est impossibile.

of which it is not subject nor effect, nor conversely, God can create without the second thing.

But if a point be such an indivisible thing, it is manifest that a line as regards itself as a whole is distinguished from a point; for it is manifest that a line is not a part of a point, nor is a point a part of a line, nor again is a line the subject of a point, as was proved before; and conversely a point is not the subject of a line. Moreover, a line is not the cause of a point, nor conversely; as is obvious by a survey of all classes of causes; therefore, God can of His absolute power make a line without any point.

Then I ask, whether that line is finite or infinite. If it be finite and without any point; it is consequently needless to posit a point to terminate a line, and yet it is not posited by virtue of another by those who thus posit it. If, however, that line be not terminated nor finite, and is in the nature of things per casum; it, therefore, is infinite, which obviously is manifestly false; for that line will not by virtue of this be greater, or longer because that point is separated or destroyed; therefore, in no mode will there be that infinite, no matter to what extent all the points may be destroyed. Moreover, if all the points be destroyed by God, and the line is saved; I ask whether or not that line is continuous. If it is, and not through a point, for it is not per casum; there is, therefore, a continuous line without any point, and consequently a point is needlessly posited there. If it be not continuous; I ask whether any part of it be continuous, in which case the preceding argument applies, or else no part is continuous; from which it follows that there is some line which is not composed of continua, which is impossible.

Similiter illa linea est continua vel discreta; si continua, habetur propositum; si discreta, ergo quaelibet pars est divisa in infinitum quantum ad omnes eius partes, quod est impossibile. Ista autem ratio probat quod linea sufficienter est continua et finita per naturam propriam sine omni alia re addita sibi; et per consequens, cum non propter aliud debeat poni punctus, frustra ponitur punctus esse talis res indivisibilis.

Si dicatur quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest facere lineam sine puncto; contra, quando aliqua res absoluta potest per naturam fieri sine multis rebus divisim ita quod sine quacumque illarum sigillatim illa res potest per divinam potentiam fieri sine omnibus illis coniunctis, ita quod nullum illorum sit cum eo; quod maxime est verum, quando istae res secundum se totas sunt distinctae realiter et neutra est effectus nec accidens alterius; sicut est de puncto et linea. Si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, (sed haec linea per naturam potest esse sine hoc puncto et sine illo et sic de aliis et sic de quolibet); igitur potest Deus facere eam sine omni puncto; et ita habetur propositum.

Praeterea si illud, quod dependet essentialiter ab aliquo tamquam effectus a causa et accidens a suo subiecto, potest per divinam potentiam separari ab illo; multo fortius id, quod non dependet ab alio nec tamquam totum a parte nec tamquam accidens a suo subiecto nec tamquam effectus ab alio potest Deus facere sine eo.

Sed accidens in sacramento altaris ante separationem dependet a substantia tamquam a causa et a suo

Similarly, that line is continuous or discrete; if continuous, the thesis is established; if discrete, then each part is divided into a quantum infinite as regards all its parts, which is impossible. But this reason proves that a line is sufficiently continuous and finite through its proper nature without any other thing added to it; and consequently, since a point ought not to be posited by virtue of another, a point is needlessly posited to be such an indivisible thing.

If it be said that God can not of His absolute power make a line without a point; on the contrary, when any absolute thing can through nature be made without many things separately so that it may be without any of them singly, that thing can be made through the divine power without all of them joined together so that none of them may be with it; which is especially true, when these things as regards themselves as wholes are really distinct and neither of them is an effect or an accident of the other; as is the case of the point and of the line. If the point be such an indivisible thing, (but this line can through nature be without this point and that point and so of others and so of any,) God can, therefore, make this without any point; and so the thesis is established.

Moreover, if that, which essentially depends on something as an effect depends on a cause and an accident on its subject, can be separated from that through divine power; much more firmly can God make that, which does not depend on another either as a whole on a part or as an accident on its subject or as an effect on another, without that.

But an accident in the sacrament of the altar depends before the separation on a substance as if on a

subiecto, et tamen per divinam potentiam fit accidens sine subiecto; igitur multo fortius linea quae non dependet a puncto nec tamquam a parte sua nec tamquam a subiecto nec tamquam a sua causa, potest fieri sine eo; et ita stat primum argumentum.

Confirmatur ratio illa, quia secundum Philosophum secundo Physicorum, "Quantitas est per se finita vel infinita." Sed si quantitas esset finita per rem aliam, sicut linea per puncta tamquam per rem aliam, ipsa non esset finita per se sed per aliud. In sacramento altaris quantitas est separata ab omni substantia; igitur linea est separata ab omni subiecto. Tunc quaero de puncto terminante illam lineam, aut est separata ab omni subiecto aut non; si sic, igitur punctus ille et linea nullo modo faciunt unum quia nec unum per se nec unum per accidens, cum neutrum sit receptivum alterius; et per consequens linea non potest aliter terminari per punctum nisi sicut aqua terminatur corpori solido, puta, terra vel consimili, quod non potest competere puncto.

Si autem punctus non sit sine subiecto, et manifestum est quod non est subiective in substantia, cum non sit ibi nisi corpus Christi, in quo non potest poni punctus; ille igitur est subiective in linea, sed hoc est impossibile sicut probatum est prius; quia si esset subiective in linea vel in aliqua parte lineae, tamquam in subiecto primo et adequato, et non tantum per partem, sicut haec albedo dicitur esse in Sorte, quia est in una parte Sortis, punctus a nulla parte subiecti, puta, lineae

cause and on its subject; and yet through divine power it becomes an accident without a subject; therefore, much more firmly can the line, which does not depend on the point either as if on its part or as if on a subject or as if on its cause, be made without it; and so the first argument obtains.

That reason is confirmed; for, according to the Philosopher in the second book of the Physics, "Quantity is per se finite or infinite." But if a quantity were finite through another thing, as a line is finite through points as if through another thing, it itself would not be finite per se but through another. In the sacrament of the altar a quantity is separated from every substance; therefore, a line is separated from every subject. Then I ask about the point terminating that line, whether or not it is separated from every subject; if so, then that point and the line do not in any mode make one, for they are neither one per se nor one through an accident, since neither may be receptive of the other; and consequently the line can not otherwise be terminated through a point, unless as water is terminated by a solid body; namely, earth or something similar, which can not correspond to a point.

But if a point may not be without a subject, and it is manifest that it is not subjectively in a substance; since it may not be there unless the body of Christ, in which a point can not be posited; that, therefore, is subjectively in a line, but this is impossible as was proved before; for if it were subjectively in a line or in some part of a line, as if in a primary and adequate subject and not only through a part, as this whiteness is said to be in Sortes; for it is in one part of Sortes, a point might be able to be separate in place and in situation

vel partis lineae posset distare loco et situ, sicut argumentum est prius, quod est manifeste falsum sicut probatum est prius.

Propter praedicata et multa alia, quae possunt adduci, dicerent ponentes nihil esse simpliciter indivisibile in rebus per creationem omnium partium realiter distinctarum praeter substantias separatas a materia et principaliter animam intellectivam et accidentia sua, et quod punctus non est res indivisibilis positiva et absoluta distincta realiter a linea et omni quantitate. Sed dicerent quod quaelibet res divisibilis seipsa formaliter est finita et terminata et continua; si sit continua sine omni alia re addita sibi, causaliter est terminata et finita et continua a Deo et aliis causis per se ponentibus eam in esse, quaecumque sint illae causae, unde haec linea sine omni alia re addita sibi. Immo, si quaelibet alia res destrueretur et haec linea conservaretur a Deo, vere esset finita, terminata et continua; et ideo cum talis res indivisibilis propter alia non ponatur, videtur tam impossibile quam superfluum ponere punctum esse talem rem indivisibilem.

Et si quaeritur: quid est punctus? Aut est res divisibilis aut indivisibilis? Dicendum est quod sic dicendo, 'punctus est aliquid' vel 'punctus est res' vel huiusmodi. Si punctus supponat pro aliquo ita quod habeat praecise vim nominis et non includat aequivalenter unum complexum ex nomine et verbo vel aliquod consimile quod secundum proprietatem vocis potest reddere suppositum verbo, debet concedi quod punctus est

from no part of a subject, say, a line or a part of a line, as was affirmed before; which is manifestly false, as was proved before.

By virtue of the previous statements and many others, which can be adduced, those positing might say that nothing is simply indivisible in things through the creation of all parts really distinct except substances separate from matter and principally the rational soul and its accidents; and that a point is not a thing indivisible, positive and absolute, really distinct from a line and every quantity. But they might say that any thing divisible in itself is formally finite, terminated and continuous; if it be continuous without any other thing added to it, it is causally terminated, finite, and continuous by God and other causes per se placing it in being, whatever may be those causes; whence this line without any other thing added to it. Indeed, if any other thing were destroyed and this line were preserved by God, it would truly be finite, terminated and continuous; and, indeed, since such an indivisible thing may not be posited by virtue of others, it seems as impossible as superfluous to posit that a point is such an indivisible thing.

And if it is asked: What is a point? Whether it is a thing divisible or an indivisible? Which must be answered thus by saying, 'a point is something' or 'a point is a thing' or anything else of the kind. If a point stand for something so that it may have precisely the force of a *name* and may not embrace as an equivalent one compounded of a noun and a verb, or something very similar which can represent a supposition for a verb according to a property of speech; it ought to be conceded that a point is something and that a

aliquid et quod punctus est res, et hoc quia debet concedi quod punctus est linea vel punctus est quantitas; quia tunc hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivalebit isti, 'linea tantae vel tantae longitudinis,' sive 'linea non ulterius protensa vel extensa,' vel alicui toti complexo ex nomine et verbo mediante coniunctione vel adverbio vel hoc pronomine 'quae,' secundum quod placet dare diversas diffinitiones exprimentes quid nominis illius nominis 'punctus.' Et ideo sicut hoc praedicatum 'res divisibilis' praedicatur de tali subiecto et per consequens de composito ex adiectivo et substantivo, ita praedicatur de puncto.

Unde sicut dicunt aliqui quod hoc nomen 'privatio' aequivalet in significando huic toti 'subiectum privatum'; et propter hoc, sicut concedunt istam, 'subiectum privatum' est materia, ita concedunt illam, 'privatio' est materia. Ita si hoc nomen 'punctus' in significando aequivalet isti toti, 'linea non ulterius protensa' vel alicui consimili, cuius una pars sit linea, et aliae partes sint aliqua adiectiva vel verbum coniunctum cum linea, mediante hoc pronomine 'quae' vel altero consimili. Sicut haec conceditur, 'linea est divisibilis,' ita illa conceditur de virtute significationis, 'punctus est linea,' 'punctus est divisibilis.' Quicquid enim verificatur de hoc nomine 'linea' sumpto significative, verificatur de hoc nomine 'punctus' sumpto significative, et hoc de virtute significationis loquendo; hoc tamen non obstante, una propositio, in qua subiicitur hoc nomen 'punctus,' poterit esse per se; et alia, in qua ponitur hoc nomen 'linea,' non erit per se et econverso.

point is a thing, and this because it ought to be conceded that a point is a line or a point is a quantity; for then this name 'point' will be equivalent to this 'a line of such or such length,' or 'a line not farther lengthened or extended,' or to some whole compounded of a noun and a verb with an intervening conjunction or adverb or this pronoun 'quae'; according to which it is pleasing to give diverse definitions expressing some characteristic of that name 'point.' And indeed, as this predicate 'a divisible thing' is predicated of such a subject and consequently of a composite of an adjective and a substantive, so it is predicated of a point.

Whence, as some say that this name 'privation' is equivalent in significance to this whole 'subjectum privatum'; and by virtue of this, as they concede this, 'subjectum privatum' is matter; so they concede this, 'privation' is matter. So if this name 'point' is equivalent in signification to this whole, 'a line not farther lengthened' or to something similar; of which one part may be a line, and other parts may be some adjectives or a verb connected with line, this pronoun 'quae' intervening, or another similar. As this is conceded, 'a line is divisible,' so this is conceded according to the virtue of signification, 'a point is a line,' 'a point is divisible.' For whatever is true of this name 'line,' when used significatively, is true of this name 'point' when used significatively, and this by speaking according to the virtue of signification; yet this, notwithstanding that one proposition, in which this name 'point' is substituted, could be per se; and another, in which this name 'line' is posited, will not be per se, and conversely.

Sicut quicquid praedicatur de uno convertibilium sumpto significative, verificatur de reliquo sumpto significative, et tamen una illarum per se et non reliqua. Unde haec est per se primo modo, 'omnis homo est animal' et non illa, 'omne risibile est animal.' Si autem hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivalebit in signando alicui composito ex nomine vel verbo vel coniunctione vel adverbio et hoc pronomine 'qui,' vel ex obliquo et verbo composito, quod secundum proprietatem sermonis non potest reddere suppositum verbo loquendo grammatice; et per consequens omnis oratio, in qua ponitur, non est secundum proprietatem, sed est figurativa locutio et potest reduci ad figuram quae vocatur a grammaticis 'hypallage' de qua dicunt, quod hypallage est conversio casuum vel constructionis vel aliquando totius sententiae.

Sic debet concedi quod 'punctus est res indivisibilis' et 'punctus non habet partes' et huiusmodi. Sed illae propositiones et consimiles non sunt concedendae secundum proprietatem sermonis, tamquam propriae non excusandae per aliquam figuram grammaticalem; et per consequens non est ex eis arguendum in investigatione veritatis, nisi ipsis acceptis secundum sensum quem habent ex intentione auctorum; sed concedendae sunt sub illo sensu, quem habent ex hoc quod per praedictam figuram excusantur; eo, videlicet, quod una dictio ponitur loco unius orationis vel compositi ex multis dictionibus, et simul cum hoc oportet convertere orationem transponendo et etiam mutando aliquando

Just as whatever is predicated of one of the convertibles, when used significatively, is true of the rest when used significatively, and yet one of them per se and not the rest. Whence, this is per se in the first mode, 'every man is an animal,' and not this, 'every risible is an animal.' But if this name 'point' will be equivalent in signification to some composite of a noun or a verb or a conjunction or an adverb and this pronoun 'qui,' or of a composite of an oblique case and a verb, which according to a property of common speech can not express, speaking grammatically, a supposition for a verb; consequently, too, any language, in which it is posited, is not according to a property, but is figurative speech and can be reduced to a figure which is called by the grammarians 'hypallage,' of which they say that hypallage is the conversion of cases or of a construction or sometimes of a whole sentence.

So it ought to be conceded that 'a point is an indivisible thing' and that 'a point does not have parts,' and anything else of the kind. But those propositions and similar ones must not be conceded according to a property of common speech, as proper propositions must not be disposed of through any grammatical figure; and consequently in the investigation of reality it must not be argued from these, unless they are taken according to the sense which they have according to the intention of the authors; but they must be conceded under that sense, which they have from this, that they are disposed of through the aforesaid figure; for this reason, namely, that one expression is posited in place of one form of language or of a composite of many expressions, and at the same time with this it is necessary to convert the language by transposing and even by

unam partem orationis in aliam, et aliquando unam dictionem in aliam et casum in casum vel unum accidens grammaticale in aliud vel consimili modo convertendo; ut sensus illius propositionis, 'punctus est indivisibilis,' sit ille, 'linea ultra non protenditur,' cuius tamen quaelibet pars est divisibilis, vel alius consimilis sensus secundum quod placet praedictam propositionem exponere. Sensus autem istius propositionis, 'punctus est divisibilis,' sit ille vel aliquis consimilis sensus, quacumque parte lineae data adhuc convenit accipere ulteriorem.

Et sicut dicitur de istis propositionibus, ita dicendum est de consimilibus; et non tantum est hoc verum de hoc nomine 'punctus'; verum etiam de omnibus nominibus verbalibus et omnibus nominibus formatis ab adverbiis, coniunctionibus, pronominibus, praepositionibus, et universaliter ab omnibus sincategoreumatibus, et universaliter ab omnibus, quae non sunt praecise habentia virtutem nominis; ita quod sine omni figura et proprietate sermonis non possunt esse extrema propositionis distincta a copula. Et secundum hoc omnes tales: 'actio est in passo,' 'motus est in mobili,' 'similitudo est in simili,' 'albedo est terminus motus,' 'omnis res producitur per productionem,' 'ignis calefacit calefactione,' et huiusmodi innumerabiles propositiones, quae inveniuntur in dictis philosophorum et sanctorum et etiam in scriptura sacra, sunt figurative per aliquam figuram grammaticalem excusandae. Nec est inconveniens concedere, quod philosophi et sancti sic figurative loquebantur, cum multa talia in sacra scriptura reperi-

changing sometimes one part of the language into another, and sometimes one expression into another, and a case into a case, or one grammatical accident into another, or in a similar mode by conversion; that the sense of this proposition, 'a point is indivisible,' may be this, 'a line is not farther lengthened,' of which, however, each part is divisible; or another similar sense according as one is pleased to explain the previous proposition. But the sense of this proposition, 'a point is divisible,' may be that or some similar sense; for whatever part of the line is taken, it is still proper to take the more remote.

And as it is said of these propositions, so it must be said of similar propositions; and not only is this true of this name 'point'; but it is also true of all verbal names and all *names* formed from adverbs, conjunctions, pronouns, prepositions, and in general of all syncategorematics, and in general of all, which do not precisely have the virtue of a *name;* so that they can not be the extremes of a proposition separated by a copula without any figure and a property of common speech. And according to this, all such: 'action is in passion,' 'motion is in the mobile,' 'likeness is in the similar,' 'whiteness is the terminus of motion,' 'every thing is produced through production,' 'fire makes warm by heating,' and innumerable propositions of a similar kind, which are found in the statements of the philosophers and of the Saints and even in Sacred Scriptures, must be figuratively disposed of through some grammatical figure. Nor is it inconsistent to concede that the philosophers and the Saints spoke thus figuratively, since many such may be found in Sacred Scripture; not however by accepting the statements of

antur; non tamen accipiendo dicta sacrae scripturae in sensu spirituali sed etiam in sensu litterali.

Immo etiam frequenter vulgaris et communis modus loquendi talibus figurativis locutionibus utitur; sicut per dicta grammaticorum de talibus tractantium potest probari. Unde non tantum dictio potest transferri a propria significatione ad impropriam, sed etiam aliquando dantur vocabula, quae nullam propriam significationem habent, qualem primo instituta habent. Et sicut translatio secundum grammaticos fit triplici de causa: quia aliquando causa metri sicut in poetis; aliquando causa ornatus sicut in rhetorica locutione, aliquando causa necessitatis sive brevitatis sive utilitatis sicut in philosophia; et omnibus istis modis fit translatio in theologia. Ita impositio talium nominum sive sint abstracta sive concreta fit triplici de causa; scilicet, metri, ornatus, et utilitatis sive brevitatis. Quamvis ex praedictis causis occasionaliter multi errores proveniunt in simplicibus, qui omnia dicta philosophorum et sanctorum secundum proprietatem sermonis volunt accipere, cum tamen sint figurative sumenda.

Secundus articulus principalis. Sed contra praedicta arguit quidam doctor primo sic. Ex illa opinione sequitur quod generatio subita, quae non est per se terminus continui, nihil erit vel saltem in nihilo; quia non est ei aliqua alia mensura positiva, et ita est de illuminatione et de omnibus mutationibus subitis, quae non sunt per se termini motus. Et licet possunt evadere de mutationibus quae sunt termini motuum et

Sacred Scripture in a spiritual sense but even in a literal sense.

Indeed, even the popular and common mode of speaking frequently employs such figurative expressions; as can be proved through the statements of the grammarians treating of such. Whence, not only the expression can be transferred from a proper to an improper signification, but even sometimes terms are given which have no proper signification, such as they have when first instituted. And as a translation is made according to the grammarians for a threefold cause: sometimes for the sake of metre as in the poets; sometimes for the sake of ornament as in rhetorical speech; sometimes for the sake of necessity, either brevity or utility, as in philosophy; and in all of these ways a translation is made in theology. So the application of such names, whether they be abstract or concrete, is made for a three-fold cause; namely, for the sake of metre, ornament, and utility or brevity. Although from the previous causes many errors occasionally originate among the simple minded, who wish to accept all the statements of the philosophers and of the Saints according to a property of common speech, when they must be taken figuratively.

The second principal division. But a certain Doctor argues first thus against the previous statements. It follows from that opinion that sudden generation, which is not per se the terminus of a continuum, will be nothing or at least in nothing; for it does not have any other positive measure, and so is it of illumination and of all sudden changes, which are not per se terminations of motion. And although they can escape from the changes, which are the terminations of mo-

fiunt in instanti sicut in nihilo, vel privatio continuitatis in privatione continuitatis; tamen de istis videtur absurdum, quia non sunt termini continuitatis alicuius continui, quia nihil sunt alicuius continui nec positive nec privative.

Praeterea Primo Posteriorum, ratio lineae est ex punctis, hoc est, in ratione essentiali lineae cadit punctus, quae ratio dicitur de linea in primo modo dicendi per se; nulla autem privatio per se pertinet ad rationem essentialem positivi.

Tertio, ex eodem sequitur, quod, si punctus tantum est privatio, linea tantum erit privatio et superficies et corpus; semper enim terminatum definitur per terminans et positivum non includit essentialiter privationem.

Quarto, contra illam opinionem videtur esse Aristoteles in Praedicamentis ubi dicit quod partes lineae terminantur ad punctum tamquam ad terminationem, sed terminus semper est aliud ab illo quod terminatur ad ipsum; igitur, punctus est talis res indivisibilis.

Quinto, philosophus Primo Physicorum, 'terminus indivisibilis non infinitus est'; ex quo vult quod punctus, quia est indivisibilis, neque est finitus neque infinitus.

Sexto, philosophus Quarto Physicorum, ubi probat quod locus non est corpus, dicit quod neque unam habemus puncti et loci differentiam; igitur secundum eum punctus est aliquod distinctum a rebus divisibilibus.

tions and happen in an instant, as in nothing, or the privation of continuity in the privation of continuity; yet concerning these it seems absurd; for they are not the terminations of the continuity of some continuum; for they are by no means characteristic of any continuum, either positively or privatively.

Moreover, in the first book of the Posteriores, the ground of the line is from points; that is, a point falls within the essential ground of the line, which is called the ground according to line in the first mode of speaking per se; but no privation pertains per se to the essential ground of a positive.

In the third place; it follows from the same, that, if a point is only privation, a line will be only privation and surface and body; for the terminate is always limited through a terminant, and a positive does not essentially include privation.

In the fourth place; Aristotle in the Categories seems to be in opposition to that opinion, where he says that parts of a line are terminated at a point as if at a termination; but the terminus is always other than that which is terminated at itself; therefore, a point is such an indivisible thing.

In the fifth place; the philosopher in the first book of the Physics says that 'an indivisible terminus is not infinite'; according to this he affirms that a point, because it is indivisible, is neither finite nor infinite.

In the sixth place; the philosopher in the fourth book of the Physics, where he proves that place is not body, says that we do not have one difference of point and of place; therefore, according to him a point is something distinct from divisible things.

Septimo, secundum philosophum Secundo Physicorum, "illa tangunt se quorum ultima sunt simul"; igitur duo ultima duarum linearum tangentium se sunt simul; sed nullae duae partes istarum linearum sunt simul, nec ipsae lineae sunt simul; igitur praeter lineas et partes earum sunt alia quae sunt simul quae non possunt esse nisi puncta indivisibilia.

Octavo, Quinto et Sexto Physicorum dicit quod continua sunt illa quorum ultima sunt unum; ergo duo ultima duarum medietatum in linea una sunt unum; sed manifestum est quod nec illae medietates nec aliquae partes earum sunt unum; igitur praeter illa sunt aliqua quae sunt unum.

Nono, philosophus ibidem ponit, quod linea est divisibilis et punctum indivisibile et hoc per hoc probatur quod linea non componitur ex punctis, nec aliquod continuum ex indivisibilibus, quod esset vanum nisi essent talia indivisibilia praeter continua.

Decimo, philosophus ibidem dicit quod, quoniam autem impartibile indivisibile est, necesse est totum tangere, et cetera; ex quo patet quod ponit aliquod tale indivisibile.

Talia innumerabilia possent adduci propter quod videtur quod de intentione philosophi sit ponere tales res indivisibiles distinctas realiter a rebus divisibilibus.

Tertius articulus principalis respondet ad rationes; sed quia ex solutione praedictorum poterit patere via

In the seventh place; according to the philosopher in the second book of the Physics, he says that "they touch each other whose extremes are together"; therefore, the two extremes of two lines touching each other are at the same time; but no two parts of these lines are at the same time, nor are the lines themselves at the same time; therefore, besides the lines and their parts, there are others, which are at the same time, which can not be unless indivisible points.

In the eighth place: in the fifth and the sixth book of the Physics he says that those are continuous of which the extremes are one; therefore, the two extremes of two halves in one line are one; but it is manifest that neither those halves nor any parts of them are one; therefore, besides those there are some which are one.

In the ninth place: the philosopher in the same place posits, that a line is divisible and a point invisible, and this is proved through this, that a line is not composed of points, nor is any continuum composed of indivisibles; which would be futile unless there could be such indivisibles other than continua.

In the tenth place; the philosopher says in the same place that, since however an impartible is indivisible, it is necessary for a whole to touch, et cetera; from which it is obvious that he posits some such indivisible.

Innumerable statements of such a character might be adduced by virtue of which it seems that it may be in accordance with the intention of the philosopher to posit such indivisible things really distinct from divisible things.

The third principal division responds to the reasons; but because another way of solving could appear from

solvendi alia; ideo illa obmitto causa brevitatis et respondeo ad ista.

Ad primum dico, quod instans non est talis res absoluta distincta realiter ab omni re divisibili, quod potest probari multipliciter.

Primo, quia non habet aliquod subiectum primum in quo possit esse primo et adaequato tamquam accidens in suo subiecto sicut inductive patet.

Secundo, quia tunc Deus non posset facere tempus existere nisi necessario produceret res infinitas secundum se totas distinctas et corrumperet easdem.

Tertio, quia tales res productae non possent naturaliter destrui; quia nec per corruptionem sui subiecti nec per absentiam suae causae conservantis nec per inductionem sui contrarii.

Quarto, quia, si esset talis res, esset in genere per se, quod est manifeste falsum.

Quinto, quia omnes res eiusdem rationis potest Deus conservare simul in rerum natura, cum non repugnent inter se; ergo posset Deus facere quod omnia instantia praeterita essent nunc, quae tamen sunt infinita.

Sexto, quia possit Deus instans facere ab omni subiecto suo, quod est impossibile.

Declarationem illarum rationum propter brevitatem

the solution of the previous statements; I, therefore, omit those arguments for the sake of brevity, and I reply to these.

As regards the first; I say that an instant is not such an absolute thing really distinct from every divisible thing, which can be proved in various ways.

First; because it does not have any primary subject in which it may be able to be in a primary and adequate subject as if an accident in its subject, as is obvious inductively.

In the second place; because then God might not be able to make time to exist, unless he could necessarily produce infinite things as regards themselves distinct wholes and corrupt the same.

In the third place; because such things, when produced, would not be able naturally to be destroyed; for they could not be destroyed either through the corruption of their subject or through the absence of their preserving cause, or through the induction of their contrary.

In the fourth place; because, if there were such a thing, it could be in a genus per se, which is manifestly false.

In the fifth place; because God can preserve at the same time in the nature of things all things of the same ground, since they may not repel one another; therefore, God could bring it to pass that all past instants might be now, which however are infinite.

In the sixth place, because God may be able to make an instant apart from any subject of its own, which is impossible.

For the sake of brevity I pass by the presentation

obmitto; sed dico quod nec mutatio nec generatio est talis res indivisibilis. Et ideo consequenter ad prius dicta quod omnes tales locutiones sunt figurativae et tropicae: 'instans est indivisibile,' 'generatio est in instante,' 'mutatio subita est in instante,' 'generatio est subita,' 'forma substantialis est terminus generationis,' 'mutatum esse est terminus motus,' et huiusmodi; quia in omnibus talibus orationibus pro altero extremo propositionis ponitur unum nomen quod non habet tantum vim nominis in significando, sed habet vim nominis et verbi, vel habet vim alicuius compositi ex diversis vocabulis, quod compositum secundum proprietatem sermonis non potest reddere suppositum verbo, nec esse extremum propositionis distinctum ab altero extremo et a copula.

Unde quantum ad hoc simile est de talibus sicut esset si esset unum nomen impositum ad significandum illud quod significat 'tunc bene,' puta A; secundum proprietatem sermonis non esset bene dictum, 'tunc bene est.' Ita nec esset bene dictum, 'A est aliquid;' posset tamen talis locutio, 'A est aliquid' recipi tamquam locutio tropica et figurativa, ut aequivaleret isti, 'iste, qui bene tunc est, est aliquid,' vel alteri huiusmodi. Ita dico de talibus, 'generatio est subita' et huiusmodi, quod non sunt propriae locutiones sed figurativae; et hoc est ex eo quod hoc nomen 'instans' et hoc nomen 'generatio' et huiusmodi non sunt nomina finita habentia finitas significationes, quasi significent praecise res

of those reasons: but I say that neither change nor generation is such an indivisible thing. And consequently, therefore, as regards the previous statements that all such expressions are figurative and metaphorical: 'an instant is indivisible,' 'generation is in an instant,' 'sudden change is in an instant,' 'generation is sudden,' 'substantial form is a terminus of generation,' 'to have been changed is a terminus of motion,' and any other of the kind; because in all such formal expressions in place of the other extreme of the proposition, one name is posited which has not only the force of a name in signification, but has the force of a noun and of a verb, or has the force of something composed of diverse terms, which compounded according to a property of common speech can not express a supposition for a verb, nor be the extreme of a proposition distinct from the other extreme and a copula.

Whence, so far as this is concerned: it is similar of such expressions, as it would be if there were one name put in to signify that which signifies 'tunc bene,' say, A; according to a property of common speech it would not be well said, 'tunc bene est.' So it would not be well said, 'A is something'; yet there might be such a saying, 'A is something' to be accepted, as if a metaphorical and figurative expression that might be equivalent to this, 'that, which is tunc bene, is something,' or any other of a like kind. So I say of such, 'generation is sudden,' and of any other of a like kind, that they are not proper expressions but figurative; and it is from this, that this name 'instant' and this name 'generation,' and any other of a like kind, are not finite names having finite signification, as if they signify precisely certain things for which they may

quasdam pro quibus habeant supponere, ad modum quo talia nomina 'angelus,' 'albedo,' 'nigredo,' 'calidum,' 'frigidum,' habent finitas significationes; sed sunt quaedam derivativa a verbis vel aliis partibus orationis vel consimilia talibus, quae non sunt instituta nisi causa metri vel ornatus vel causa brevitatis locutionis.

Et ideo sicut multa dicta in metris et ornato modo loquendi non sunt recitanda nisi excusentur et glossentur; ita multa dicta causa brevitatis non sunt recipienda secundum proprietatem sermonis, sed secundum intentionem auctorum dicentium ea qui figurative propter dictam causam loquebantur; et hoc, quia temporibus eorum satis fuerunt talia nota, quod non erant vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, quamvis aliqui posteriores hoc ignoraverunt.

Unde dico quod illa propositio, 'generatio est in instante,' non est recipienda sub intellectu quem sonat, quasi una res sit in alia; sicut per illam propositionem, 'aqua est in vase,' denotatur quod una res est in alia in re distincta; unde distribuendo per omnes modos quibus aequivoce accipitur haec praepositio 'in,' de quibus loquitur philosophus, IV. Physicorum, patet quod secundum nullum illorum potest dici quod generatio est in instante; sed illa propositio, 'generatio est in instante,' sub illo intellectu debet recipi, 'quando aliquid generatur, non generatur pars ante partem sed totum simul generatur,' ut illa propositio brevis, 'generatio est in instante,' ponatur causa brevitatis loco illius lon-

have to substitute, according to the mode in which such names as 'angel,' 'whiteness,' 'blackness,' 'heat,' 'cold,' have finite significations; but there are certain derivatives from verbs or other parts of formal speech or similar to such, which are not instituted, unless for the sake of metre, or ornament, or for the sake of brevity of speech.

And, therefore, as many statements in poetry and in an ornate mode of speaking must not be quoted unless they be explained and interpreted; so many statements must not be accepted for the sake of brevity according to a property of common speech, but according to the intention of the authors saying these things, who spoke figuratively by virtue of the cause stated; and this, because such were sufficiently well known in their times, that they were not true according to a property of common speech, although some later writers have ignored this.

Whence, I say that this proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' must not be accepted under the meaning which it signifies, as if one thing may be in another; as through this proposition, 'water is in a vase,' it is denoted that one thing is in another in a distinct thing; whence, in distributing through all the modes in which this proposition 'in' is taken equivocally, of which the philosopher speaks in book four of the Physics, it is obvious that according to none of those can it be said that generation is in an instant; but this proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' ought to be accepted under this meaning, 'when something is generated, a part is not generated before a part, but the whole is generated at the same time'; that this brief proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' may be posited for the

gae orationis: 'quando aliquid generatur, non generatur pars ante partem sed totum simul.'

Consimiliter illa propositio, 'motus est in tempore,' non debet recipi sub illo intellectu quem sonat secundum formam propositionis, scilicet, quod una res est in re alia distincta realiter ab ea, sed debet recipi sub illo intellectu, 'quando aliquid movetur, acquirit unam partem ante aliam, vel acquirit unum ante aliud continue' vel sub tali 'quando aliquid movetur, acquirit vel deperdit unum post aliud simul coexistens mobili primo acquirenti unum post aliud,' vel alicui tali, ut illa oratio brevis, 'motus est in tempore,' ponitur loco orationis talis longae vel alicuius consimilis. Et quando dicitur quod secundum praedicta 'generatio nihil esset,' dico quod 'generatio est aliquid' sub illo intellectu, 'quando aliquid generatur, una forma tota simul et non pars ante partem acquiritur materiae.' Et sub intellectu opposito isti, haec est falsa, 'generatio nihil est.' Et si dicatur, 'generatio non est per se terminus continui, nec est aliquod continuum;' igitur nihil est. Quia omne, quod est in istis inferioribus, est continuum vel pars continui. Dicendum quod illa propositio de virtute sermonis et secundum omnem proprietatem sermonis, 'omne, quod est in istis inferioribus, est per se unum et continuum vel continui terminus,' est vera; quia altera pars est vera, scilicet, 'omne per se

sake of brevity in place of that long formal expression, 'when something is generated, a part is not generated before a part but the whole at the same time.'

Similarly this proposition, 'motion is in time,' ought not to be accepted under that meaning which it signifies according to the form of the proposition; namely, that one thing is in another thing really distinct from it, but it ought to be accepted under this meaning, 'when something is moved, it acquires one part before another, or it acquires one before another without interruption,' or under such a meaning, 'when something is moved, it acquires or loses one thing after another, co-existing at the same time with a movable first acquiring one after another,' or in some such meaning as that brief formal expression, 'motion is in time,' is posited in place of such a long formal expression or of some very similar expression. And when it is said that according to the preceding statements, 'generation would be nothing,' I say that 'generation is something' under this meaning, 'when something is generated, one whole form is acquired at the same time and not a part before a part is added to matter.' And under a meaning opposed to this, this is false, 'generation is nothing.' And if it be said, 'generation is not per se the terminus of a continuum, nor is it something continuous'; then it is nothing. For everything, which is in these inferiors, is a continuum or part of a continuum. It must be said that, according to the virtue of common speech and according to every property of common speech, that that proposition is true, 'everything, which is in these inferiors, is per se one and a continuum or the terminus of a continuum'; for the other part is true; namely, 'everything one per

unum in istis inferioribus est continuum,' quia nihil est in istis inferioribus nisi continuum, nisi forte cum istis inferioribus includatur anima intellectiva. Et ideo si illa propositio, 'generatio est aliquid,' esset vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, illa esset vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'generatio est continua'; sed neutra est vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, et ratio quare secundum proprietatem sermonis haec non est vera, 'generatio est continua vel terminus continui.' Nec est vera secundum intellectum auctorum, quia intelligunt illam, 'quando aliquid generatur, una pars formae acquiritur mediate ante aliam vel prius aliquid eiusdem rationis acquirebatur.' Et ideo non est imaginandum quod generatio sit aliquid positivum vel privativum distinctum realiter ab omni continuo et ab omni re permanente.

Immo secundum proprietatem sermonis, neutra illarum est vera, 'generatio est aliquid,' 'generatio est nihil,' sive generatio est negatio vel privatio; sicut nec aliqua illarum est vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'hominem esse aliquid,' 'hominem esse nihil' vel negatio seu privatio; et hoc accipiendo omnes terminos significative, quia secundum proprietatem sermonis non plus debet fingi tale abstractum 'generatio' ab hoc verbo 'generari' quam tale abstractum 'hominitas' ab illo accusativo casu 'hominem.' Et ideo per modum consimilem per quem responderes ad tales quaestiones factas de abstracto correspondente praecise isti accu-

se in these inferiors is a continuum'; for there is nothing in these inferiors except a continuum, unless perchance the rational soul may be included with these inferiors. And, therefore, if this proposition, 'generation is something,' were true according to a property of common speech, this would be true according to a property of common speech, 'generation is continuous'; but neither is true according to a property of common speech; and there is a reason why this is not true according to a property of common speech, 'generation is continuous or the terminus of a continuum.' Nor is it true according to the meaning of the authors; for they understand this, 'when something is generated, one part of the form is acquired mediately before another or before something of the same ground was acquired.' And, therefore, it must not be imagined that generation may be something positive or privative really distinct from every continuum and from every permanent thing.

On the contrary, according to a property of common speech, neither of these is true, 'generation is something,' 'generation is nothing,' whether generation is negation or privation; as any one of these is not true according to a property of common speech, 'man is something,' 'man is nothing,' whether negation or privation; and this by accepting significatively all the terms; for according to a property of common speech such an abstract 'generatio' ought not any more to be formed from this verb 'generari,' than such an abstract 'hominitas' from this accusative case 'hominem.' And, therefore, through a similar mode through which you might reply to such questions raised about an abstract corresponding precisely to this accusative case 'homi-

sativo casui 'hominem.' Quid sit tale hominitas? Quid est hominitas? Aut hominitas est aliquid aut nihil, aut est res? Respondeo ad tales quaestiones: aut generatio est aliquid aut nihil, et sic de aliis; quia sic etiam tales quaestiones non sunt propriae secundum proprietatem sermonis; sed si debeant recipi, debent recipi secundum bonum sensum utentium. Ita dico de talibus, an 'generatio sit aliquid,' et consimilibus.

Et universaliter dico proportionabiliter de omnibus abstractis, quae finguntur ex adverbiis, praepositionibus, verbis, coniunctionibus, et universaliter sincategoreumatibus et de aliis abstractis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta nec pro illis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta, quasi possent supponere pro illis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta, nisi includant aequivalenter in significando aliquod sincategoreuma. Quicquid conceditur de concreto, debet concedi secundum proprietatem sermonis de abstracto.

Et ideo sicut Aristoteles concedit illam, 'homo currit'; ita concederet istam, 'humanitas currit,' nisi humanitas praecise significet formam. Et sic dicatur quod quicquid praedicatur de aliquo abstracto, si vere praedicetur, praedicatur de illo per se primo modo. Dicendum quod illa propositio est simpliciter falsa. Si enim illa propositio sic accepta esset vera, omnes tales essent falsae: 'deitas videtur a beatis,' 'deitas distinguitur realiter a creaturis,' 'deitas est omnipotens,' 'humanitas est in rerum natura,' 'humanitas est unibilis supposito verbi,' 'humanitas distinguitur ab angelo,' et

nem.' What may such humanity be? What is humanity? Is humanity either something or nothing, or is it a thing? I reply to such questions; generation is either something or nothing, and so of others; for thus even such questions are not proper according to a property of common speech; but if they ought to be accepted, they ought to be accepted according to the good sense of those using. So I say of such, whether 'generation may be something,' and of similar questions.

And in general, I say proportionately of all abstracts, which are formed from adverbs, prepositions, verbs, conjunctions, and in general of syncategorematics and of other abstracts for which their concretes stand; not for those for which their concretes stand, as if they might be able to stand for those for which their own concretes stand, unless they may equally include in signification something syncategorematic. Whatever is conceded of a concrete, ought to be conceded according to a property of common speech of an abstract.

And, therefore, as Aristotle concedes this, 'man runs'; so he would concede this, 'humanity runs,' unless humanity may precisely signify form. And so it may be said that whatever is predicated of any abstract, if it be truly predicated, is predicated of that per se in the first mode. It must be said that that proposition is simply false. For if that proposition thus accepted were true, all such would be false: 'deity is seen by the blessed,' 'deity is really distinguished from creatures,' 'deity is omnipotent,' 'humanity is in the nature of things,' 'humanity is unible with a supposition for a verb,' 'humanity is distinguished from angel,' and many such; since they may not be per se in the

multae tales; cum non sint per se primo modo, et tamen manifestum est quod sint verae et multae earum cadunt sub fide, ita quod oppositae sunt haereticae.

Unde nec in philosophis nec antiquis sanctis vel aliis invenitur, quod talem distinctionem posuerunt inter abstractum et concretum, sicut moderni faciunt. Sed apud antiquos multa fuerunt synonyma cum suis concretis et multa abstracta non debebant haberi secundum proprietatem sermonis; sed tantum fierent ficta propter aliquam trium causarum dictarum prius. Et ideo non reprehendo antiquos, quia utiliter et causa metri vel ornatus sermonis vel brevitatis talis abstracta fingebant. Et hoc erat eis satis conveniens, quia de re satis eis constabat, saltem sapientibus, principue Aristoteli. Et ideo Aristoteles minus de modo loquendi curabat; ex quo res fuit nota sicut patet Primo Physicorum, quod modicam solicitudinem habebat de nominibus. Et ideo multi propter hoc, quod recipiunt auctoritates antiquorum sicut sonant ad litteram et secundum proprietatem sermonis quod tamen intentum non habuerunt antiqui, in errores varios incidunt.

Consequenter ad praedicta debet dici, quod omnes tales propositiones sunt impropriae: 'aditas est aliquid,' 'abietas est relatio,' 'aquietas est respectus,' 'haectitas est distincta a natura,' et sic de multis talibus quae recipiuntur a modernis. Nec plus sunt recipiendae secundum proprietatem sermonis, quam si ab

first mode; and yet it is manifest that they may be true and that many of them fall under faith, so that the opposite are heretical.

Whence, neither among the philosophers nor among the ancient Saints nor among others, is it found that they have posited such a distinction between an abstract and a concrete, as the modernist make. But among the ancient writers there have been many synonyms with their concretes, and many abstracts were not necessarily considered according to a property of common speech; but they could become formed only by virtue of any of the three causes previously mentioned. And, therefore, I do not censure the ancients, because they formed such abstracts for the sake of utility and metre, or the embellishment of common speech, or brevity. And this was sufficiently convenient for them, for it was about a thing sufficiently well known to them; at least to the wise, especially to Aristotle. And indeed Aristotle cared less about a mode of speaking; from which the thing was well known, as is obvious in the first book of the Physics, that he had moderate solicitude about names. And indeed many fall into various errors by virtue of this, that they accept the passages of the ancients as they sound according to the letter and according to a property of common speech, which intent, however, the ancients have not held.

Consequently, it ought to be said according to the previous statements that all such propositions are improper; 'aditas is something,' 'abietas is relation,' 'aquietas is respect,' 'haectitas is distinct from nature,' and so of many such, which are accepted by the modernists. Nor are they to be accepted according to a property of common speech any more than if from these

istis adverbiis: 'dum': 'cum,' 'tunc,' 'iam,' et ab aliis adverbiis; et a talibus coniunctionibus: 'si,' 'et,' 'vel,' 'at,' 'quia'; et ab aliis fingantur talia abstracta: 'dummitas,' 'cummitas,' 'tunctitas,' 'iammitas,' 'siitas,' 'attitas,' 'etitas,' 'quiitas.' Et propter hoc formentur tales propositiones: 'dummitas est aliquid,' 'siitas est aliquid,' 'velitas est Deus,' et sic de aliis.

Ad secundum dico, quod philosophus non intendit quod punctus cadit in diffinitione lineae, tamquam aliquid de essentia lineae, vel tamquam importans aliquid de essentia lineae et distinctum a linea. Sed intendit quod in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius lineae ponitur hoc nomen 'punctus,' et secundum famosam diffinitionem lineae, sive illa sit vera diffinitio lineae sive non, quae tamen non est vera diffinitio nisi secundum intentionem recte sentientem de puncto et linea. Nec est tamen intelligendum quod punctus sit aliqua privatio distincta totaliter a linea sicut homines communiter imaginantur; quod impossibile est imaginari, scilicet, quod punctus sit aliquid vel privativum vel positivum secundum se totum distinctus vel non idem cum linea. Immo secundum proprietatem sermonis sive significationis nec est concedendum quod est positivum, nec quod est privativum.

Et si dicatur, illa sunt contradictoria, 'punctus est positivum,' 'punctus non est positivum'; igitur secundum proprietatem sermonis altera est vera et altera est falsa. Dico quod sicut secundum proprietatem illa non sunt contradictoria: 'videre hominem est aliquid,'

adverbs: 'dum,' 'cum,' 'tunc,' 'iam,' and from other adverbs; and from such conjunctions: 'si,' 'et,' 'vel,' 'at,' 'quia'; and from others such abstracts may be formed: 'dummitas,' 'cummitas,' 'tunctitas,' 'iammitas,' 'siitas,' 'attitas,' 'etitas,' 'quiitas.' And by virtue of this, such propositions may be formed: 'dummitas is something,' 'siitas is something,' 'velitas is God,' and so of others.

As regards the second point, I say that the philosopher does not intend that a point falls within the definition of a line, as if something of the essence of a line, or as if signifying something of the essence of a line and distinct from a line. But he intends that in a definition expressing something characteristic of the same name 'line,' this name 'point' is posited, and according to the famous definition of a line, whether or not that be a true definition of a line; which however is not a true definition except according to the intention of the one judging correctly of a point and a line. Nor is it, however, to be understood that a point may be any privation totally distinct from a line, as men commonly imagine; which it is impossible to imagine; namely, that a point may be something, either a privative or a positive, distinct as regards itself as a whole, or not the same as a line. On the contrary, according to a property of common speech or of signification, it must not be conceded that it is a positive, nor that it is a privative.

And if it be said that these are contradictories: 'a point is a positive,' 'a point is not a positive'; then, according to a property of common speech, one is true and the other is false. I say that, as according to property, these are not contradictories: 'to see a man is

'videre hominem non est aliquid'; nec illa: 'non habet ulteriorem extensionem est aliquid,' 'non habet ulteriorem protensionem non est aliquid,' 'punctus est aliquid,' 'punctus non est aliquid,' et hoc accipiendo terminos omnes significative. Et propter haec neutra illarum est concedenda de virtute sermonis. Et istud cum praecedentibus dictum sit secundum illum modum ponendi eorum, qui dicunt quod hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivalet in significando uni aggregato ex multis dictionibus, quod secundum artem grammaticam non potest reddere suppositum verbo; et ideo nulla oratio est propria in qua ponitur ut supponat respectu verbi grammatice loquendo. Si autem teneatur alius modus ponendi de quo dictum est prius, sic concedendum est quod punctus est aliquid positivum et punctus est quantus, et linea est divisibilis; quia aequivalet isti: 'quantum tantum,' vel 'tantae protensionis est aliquid,' et 'quantum est divisibile' et sic de aliis.

Ad tertium; concedo proportionabiliter de linea et superficie sicut de puncto; unde sicut secundum unum modum loquendi haec est concedenda, 'punctus est divisibilis,' ita ista, 'linea est corpus.' Secundum autem alium modum loquendi, sicut haec non est propria, 'punctus est aliquid,' ita nec illa, 'linea est aliquid,' nec illa, 'superficies est aliquid'; sed quaelibet illarum est figurative dicta et accipienda.

Et quando dicitur quod terminatum definitur per terminans, dicendum quod illa propositio, sicut est formata, est falsa. Unde non est imaginandum quod sit

something,' 'to see a man is not something'; nor these: 'it does not have farther extension is something,' 'it does not have farther lengthening is not something,' 'a point is something,' 'a point is not something'; and this by accepting all the terms significatively. And by virtue of these neither of them is to be conceded according to the virtue of common speech. And this with the preceding statements may be said according to that mode of positing of those who say that this name 'point' is equivalent in signification to one aggregate of many expressions, which can not express a supposition for a verb according to grammatical science; and, therefore, no language is proper, in which it is posited, that in speaking grammatically it may be substituted with respect to a verb. But if another mode of positing concerning that, which was stated before, be held; it must be so conceded that a point is something positive, and a point is a quantum, and a line is divisible; for it is equivalent to this: 'so much quantum,' or 'something is of so much extension,' and 'a quantum is divisible,' and so of others.

As regards the third point, I concede proportionately of a line and of a surface as of a point; whence, as according to one mode of speaking this must be conceded, 'a point is divisible,' so this, 'a line is a body.' But according to another mode of speaking, as this is not proper, 'a point is something,' so neither this, 'a line is something,' nor this, 'a surface is something'; but each of them is stated figuratively and must be accepted.

And when it is said that a terminate is defined through a terminant, it must be said that that proposition, as it is formed, is false. Whence, it must not be

ibi aliquod terminatum, et praeter illud terminatum sit aliud terminans distinctum a terminato, sive privativum sive positivum terminans illud terminatum; sed tantum est ibi dictio nominum importantium easdem res diversis modis grammaticalibus, sicut isti duo obliqui 'hominis' et 'homini' important easdem res omnino diversis tamen modis grammaticalibus.

Et de talibus nominibus non est inconveniens, si unum cadit in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis alterius nominis. Sic enim hoc nomen 'ens' cadit in diffinitione exprimente quid illius nominis 'unum,' et illius nominis 'verum,' et illius nominis 'bonum'; et tamen nihil importatur per unum nomen quin importetur per reliquum, quamvis intelligitur per unum nomen tam in obliquo quam in recto, et per aliud nomen non nisi in recto; unde intelligimus per hoc nomen 'verum,' importatur tam in obliquo quam in recto; pro eo quod intelligimus, 'est ens intelligibile et ab intellectu intelligibile.' Per hoc nomen autem 'ens' non importatur nisi in recto tantum, et ideo in proposito posset concedi vel proprie vel figurative secundum diversum modum ponendi illa nomina esse significativa 'terminans' et 'terminatum,' quod 'idem' est 'terminans' et 'idem' est 'terminatum,' et 'idem' terminat se; sicut 'idem' intelligit se, vel 'idem' quod est 'idem' sibi. Et quando dicitur quod positivum nunquam includit essentialiter priva-

imagined that there may be some terminate there, and by virtue of that terminate there may be another terminant distinct from a terminate, whether a privative or a positive terminating that terminate; but there is there only a mode of expression of names signifying the same things in different grammatical modes, as these two in oblique cases 'hominis' and 'homini' signify the same things, yet in entirely diverse grammatical modes.

And there is no inconsistency concerning such names, if one falls within a definition expressing something characteristic of another name. For thus this name 'entity' falls within a definition expressing some characteristic of that name 'unum,' and of that name 'verum,' and of that name 'bonum'; and yet nothing is signified through one name that may not be signified through the rest, although it is understood through one name in an oblique case as well as in a direct case and through another name not unless in a direct case; whence, we know through this name 'verum,' that there is as much signified in an oblique case as in a direct case; for this that we understand, 'entity is knowable and cognizable by the intellect.' But through this name 'entity' it is not signified except in a direct case only, and indeed in the proposition it might be able to be conceded either properly or figuratively according to a diverse mode of positing that those names 'terminant' and 'terminate' are significative; that 'the same' is 'terminant' and 'the same' is 'terminate,' and 'the same' terminates itself; as 'the same' understands itself, or 'the same' is that which is 'the same' to itself. And when it is said that a positive never includes essentially a privation, it is obvious; for this must not be con-

tionem, patet; quia illa non est concedenda, 'punctus est privatio,' 'superficies est privatio' et hoc secundum proprietatem sermonis et secundum imaginationem illorum qui imaginantur quod privatio sit aliquid a parte rei quocumque modo distinctum a rebus positivis.

Unde argumenta illa sunt recitata sive facta contra illam imaginationem quae imaginatur, quod punctus sit a parte rei, quaedam privatio distincta quocumque modo imaginabili secundum se totum a linea. Secundum quod intentum videtur ille doctor improbare illam opinionem contra quam facit argumenta praetacta.

Sed sic non ponit illa opinio, nec magis ponit quod punctus est privatio quam positivum; quamvis in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius debeat poni unum nomen 'negativum' vel conceptus 'negativus.' Et ideo de virtute sermonis vel est concedendum quod punctus sit res absoluta, quanta et divisibilis, vel quod omnis oratio est impropria in qua ponitur hoc nomen 'punctus' pro altero extremo distincto ab alio extremo et a copula; et nulla talis est recipienda secundum proprietatem, sed tamquam figurative dicta, et contra illum modum ponendi in nullo procedunt argumenta doctorum.

Ad quartum, quod tactum est post argumenta doctoris, potest dici multipliciter quod philosophus tam ibi quam in Libro Physicorum, quam etiam in aliis locis loquens de puncto loquebatur secundum opinionem famosam secundum consuetudinem suam; quia conformabat se modo loquendi aliorum quando materiam

ceded, 'a point is privation,' 'a surface is privation,' and this according to a property of common speech and according to the fancy of those who imagine that privation may be something apart from a thing in any mode whatever distinct from positive things.

Whence, those arguments are cited or made contrary to that fancy which imagines, that a point may be apart from a thing, a certain privation distinct from a line as regards itself as a whole in every mode imaginable. According to which intent that Doctor seems to reject that opinion in opposition to which he offers the arguments touched upon before.

But that opinion does not thus posit, nor does it posit that a point is privation any more than that it is a positive; although in a definition expressing some characteristic of the same name, one name 'negative' or a concept 'negative' may necessarily be posited. And, therefore, according to the virtue of common speech either it must be conceded that a point may be an absolute thing, a quantum and divisible, or that every formal expression is improper in which this name 'point' is posited for one extreme distinct from the other extreme and from a copula; and no such expression ought to be accepted according to property but as if stated figuratively, and the arguments of the Doctors in no mode proceed contrary to that mode of positing.

As regards the fourth point, which was touched upon after the arguments of the Doctor, it can be said in various modes that the philosopher there as well as in the book of the Physics as also in other places where he speaks of a point, was speaking according to the famous opinion according to his custom; because he adapted himself to the mode of speaking of others,

non ex intentione tractabat. Unde de auctoritatibus suis tangentibus aliquam materiam quam non ex intentione tractavit, non videtur multum esse curandum, quia tunc frequenter loquebatur ut plures; et ideo ubi tales materias ex intentione tractavit, frequenter dixit oppositum, sicut in Libro Praedicamentorum dicit quod "genera et species sunt substantiae secundae." In Septimo autem Metaphysicae ubi ex intentione quaerit an 'genus' et 'species' universaliter universalia sint substantiae, ex intentione determinat quod nullum universale est substantia; ita est in proposito.

Nusquam invenitur quod Aristoteles ex intentione pertractavit illam quaestionem an punctus sit res indivisibilis distincta realiter ab omni re divisibili. Ideo omnes auctoritates suae, quae sonant punctum esse talem aliam rem, sunt exponendae et glossandae, quia vel loquebatur ut plures vel secundum opinionem famosam vel gratia exempli vel figurativae, vel diversae sunt diversimode exponendae sicut de diversis patebit inferius.

Unde philosophus in Libro Praedicamentorum non intendit quod una res absoluta distincta realiter a partibus lineae copulet partes lineae ad invicem, et propter hoc dicatur linea continua, tunc enim linea non esset continua per seipsam nec per aliquas partes suas, sed per unam rem distinctam totaliter a linea; et eadem facilitate diceretur quod duo ligna continuantur per unum lapidem. Nec potest plus dici quod punctus, si

when he was treating a matter not according to intention. Whence, concerning his passages touching upon any matter which he treated not according to intention, it does not seem that he exercised much care; for he then frequently spoke as many do; and, therefore, where he treated such matters according to intention, he frequently said the opposite; as he says in the book of the Categories that "genera and species are secondary substances." But in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where he inquires according to intention whether 'genus' and 'species,' generally universals, may be substances, he decides according to intention that no universal is a substance; so is it in the proposition.

Nowhere is it found that Aristotle according to intention thoroughly treated that question, whether a point may be an indivisible thing really distinct from every divisible thing. Therefore, all his passages, which affirm that a point is such another thing, must be explained and interpreted, because either he spoke as many do or according to that famous opinion or for the sake of an example or figuratively; or diverse passages must be explained in different ways, as will be obvious further on of diverse passages.

Whence, the philosopher in the book of the Categories does not intend that one absolute thing really distinct from parts of a line may mutually connect parts of a line, and by virtue of this a line may be called continuous; for then a line would not be continuous through itself or through some of its parts, but through one thing totally distinct from a line; and it might be said with the same facility that two pieces of wood are continuous through one stone. Nor can it any

sit talis res, sit terminus lineae quam quod lapis est terminus ligni, cum tanta vel maior sit distinctio inter lineam et punctum quam inter lapidem et lignum.

Nec plus potest dici quod punctus sit accidens substantiae existens in linea quam lapis est in ligno. Et ideo philosophus per illam propositionem, 'partes lineae copulantur ad unum terminum communem,' intelligit illam propositionem, 'inter partes lineae nihil est medium et illae faciunt per se unum'; ita quod duo requiruntur ad hoc, quod 'linea sit continua,' videlicet, quod 'inter partes lineae nihil sit medium situaliter.' Et propter hoc, quando unum corpus est in uno situ et aliud corpus in alio situ et inter illa corpora est aliud medium situaliter, illa duo corpora non continuantur. Secundum requiritur, videlicet, quod faciant per se unum et propter hoc contigua non sunt continua, et ita per illam propositionem 'partes lineae copulantur ad punctum tamquam ad terminum communem,' et per consimiles intelligit philosophus illam copulativam: 'inter partes lineae nihil est medium et ipsae faciunt per se unam lineam.' Et quando dicitur quod semper terminus distinguitur a terminato; dicendum est quod, si hoc nomen 'terminus' supponat praecise pro alia re, ita quod praecise habeat vim nominis 'categoriae' in significando ut non aequivaleat alicui alteri parti orationis nec alicui composito ex tali parte; et similiter hoc nomen 'terminatum'; tunc posset con-

more be said that a point, if there be such a thing, may be the terminus of a line than that a stone is the terminus of wood, since the distinction between a line and a point may be as much or greater than the distinction between stone and wood.

Nor can it any more be said that a point may be an accident of a substance existing in a line than that a stone is in wood. And, therefore, the philosopher understands through this proposition, 'parts of a line are joined at one common terminus,' this proposition, 'nothing is intermediate between parts of a line and they make one per se'; so that two are required for this, that 'a line may be continuous'; namely, that 'nothing may be in situation intermediate between parts of a line.' And by virtue of this when one body is in one situation and another body is in another situation and between those bodies there is in situation another intermediate, those two bodies are not continuous.

A second statement is required; namely, that they make one per se, and by virtue of this the contiguous are not continuous; and so through this proposition, 'parts of a line are joined at a point as if at a common terminus,' and through similar propositions the philosopher understands that copulative, 'nothing is intermediate between parts of a line and they themselves make one line per se.' And when it is said that a terminus is always distinguished from a terminate; it must be said that, if this name 'terminus' is precisely substituted for another thing so that it may have precisely the force of the name 'category' in signification, that it may not be equivalent to any other part of language nor to any composite of such a part; and similarly this name 'terminate'; then it might be able to

cedi quod 'terminus' distinguitur realiter a 'terminato' si aliud sit 'terminus' et aliud 'terminatum.' Sed sic sumendo; haec est falsa, 'punctus est terminus,' et 'linea est terminata per punctum.' Si aliter significent illa, 'terminans' et 'terminatum'; tunc potest negari illa propositio vel concedi secundum quod diversimode placet exponere significata vocabulorum.

Hoc tamen dico, quod non est imaginandum quod linea sit quaedam res distincta a re quae est terminus vel quae sit terminus; sed ex hoc ipso quod 'linea est talis res et non ulterius protensa,' dicitur ibi terminari. Sicut quando dicimus quod albedo est terminus dealbationis et forma substantialis est terminus generationis, non est ibi imaginandum quod sit ubi una res, quae sit dealbatio et generatio, et postea vel simul una res alia quae sit albedo et forma; nulla enim apparet contradictio quin Deus posset facere formam sine omni re alia etiam in subiecto; nec videtur quare res illa debet destrui si ponatur. Sed per istam propositionem, 'forma est terminus generationis,' debet intelligi illa, 'quando aliquid generatur, forma de novo acquiritur materiae prae-existendi'; et sicut dicitur de ista, ita dicendum est proportionabiliter de multis aliis consimilibus.

Ad quintum et sequentem potest dici, quod philosophus loquitur secundum opinionem famosam quae ponit punctum esse talem aliam rem, non secundum opinionem propriam.

Ad septimum dico quod hoc vocabulum 'simul' multipliciter accipitur. Aliquando 'simul' aequivalet huic

be conceded that 'terminus' is really distinguished from 'terminate,' if one be a 'terminus' and another a 'terminate.' But in taking them thus; this is false, 'a point is a terminus,' and 'a line is terminated through a point.' If those names 'terminant' and 'terminate' signify differently; then that proposition can be denied or conceded according as one is pleased to express in various modes the significations of terms.

Yet I say this, that it must not be imagined that a line may be a certain thing distinct from a thing which is a terminus or which may be a terminus; but from this itself, that 'a line is such a thing and is not farther lengthened,' it is said to be terminated there. As when we say that whiteness is the terminus of whitening and substantial form is the terminus of generation, it must not there be imagined that where there is one thing which may be whitening and generation, and afterwards or at the same time one other thing which is whiteness and form; for no contradiction appears but that God might be able to make form without any other thing even in a subject; nor does it appear why that thing ought to be destroyed if it be posited. But through this proposition, 'form is the terminus of generation,' this ought to be understood, 'when something is generated, form is added de novo to pre-existing matter'; and as it is said of this, so it must be said proportionately of many other similar propositions.

As regards the fifth and the following point, it can be said that the philosopher speaks according to the famous opinion which posits that a point is such another thing, not according to a proper opinion.

As regards the seventh point, I say that this term 'simul' is accepted in various ways. Sometimes, 'simul'

toti 'nihil est medium,' ut sit sensus talis propositionis, 'ista sunt simul,' id est, 'inter illa nihil est medium.' Et sic est ista concedenda, 'illa tangunt se quorum ultima sunt simul' sub illo sensu, 'illa tangunt se inter quae nihil est medium.' Aliquando 'simul' aequivalet isti in significando, 'non distare situ'; et sic nullae duae res, quae sint quocumque modo se tangentes, sunt simul; nec hoc vult philosophus. Sed per illam propositionem, 'illa tangunt se inter quae nihil est medium,' intelligit istam sicut dictum est, 'ista tangunt se inter quae nihil est medium'; et si essent talia indivisibilia in istis tangentibus, ista essent simul, et hoc secundo modo accipiendo hoc vocabulum, 'simul'; quia non distarent loco neque situ. Et quando dicitur quod nullae partes duarum linearum sunt simul; dicendum est quod accipiendo 'simul' secundo modo verum est, nec hoc requiritur ad hoc quod aliqua tangant se; tamen accipiendo 'simul' primo modo partes lineae sunt simul, quia inter eas nihil est medium.

Ad octavum, quando dicitur quod continua sunt illa quorum ultima sunt unum, manifestum est quod illa propositio debet exponi, quia falsa est de virtute sermonis includens contradictionem, sicut illa includit contra dictionem, 'plures homines sunt unus homo'; nam, si sunt ultima, sunt plura, et per consequens non sunt unum. Ideo dico, quod intellectus philosophi est

is equivalent to this whole, 'nothing is intermediate,' so that it may be the sense of such a proposition, 'these are at the same time'; that is, 'nothing is intermediate between them.' And so this must be conceded, 'those touch each other whose extremes are at the same time' under this sense, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate.' Sometimes 'simul' is equivalent in signification to this, 'not to be separate in situation'; and so no two things, which may be touching each other in any mode whatever, are at the same time; nor does the philosopher wish this. But through this proposition, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate,' he understands this, as was said, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate,' and if there could be such indivisibles in these touching, these would be at the same time; and this by taking this term 'simul' in the second mode; for they would not be separate in place nor in situation. And when it is said that no parts of two lines are at the same time; it must be said that in accepting 'simul' in the second mode it is true, and this is not required for this, that some touch each other; yet in accepting 'simul' in the first mode parts of a line are at the same time, for nothing is intermediate between them.

As regards the eighth point; when it is said that those are continuous whose extremes are one, it is manifest that that proposition ought to be explained; for it is false according to the virtue of common speech since it involves a contradiction, as that involves a contradiction, 'more men are one man'; for, if they are extremes, they are more, and consequently are not one. Therefore, I say that the understanding of the philos-

ille, 'continua sunt illa quae faciunt per se unum,' id est, 'non distant,' sive 'inter quae nihil est medium.'

Ad nonum, quando dicitur quod punctum est indivisibile, dicendum est quod philosophus vel loquebatur secundum opinionem famosam vel exponenda est propositio sicut dictum est prius.

Ad confirmationem quando dicitur quod philosophus probat quod nullum quantum componitur ex indivisibilibus, dicendum quod verum est; et illa, cum sit negativa, non infert aliquam talem affirmativam, 'aliquod indivisibile est.'

Et quando dicitur quod vanum fuisset ita diffuse probare continuum non componi ex indivisibilibus nisi essent aliqua talia indivisibilia, decendum quod non est vanum probare unam conclusionem per diversa media, quamvis posset probari per unum medium sufficienter. Unde sufficiens medium fuit probare nullum indivisibile esse sed tamen alia non superfluerent, et hoc specialiter in illo casu; nam probare quod nihil est indivisibile in istis inferioribus non potest fieri nisi per rationes subtiles, quas mathematici et alii minus exercitati in metaphysica et logica non possunt comprehendere. Sed probare continuum non componi ex indivisibilibus per alia media, etiam si essent talia indivisibilia, potest fieri per rationes magis apparentes mathematicis et aliis quibuscumque, sicut alias ostendetur; et ideo non sunt rationes superfluae.

opher is this, 'those are continuous which make one per se,' that is, 'they are not separate,' or 'between which nothing is intermediate.'

As regards the ninth point; when it is said that a point is indivisible, it must be said that the philosopher either was speaking according to the famous opinion or the proposition must be explained, as was stated before.

When it is said for confirmation that the philosopher proves that no quantum is composed of indivisibles, it must be said that it is true; and that, since it may be negative, does not infer any such affirmative, 'something is indivisible.'

And when it is said that it would have been useless to prove so diffusedly that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles unless there were some such indivisibles, it must be said that it is not useless to prove one conclusion through diverse intermediates, although it might be able to be proved sufficiently through one intermediate. Whence, an intermediate was sufficient to prove that there is no indivisible, but however others would not be superfluous, and this especially in that case; for to prove that nothing is indivisible in these inferiors can not be accomplished except through subtle reasons, which mathematicians and others less skilled in metaphysics and logic can not comprehend. But to prove that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles through other intermediates, even if there were such indivisibles, can be accomplished through reasons more apparent to mathematicians and to all others, as will be shown elsewhere; and, therefore, the reasons are not superfluous.

Ad decimum, potest dici sicut ad praecedentia, quia loquebatur secundum famosam opinionem.

Ad argumentum principale patet quod illa, 'punctus est terminus lineae,' est falsa de virtute sermonis, est tamen vera secundum sensum quod praetendit sicut dictum est.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR

Utrum linea et superficies realiter distinguantur inter se et a corpore. Et videtur quod sic; quia secundum philosophum in Praedicamentis sunt distinctae species quantitatis, ergo distinguuntur realiter inter se et a corpore.

Ad oppositum; sicut punctus habet se ad lineam sic se habet linea ad superficiem, et superficies ad corpus; sed punctus non est realiter distinctus a linea sicut probatum est in Praedicamentibus; igitur nec linea a superficie nec superficies a corpore, et per consequens linea et superficies non distinguuntur inter se nec a corpore.

Ad illam quaestionem dico quod linea et superficies non sunt res distinctae inter se et a corpore. Quod enim linea non sit distincta a superficie potest probari per primam rationem et tertiam et quartam, et per alias rationes theologicas per quas probatur quod punctus non est res indivisibilis distincta realiter a linea; nam si linea esset talis alia res, non esset in aliquo subiecto primo et adaequato. Similiter essent infinitae lineae, quarum nulla esset pars alterius.

As regards the tenth point; it can be said just as about the preceding; for he was speaking according to the famous opinion.

As regards the principal argument it is obvious, that this, 'a point is the terminus of a line,' is false according to the virtue of common speech, yet it is true according to the sense that it alleges, as has been said.

QUESTION II

In the second place it is asked, whether a line and a surface may really be distinguished from each other and from a body. And it seems that they are; for they are distinct species of quantity according to the philosopher in the Categories; therefore, they are really distinguished from each other and from a body.

As regards the opposite; as is the relation of a point to a line so is the relation of a line to a surface, and a surface to a body; but a point is not really distinct from a line, as was proved in the Categories; therefore, a line is not distinct from a surface nor a surface from a body, and consequently a line and a surface are not distinguished from each other or from a body.

With respect to that question, I say that a line and a surface are not things distinct from each other and from a body. For that a line may not be distinct from a surface can be proved through the first, third, and fourth reasons, and through other theological reasons through which it is proved that a point is not an indivisible thing really distinct from a line; for if a line were such another thing, it would be in some primary and adequate subject. Similarly, there would be infinite lines, none of which would be a part of another.

Similiter Deus non posset dividere unum continuum nisi causaret plures res absolutas, et destrueret aliquam rem absolutam; nec posset unire, nisi consimiliter corrumperet et produceret res novas. Similiter tunc non videtur contradictio quod esset superficies sine linea, et per consequens esset superficies non terminata, et tamen esset finitae latitudinis.

Quod autem superficies esset distincta a corpore potest probari per primam rationem theologicam, quia non potest sibi assignari aliud subiectum adaequatum et primum sicut evidenter apparet. Similiter potest hoc probari per tertiam rationem, nam essent infinitae superficies in actu sed in potentia tantum finitae, quia solae ultimae superficies corporis sunt in actu, aliae autem non sunt nisi tantum in potentia.

Contra sic ponentes; aut partes corporis copulantur ad superficiem quae est in rerum natura et existens, aut ad superficiem quae non est in rerum natura sed potest esse. Si detur primum, igitur illa superficies est in actu, et per consequens sunt infinitae superficies in actu. Si detur secundum, igitur illae partes corporis non sunt actualiter continuae sed tantum in potentia, quia nullae partes actualiter continuantur per id quod non est in rerum natura.

Et tunc quaero, quomodo illa potentia reducetur ad actum; an quando illae partes continuantur, an quando non continuantur. Non primo modo quia tunc secundum illos semper superficies continuans est in potentia non in actu; nec secundo modo, quia tunc non continuantur. Sed dicatur quod illa superficies non dicitur

Similarly, God might not be able to divide one continuum unless He could create more absolute things, and could destroy some absolute things; nor would He be able to unite, unless He could very similarly corrupt and produce new things. Similarly, then it does not seem contradictory that there could be a surface without a line, and consequently there could be a surface not terminated, and yet it would be of finite length.

But that a surface could be distinct from a body can be proved through the first theological reason; for another primary and adequate subject can not be assigned to itself, as is evidently clear. Similarly, this can be proved through the third reason, for there would be surfaces infinite actually but potentially only finite; for the extreme surfaces alone of a body are actually; but the others are not except only potentially.

In opposition to those positing thus; either the parts of the body are joined to a surface, which is in the nature of things and is existent, or to a surface which is not in the nature of things but can be. If the first be granted; then that surface is actually, and consequently there are surfaces infinite actually. If the second be conceded, then those parts of a body are not actually continuous but only potentially; for no parts are actually continuous through that which is not in the nature of things.

And then I ask, how that potentiality may be reduced to actuality; whether when those parts are continuous or when they are not continuous. Not in the first mode, for then according to those writers a continuant surface always is potentially, not actually; nor in the second mode, for then they are not continuous. But it may be said that that surface is not indeed said to

ideo esse in potentia quia non est in rerum natura, sed quia non est separata a corpore; sicut partes dicuntur in potentia non quia non sunt in rerum natura, sed quia non sunt separatae a toto.

Contra hoc non sufficit. Primo, quia ad hoc inconveniens sequitur tale, quod, scilicet, infinita sunt in rerum natura eiusdem quantitatis. Secundo, quia omne, quod est in rerum natura et non est pars alterius, est simpliciter in actu sibi competenti, sed illa superficies est in rerum natura et non est pars alterius; igitur est simpliciter in actu.

Tertio, sic; quia sicut illa superficies media non est separata a corpore ita nec ultima est separata a corpore; igitur sicut ultima est in actu, ita illa est in actu. Sic igitur patet quod, si superficies sit alia res a corpore, sequitur illud inconveniens quod infinita eiusdem quantitatis, quorum nullum est pars alterius, sunt in actu.

Conclusio etiam principalis potest probari per quattuor et quinque rationes, et per alias sequentes. Si enim superficies sit res secundum se totam distincta a corpore, non videtur aliqua contradictio quod Deus faciat eam sine corpore, vel econverso; et per consequens potest esse corpus sine omni superficie tali et tamen erit finitum et continuum; ergo omnino frustra ponitur superficies.

Similiter quaero quomodo superficies et corpus faciunt unum in sacramento altaris; aut faciunt unum per se aut unum per accidens aut unum aggregatione so-

be potentially; for it is not in the nature of things; but because it is not separate from a body; as parts are said to be potentially, not because they are not in the nature of things, but because they are not separate from a whole.

On the contrary, this does not suffice. First, because according to this such an inconsistency follows; namely, that infinites are in the nature of things of the same quantity. In the second place, because everything, which is in the nature of things and is not part of another, is simply actually suitable to itself, but that surface is in the nature of things and is not a part of another; therefore, it simply is actually.

In the third place thus; for, as that intermediate surface is not separate from a body, so neither is the extreme separate from a body; therefore, as the extreme is actually, so that is actually. Thus, therefore, it is obvious that, if a surface be a thing other than a body; this inconsistency follows, that infinites of the same quantity, of which none is part of another, are actually.

However, the principal conclusion can be proved through four and five reasons and through other reasons which follow. For if a surface be a thing as regards itself as a whole distinct from a body, there does not appear any contradiction that God may make it without a body, or conversely; and consequently a body can be without any such surface, and yet it will be finite and continuous; therefore, a surface is needlessly posited.

Similarly, I ask how a surface and a body make one in the sacrament of the altar; whether they make one per se or one through accident or one only by aggre-

lum. Primum non potest dari, quia tunc superficies esset pars corporis vel ambo essent partes essentiales alterius, quod non potest dari. Et si dicatur quod superficies, quamvis non sit pars quantitativa corporis, est tamen pars essentialis corporis, nec improbatur a philosopho, quamvis improbetur, quod superficies sit pars quidditativa corporis.

Contra quandocumque aliquod est pars alterius, vel est eiusdem rationis cum alia parte vel alterius rationis. Igitur si superficies sit pars corporis quod est per se unum, vel est eiusdem rationis cum alia parte corporis vel alterius rationis, quod etiam non potest dari; quia, quandocumque aliquae partes diversarum rationum faciunt per se unum, una illarum est materia vel potentia, et alia est actus vel forma, sed potentia et actus facientes per se unum numquam distinguuntur loco et situ, sicut manifeste patet; ergo nullo modo sunt (corpus et superficies) potentia et actus, et per consequens non faciunt per se unum.

Secundum etiam non potest dari, videlicet, quod superficies et corpus faciunt unum per accidens, quia tunc unum esset actus alterius, et per consequens superficies esset subiective in corpore, vel econverso; quorum utrumque est falsum ex argumentis factis in praecedenti quaestione.

Nec potest dari tertium; scilicet, quod faciunt aggregatione unum, quia tunc non posset assignari quod superficies aliter esset terminus corporis quam vas est terminus aquae. Tunc etiam nulla apparet contradictio quin Deus posset facere corpus in eodem loco et situ

gation. The first can not be granted; for then a surface would be part of a body or both would be essential parts of another, which can not be conceded. And if it be said that a surface, although it may not be a quantitative part of a body, is however an essential part of a body; it is not refuted by the philosopher, although it may be refuted, that a surface may be a quidditative part of a body.

On the contrary, whenever something is part of another, either it is of the same ground as another part or it is of another ground. Therefore, if a surface be a part of a body which is per se one, either it is of the same ground as another part of a body or it is of another ground, which also can not be conceded; for, whenever some parts of diverse grounds make one per se, one of them is matter or potentiality, and the other is actuality or form; but potentiality and actuality making one per se are never distinguished in place or situation, as is manifestly obvious; therefore, in no mode are body and surface potentiality and actuality, and consequently they do not make one per se.

The second also can not be granted; namely, that a surface and a body make one by accident; for then one would be the actuality of another, and consequently a surface would be subjectively in a body, or conversely; each of which is false according to the arguments set forth in the preceding question.

Nor can the third be conceded; namely, that they make one by aggregation, since it could not then be affirmed that a surface would otherwise be a terminus of a body than that a vase is a terminus of water. Then also no contradiction appears in the statement that God might be able to make a body in the same

sine superficie, sicut potest facere aquam in eodem loco et situ sine vase; et tamen tunc corpus esset continuum infinitum sine omni superficie; quo concesso patet quod omnino frustra ponitur talis superficies.

Similiter tunc ante transsubstantiationem superficies vel esset sine substantia vel esset in alia substantia, tamquam in subiecto primo et adaequato, et non in eadem substantia in qua est primo et adaequato corpus, sicut potest probari per argumenta facta in quaestione praecedenti, et per consequens esset alia substantia ibi praeter materiam et formam in quibus ponitur corpus quod est quantitas subiective.

Ex praedictis patet quod linea et superficies non distinguuntur realiter inter se; et quia probatum est quod superficies non distinguitur a corpore, ergo nec linea, et per consequens nec inter se nec a corpore realiter distinguuntur.

Ad argumentum principale dico, quod isti conceptus 'linea' et 'superficies' sunt distincti, et hoc sufficit ad distinctionem specierum; hoc tamen non obstante illa, quae significantur, non sunt distincta; sic enim 'locus' et 'superficies' sunt species distinctae, et tamen non sunt distincta realiter; sed sufficit quod significent diversimode idem, sicut dicit commentator, IV. Metaphysica de 'ente' et 'uno,' ubi vult quod 'ens' et 'unum' significant idem, sed modis diversis.

Unde sicut talis diversitas modorum significandi eandem rem falsificat praedicationem unius de alio, quamvis tales modi significandi non sint nisi duo, sci-

place and situation without a surface, as he can make water in the same place and situation without a vase; and yet a body would then be an infinite continuum without any surface; if this is conceded, it is obvious that such a surface is posited entirely in vain.

Similarly, then before transubstantiation a surface either would be without a substance or would be in another substance, as if in a primary and adequate subject, and not in the same substance in which a body is in a primary and adequate subject; as can be proved through the arguments set forth in the preceding question, and consequently there would be another substance there besides matter and form in which a body is posited, which is a quantity subjectively.

From the preceding statements it is obvious, that a line and a surface are not really distinguished from each other; and because it was proved that a surface is not distinguished from a body; therefore, neither is a line, and consequently they are not really distinguished from each other or from a body.

As regards the principal argument, I say that these concepts 'line' and 'surface' are distinct, and this suffices for a distinction of species; yet notwithstanding this, those, which are signified, are not distinct; for 'place' and 'surface' are thus distinct species, and yet they are not really distinct; but it suffices that they signify the same in diverse modes, as the commentator says in Book IV. of the Metaphysics concerning 'entity' and 'one,' where he states that 'entity' and 'one' signify the same, but in diverse modes.

Whence, as such diversity of modes of signifying the same thing vitiates the predication of one of another, although there may be only two such modes of

licet, 'casus' et 'numerus'; ita diversitas modorum significandi sufficit ad distinctionem specierum, quantumcumque frequenter una vere praedicetur de alia.

Contra ista sunt multa quae ad praesens pertranseo, quia alias in diversis locis dixi de eis.

TERTIO QUAERITUR

Utrum corpus, quod est quantitas, sit res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia. Quod sic probatur; quia secundum philosophum Primo Posteriorum negativa est immediata in qua negatur unum praedicamentum ab alio, sicut haec est immediata, 'nulla substantia est quantitas,' et per consequens substantia est alia res a quantitate.

Ad oppositum; substantia de se habet partes, igitur de se est quanta; igitur non est per aliam rem quanta, et per consequens non est alia res.

Circa istam quaestionem; primo declarabo unam opinionem per viam narrationis; secundo per viam probationis; tertio ponam obiectiones contra istam opinionem et solvam.

Circa primum, dico quod quantitas non est alia res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et a qualitate. Sed si hoc nomen 'quantitas' supponat pro aliqua re et habeat praecise vim nominis 'categoreumatici' in significando, debet concedi quod aliqua quantitas non est substantia sed qualitas, ita quod quantitas praedicatur

signification, namely, 'case' and 'number'; so a diversity of modes of signification suffices for the distinction of species, no matter how frequently one be truly predicated of another.

There are many arguments contrary to these which I pass over for the present; for I have spoken of them elsewhere in diverse places.

QUESTION III

It is asked in the third place whether a body, which is a quantity, may be an absolute thing really distinct from substance. Which is thus proved; for according to the philosopher in the first book of the Posteriores, a negative is immediate in which one category is denied of another, as this is immediate, 'no substance is a quantity,' and consequently a substance is a thing other than a quantity.

As regards the opposite; a substance has of itself parts; therefore, it is of itself a quantum; therefore, it is not a quantum through another thing; and consequently it is not another thing.

Regarding this question; in the first place, I shall declare one opinion through the mode of narration; in the second place, through the mode of demonstration; in the third place, I shall posit the objections against this opinion and I shall refute them.

Regarding the first, I say that quantity is not another absolute thing really distinct from substance and quality. But if this name 'quantity' be substituted for another thing and have precisely the force of the name 'categorematic' in signification, it ought to be conceded that any quantity is not substance but quality, so that

particulariter tam de substantia quam de qualitate; quia aliqua substantia est quantitas, et aliqua qualitas est quantitas.

Modus autem ponendi est ille, aliqua substantia est simpliciter indivisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, quae substantia est angelus et anima intellectiva; omnis autem alia substantia componitur ex aliquibus partibus eiusdem rationis inter se, quamvis non omnes partes sint eiusdem rationis cum toto inter se; sicut etiam in homine aliquae partes sunt eiusdem rationis inter se, quamvis non omnes partes sunt eiusdem rationis cum homine; tales autem sicut ex naturis suis sine omni re addita habent quod sunt plures, quamvis non sunt plures causaliter ex se sed per suas causas essentiales, puta, efficientem et finalem, ita ex suis naturis habent quod naturaliter et per agens creatum, quicquid sit de potentia divina absoluta, non sunt in eodem loco et situ. Et ideo ex hoc quod producuntur a quocumque agente creato producuntur, sunt in distincto situ ita quod una pars distat ab alia situ et est extra aliam, quantumcumque nulla alia res secum producatur; et si sit alius locus ambiens ipsum productum, illud productum, quantumcumque nulla alia res sibi inhaereret, esset circumscriptive in illo loco, ita quod totum esset in toto loco et pars in parte; et per consequens eo ipso esset quantum, quia nihil aliud esset quantitas, de qua est quaestio, quam corpus continuum per se unum vel res habens partes vel partem extra partem circumscrip-

quantity is predicated particularly of substance as well as of quality; for any substance is a quantity, and any quality is a quantity.

But the mode of positing is this: some substance is simply not divisible into parts of the same ground, which substance is an angel and a rational soul; but every other substance is composed of some parts of the same ground among themselves, although not all parts may be of the same ground with the whole among themselves; as also in man some parts are of the same ground among themselves, although not all the parts are of the same ground with man; but such as are so constituted out of their own natures without any thing added, that they are more, although they are not more causally out of themselves but through their essential causes, say, efficient and final; so out of their natures are they constituted that they are not in the same place and situation naturally and through created agency, whatever may be of the absolute divine power. And indeed from this, that they are produced by whatever created agency they are produced, they are in a distinct situation so that one part is separate from another in situation and is outside another, no matter how much no other thing may be produced with it; and if there be another place surrounding the same product, that product, no matter how much no other thing might inhere in it, would be circumscriptively in that place, so that the whole would be in a whole place and a part in a part; and consequently by this itself it would be a quantum; since nothing other could be quantity, concerning which there is a question, than a continuous body per se one or a thing having parts or a part outside of a part existing circumscriptively in a place,

tive existens in loco, si locus sit ambiens ipsum. Et ita ipsamet substantia per hoc solum, quod habet partem extra partem sine omni re adveniente sibi, est quanta; et per consequens ad hoc, quod sit quanta, non requiritur talis alia res. Et sicut est de substantia quod aliqua habet tales partes, ita est de aliqua qualitate, quae sine omni re addita sibi, immo si ab omni alia re esset separata et haberet partem extra partem, esset quanta, et per consequens ista qualitas non differret realiter ab ista quantitate. Sic igitur aliqua quantitas est substantia, et aliqua quantitas est qualitas, sicut aliqua substantia habet partem extra partem, et aliqua qualitas habet partem extra partem.

Secundo, probo istam conclusionem; scilicet, quod aliqua substantia est quantitas, et eodem modo potest probari quod aliqua qualitas est quantitas; ita, scilicet, quod non sit alia res distincta.

Primo, sic: omnem rem absolutam priorem alia re absoluta, potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta conservare et posteriorem destruere non mutando illam rem priorem localiter vel situaliter. Si igitur haec substantia sit quanta, puta, ille lapis, potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta conservare illam substantiam et destruere illam rem posteriorem, quae ponitur quantitas, non mutando substantiam illius lapidis localiter vel situaliter, sed cum quiete illius substantiae; quia non videtur necessarium, ita quod eius oppositum includat contradictionem, si Deus velit illam rem absolutam priorem conservare, quod cogatur eam mutare loco ad locum.

Ponatur igitur quod sine mutatione locali illa res prior conservetur et posterior destruatur. Tunc quaero

if there be a place surrounding it. And so the substance itself through this alone, that it has part outside of part without any thing advening to it, is a quantum; and consequently for this, that it may be a quantum, such another thing is not required. And as it is of substance that something has such parts, so is it of any quality, which would be a quantum without any thing added to it; even if it could be separated from every other thing and could have part outside of part, and consequently this quality would not really differ from this quantity. So, therefore, any quantity is substance, and any quantity is quality; as any substance has part outside of part, and any quality has part outside of part.

In the second place, I prove this conclusion; namely, that any substance is quantity, and in the same mode it can be proved that any quality is quantity; so, namely, that it may not be another distinct thing.

First in this way: God can of His own absolute power preserve every absolute thing prior to another absolute thing, and can destroy a posterior not by changing that prior thing locally or in situation. Therefore, if this substance be quantum, say, that stone, God can of His absolute power preserve that substance and destroy that posterior thing, which is posited as quantity, not by changing the substance of that stone locally or in situation, but with the repose of that substance; for it does not seem necessary, so that the opposite of this may involve a contradiction, if God wills to preserve that absolute thing prior, that He be compelled to change it from place to place.

Therefore, let it be posited that that prior thing may be preserved without local change and that a posterior

aut illa substantia est circumscriptive in loco aut non est circumscriptive in loco. Si detur primum, igitur illa substantia est quanta; igitur haec est aliqua quantitas et haec non est alia res posterior; igitur haec, 'aliqua quantitas est sine quantitate,' quod est falsum; si non sit circumscriptive in loco.

Contra, accipio unam partem illius substantiae et quaero, aut est in eodem loco sive diffinitive sive circumscriptive in quo est alia pars aut non. Si sic, igitur est mutata localiter, quia prius non erat in eodem loco. Si non sit in eodem loco, igitur est in alio et per consequens totum est in toto loco et pars in parte; et per consequens totum est circumscriptive in loco, et per consequens totum est quantum sine omni alia re addita sibi.

Unde multo magis derogatur divinae potentiae dicendo quod Deus non potest conservare rem priorem sine mutatione locali ipsius et destruere rem posteriorem, quod tamen sequitur ad contrariam opinionem, quam ponere quod aliqua quantitas est substantia; si dicatur quod substantia illa non habet partes nisi per quantitatem, et ideo destructa quantitate non habet partem et per consequens non erit in loco circumscriptive sed tantum diffinitive.

Contra ista positio non vitiat responsionem quia semper sequitur illud inconveniens quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest conservare rem priorem sine mutatione locali destruendo rem posteriorem. Praeterea responsio falsum accipit, scilicet, quod substantia non habet partes nisi per quantitatem si quantitas sit alia res.

may be destroyed. Then I ask whether that substance is circumscriptively in a place or is not circumscriptively in a place. If the first is granted, then that substance is quantum; therefore, this is some quantity and this is not another posterior thing; therefore, this, 'some quantity is without quantity,' which is false; if it be not circumscriptively in a place.

On the contrary, I take one part of that substance and I ask, whether or not it is either definitively or circumscriptively in the same place in which there is another part. If so, then it has been changed locally, because it was not before in the same place. If it be not in the same place, then it is in another and consequently a whole is in a whole place and a part in a part; and consequently the whole is circumscriptively in a place, and consequently the whole is a quantum without any other thing added to it.

Whence, it much more restricts the divine power by saying that God can not preserve a thing prior without local change of it and destroy a thing posterior, which however follows according to the contrary opinion, than to posit that some quantity is substance; if it be said that that substance does not have parts except through quantity; and, therefore, when quantity is destroyed, it does not have part and consequently will not be in a place circumscriptively but only definitively.

On the contrary, this proposition does not vitiate a response; for there always follows that inconsistency, that God of His absolute power can not preserve a thing prior without local change by destroying the thing posterior. Moreover, the response embraces a falsehood; namely, that substance does not have parts except through quantity, if quantity be another thing.

Primo, quia si tota substantia est prior tota quantitate et subiectum eius, ita pars substantiae est prior parte quantitatis et subiectum eius; igitur partes substantiae sunt priores partibus quantitatis, si quantitas est res existens subiective in substantia; igitur substantia non habet partes praecise per aliam rem advenientem sibi. Praeterea id, quod manet sine alio, est prius isto, sed pars ista substantiae est sine illa quantitate; igitur prior est ea, et eadem ratione est prior alia quantitate.

Si dicatur quod substantia non habet alias partes nisi partes quae sunt partes quantitatis, ita quod partes istae non sunt substantiae sed sunt quantitates, (contra illa pars quantitatis est in aliquo subiecto primo; aut igitur in eodem subiecto primo in quo est alia pars quantitatis, aut in alia; si in eodem igitur illud subiectum non plus est extensum per quantitatem quam anima intellectiva, quae est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte; si sit in alio subiecto, igitur sunt ibi distinctae partes quantitatis; puta, dividatur lignum in duas partes) manifestum est, quod utraque quantitas est in aliquo subiecto, et non in eodem; igitur in distinctis, et per consequens vel per divisionem causatur nova substantia vel istae substantiae, quae sunt istarum quantitatum, erant ante divisionem, et habet propositum.

Secundo, arguo sic: non est magis impossibile Deo facere 'rem habentem partes distinctas realiter' coexistere alicui toti non informanti ita quod totum coexistit toti et pars parti quam facere istam eandem rem

First; because, if a whole substance is prior to a whole quantity and the subject of it, so a part of a substance is prior to a part of a quantity and the subject of it; therefore, parts of a substance are prior to parts of a quantity, if quantity is a thing existing subjectively in substance; therefore, substance does not have parts precisely through another thing advening to it. Moreover, that, which remains without another, is before this, but this part of substance is without that quantity; therefore, it is prior to it, and for the same reason is prior to another quantity.

If it be said that substance does not have other parts except parts which are parts of a quantity, so that these are not substances but are quantities, (on the contrary that part of a quantity is in some primary subject; therefore, either in the same primary subject in which there is another part of quantity, or in another; therefore, if in the same, that subject is not extended through quantity more than the rational soul, which is a whole in a whole body and a whole in each part; if it be in another subject, then there are distinct parts of quantity there say, wood may be divided into two parts) it is manifest; that each quantity is in some subject, and not in the same; therefore in distinct, and consequently either a new substance is caused through division or these substances, which are of these quantities, were before division; and the proposition is maintained.

In the second place, I argue thus: it is not more impossible for God to make 'a thing having parts really distinct' to coexist with some whole not informing so that a whole coexists with a whole and a part with a part, than to make this same thing to coexist with

coexistere toti tali informanti. Sed secundum communiter opinantes 'substantia habens partes distinctas realiter coexistit toti quantitati informanti ita quod tota substantia est sub tota quantitate,' et 'pars substantiae sub parte quantitatis'; igitur possibile est Deo facere quod substantia tota sit coexistens eidem quantitati non informanti et pars toti. Hoc posito, ista substantia vere est quanta, quia vere habet partem distinctam situ a parte, et non est substantia quanta per aliquam quantitatem aliam informantem, quia ponitur quod nulla quantitas substantiae informet eam, sed tantum coexistat sibi; igitur est quanta per seipsam; igitur ipsa substantia est quaedam quantitas, quod est propositum.

Confirmationem istius rationis pono per dicta aliorum opinantium contraria, quia secundum eos quicquid sit de respectu intrinsecus adveniente, dicitur de respectu extrinsecus adveniente, tamen est verum; sed Deus potest facere extrema sine tali respectu, quia respectus inhaerentiae, quo quantitas inhaeret subiecto, est respectus extrinsecus adveniens secundum eos; igitur potest Deus facere ista extrema sine tali respectu. Conservet igitur Deus istam substantiam lapidis et illam quantitatem destruendo praecise illum respectum inhaerentiae. Hoc posito, adhuc ista substantia habebit respectum praesentialitatis ad istam quantitatem, ita quod tota erit praesens toti et pars parti; igitur illa substantia habet partem extra partem, et per consequens esset quanta et tamen sine omni quantitate in-

such a whole informing. But according to those holding this opinion in common, 'a substance having parts really distinct coexists with a whole quantity informing so that a whole substance is under a whole quantity,' and 'a part of a substance is under part of a quantity'; therefore, it is possible for God to bring it to pass that a whole substance may be coexisting with the same quantity not informing and part with the whole. This having been posited, this substance is truly a quantum; for it truly has part distinct in situation from part, and a substance is not a quantum through some other quantity informing; for it is posited that no quantity of a substance may inform it, but it may only coexist with it; therefore, it is a quantum through itself; therefore, the substance itself is a certain quantity, which is the thesis.

I posit the confirmation of this ground through the statements of those holding opposite views; for according to them, whatever may be of a respect intrinsically advening, is said of a respect extrinsically advening, yet it is true; but God can make extremes without such a respect; for the respect of inherence, by which quantity inheres in a subject, is a respect extrinsically advening according to those writers; therefore, God can make these extremes without such a respect. Therefore, God may preserve this substance of stone and that quantity by destroying precisely that respect of inherence. This having been posited, still this substance will have the respect of presentiality as regards this quantity, so that a whole will be present with a whole and a part with a part; therefore, that substance has part outside of part, and consequently would be a quantum and yet without any quantity informing;

formante; igitur ipsamet substantia est tunc quantitas. Istae duae rationes probant quod substantia vere est quanta per suas partes substantiales sine omni alia re adveniente sibi et per consequens quod ipsa est quantitas.

Ex quo arguo ulterius quod non est aliqua alia quantitas nisi substantia vel qualitas; quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; sed omnia, quae possunt salvari per talem quantitatem distinctam a substantia et qualitate, possunt salvari sine ea, sicut inductive patet; igitur talis quantitas distincta a substantia et qualitate non est ponenda. Per istas etiam duas rationes potest probari quod qualitas est quantitas; assumpta ista maiore quod qua ratione potest Deus facere qualitatem sine quantitate, si sit alia res, cum non magis dependeat a quantitate quam a substantia. Similiter si Deus potest facere talem quantitatem, quam ponunt, sine substantia, eadem ratione poterit facere qualitatem sine quantitate, cum non plus dependet qualitas a quantitate quam qualitas a substantia. Confirmo rationes praedictas.

Non magis repugnat substantiae habenti partes per seipsam sine omni alia re informante eam esse in loco divisibili, ita quod tota res sit in toto loco et partes in partibus loci, quam repugnet rei indivisibili sine omni re informante eam esse in toto loco et in qualibet parte; sed res indivisibilis, sicut angelus et anima intellectiva, est tota in toto loco et in qualibet parte; igitur non repugnat rei habenti partes realiter distinctas,

therefore, the substance itself is then quantity. Those two reasons prove that substance is truly quantum through its substantial parts without any other thing advening to itself, and consequently that it itself is quantity.

From which I argue farther that there is not any other quantity except substance or quality; for that is needlessly accomplished through more which can be accomplished through fewer; but all, which can be saved through such a quantity distinct from substance and quality, can be saved without it, as is obvious inductively; therefore, such a quantity distinct from substance and quality must not be posited. It can also be proved through these two reasons, that quality is quantity; since this major premise is assumed, that God for this reason can make quality without quantity, if it be another thing, since it may no more depend on quantity than on substance. Similarly, if God can make such quantity, which they posit, without substance; for the same reason he could make quality without quantity, since quality no more depends on quantity than quality on substance. I confirm the previous arguments.

It is not more inconsistent for a substance having parts through its own self without every other thing informing it to be in a divisible place so that a whole thing may be in a whole place and parts in parts of a place, than it may be inconsistent for an indivisible thing without every thing informing it to be in a whole place and in each part; but an indivisible thing, as an angel and a rational soul, is a whole in a whole place and in each part; therefore, it is not inconsistent for a thing having parts really distinct, of such a kind is

cuiusmodi est substantia materialis et etiam multae qualitates, esse totam in toto loco et partem in parte sine omni alia re adveniente. Sed hoc posito talis res vere habebit partem extra partem et per consequens erit quanta sine omni alia re adveniente sibi; unde multum videntur derogare divinae potentiae illi qui dicunt quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest facere quod una res distet situ ab alia, nisi faciat unam aliam rem facientem illas res distare; et magis videntur negare divinam omnipotentiam quam illi qui dicunt quod substantia habens partes est sine omni alia re sibi adveniente quanta et circumscriptive in loco.

Item confirmantur praedictae rationes. Non plus repugnat substantiae compositae ex aliquibus distinctis realiter et natis distare situ esse per seipsam sine re addita sibi in loco modo sibi convenienti, quam repugnat substantiae indivisibili non habenti partes esse in loco modo sibi convenienti sine re addita sibi. Sed angelus sine omni re addita sibi est in loco diffinitive; igitur non repugnat substantiae habenti partes distinctas realiter esse in loco circumscriptive sine omni re addita sibi. Sed nihil est in loco circumscriptive nisi quantum; igitur substantia potest esse quanta sine omni re distincta, realiter addita sibi; igitur frustra ponitur talis alia quantitas.

Item confirmatur; quia omnis res, quae est praesens alteri rei localiter, per seipsam vel per aliud intrinsecum est sibi praesens, nihil enim aliud est dictum

material substance and also many qualities, to be a whole in a whole place and a part in a part without every other thing advening. But if this is posited, such a thing will truly have part outside of part, and consequently will be quantum without any other thing advening to it; whence they seem to detract much from the divine power who say that God of His own absolute power can not bring it to pass that one thing may be separate from another in situation, unless He create one other thing making those things to be separate; and they seem to reject the divine omnipotence more than those who say that a substance having parts is a quantum without any other thing advening to itself and is circumscriptively in a place.

Again, the preceding reasons are confirmed. It is not more inconsistent for a substance composed of some things really distinct and created to be separate in situation to be through itself without a thing added to itself in a place in a mode suitable to itself, than it is inconsistent for an indivisible substance not having parts to be in a place in a mode suitable to itself without a thing added to itself. But an angel without any thing added to itself is in a place definitively; therefore, it is not inconsistent for a substance having parts really distinct to be in a place circumscriptively without any thing added to itself. But nothing is in a place circumscriptively except a quantum; therefore, a substance can be a quantum without any thing really distinct added to it; therefore, such another quantity is needlessly posited.

Again, it is confirmed; for every thing, which is present to another thing locally, is present to itself through itself or through another intrinsic; for it has

quod una res est praesens localiter alteri nisi quia finis suus est ibi praesens localiter. Si igitur substantia lapidis sit praesens loco, per seipsam est praesens loco, et per consequens eadem ratione partes substantiae per seipsas sunt praesentes loco, et per consequens tota substantia est per seipsam fundamentaliter circumscriptive in loco; sed omne, quod seipso est circumscriptive in loco, seipso est quantum, igitur substantia seipsa est quanta et per consequens est quantitas. Eadem ratio fieri potest de qualitate.

Item confirmantur praedictae rationes; quia quando aliqua sunt nata facere unum quae tamen possunt non facere unum, cuiusmodi sunt partes aquae et aëris et aliorum multorum, quia aliquando eaedem partes faciunt per se unum aliquando non. Si Deus potest facere ea esse in loco et situ distincta, quando non faciunt per se unum sine omni re addita eis, ista eadem potest Deus facere esse in loco et situ distincta sine omni re addita eis, quamvis faciunt per se unum, nulla enim ratio apparet quare unum plus debet negari ab omnipotentia divina quam reliquum. Sed Deus potest facere istum aërem, qui est hic, et illum aërem, qui est Romae, esse loco et situ distinctos destruendo omnia accidentia absoluta in eis et sine omni quantitate inhaerente eis; igitur Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere quod isti duo aëres uniantur et faciant unum aërem, et tamen quod sint distincti loco et situ sine omni tali re adveniente eis; igitur ille aër habebit partem extra partem sine re tamen addita, et per con-

not been said that one thing is locally present to another, unless because its *end* is present there locally. If, therefore, the substance of a stone be present in a place, it is present in a place through itself, and consequently for the same reason parts of a substance are present in a place through themselves, and consequently the whole substance is through itself fundamentally and circumscriptively in a place; but every thing, which in itself is circumscriptively in a place, is in itself a quantum; therefore, substance in itself is quantum and consequently is quantity. The same reason can be applied concerning quality.

Again, the previous reasons are confirmed; for when some are created to make one which however can not make one, of such kind are parts of water and of air and of many others; for sometimes the same parts make one per se, sometimes not. If God can make these to be distinct in place and in situation, when they do not make one per se without any thing added to them, God can make these same to be distinct in place and in situation without any thing added to them, although they make one per se; for no reason appears why one more than the rest ought to be denied of the divine omnipotence. But God can make this air, which is here, and that air which is at Rome, to be distinct in place and in situation by destroying all the absolute accidents in them and without any quantity inhering in them; therefore, God of His absolute power can bring it to pass that those two bodies of air may be united and make one body of air, and yet that they may be distinct in place and situation without any such thing advening to them; therefore, that air will have part outside of part without a thing however added,

sequens erit quantus sine tali re addita; igitur frustra ponitur talis res addita ad hoc, quod aër sit quantus.

Multis aliis viis possunt praedictae rationes confirmari, quas pertranseo causa brevitatis.

Tertio, principaliter arguitur sic secundum Magistrum Sententiarum Libro IV., Distinctione XII. Huiusmodi accidentia, sapor, color, pondus, et huiusmodi sunt sine subiecto in sacramento altaris. Sed si quantitas esset alia res deferens illas qualitates, illae qualitates non essent sine subiecto, sed essent in subiecto; immo nullo modo posset verificari commune dictum doctorum, et perinformiter, ut videtur, determinatio ecclesiae quod accidentia remanent in sacramento altaris sine subiecto; sic enim tantum unum accidens remaneret sine subiecto, et omnia alia essent in subiecto; igitur quantitas non esset talis res distincta, et cetera. Recte itaque intuendo Magistrum et textum cum glossa De Consecratione, et dicta sanctorum, non invenitur auctoritas ita apparens quod propter sacramentum altaris oporteat ponere talem aliam rem mediam inter substantiam et qualitates, sicut est ista contra talem rem mediam deferentem qualitates. In omnibus illis locis de mediante quantitate non fit mentio, nec semel etiam nominatur hoc vocabulum, nec aliqua auctoritas loquitur de quantitate utrum sit vel non sit nisi quod multi videntur ponere quod omnes qualitates in sacramento altaris non sunt in aliquo subiecto; unde dicit Magister sic Libro IV., Distinctione XII., A:

and consequently will be a quantum without such a thing added; therefore, such an added thing is needlessly posited for this, that air may be a quantum.

The previous reasons can be confirmed in many other ways, which I pass by for the sake of brevity.

In the third place, it is principally argued thus according to the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XII. Accidents of such a kind, taste, color, weight, and any other of the kind, are without a subject in the sacrament of the altar. But if quantity were another thing bearing those qualities, those qualities would not be without a subject, but would be in a subject; on the contrary the common dictum of the Doctors could in no mode be able to be verified, and very incorrectly, as it seems, the determination of the church that the accidents remain in the sacrament of the altar without a subject; for thus only one accident could remain without a subject, and all others would be in a subject; therefore, a quantity would not be such a distinct thing, et cetera. And so in carefully considering the Master and the text with the gloss on the De Consecratione and the statements of the Saints, there is not found a passage so apparent that by virtue of the sacrament of the altar it may be necessary to posit such another thing intermediate between substance and qualities, as is this against such an intermediate thing bearing qualities. No mention is made in all those places of an intermediate quantity nor is this term even once mentioned, nor does any passage speak of quantity, whether or not it be, except that many seem to posit that all the qualities in the sacrament of the altar are not in any subject; whence, the Master says thus in Book IV., Distinction XII., A:

"Remanent ergo illa accidentia," quae supra enumeravit; scilicet, sapor, pondus, et huiusmodi, "per se subsistentia ad mysterii ritum," et cetera. Nec tamen intendo dicere quod ponentes talem rem deferentem talia accidentia, de quibus loquuntur sancti et quae isti videntur ponere sine omni subiecto, sint haeretici vel errantes in fide seu circa sacramentum Eucharistiae, quia tales auctoritates licitum est eis exponere; nec omnes dicentes falsum sunt erronei aestimandi. Et sicut licitum est eis exponere tales auctoritates doctorum approbatorum ab ecclesia, ita licitum erit mihi non solum exponere sed etiam negare dicta sanctorum qui se mutuo reprobant, et in nullo tamquam authentici ab ecclesia approbantur.

Quarto, arguo sic: nullum accidens absolutum est simplicius suo subiecto primo et adaequato; sed, si quantitas esset alia aliqua res a substantia et qualitate, esset accidens. Quaero igitur de suo subiecto primo et adaequato, aut est materia aut est forma aut compositum. Non compositum, quia subiectum esset compositius suo accidente absoluto, quod videtur falsum; nec materia est suum subiectum, quia tunc aliquod accidens absolutum praecederet forman in materia; nec forma est suum subiectum primum, quia tunc materia si esset separata, non posset esse quanta, quod videtur esse falsum.

Similiter secundum commentatorem dimensiones formam praecedunt interminate in materia; igitur eadem ratione dimensiones terminatae sunt primo in materia. Illa ratio est efficax, sicut aestimo, si teneatur

"Those accidents, therefore, remain," which he enumerated before; namely, taste, weight, and any other of the kind, "subsisting per se at the celebration of the mystery," et cetera. However, I do not intend to say that those who posit such a thing bearing such accidents, of which the Saints speak and which they seem to posit without any subject, may be heretical or erring in the faith or about the sacrament of the Eucharist; for they were permitted to explain such passages; nor are all who have uttered a falsehood to be considered in error. And as they were permitted to explain such passages of the Doctors approved by the church, so I shall be permitted not only to explain but even to refute the statements of the Saints who mutually condemn one another, and in no way were approved as if authorized by the church.

In the fourth place, I argue thus: no absolute accident is more simple than its primary and adequate subject; but, if a quantity were any thing other than substance and quality, it would be an accident. Therefore, I ask about its primary and adequate subject, whether it is matter or form or a composite. It is not a composite; for a subject would be more composite than its absolute accident, which seems false; nor is matter its own subject, because then some absolute accident would precede form in matter; nor is form its own primary subject, because then matter, if it were separated, could not be a quantum, which seems to be false.

Similarly, dimensions precede form without limits in matter according to the commentator; therefore, for the same reason dimensions are limited at first in matter. That reason is valid, as I think, if this opinion

ista opinio quae negat istam entitatem distinctam a materia et forma, quam ponunt aliqui.

Quinto, arguo sic: secundum philosophum in Praedicamentis, sola substantia est susceptiva contrariorum; quantitas vero secundum illos non est substantia et tamen est susceptiva contrariorum, quod est contra Aristotelem.

Sexto, arguitur sic: quando ex denso fit rarum; quaero aut est ibi nova alia quantitas aut non; sed praecise est eadem quantitas numero; si est ibi nova, igitur quaelibet quantitas praecedens est corrupta, quod videtur falsum. Si pars sit nova; quaero de subiecto illius quantitatis, oportet enim quod sit tota substantia rarefacta vel pars eius; non tota quia tunc duae quantitates essent simul, quod negant sic opinantes. Si pars, sequitur idem, vel quod accidens migraret a subiecto in subiectum, sicut posset evidenter ostendi, sed obmittitur propter brevitatem. Si sit eadem quantitas, tunc sine variatione absoluti coexistit maiori loco nunc quam prius; sed hoc inconveniens ponitur de substantia; igitur frustra ponitur talis quantitas distincta a qualitate et a substantia.

Ideo dico propter illas rationes et multas alias tam physicas quam theologicas, quod quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, sed aliqua quantitas est realiter eadem cum substantia, et aliqua quantitas est realiter eadem cum qualitate; unde quantitas non est nisi 'res habens partem extra partem et habens partem distantem situ ab alia,' sive 'res existens

hold which rejects this entity distinct from matter and form, which some posit.

In the fifth place, I argue thus: according to the philosopher in the Categories, substance alone is susceptive of contraries; but quantity is not a substance according to those writers, and yet it is susceptive of contraries, which is contrary to Aristotle.

In the sixth place, it is argued thus: when a thing becomes rare from dense, I ask whether or not there is there another new quantity; but it is precisely the same quantity numerically; if it is new there, then any preceding quantity is corrupted, which seems false. If a part be new; I ask about the subject of that quantity, for it is necessary that there be a whole rarefied substance or a part of it; not the whole because then the two quantities would be at the same time, which they deny who think thus. If a part, the same argument follows, or that an accident might travel from subject into subject, as would be able to be clearly shown; but it is omitted for the sake of brevity. If it be the same quantity, then it coexists in a larger place now than before without the variation of an absolute; but this inconsistency is posited of substance; therefore, such a quantity distinct from quality and substance is needlessly posited.

Therefore, I say by virtue of those reasons and many other reasons, physical as well as theological, that quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance and quality, but any quantity is really the same as substance, and any quantity is really the same as quality; whence, quantity is not, unless 'a thing having part outside of part and having part separate from another in situation,' or 'a thing existing circumscrip-

circumscriptive in loco,' si sit aliquis ambiens ipsam. Et quia aliqua substantia seipsa fundamentaliter, quamvis causaliter a Deo vel aliis causis extrinsecis habet partem extra partem, nec oportet ponere aliam rem trahentem unam partem extra aliam. Sed causae extrinsecae rei, puta, efficiens et finalis, sufficiunt ad producendum res diversas, unam in uno situ et aliam in alio, sine omni re media inter eas; ideo ipsamet substantia est quanta sine omni alia re applicata sibi vel facta simul cum ea.

Et sicut dico de substantia, ita dico proportionabiliter de qualibet re corporali. Nec illa opinio in aliquo derogat sacramento altaris, sed multas difficultates circa sacramentum altaris evitat, sicut in respondendo ac obiciendo patebit.

Et ideo licet aliqui moderni forte stimulante invidia illam opinionem tamquam erroneam non argumentis sed detractionibus lacerarent; antiqui tamen doctores, quamvis eam non intelligerent, non tamen haereticam circa fidem vel mores reputaverunt, quorum rationes intendo recitare et solvere. Unde quidam doctor arguens contra eam dicit sic. Haec opinio est contra philosophum qui in Praedicamentis distinguit quantitatem a substantia et qualitate. Est etiam contra communem opinionem doctorum. Est etiam contra experientiam, et cum substantia corporea densatur absque conversione alicuius rei in ipsam, efficitur minoris quantitatis absque alicuius partis amissione. Est etiam contra rationem, quia in diversis subiectis differentibus

tively in a place,' if it be something surrounding itself. And because some substance in itself fundamentally, although causally by God or other extrinsic causes, has part outside of part; it is not necessary to posit another thing bearing one part outside of another part. But the extrinsic causes of a thing, say, efficient and final, are sufficient to produce things diverse, one in one situation and another in another, without any intermediate thing between them; therefore, the substance itself is a quantum without any other thing connected with itself or made at the same time with it.

And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of any corporeal thing. Nor does that opinion in any way detract from the sacrament of the altar; but it avoids many difficulties respecting the sacrament of the altar, as will be obvious in replying and in objecting.

And, therefore, although some modern writers, stimulated perhaps by envy, would censure that opinion as if erroneous not by arguments but by detractions; yet the ancient Doctors, although they could not understand it, did not, however, repudiate it as heretical respecting faith or character, whose reasons I intend to cite and to explain. Whence, a certain Doctor arguing against this opinion says thus. This opinion is contrary to the philosopher, who in the Categories distinguishes quantity from substance and quality. It is also contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. It is also contrary to experience; and when a corporeal substance is condensed without conversion of anything into itself, it is effected of a less quantity without the loss of any part. It is also contrary to reason, for in diverse subjects differing in species a

specie videtur posse esse eadem quantitas specie; non enim est alia longitudo seu latitudo vel profunditas in pugillo aëris quam in pugillo aquae. Quod etiam dicunt quantitatem qualitatis realiter differre a quantitate substantiae et ipsam realiter esse idem cum qualitate, est contra auctoritatem et rationem. Dicit enim philosophus VI. Physicorum, quod "qualitas non est quantitas nisi per accidens," quod non esset verum si quantitas diceretur proprie. Per rationes arguitur sic: impossibile est naturaliter corpus, quod est quantitas, simul esse cum alio corpore quod est quantitas; sed qualitas simul est cum substantia; igitur ex praedicta opinione sequitur hoc impossibile, quod naturaliter simul sunt soliditates duae et etiam multo plures; quia qua ratione albedo haberet suam propriam quantitatem, eadem ratione sapor haberet suam, et caliditas vel frigiditas suam, et humiditas et siccitas et sic de aliis; et sic non erunt tantum simul quantitas substantiae et quantitas qualitatis, sed etiam essent simul soliditates plurium qualitatum; patet igitur quod supradicta opinio multa implicat inconvenientia. Istae sunt rationes illius doctoris quae apparentiores sunt aliis. Sed praeter illas addo alias; primo, quia substantia panis non transsubstantiatur in quantitatem corporis Christi sed tantum in substantiam corporis Christi. Sed si substantia esset quantitas, vere esset transsubstantiata in quantitatem. Confirmatur, quia quantitas corporis Christi non est in

quantity the same in species seems to be able to be; for the length, or breadth, or depth in a handful of air is not other than that in a handful of water. That they, however, say that the quantity of a quality really differs from the quantity of a substance and that it itself is really the same as quality, is contrary to authority and reason. For the philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics says that "quality is not quantity except through accident," which would not be true if it were properly called quantity. It is argued through the reasons thus: it is naturally impossible for a body, which is a quantity, to be at the same time with another body which is a quantity; but quality is at the same time with substance; therefore, from the previous opinion it follows that this is impossible, that two thicknesses or even many more are naturally at the same time; because for whatever reason whiteness would have its proper quantity, for the same reason taste would have its own, and coldness or frigidity its own, and humidity and dryness, and so of others; and so not only will the quantity of substance and the quantity of quality be at the same time, but there would also be at the same time the thicknesses of several qualities; therefore, it is obvious that the opinion cited above implies many inconsistencies. These are the reasons of that Doctor, which are more apparent than others. But besides these I add others; first, because the substance of the bread is not transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ but only into the substance of the body of Christ. But if substance could be quantity, it would have been truly transubstantiated into quantity. It is confirmed; for the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of

sacramento altaris ex vi conversionis sed tantum concomitanter. Sed si substantia corporis Christi esset quantitas, vere esset ibi quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis. Praeterea arguunt aliqui: si substantia est quantitas, igitur cum in sacramento altaris non maneat substantia panis, igitur non est ibi quantitas, quod est contra sensum et contra veritatem sacramenti. Aliae rationes possunt adduci; sed, quia solutio earum poterit patere ex solutionibus iam factarum, ideo pertranseo.

Ad primum argumentum illius doctoris dico quod illa opinio in nullo est contra philosophum nec in Praedicamentis nec alibi. Et quando dicit quod in Praedicamentis distinguit quantitatem a substantia et qualitate; respondeo quod philosophus non intendit distinguere inter substantiam, quantitatem et qualitatem, quasi illa sint res absolutae distinctae realiter inter se. Sed intendit distinguere inter illa praedicamenta quae important res, non quidem distinctas res sed easdem quamvis modis diversis, qui modi non sunt nisi modi grammaticales vel logicales; et ideo quamvis hoc praedicamentum 'quantitas' sit distinctum realiter, si sit res in anima ab aliis praedicamentis, de qua distinctione dictum est alias; non tamen importat aliam rem per se unam, nisi illa res sit substantia vel qualitas; et ita distinctio praedicamentorum, de qua loquitur philosophus, stat simul cum hoc, quod quantitas non sit alia res a substantia et qualitate; sicut secundum eum 'locus' et 'superficies' non distinguuntur realiter et

the altar by the power of conversion but only concomitantly. But if the substance of the body of Christ were a quantity, the quantity of the body of Christ would truly be there by the power of conversion. Moreover, some argue: if substance is quantity, then since the substance of the bread may not remain in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, a quantity is not there, which is contrary to sense and contrary to the reality of the sacrament. Other reasons can be adduced; but, because the solution of these could be made clear from the explanations of those already offered, I, therefore, pass them by.

As regards the first argument of that Doctor, I say that that opinion is in no mode contrary to the philosopher either in the Categories or elsewhere. And when he says that in the Categories he distinguishes quantity from substance and quality, I reply that the philosopher does not intend to distinguish between substance, quantity and quality; as if they be absolute things really distinct from one another. But he intends to distinguish between those categories which signify things, not indeed distinct things but the same things although in diverse modes, which are not modes, unless grammatical or logical modes; and indeed although this category 'quantity' may be really distinct, if it be a thing in mind different from other categories, of which distinction a statement was made elsewhere; yet it does not signify another thing one per se, unless that thing be a substance or a quality; and so the distinction of categories, of which the philosopher speaks, obtains at the same time with this, that quantity may not be a thing other than substance and quality; as according to him 'place' and 'surface' are not really

tamen sunt distinctae species quantitatis. Quod enim sint distinctae species quantitatis patet per philosophum in Praedicamentis. Quod istae species non important distinctas quantitates a parte rei, patet, quia tunc essent duae quantitates continuae simul situ et loco, quarum neutra esset nata informare aliam.

Similiter secundum philosophum in Praedicamentis, Capitulo de 'qualitate,' idem est in diversis praedicamentis; igitur praedicamenta aliquando important eandem rem; igitur non obstante quod quantitas et substantia et qualitas sint distincta praedicamenta; poterunt tamen aliqua eorum importare eandem rem, et ita potest stare cum philosopho quod quantitas non est alia res absoluta a substantia et a qualitate, sicut simile et album sunt in diversis praedicamentis, sive per se sive per reductionem; ad praesens non curo, et tamen important aliquam eandem rem.

Consimiliter dico de 'numero' qui nullam rem per se unam importat, nisi qui est sub aliqua alia specie quam sub hoc communi 'numero,' sicut probatum est alias; et tamen sunt diversae species. Similiter 'ternarius' et 'quaternarius' sunt distinctae species, et tamen nulla res una per se importatur per 'ternarium,' quin est vel esse potest eiusdem speciei cum alia re importata per 'quaternarium' nec econverso. Et ideo, sicut dictum est prius, ad negandum unum conceptum ab alio sufficit sola diversitas modorum significandi, non absolute quod nulla res significetur per unum, quin significetur

distinguished, and yet they are distinct species of quantity. For that there may be distinct species of quantity is obvious through the philosopher in the Categories. That these species do not imply quantities distinct from a part of a thing, is obvious; since there would then be two continuous quantities at the same time in situation and in place, neither of which would be created to inform another.

Similarly, according to the philosopher in the Categories in the chapter on 'quality'; the same is in diverse categories; therefore, categories sometimes signify the same thing; therefore, notwithstanding that quantity and substance and quality may be distinct categories, yet some of them have been able to signify the same thing, and so it is possible to agree with the philosopher that quantity is not an absolute thing other than substance and quality, as resemblance and white are in diverse categories, whether per se or through reduction; for the present I do not care, and yet they signify some thing the same.

Quite similarly I speak of 'number' which signifies no thing one per se, unless that which is under some species other than that under this common (species) 'number'; as was proved elsewhere; and yet they are different species. Similarly, 'ternary' and 'quaternary' are distinct species, and yet no thing one per se is signified through 'ternary,' but that it is or can be of the same species with another thing signified through 'quaternary,' or conversely. And, indeed, as was stated before, only a diversity of modes of signification suffices to distinguish one concept from another; not that no thing may be signified absolutely through one, but that it may be signified by another. So also it is ob-

per alium. Sic etiam patet de istis duobus 'homo' et 'homines,' impossibile est enim dare aliquam rem importatam per unum quin importetur per reliquum; tamen haec est falsa, 'homo est species.' Ita idemptitas significatorum per aliquas species vel genera stat cum distinctione specierum et generum; et, sicut frequenter probatum est, genera vel species non sunt nisi conceptus vel nomina.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod illa opinio est contra communem opinionem doctorum, respondeo quod, si intelligat per doctores approbatos ab Ecclesia Romana, non est verum. Immo per nullam auctoritatem alicuius doctoris approbati ab Ecclesia Romana potest hoc probari. Et si inveniatur aliqua auctoritas talis doctoris sonans, haec sufficienter exponenda est. Nec est inconveniens exponere dicta eorum, cum multa dicta etiam sacrae paginae indigeant etiam expositione; quia multa non sunt vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, sed secundum sensum, quem debemus habere, sunt verissima.

Unde tales propositiones quas dixit Salvator: "Ego sum vitis vera et Pater meus agricola est," "doctrina mea non est mea," et huiusmodi multae non sunt verae secundum proprietatem sermonis; sicut dicit beatus Augustinus in quadam Homilia super Iohannem: "Quamquam in sensu, quo dicebantur et quo debent accipi, sint verissimae." Et sicut multae auctoritates scripturae sacrae sunt exponendae, ita auctoritates doctorum approbatorum ab Ecclesia Romana sonantes quod quantitas sit alia res a substantia et qualitate

vious from these two 'homo' and 'homines'; for it is impossible to grant any thing signified through one that may not be signified through the rest; yet this is false, 'man is species.' So the identity of significators through some species or genera obtains with the distinction of species and of genera; and, as was frequently proved, genera or species are not, unless concepts or names.

As regards the second point; since it is said that that opinion is contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors, I reply that, if it be understood through the Doctors approved by the Roman Church, it is not true. On the contrary, this can be proved through no passage of any Doctor approved by the Roman Church. And if there be found any high-sounding passage of such a Doctor, this must be sufficiently explained. Nor is it inconsistent to explain their statements, since many statements even of the Sacred Page may also be in need of exposition; for many are not true according to a property of common speech, but are most true according to the sense which we ought to have.

Whence, such propositions which the Saviour uttered: "I am the true vine and my Father is the husbandman," "My doctrine is not mine," and many of a like kind, are not true according to the propriety of common speech; as the blessed Augustine says in a certain Homily on John: "Although in the sense in which they were spoken and in which they ought to be accepted, they may be most true." And as many passages of Sacred Scripture must be explained, so the passages of the Doctors approved by the Roman Church declaring that quantity may be a thing other than substance and quality must also be explained. But

etiam sunt exponendae. Si autem per doctores intelligant doctores modernos mutuo se reprobantes publice et occulte et etiam in scriptis, concedo; sed negare eos non est inconveniens; nihil enim, quod dicunt, est recipiendum, nisi quod possunt probare per rationem evidentem vel per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae vel per determinationem ecclesiae vel per doctores approbatos ab ecclesia.

Et ideo quia nullo praedictorum modorum possunt probare quod quantitas est alia res a substantia et qualitate, quamvis aliquae sophisticationes possint adduci ad hoc; ideo non habeo pro inconveniente negare eos in hac parte, qua enim ratione ipsi se mutuo reprobant, et posteriores reprobant priores, eos possum negare, ubi non habent pro se nisi sophismata vel auctoritates male intellectas; nec reputo me debere artari ad eos contra rationis dictamen.

Immo periculosum et temerarium aestimo velle artare quemcumque ad captivandum ingenium suum et ad credendum aliquod quod ratio dictat sibi esse falsum, nisi possit elici ex scriptura sacra vel ex determinatione Ecclesiae Romanae vel ex dictis doctorum approbatorum. Quale non est illud, 'quantitas est alia res absoluta a substantia et qualitate,' unde hoc assero, quod nulla cuiuscumque philosophi auctoritas nec aliqua ratio naturalis, quam umquam audivi vel legi, movet me plus ad credendum quantitatem esse aliam rem absolutam a substantia et qualitate quam ad credendum quod caro est alia res a Deo et creatura. Si

if through the Doctors they may understand the modern Doctors who mutually censure each other publicly and privately and even in their writings, I concede; but it is not inconsistent to contradict them; for nothing, which they say, must be accepted, except that which they can prove through clear reason or through the authority of Sacred Scripture or through a decree of the church or through the Doctors approved by the church.

And, therefore, since they can prove in none of the preceding modes that quantity is a thing other than substance and quality, although some sophistications may be able to be adduced for this; I, therefore, do not hold it as an inconsistency to refute them in this part; for by what reason they themselves mutually censure one another, and the latter reprove the former, I can refute them, when they have for their support nothing but sophisms or passages wrongly understood; nor do I think that I ought to be limited to those contrary to the dictate of reason.

On the contrary, I consider it dangerous and rash to wish to limit any one to the holding captive of his ability and to the believing of something which reason dictates to him to be false, unless it may be able to be drawn from Sacred Scripture or from a decree of the Roman Church or from the statements of the approved Doctors. Such is not this, 'quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality'; whence, I assert this, that no passage of any philosopher, nor any natural reason, which I have ever heard or read, moves me to believe that quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality more than to believe that flesh is a thing other than God and creature. Yet

tamen possit probari, quod sit de mente alicuius sancti vel doctoris approbati ab ecclesia, quem negare non est licitum, propter eum volo ingenium captivare et concedere quod sit alia res a substantia et qualitate.

Ad tertium dico quod non est contra experientiam, sed magis consonum experientiae; unde si aliam rationem non haberet nisi illam experientiam quam adducit, concederem quod quantitas non est talis res sicut ipsi imaginantur.

Unde, quando substantia corporea condensatur, quaero aut amittitur aliqua pars quantitatis aut nulla. Si nulla, et tunc potest salvari condensatio, igitur eadem ratione, quamvis substantia sit quantitas et nulla pars substantiae amittatur, poterit salvari condensatio. Si autem aliqua pars amittitur quantitatis, quaero de primo subiecto et adaequato ipsius quantitatis, aut remanet sine omni quantitate quod est contra experientiam, aut habet aliquam quantitatem, et tunc vel novam vel prae-existentem. Non novam, quia eadem ratione alia pars haberet novam quantitatem, cum non sit maior ratio de una quam de alia, et per consequens tota substantia perderet totam quantitatem prae-existentem et acquireret novam, quod est contra experientiam. Nec habet prae-existentem, quia tunc accidens migraret a subiecto in subiectum, quod non est consonum experientiae.

Et ita patet quod in nullo est contra experientiam dicere, quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate.

if it may be able to be proved that it may be from the mind of some Saint or Doctor approved by the church, whom it is not permitted to refute; for his sake I wish to hold in check my ability and to concede that there may be a thing other than substance and quality.

As regards the third, I say that it is not contrary to experience, but rather consonant with experience; whence, if he should not have another reason, except that experience which he adduces, I would concede that quantity is not such a thing as they themselves imagine.

Whence, when a corporeal substance is condensed, I ask whether any part or no part of a quantity is lost. If no part, now then condensation can be saved; then for the same reason, although substance may be quantity and no part of substance may be lost, condensation will have been saved. But if some part of quantity is lost, I ask about the primary and adequate subject of the quantity itself, whether it remains without any quantity, which is contrary to experience, or whether it has any quantity, and then whether new or pre-existing. It does not have a new quantity, because for the same reason another part would have a new quantity, since there may be no greater reason for one than for another; and consequently the whole substance would utterly lose the whole pre-existing quantity and would acquire a new quantity, which is contrary to experience. Nor does it have a pre-existing (quantity), since then an accident would change from subject into subject, which is not consonant with experience.

And so it is obvious that in no way is it contrary to experience to say, that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality.

Respondetur igitur ad illam experientiam et concedendo quod, quando substantia corporea condensatur, ipsa efficitur minoris quantitatis absque alicuius partis suae amissione, sed non sine suarum partium omnium motu locali.

Unde per hoc solum, quod omnes partes sic moventur localiter ut occupent minorem locum nunc quam prius et una pars minus distet ab alia nunc quam prius, condensatur tota substantia, nec aliud est substantiam condensari. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in Praedicamentis, quod "densum est cuius partes propinquius iacent," quod non est intelligendum de partibus inter quas non est medium; quia illae non possunt secundum se totas propinquius iacere; sed est intelligendum de partibus inter quas sunt partes mediae, quia illae propinquius iacent in corpore denso quam fecerunt in eodem corpore quando erat rarum. Et ex hoc ipso quod omnes tales partes propinquius iacent, sive sint sub alia re sive non; seipsis propinquius iacent et est illud corpus magis densum nunc quam prius.

Unde non video quod convenienter possit salvari condensatio et rarefactio, nisi ponendo quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et per illum modum salvatur faciliter. Et si dicatur tota substantia manet post condensationem, (sed tota quantitas non manet; quia, si tota maneret, sequitur quod est tantae quantitatis quantae prius fuit); igitur illa quantitas praecedens non fuit substantia ipsa. Dicendum quod perfecte scientes logicam evidenter vident omnia talia

Therefore, a reply is made to that experience and by conceding that, when corporeal substance is condensed, it itself is effected of a smaller quantity without the loss of any of its part; but not without local motion of all of its parts.

Whence, through this alone, that all the parts are so moved locally that they may occupy a smaller place now than before and one part may be less separate from another now than before, the whole substance is condensed, and otherwise a substance is not to be condensed. And this is that which the philosopher says in the Categories, that "that is dense whose parts lie closer together," which is not to be understood of the parts between which there is not an intermediate; for those can not as regards themselves as wholes lie closer together; but it must be understood of the parts between which there are intermediate parts, for those parts lie closer together in a dense body than they did in the same body when it was rare. And from this itself, that all such parts lie closer together whether they may be under another thing or not; they in themselves lie closer together, and that body is more dense now than before.

Whence, I do not see that condensation and rarefication may be able conveniently to be saved, except by positing that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and through that mode is easily saved. And if it be said that the whole substance remains after condensation (but the whole quantity does not remain; for, if the whole could remain, it follows that it has as much quantity as there was before); then, that preceding quantity was not itself substance. It must be said that those who perfectly understand

esse sophistica, quia tales consequentiae inferentes unam de praeterito ex duabus de praesenti non valent; sicut frequenter duae de praeterito vel futuro non inferunt unam de praesenti et frequenter etiam una de praeterito, et una de praesenti non inferunt unam de praesenti. Sed quomodo ex talibus sit argumendum, longum foret enarrare; ideo de hoc pertranseo. Et dico quod illa consequentia non valet: tota substantia manet et non manet tanta quantitas; igitur tanta quantitas non fuit in tota illa substantia. Et consimiliter tales consequentiae non valent: 'illa pedalis quantitas non manet' et 'ista substantia manet'; igitur 'illa substantia non erit pedalis quantitatis,' nec infert ultra; ergo illa substantia fuit aliud a pedali quantitate. Et sicut dicitur de istis, ita proportionabiliter dicendum est de omnibus consimilibus, quae reputantur demonstrationes a multis.

Unde sicut non sequitur, 'beatificans non est.' Ponatur quod Deus nullum beatificet, 'Deus est,' igitur 'Deus non fuit beatificans.' Similiter non sequitur: 'mortuus non est,' 'Christus est,' igitur 'Christus non est mortuus.' Ita non sequitur: 'tanta quantitas non est,' 'substantia est'; igitur 'substantia non fuit tanta quantitas.' Et ita evidenter patet quod, quamvis tales praemissae inferant illam de praesenti, non tamen inferunt illam de praeterito. Nec refert quantum ad modum, utrum recipiantur termini 'abstracti' vel 'concreti.'

Et sicut de istis dicitur, ita proportionabiliter de illis de 'possibili'; quia frequenter duae de 'possibili,' et

logic clearly see that all such are sophistic, for such consequences inferring one of the past from two of the present are not valid; as frequently two of the past or of the future do not infer one of the present, and frequently even one of the past and one of the present do not infer one of the present. But it would take too long to tell how it must be argued from such; therefore, I pass on from this. And I say that this consequence is not valid: 'the whole substance remains' and 'so much quantity does not remain'; therefore, 'so much quantity was not in that whole substance.' And quite similarly such consequences are not valid: 'that foot of quantity does not remain' and 'this substance remains'; therefore, 'that substance will not be of the quantity of a foot'; nor does it infer more; therefore, that substance was other than a quantity of a foot. And as it is said of these, so proportionately must it be said of all of like kind, which are considered demonstrations by many.

Whence, as it does not follow: 'making happy is not.' It may be posited that 'God may make no one happy,' 'God is'; therefore, 'God was not making happy.' Similarly, it does not follow: 'the dead is not,' 'Christ is'; therefore, 'Christ is not dead.' So it does not follow: 'so much quantity is not,' 'substance is'; therefore, 'substance was not so much quantity.' And so it evidently is obvious that, although such premises may not infer that of the present, yet they do not infer that of the past. Nor does it refer quantum to a mode, whether the terms 'abstracts' or 'concretes' be accepted.

And as it is said of these, so proportionately of those of a 'possible'; for frequently two of a 'possible,' and

etiam de 'in esse' una et alia de 'possibili,' non inferunt unam negativam de 'in esse,' quamvis inferant unam de 'possibili'; et ideo tales modi arguendi non valent. Haec est possibilis, 'haec similitudo non est,' hac existente vera, 'haec albedo' est, ergo 'haec albedo non est haec similitudo,' quamvis sequitur illa 'de possibili,' ergo possibile est 'hanc albedinem non esse hanc similitudinem.' Nec sequitur: possibile est 'hanc albedinem non esse hanc similitudinem'; ergo 'haec albedo' et 'haec similitudo' non sunt eadem res. Sic non sequitur: 'possibile est Deum non esse creantem,' ergo 'Deus' et 'creans' non sunt eadem res. Sed certe bene sequitur quod haec est possibilis, 'Deus et creans non sunt eadem'; et hoc est verum.

Consimiliter est in proposito, quod quia illa substantia potest manere, quamvis haec non sit vera, 'tota quantitas est'; tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod haec sit vera, 'haec substantia' et 'tanta quantitas' non sunt eadem res, sed sequitur quod sit possibilis; et hoc est verum.

Et si dicatur, haec est possibilis, 'haec substantia' et 'haec quantitas' non sunt eadem res manente substantia; propter eandem rationem dico quod haec est bene possibilis, 'haec substantia' et 'haec quantitas' non sunt eadem res, ita quod potest esse vera, hac existente vera, 'haec substantia est'; sed non potest esse vera, hac existente vera, 'haec quantitas est.' Unde tunc erit haec vera propter illam causam veritatis, 'haec quantitas non est,' quae sequitur ex illa, 'haec substantia non est quanta,' quae est possibilis.

even one of an 'actual' and another of a 'possible,' do not infer one negative of an 'actual,' although they may infer one of a 'possible'; and, therefore, such modes of arguing are not valid. This is possible, 'this likeness is not,' while this appears true, 'this whiteness is'; therefore, 'this whiteness is not this likeness'; although that follows from a 'possible'; therefore, it is possible for 'this whiteness not to be this likeness.' It does not follow: it is possible for 'this whiteness not to be this likeness'; therefore, 'this whiteness' and 'this likeness' are not the same thing. So it does not follow: 'it is possible for God not to be creating'; therefore, 'God' and 'creating' are not the same thing. But it certainly correctly follows that this is possible, 'God and creating are not the same'; and this is true.

Quite similarly is it in the proposition, that because that substance can remain, although this may not be true, 'the whole quantity is'; yet from this it does not follow that this may be true, 'this substance' and 'so much quantity' are not the same thing; but it follows that it may be possible; and this is true.

And if it be said that this is possible, 'this substance' and 'this quantity' are not the same thing, if the substance remains; by virtue of the same reason I say that this is fully possible, 'this substance' and 'this quantity' are not the same thing, so that it can be true, while this appears true, 'this substance is'; but it can not be true, while this appears true, 'this quantity is.' Whence, this will then be true by virtue of that cause of reality, 'this quantity is not,' which follows from this, 'this substance is not quantum,' which is possible.

Aliud inferius declarabitur. Et si dicatur adhuc quod impossibile est transire de contradictorio ad contradictorium sine omni novitate, (si igitur haec sit primo vera, 'illa substantia est tantae quantitatis' et postea sit falsa;) oportet quod sit aliqua novitas vel saltem destructio alicuius antiqui. Dicendum est quod non est verum, sed aliquando sufficit solus motus localis, per quem non est necesse aliquid acquiri vel perdi nec tamen aliquod antiquum; puta, locum semper manentem.

Immo sicut etiam ostendetur alibi, locus ambiens corpus mobile manere potest et hoc vel toti vel parti. Et ideo in proposito ad hoc quod ipsa substantia sit maioris quantitatis vel maior quantitas nunc quam prius sicut in rarefactione, vel minor quantitas nunc quam prius sicut in condensatione, sufficit solus motus localis omnium partium istius substantiae sine omni novitate cuiuscumque rei imaginabilis et sine omni destructione cuiuscumque rei antiquae.

Ad quartum, cum dicitur quod illa opinio est contra rationem, dicendum est quod non, sed est consona rationi, sicut ostensum est prius, Et quando dicitur quod in diversis substantiis differentibus specie videtur esse eadem quantitas in specie, dicendum est quod omnis quantitas, quae non est qualitas quae est in diversis substantiis specie, differt specie; unde omnis quantitas ignis quae non est qualitas, differt specie ab omni quantitate aëris quae non est qualitas; et ideo concedo quod longitudo ignis et similiter profunditas et latitudo, differunt specie. Et tamen hoc non obstante

Another argument will be set forth later. And if it be said further that it is impossible to pass from a contradictory to a contradictory without entire newness, (if, therefore, this be at first true, 'that substance is of so much quantity' and afterwards it be false;) there is need that there be some newness or at least a destruction of something old. It must be said that it is not true; but sometimes local motion alone suffices, through which it is not necessary for something to be acquired or destroyed nor yet something old, say, a place always remaining.

On the contrary; as is shown elsewhere, a place surrounding a movable body can remain and this either in a whole or in a part. And, therefore, in the proposition regarding this, that the substance itself may be of a larger quantity or a larger quantity now than before as in rarefaction, or a smaller quantity now than before as in condensation, only local motion of all the parts of this substance suffices without entire newness of any imaginable thing whatever and without entire destruction of any thing old whatever.

As regards the fourth point; when it is said that that opinion is contrary to reason, it must be said that it is not, but is consonant with reason, as was shown before. And when it is said that in diverse substances differing in species it seems to be a quantity the same in species, it must be said that any quantity, which is not quality which is in substances diverse in species, differs in species; whence every quantity of fire, which is not a quality, differs in species from every quantity of air which is not a quality; and indeed I concede that the length of fire, and similarly the depth and the width, differ in species. And yet notwithstanding this,

eadem species specialissima poterit praedicari de eis, quamvis non 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo. Unde duo homines et duo equi differunt specie et tamen 'binarius,' qui est species specialissima, probatur de eis. Unde sicut non est inconveniens quod idem sit in diversis praedicamentis, ita non est inconveniens quod eadem sint in diversis speciebus unius praedicamenti, et tamen in una specie specialissima alterius praedicamenti; et ideo non est inconveniens quod eadem simpliciter sint in diversis speciebus substantiae, et tamen quod sint in eadem specie specialissima quantitatis. Et quandocumque ita est, tunc illa species specialissima non praedicatur de illis 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo, et multae auctoritates tam de 'generibus' quam de 'speciebus' loquuntur de illis respectu illorum de quibus praedicantur 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo; quae tamen multa de nullo nomine proprio alicuius rei nec de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem praedicantur 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo. Immo secundum intentionem philosophi secundum id quod diversimode respondetur ad quaestionem factam de individuo substantiae, secundum hoc accipiuntur diversa praedicamenta, sicut alibi dictum est, et ideo falsum est quod dicunt aliqui, quod quodlibet praedicamentum habet rem propriam de qua praedicatur 'in quid.'

Ad quintum dico quod quantitas, quae est qualitas, distinguitur realiter a quantitate, quae est substantia saltem aliqua, puta, omnis talis: color, calor, frigus, et huiusmodi, quamvis hoc non sit verum de figura et aliquibus talibus. Et quando dicitur quod qualitas se-

that the same most particular species could be predicated of them, although not 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode. Whence, two men and two horses differ in species, and yet 'binarius,' which is a most particular species, is applied to them. Whence, as it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse categories, so it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse species of one category, and yet they are in one most particular species of another category; and, therefore, it is not inconsistent that the same may be simply in diverse species of substance, and yet that they may be in the same most particular species of quantity. And whenever it is so, then that most particular species is not predicated of them 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode, and many passages concerning 'genera' as well as concerning 'species' speak of them with respect to those of which they are predicated 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode; yet there are many of no proper noun of any thing nor of a pronoun signifying some thing which are predicated 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode. Indeed, according to the intention of the philosopher relative to that which is replied in diverse modes to the question raised concerning an individual of a substance, as regards this diverse categories are accepted, as was said elsewhere; and indeed that is false which some say, that each category has a proper thing of which it is predicated 'in quid.'

As regards the fifth point; I say that quantity, which is quality, is really distinguished from quantity, which is at least some substance; say, any such, as color, heat, cold, and any other of the kind; although this may not be true of figure and of any such. And when it is

cundum philosophum non est quanta nisi per accidens; dico quod per omnes tales propositiones in Praedicamentis et in Libro Physicorum et alibi, "substantia non est quanta nisi per accidens," et sic de qualitate. Finitum et infinitum non conveniunt substantiae vel qualitati vel per accidens, et huiusmodi. Non intelligit nisi quod illud praedicabile 'quantum' non praedicatur de substantia et qualitate nisi per accidens et non per se primo modo. Unde talis non est per se primo modo nec stricte nec large accipiendo per se primo modo: 'substantia est quanta,' 'qualitas est quanta,' 'homo est quantus,' 'homo est longus,' 'albedo est lata,' et huiusmodi; cum hoc tamen stat quod quantitas non sit alia res a qualitate et substantia. Sic 'Deus' et 'creans' non sunt res distinctae, et tamen haec non est per se, 'creans est immortalis,' sicut illa, 'Deus est immortalis.' Similiter finitum vel infinitum per se secundo modo vel primo probatur de quanto et non de substantia vel qualitate. Et ita apparet, quoniam illa substantialia et praedicabilia, 'quantitas,' 'substantia,' 'qualitas,' sunt distincta; cum hoc tamen stat quod non important res distinctas, et per illum modum respondendum est ad multas auctoritates.

Ad ultimum illius doctoris, dico quod loquendo de corporibus diversarum rationum quorum unum natum est esse forma alterius, vel quorum utrumque natum est esse forma tertii, non est inconveniens duo corpora naturaliter esse in eodem loco, et sic se habent accidens et subiectum; sic etiam se habent diversa accidentia

said that quality according to the philosopher is not a quantum except through accident, I say that through all such propositions in the Categories and in the book of the Physics and elsewhere, "substance is not a quantum except through accident," and so of quality. Finite and infinite do not combine with a substance or a quality or through accident and anything else of the kind. It means nothing other than that that predicable 'quantum' is not predicated of substance and quality except through accident and not per se in the first mode. Whence, such is not per se in the first mode; neither by strictly nor freely accepting per se in the first mode: 'substance is quantum,' 'quality is quantum,' 'man is quantum,' 'man is long,' 'whiteness is wide,' and any other of the kind; since this however holds that quantity may not be a thing different from quality and substance. So 'God' and 'creating' are not distinct things, and yet this is not per se, 'creating is immortal'; as this, 'God is immortal.' Similarly, finite or infinite per se in the second or the first mode is applied to quantum and not to substance or quality. And so it appears, since those substantives and predicables, 'quantity,' 'substance,' 'quality,' are distinct; since this however holds that they do not signify distinct things, and through that mode the reply must be made to many passages.

As regards the last point of that Doctor, I say that in speaking of bodies of diverse grounds of which one was created to be in the form of another, or of which each was created to be in the form of a third, it is not inconsistent for two bodies to exist naturally in the same place; and accident and subject are so constituted; so also are constituted diverse acci-

quae nata sunt informare idem subiectum; sic etiam se habent albedo et dulcedo in lacte; et ideo de virtute sermonis debet concedi quod plura corpora possunt esse simul, hoc est, quod plures res circumscriptive existentes in hoc loco, et quarum quaelibet habet partem extra partem, sunt simul; tamen quod duo corpora eiusdem rationis, (quorum utrumque sit complete in genere aut in aliqua specie substantiae, vel duo corpora diversarum rationum, quorum neutrum natum est esse forma alterius nec utrumque tertii,) sint simul, est inconveniens; et de talibus corporibus loquitur Aristoteles et alii auctores qui dicunt quod duo corpora non possunt esse simul.

Ad alias rationes. Ad primam, quando dicitur quod substantia panis non transsubstantiatur in quantitatem corporis Christi sed tantum in substantiam corporis Christi, dicendum quod de virtute sermonis haec est concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in quantitatem corporis Christi'; nec oppositum illius invenitur in Biblia nec in dictis sanctorum nec in iure canonico nec in aliquo libro authentico, quamvis inveniatur in scripturis aliquorum qui a multis Catholicis et solemnibus reprobantur. Non dico eos reprobare tamquam haereticos sed tamquam tenentes falsas opiniones; unde Doctor subtilis communem et solemnem et omnes, in quorum scripturis invenitur oppositum illius, reprobat quantum ad multas opiniones. Multi etiam catholici doctores doctorem subtilem in multis conclu-

dents which are created to inform the same subject; so also whiteness and sweetness in milk are constituted; and, therefore, it ought to be conceded according to the virtue of common speech that several bodies can be at the same time, that is, that several things existing circumscriptively in this place, and each one of which has part outside of part, are at the same time; yet it is inconsistent that two bodies of the same ground (each of which may be completely in a genus or in some species of a substance, or that two bodies of diverse grounds, neither of which was created to be in the form of another nor both (in the form) of a third), may be at the same time; and of such bodies Aristotle speaks and other authors who say that two bodies can not be at the same time.

As regards other arguments. As regards the first; when it is said that the substance of the bread is not transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ but only into the substance of the body of Christ, it must be said that according to the virtue of common speech this must be conceded, 'the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ'; nor is the opposite of that found in the Bible nor in the statements of the Saints nor in the canonical law, nor in any authorized book; although it may be found in the writings of some who are censured by many Catholics and religious writers. I do not say that they censure them as heretics, but as those holding false opinions; whence, the subtle Doctor censures very much the profane and sacred writer and all, in whose writings is found the opposite of that, as regards many opinions. Many Catholic Doctors also censure the subtle Doctor in many con-

sionibus reprobant; et ideo, quamvis eorum oppositum concludere inveniatur, non est multum curandum, quia nullus tenetur eorum auctoritatem recipere, quamvis sint eis gratiae referendae, eo quod quando falsa dixerunt, ingenia nostra exercitaverunt, et nobis magis occasiones inveniendi veritatem dederunt. Dico ergo quod de facto haec est concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi quod est in caelo.' Similiter illa de virtute sermonis est concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi quod est in caelo localiter.' Eodem modo ad confirmationem dico quod de virtute sermonis haec est concedenda, 'quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris,' sicut haec de virtute sermonis est concedenda, 'corpus Christi in caelo existens ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; nec praecise oppositum in aliquo authentico invenitur. Verum tamen quantumcumque de virtute sermonis et de facto utraque illorum sit vera, tamen de virtute sermonis potest utraque esse falsa, hac existente vera, 'substantia corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; sed non nisi in uno casu, puta, si substantia corporis Christi nullibi esset circumscriptive. Unde non videtur includere contradictionem, quod facta transsubstantiatione in corpus Christi et remanente ibi corpore Christi sub speciebus panis, Deus faceret corpus Christi

clusions; and, indeed, although a conclusion the opposite of these may be found, it need not make much difference; for no one is bound to accept their authority, although thanks must be rendered to them, for this reason that, when they have made false statements, they have stimulated our abilities, and they have rather given to us occasions for finding the truth. I say, therefore, that this must really be conceded, 'the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven.' Similarly, this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, 'the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven locally.' In the same mode I say in confirmation that this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; as according to the virtue of common speech this must be conceded, 'the body of Christ existing in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; and precisely the opposite is not found in any authorized writer. But yet no matter how much each of those may be true according to the virtue of common speech and according to fact, yet according to the virtue of common speech both can be false; while this appears true, 'the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; but not except in one case, say, if the substance of the body of Christ should exist nowhere circumscriptively. Whence, it does not seem to involve a contradiction, that, when the transubstantiation into the body of Christ has been accomplished and the body of Christ remains there under the species of bread, God could

nullibi esse localiter seu circumscriptive. Quo facto posset sacerdos celebrare, et tunc haec esset vera de virtute sermonis, 'substantia corporis Christi est sub illis speciebus panis ex vi transsubstantiationis'; et haec tunc esset falsa, 'quantitas corporis Christi est sub speciebus illius panis,' et haec propter falsam implicationem; implicaretur enim quod substantia corporis Christi esset quanta, quod non esset verum; quia nihil est quantum nisi cuius pars est extra partem et cuius pars distat a parte. Sed isto modo, cum corpus Christi nullibi esset localiter, nusquam posset assignari quod una pars esset distans ab alia parte; sed ubicumque esset, una pars in eodem situ esset alia; et tunc haec esset vera, 'corpus Christi nullibi est circumscriptive,' et eadem ratione esset haec vera, 'corpus Christi nullibi est quantum,' et per consequens haec esset falsa, 'corpus Christi est quantitas,' et ita propter falsam implicationem haec esset falsa, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris.' Et ita qui vellet exponere dicentes, quod quantitas corporis Christi non est ex vi conversionis in sacramento altaris, posset dicere, quod hoc dicunt, quia illa consequentia non valet, scilicet, 'substantia corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; igitur quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris, quia antecedens

make the body of Christ to be nowhere locally or circumscriptively. When this has been done, the priest might be able to celebrate, and then this would be true according to the virtue of common speech, 'the substance of the body of Christ is under the species of bread by the power of transubstantiation'; and then this would be false, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is under the species of that bread,' and this by virtue of a false implication; for it would be implied that the substance of the body of Christ would be a quantum, which would not be true; for nothing is a quantum except that whose part is outside of part and whose part is separate from part. But, since the body of Christ could be nowhere locally, never could it be able in that mode to be assigned that one part could be separate from another part; but wherever it would be, one part would be in the same situation as another; and then this would be true, 'the body of Christ is nowhere circumscriptively'; and for the same reason this would be true, 'the body of Christ is nowhere a quantum'; and consequently this would be false, 'the body of Christ is a quantity'; and so by virtue of a false implication this would be false, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.' And so he who would desire to excuse those who say that the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, could say that they say this, because that consequence is not valid; namely, 'the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion; for the antecedent can be true, while the con-

potest esse verum, consequente existente falso. Sed hoc non potest contingere nisi substantia corporis Christi nullibi habeat partem distantem a parte.

Et si dicatur contra hoc quod, ubicumque ex vi conversionis est quantitas corporis Christi, ibi ex vi conversionis corpus Christi est quantitas vel quantum. Si igitur quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis sit in sacramento altaris, corpus Christi in sacramento altaris est quantum vel quantitas. Sed omne quantum est circumscriptive in loco; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris circumscriptive in loco, quod est haereticum; quia tunc non esset in tota hostia et in qualibet parte hostiae. Dicendum quod illud solum argumentum posset movere catholicum ad tenendum quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et posset sic formari: ubicumque aliqua res habet aliam rem natam denominare eam, verum est dicere quod res est ibi talis; sicut ubi corpus habet albedinem, verum est dicere quod corpus est ibi album, et sic est de omnibus. Si igitur quantitas corporis Christi sit alia res a substantia corporis Christi, non est separata ab illa quantitate; quia tunc dicunt sic opinantes, quod quantitas corporis Christi ibi est quamvis concomitanter; sed ubicumque est aliquod quantum ibi, vere habet partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte; quia ubicumque alicui competit diffinitio, eidem competit ibi diffinitum. Cum haec ergo sit diffinitio quantitatis vel quanti, 'habere partem extra partem'; si corpus Christi

sequent appears false. But this can not happen unless the substance of the body of Christ nowhere have part separate from part.

And if it be said contrary to this that, wherever the quantity of the body of Christ is by the power of conversion, there the body of Christ is a quantity or a quantum by the power of conversion. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, the body of Christ is a quantum or quantity in the sacrament of the altar. But every quantum is circumscriptively in a place; therefore, the body of Christ is circumscriptively in a place in the sacrament of the altar, which is heretical; for it could not then be in the whole host and in each part of the host. It must be said that that argument alone would be able to move a Catholic to hold that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and would be able to be formulated thus: wherever any thing has another thing created to designate it, it is true to say that the thing there is such; as when a body has whiteness, it is true to say that the body there is white; and so is it of all. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be a thing other than the substance of the body of Christ, it is not separate from that quantity; for then those holding this opinion thus say, that the quantity of the body of Christ is there, although concomitantly; but whenever there is some quantum there, it truly has part outside of part and part separate from part; for whenever a definition corresponds to something, the defined corresponds there to the same. Therefore, since this may be a definition of quantity or of quantum, 'to have part outside of part'; if the body of Christ in the sac-

in sacramento altaris sit quantum sive concomitantur sive alio modo, oportet quod ibi corpus Christi sit 'habens partem extra partem distantem a parte,' quod est manifeste falsum et periculosum, et omnino non videtur tutum concedere quod corpus Christi sit ibi quantum. Et ideo dico quod de virtute sermonis concedendum est quod corpus Christi non est quantum in sacramento altaris. Sicut de virtute sermonis est concedendum, quod corpus Christi in sacramento non habet partem extra partem, quamvis corpus Christi habeat in caelo partem extra partem, et per consequens in caelo sit quantum. Et si dicatur quod hoc repugnat priori dicto, (dictum est enim quod haec est vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; ex qua sequitur quod corpus Christi est quantum vel quantitas in sacramento altaris, quod est modo negatum;) dicendum quod haec simpliciter est vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris.' Sed illa non infert illam; ergo corpus Christi est quantum in sacramento altaris; sicut illa est vera de virtute sermonis, 'corpus Christi existens localiter in caelo est in sacramento altaris,' et tamen illa est falsa, 'corpus Christi est localiter existens in sacramento altaris.'

Similiter illa est vera, 'corpus Christi existens in loco est in sacramento altaris'; quia per illam non denotatur nisi illud pro quo supponit hoc, 'totum corpus Christi circumscriptive existens in loco,' quod non est nisi corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris, quod

rament of the altar be a quantum either concomitantly or in another mode, it is necessary that the body of Christ there be 'having part outside of part, separate from part,' which is manifestly false and perilous, and it does not seem at all safe to concede that the body of Christ may be a quantum here. And indeed I say that it must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech that the body of Christ is not a quantum in the sacrament of the altar. As according to the virtue of common speech it must be conceded that the body of Christ in the sacrament does not have part outside of part, although the body of Christ may have part outside of part in heaven, and consequently may be a quantum in heaven. And if it be said that this is contradictory to a prior statement, (for it was said that this is true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; from which it follows that the body of Christ is a quantum or a quantity in the sacrament of the altar, which was just denied;) it must be stated that this is simply true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.' But the former does not infer that; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar; as this is true according to the virtue of speech, 'the body of Christ existing locally in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar'; and yet this is false, 'the body of Christ is locally existent in the sacrament of the altar.'

Similarly, this is true, 'the body of Christ existing in a place is in the sacrament of the altar'; for nothing else is designated through that except that for which it substitutes this, 'the whole body of Christ existing circumscriptively in a place,' which is not unless the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar,

verum est; et haec tamen est falsa, 'corpus Christi est circumscriptive existens in loco in sacramento altaris.'

Similiter illa est vera, 'corpus Christi habens partem extra partem est in sacramento altaris.' Eodem modo non obstante quod ista sit vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; tamen haec est falsa secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'corpus Christi est quantum in altaris sacramento'; et ita, quamvis quantitas corporis Christi sit ibi vere, tamen corpus Christi non est ibi quantitas; sicut, quamvis corpus Christi habens partem situ distantem a parte sit ibi, tamen ibi non habet partem distantem a parte.

Et confirmatur illa responsio; quia, quandocumque aliqua sunt convertibilia, de quocumque praedicatur unum et reliquum significative sumptum, et similiter de quocumque praedicatur unum et reliquum. Sed illa sunt convertibilia; 'quantum continuum permanens' et 'habens partem distantem situ a parte,' et econverso; igitur de quocumque dicitur unum et reliquum. Si igitur haec sit vera, 'corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris habens partem distantem situ a parte'; quod est manifeste falsum, quia nulla pars distat situ ab alia in sacramento altaris; igitur haec est falsa secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'substantia corporis Christi est quantum continuum permanens in sacramento altaris.'

Dico igitur quod corpus Christi non est ibi quantum, quia non habet ibi partem distantem a parte; sed sicut

which is true; and yet this is false, 'the body of Christ is circumscriptively existent in a place in the sacrament of the altar.'

Similarly, this is true, 'the body of Christ having part outside of part is in the sacrament of the altar.' In the same way, notwithstanding that this may be true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; yet this is false according to a property of common speech, 'the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar'; and so, although the quantity of the body of Christ be truly there, yet the body of Christ is not a quantity there; as, although the body of Christ having part separate in situation from part may be there, yet it does not there have part separate from part.

And that reply is confirmed; for, whenever some are convertibles, of whatever one term is predicated the rest is also assumed significatively; and similarly of whatever one term is predicated, the rest also. But those are convertibles: 'a continuous and permanent quantum' and 'having part separate in situation from part,' and conversely; therefore, of whatever one is said, the rest also. If therefore, this be true, 'the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar having part separate in situation from part,' which is manifestly false; for no part is separate in situation from another in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, this is false according to a property of common speech, 'the substance of the body of Christ is a continuous and permanent quantum in the sacrament of the altar.'

Therefore, I say that the body of Christ is not a quantum there; for it does not have there part separate

alibi in caelo habet partem distantem situ a parte, ita in caelo est quantum. Si tantum quantitas corporis Christi esset alia res, vere esset ibi quantitas, scilicet, in sacramento altaris; et per consequens vere corpus Christi esset ibi quantum, et per consequens vere haberet ibi partem distantem a parte, et per consequens non esset totum sub tota hostia et totum sub qualibet parte.

Ad aliud, quando dicitur quod, si substantia corporis Christi esset quantitas, tunc non remaneret quantitas in sacramento altaris; sic non remanet ibi substantia panis.

Dicendum est quod illud argumentum hic non deberet fieri, nisi quia aliqui maliciose provocant aliquos simplices contra opinionem; quasi illa opinio poneret, quod omnis quantitas esset substantia, et ideo maliciose proponunt illam propositionem, 'substantia est quantitas,' et subtrahunt illam, 'qualitas est quantitas,' ut per hoc dent intelligere apud simplices non advertentes ad praedictam opinionem ponere illam, 'omnis quantitas est substantia'; et propter defectum argumentorum nituntur cautelose aliquos simplices contra opinionem provocare.

Dico igitur ad argumentum quod nimis est stolidum; quia non sequitur, 'substantia est quantitas,' et substantia desinit esse ibi; ergo non remanet ibi aliqua quantitas, sicut non remanet ibi substantia; sicut non sequitur, 'substantia est ens,' igitur nullum ens remanet ibi; sicut non remanet ibi substantia prae-existens.

from part; but in heaven, as elsewhere, it has part separate in situation from part, so in heaven it is a quantum. If only the quantity of the body of Christ were another thing, there would truly be a quantity there; namely, in the sacrament of the altar; and consequently the body of Christ would truly be a quantum there, and consequently would truly have there part separate from part, and consequently would not be a whole under a whole host and a whole under each part.

As to the other; when it is said that, if the substance of the body of Christ were a quantity, then the quantity could not remain in the sacrament of the altar; so the substance of the bread does not remain there.

It must be said that that argument ought not to be advanced here, unless because some maliciously provoke some frank statements contrary to the opinion; as if that opinion could posit, that every quantity would be substance; and they indeed maliciously propose this proposition, 'substance is quantity' and withdraw this, 'quality is quantity,' that they may grant through this an opportunity for the unlearned who pay no attention to the preceding opinion to understand and to posit this, 'every quantity is a substance'; and by virtue of a defect in the arguments they carefully strive to enlist some simple minded folk against the opinion.

Therefore, I say as regards the argument, that it is too stupid; for it does not follow, 'substance is quantity,' and substance ceases to be there; then some quantity does not remain there, as substance does not remain there; as it does not follow, 'substance is an entity'; therefore, no entity remains there; as a preexisting substance does not remain there.

Unde dico quod una quantitas prae-existens remanet in sacramento altaris; sed non remanet ibi quantitas, quae est substantia vel quae fuit substantia; sed remanet ibi una quantitas quae est qualitas; quia remanet ibi quantitas quae non est alia res ab albedine.

Similiter remanet ibi quantitas quae non est alia res a sapore et sic de aliis quantitatibus. Et dico cum doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia quod remanet ibi color, sapor, pondus, hoc est, gravitas, et huiusmodi qualitates; quarum nulla est alia res a quantitate extra omne subiectum situ per se subsistentia divina potentia; quarum nulla est in alia subiective; sed quaelibet per divinam potentiam existit extra subiectum, et simul in eodem loco et situ per divinam potentiam conservantur; et ideo remanet ibi quantitas una habens partem distantem a parte, quae numquam fuit nec umquam erit substantia, sed est simpliciter alia res a substantia. Et ista de illa materia ad praesens sufficiant, quia alias diffuse de ea tractabo.

Whence, I say that one pre-existing quantity remains in the sacrament of the altar; but quantity does not remain there, which is substance or which was substance; but one quantity remains there, which is quality; for quantity remains there, which is not a thing other than whiteness.

Similarly, a quantity remains there which is not a thing other than taste, and so of other quantities. And I say with the Doctors approved by the church, that color, taste, weight, that is, gravity, and some qualities of a like kind, remain there; none of which is a thing other than a quantity subsisting per se in situation outside of every subject by divine power; none of which is subjectively in another; but each one exists outside of a subject through the divine power, and they are preserved at the same time in the same place and situation through the divine power; and indeed there remains there one quantity having part separate from part, which never was nor ever will be substance, but is simply a thing other than substance. And these arguments concerning that matter may suffice for the present, for I shall elsewhere treat at length of it.

Incipit accessus ad tractatum de corpore Christi

PROLOGUS

Stupenda superne munera largitatis ad reparationem generis humani eidem impensa, ipsum suo redemptori magnifico obligant immensum; Unigenitus siquidem Dei Filius, substantia nostrae fragilitatis assumpta ut nos a diabolica servitute redimeret et pristinae restitueret libertati ac tandem ad caelestem perduceret hereditatem, semetipsum in ara crucis redemptionis humanae pretium immolavit.

Ut autem tanti muneris in nobis iugis maneret memoria ac pro nobis, qui quotidie labimur, Christus quotidie mystice immolaretur, corpus suum in cibum et sanguinem suum in potum in Eucharistiae sacramento sumendum fidelibus dereliquit, cuius ineffabilis altitudo humanae indagini subiici dedignatur; propter quod de isto summo et excellentissimo sacramento cum omni timore et modestia est loquendum, quia circa nullum sacramentum est error periculosior nec inquisitio laboriosior nec inventio fructuosior.

Proinde de isto altissimo sacramento aliqua brevia conspecturus protestor me nihil asserturum nisi quod Romana tenet et docet Ecclesia. Quod autem physica

The introduction to the tract concerning the body of Christ begins.

PROLOGUE

Wondrous gifts from the abundance on high, expended by Him for the redemption of the human race, place it under an infinite obligation to its glorious Redeemer; for the Only-begotten Son of God, after He had assumed the substance of our frailty in order that He might redeem us from the servitude of the devil and restore us to our original liberty and also bring us at last to our heavenly inheritance, offered Himself on the altar of the cross as the price for the redemption of the human race.

Moreover, that a perpetual memorial of so great a gift might remain among us and also that Christ might daily be mystically offered as a sacrifice for us who err daily, He left behind His body in the food and His blood in the drink to be received by the faithful in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the unspeakable loftiness of which is deemed an improper subject for human investigation; by virtue of which there is need to speak of this sublime and most excellent sacrament with all fear and modesty; for with respect to no sacrament is error more perilous, nor inquiry more laborious, nor invention more fruitful.

Accordingly, since I am about to examine carefully some views of this most worthy sacrament, I protest that I will not assert anything except that which the Roman Church holds and teaches. Moreover, subjecting and exposing myself to the correction of all the skilled, orthodox Catholics who are interested, I

inserenda et universaliter quaecumque dicenda quae non sunt per Romanam Ecclesiam authentica, id est, non temerarie approbando sed tantum recitando causa exercitii et veritatis inquirendae cum omni humilitate et modestia explicabo, correctioni quorumque peritorum catholicorum orthodoxorum, quorum interest, me subiiciens et exponens.

Noverint autem universi quod hoc praesens opusculum non aggredior ut fidelium auribus aliquas prophanas vocum ingeram novitates; sed ut quam innocenter et sobrie de hoc altissimo sacramento, quando sententias legi, fuerim locutus, ostendam.

shall explain the statements of physics which are to be inserted and whatever statements are in general to be quoted, which are not authorized by the Roman Church, with all humility and modesty, that is, not by rashly approving them but by citing them only for the sake of practice and of inquiring into the truth.

However, let all men understand that I do not undertake this present little work that I may inflict some profane novelties of speech upon the ears of the faithful, but that I may show how blamelessly and temperately I have spoken on this most worthy sacrament when I expressed my opinions.

CAPITULUM I

Quid doctores Catholici de veritate Eucharistiae senserunt

Doctores Catholici a Romana Ecclesia approbati, qui de sacramento Eucharistiae conscripserunt, hoc intendunt asserere, quod corpus Christi quod sumptum est de Virgine Maria, quod passum est et sepultum, quodque resurrexit et in caelum ascendit et sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris et in quo Filius Dei venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos, sub specie panis realiter et veraciter continetur. Quamvis autem realiter lateat sub specie panis; non enim videtur a nobis oculo corporali, sed ipsum operiri sub specie panis a fidelibus mente creditur.

Et tenetur etiam quod substantia panis transsubstantiatur, convertitur seu mutatur ita quod substantia panis non manet sed quod remanent accidentia sola per se existentia sine subiecto.

Et non tantum corpus Christi, quod est altera pars humanae naturae facta transsubstantiatione panis, sub specie panis realiter continetur, sed etiam totus Christus integer perfectus Deus et verus homo sub tota hostia et qualibet parte simul vere et realiter continetur; quamvis proprie sumendo 'conversionem' et 'transsubstan-

CHAPTER I

What the Catholic Doctors discerned by the senses concerning the reality of the Eucharist

The Catholic Doctors approved by the Roman Church, who have written about the sacrament of the Eucharist, intend to assert this, that the body of Christ which was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered and was buried, which also rose from the dead and ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God, the Father, and in which the Son of God is about to come to judge the living and the dead, is really and truly contained under the species of bread. But, although it may really lie hidden under the species of bread, it certainly is not seen by us with the bodily eye, but with the mind the faithful believe that it is concealed under the species of bread.

And it is also held that the substance of the bread is transubstantiated, converted, or changed, so that the substance of the bread does not remain but that only the accidents existing per se remain without a subject.

And not only the body of Christ, which is one of the two parts of the human nature affected by the transubstantiation of the bread, is really contained under the species of bread; but also the whole Christ, undivided, perfect God and true man, is at the same time truly and really contained under the entire host and under each part; although by a proper assumption of 'conversion' and 'transubstantiation,' the substance

tiationem' substantia panis non in divinitatem nec in rationalem animam nec in aliquod accidens convertatur.

Haec est et mea fides, quoniam haec est catholica fides. Quicquid enim explicite credit Romana Ecclesia, hoc solum et non aliud nihil vel explicite vel implicite credo. Quantae autem efficaciae et nobilitatis sit fides implicita, explicat Innocentius extra De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter,' in glossa. "In tantum," inquit, "valet fides implicita, ut dicunt quidam, quod si aliquis eam habet, quod, scilicet, credit ut ecclesia credit, si false opinatur ratione naturali motus quod Pater maior vel prior sit Filio vel quod tres personae sint tres res ad invicem distantes, non est haereticus nec peccat, dummodo hunc errorem non defendit et hoc ipsum credit quia credit ecclesiam sic credere et suam opinionem fidei ecclesiae supponit; quia licet male sic opinetur, tamen illa fides non est fides sua, immo fides sua est fides ecclesiae."

Si ergo tantae efficaciae sit fides implicita ut excuset ignoranter errantem circa illa quae in scriptura canonica sunt expressa, multo magis excusabit ignoranter opinantem aliquid quod nec in scriptura canonica nec in doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia fuerit expressum.

of the bread may not be converted into divinity or rational soul or into some accident.

This is also my faith, since this is the Catholic faith. For whatever the Roman Church explicitly believes, this alone and nothing else either explicitly or implicitly I believe. But how much efficiency and nobility there may be in implicit faith Innocent sets forth in a gloss on the De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter.' "Implicit faith," he says, "prevails to such a degree, as some say, that if any one has this; namely, that he believes as the church believes; if he is impelled by natural reason falsely to think that the Father may be greater or prior to the Son or that the three persons may be three things mutually separate, he is not a heretic nor does he sin; provided he does not defend this error and believes this very statement because he believes that the church so believes, and substitutes his opinion for the faith of the church; for although he may thus wrongly think, yet that faith is not his faith; on the contrary his own faith is the faith of the church."

Therefore, if there be such great efficacy in implicit faith that it may excuse one ignorantly erring concerning those doctrines which are set forth in the canonical Scriptures, much more will it excuse the one ignorantly forming an opinion of something which is found set forth neither in the canonical Scriptures nor in the writings of the Doctors approved by the church.

CAPITULUM II

Quod corpus Christi continetur realiter sub specie panis

Quod corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter continetur per rationem naturalem, ostendi non potest; et ideo ad istius veritatis notitiam oportet per fidem accedere, de qua dubitare non debemus cum constet nobis ipsam per Unigenitum Dei Filium fuisse revelatam Apostolis, teste sanctissimo evangelista Matthaeo XXVI.: "Accepit," inquit, "Iesus panem et benedicens fregit deditque discipulis Suis et ait: 'Accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum.'" Huic etiam veritati perhibet testimonium Marci, Capitulo XIV., dicens: "Manducantibus illis accepit Iesus panem et benedicens fregit deditque eis et dixit: 'Sumite, hoc est corpus meum.'" Quibus consentit Lucas, Capitulo XXII., dicens: "Accepto pane gratias egit et fregit deditque illis dicens: 'Hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis datur; hoc facite in meam commemorationem.'" Iohannes etiam Evangelista refert verba Salvatoris simul veritatem et utilitatem illius sacramenti denotantis, Iohanne VI.: "Panis, quem ego dabo vobis, caro mea est, pro mundi vita"; et sequitur: "Nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii Hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem, non habebitis vitam in vobis. Qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem, habet vitam aeternam." Similiter apostolus Paulus, I., ad

CHAPTER II

That the body of Christ is really contained under the species of bread

That the body of Christ is really contained under the species of bread can not be shown through natural reason; and, therefore, it is necessary to assent through faith to a conception of this truth, concerning which we ought not to be in doubt since it may be well known to us that the same truth was revealed to the Apostles through the Only-begotten Son of God; a witness to which is the most holy Evangelist, Matthew, in Chapter XXVI. "Jesus took bread," he says, "and blessing, brake it and gave it to His disciples and said: 'Take and eat; this is my body.'" To this truth Mark also bears testimony in Chapter XIV., saying: "While they were eating, Jesus took bread and blessing, brake it and gave it to them and said: 'Take, this is my body.'" With these statements Luke agrees in Chapter XXII., saying: "When He had taken bread, He gave thanks and brake it and gave it to them, saying: 'This is my body which is given for you; this do in remembrance of me.'" In John, Chapter VI.; John, the Evangelist, also records the words of the Saviour as He points out both the reality and the benefit of that sacrament: "The bread, which I shall give to you for the life of the world, is my flesh"; and there follows: "Except ye will have eaten the flesh of the Son of Man and will have drunk his blood, ye *will* not have life in you. He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood, hath eternal life." The Apostle Paul similarly says in I.

Corinthios XI., dicit: "Dominus," inquit, "Iesus, in qua nocte tradebatur, accepit panem et gratias agens fregit et dixit: 'Accipite et manducate; hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis datur. Hoc facite in meam commemorationem.'" Item, I. Corinthii X. dicit: "Panis quem frangimus, nonne communicatio corporis Domini est?" Isti sunt auctores scripturae canonicae, qui concorditer affirmant corpus Christi veraciter et realiter sub specie panis fuisse datum Apostolis ac eisdem a Salvatore fuisse praeceptum ut in memoriam passionis Dominicae corpus Christi sub specie panis offerrent.

Praedictis etiam scriptoribus scripturae canonicae consentiunt Doctores egregii Sancti Patres scripturae divinae expositores clarissimi ac a Romana Ecclesia authentici, quorum non nullae auctoritates insertae iuri canonico sunt in medium proponendae.

Unde dicit beatus Augustinus et habetur I., Questione I., 'Intra Ecclesiam.' "Intra," inquit, "Ecclesiam Catholicam in mysterio corporis et sanguinis Domini nihil a bono maius nec nihil a malo minus perficitur sacerdote."

Item beatus Cyprianus Episcopus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Scriptura.' Inquit: "Quotienscumque calicem in commemorationem Domini et passionis eius offerimus, illud quod constat Dominum fecisse faciamus."

Item Ambrosius et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II.: 'Ante benedictionem.' "Ante," inquit, "benedictionem alia species nominatur; post benedic-

Corinthians XI.: "The Lord Jesus," he says, "in the night in which he was betrayed, took bread, and giving thanks brake it and said: 'Take and eat; this is my body which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me.'" Likewise, in I. Corinthians X., he says: "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of the Lord?" These are the authors of the canonical scriptures, who alike affirm that the body of Christ was truly and really given to the Apostle under the species of bread and that it was also enjoined upon the same Apostles by the Saviour that they should offer the body of Christ under the species of bread in memory of the passion of the Lord.

With the previously quoted writers of the canonical Scriptures also agree the eminent Doctors, the Holy Fathers, the most illustrious expositors of the divine scriptures, and also those recognized as authorities by the Roman Church; some of whose passages preserved in the canonical law must be publicly set forth.

Whence, the blessed Augustine says as quoted in I., Question I., 'Intra ecclesiam.' "Within the Catholic Church," he says, "in the mystery of the body and the blood of the Lord, nothing greater is conferred by a good priest and nothing less by a bad priest."

Likewise, the blessed Cyprian, the bishop, as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Scriptura.' He says: "As often as we offer the cup in commemoration of the Lord and His Passion, we do that which it is well known that the Lord did."

Likewise, Ambrose as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Ante benedictionem.' "Before the blessing," he says, "a different species is indicated,

tionem, corpus signatur. Item in isto sacramento Christus est."

Item Ieronymus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Nec Moyses,' "Nec," inquit, "Moyses dedit panem vobis de coelo verum, sed Dominus Iesus; ipse convivium et conviva, ipse comedens et qui comeditur."

Item beatus Gregorius et habetur I., Questione I., 'Multi.' "Polluimus," inquit, "panem, id est, corpus Christi, quando indigni accedimus ad altare."

Ex his aliisque auctoritatibus pluribus evidenter ostenditur corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter contineri; et quia illud a primordio fidei Christianae omnibus fidelibus erat perspicuum, ideo circa eius confirmationem nolo diutius immorari.

after the blessing the body is designated. Christ is likewise in that sacrament."

Likewise, Hieronymus as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Nec Moyses.' "Moses," he says, "did not give to you the true bread from heaven, but the Lord Jesus, feast and guest, the one eating and the one who is eaten."

Likewise, the blessed Gregory as quoted in I., Question I., 'Multi.' "We," he says, "desecrate the bread, that is, the body of Christ when we approach the altar unworthily."

From these and numerous other passages, it is clearly shown that the body of Christ is really contained under the species of bread; and because that was clear to all the faithful from the commencement of the Christian faith; therefore, as regards the confirmation of this, I do not wish to delay longer.

CAPITULUM III

Quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi

Quamvis in scriptura canonica expresse tradatur quod corpus Christi sub specie panis fidelibus est porrigendum, tamen quod substantia panis in corpus Christi realiter convertitur vel transsubstantiatur in canone Bibliae non invenitur expressum; sed hoc Sanctis Patribus creditur divinitus revelatum vel ex auctoritatibus Bibliae diligenti et solerti inquisitione probatum; et ideo ad istam veritatem probandam auctoritates Sanctorum Patrum adducam.

Unde dicit beatus Eusebius Emissenus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Quia corpus': "Invisibilis Sacerdos visibiles creaturas in substantiam corporis Sui et sanguinis verbo Suo secreta potestate convertit." Et subditur; "Quanta itaque et quam celebranda beneficia vis divinae benedictionis operetur, et quod tibi novum et impossibile esse non debeat quod in Christi substantiam terrena mortaliaque convertuntur."

Item Ambrosius et hoc habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Panis.' "Si tanta," inquit, "vis est in sermone Domini Iesu ut in opere faciat esse quod non erat; quanto magis operatorius est ut sint quae erant et in aliud commutentur. Et sic quod erat panis ante

CHAPTER III

That the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ

Although it is expressly set forth in the canonical Scriptures that the body of Christ is to be offered to the faithful under the species of bread, yet that the substance of the bread is really converted or transubstantiated into the body of Christ is not found expressed in the canon of the Bible; but this doctrine is believed to have been divinely revealed to the Holy Fathers, or to have been proved from passages of the Bible by a diligent and skillful examination; and, therefore, I shall cite passages of the Holy Fathers to prove this truth.

Whence, Eusebius Emissenus says as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Quia corpus': "The invisible Priest converts visible creatures into the substance of His body and blood by His word by a secret power." And he adds: "And so how many and how celebrated the benefits the power of the divine blessing may produce; and that it ought not to be strange or impossible to you that earthly and mortal objects are converted into the substance of Christ."

Likewise, Ambrose as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Panis.' "If," he says, "there is such power in the Word of the Lord Jesus, that by a miracle He may cause that to be which was not; how much more efficacious is it that those may be which were and may be changed into another. And so that

consecrationem, iam est corpus Christi post consecrationem."

Item extra De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter,' ubi dicit Innocentius III. in concilio generali: "Una est fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur; in qua ipse idem sacerdos est et sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub specie panis et vini veraciter continetur, translato pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina."

Item extra De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthae': "Si tunc igitur levavit oculos ad Patrem cum ad corpus exanime animam Lazari revocavit, probabilius esse videtur quod tunc oculos levavit ad Patrem in caelum cum panem et vinum in corpus et sanguinem proprie commutavit."

Ex quibus aliisque quam plurimis Sanctorum et Doctorum auctoritatibus constat quod substantia panis virtute divina realiter et veraciter in substantiam corporis Christi transsubstantiatur, convertitur seu commutatur; sine tamen omni augmento vel translatione substantiali corporis Christi.

which was bread before consecration, is now the body of Christ after consecration."

Likewise, in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter,' where Innocent III. says in a general council: "There is one universal church of believers, outside of which no one at all is saved; in which Jesus Christ Himself is both priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood is truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, since the bread has been transformed into body and the wine into blood by divine power."

Likewise, in the margin of the De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthæ.' "If, therefore, He lifted His eyes to the Father at the time when He called the soul of Lazarus back to the lifeless body, it seems to be more probable that He lifted His eyes to the Father in heaven at the time when He specially changed the bread and the wine into body and blood."

From these and very many other passages of the Saints and the Doctors, it is established that the substance of the bread is really and truly transubstantiated, converted, or changed by divine virtue into the substance of the body of Christ, yet without any increase or substantial translation of the body of Christ.

CAPITULUM IV

Quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, non in divinitatem, nec in animam intellectivam, nec in sanguinem, nec in aliquod accidens substantiae

Praedicta conversio seu transsubstantiatio panis proprie accipiendo vocabulum non sit in animam Christi, nec in divinitatem, nec in aliquod accidens substantiae corporis Christi, nec in sanguinem sed tantum in corpus Christi. Quamvis improprie et large sumendo hoc vocabulum 'conversio' seu 'transsubstantiatio' posset concedi quod panis transsubstantiatur in animam vel in accidens corporis Christi vel in sanguinem. Quod enim substantia panis in animam Christi vel divinitatem non convertitur, doctorum auctoritatibus persuadetur. Unde dicit glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione, II., super illo capitulo, 'Quid est Christum manducare?': "Panis in solam carnem convertitur et vinum in sanguinem."

Item Magister Sententiarum in Libro IV., Distinctione, XI.: "Licet," inquit, "sub utraque specie totus Christus sumatur, tamen non fit conversio panis nisi in carnem nec vini nisi in sanguinem."

Ex quibus auctoritatibus claret, quod substantia panis, ex quo in solam carnem convertitur, non in divinitatem vel animam rationalem vel sanguinem transsubstantiatur, nec per consequens in accidens

CHAPTER IV

That the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, not into the divinity, or the rational soul, or the blood, or some accident of the substance

According to a proper acceptation of the term, the previously mentioned conversion or transubstantiation of the bread may not be into the soul, or the divinity, or into an accident of the substance of the body of Christ, or the blood of Christ, but only into the body of Christ. Although, by putting an improper and loose construction upon this term 'conversion' or 'transubstantiation' it might be able to be conceded that the bread is transubstantiated into the soul or an accident of the body of Christ, or the blood. For the passages of the Doctors prove conclusively that the substance of the bread is not converted into the soul or the divinity of Christ. Whence a gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., above that Chapter, 'Quid est Christum manducare?' says: "The bread is converted into flesh alone and the wine into blood."

Likewise, the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XI.: "Although," he says, "the entire Christ may be assumed under both species, yet no conversion of the bread except into flesh or of wine except into blood takes place."

From these passages it is clear that the substance of the bread, from which it is converted into flesh alone, is not transubstantiated into divinity or rational soul or blood, nor as a consequence into an accident of

carnis nec animae; sed hoc quidem verum est proprie sumendo hoc vocabulum, 'convertitur.'

Unde sciendum quod in illud proprie convertitur vel transsubstantiatur substantia panis, quod non est, quia coniunctum est alteri; sed, etiam si ab aliis esset separatum, ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium a sacerdote super materia conveniente cum intentione debita potestate divina sic incipit esse sub specie panis. Huius autem est caro Christi et non anima nec sanguis nec aliquod accidens inhaerens carni vel animae. Nam, si esset anima separata a carne, quantumcumque sacerdos cum intentione debita proferret verba sacramentalia super materia conveniente, non ibi inciperet esse anima Christi sed caro tantum.

Similiter, si sanguis esset separatus a carne, non ibi inciperet esse sanguis sed caro tantum. Et idem iudicium est de accidentibus carnis et animae. Et propter hoc dicunt doctores corpus Christi esse sub specie panis virtute verborum sacramentalium et ex vi conversionis et propter hoc substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi et non in animam nec in deitatem.

Si tamen velit aliquis uti vocabulo conversionis vel transsubstantiationis magis improprie, ut dicat substantiam panis converti in omne illud quod ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium incipit nunc de facto esse sub specie panis, sic utendo vocabulo potest concedere quod substantia panis convertitur in animam Christi intellectivam; hoc est dicere, ad prolationem

flesh or soul; but this is certainly true according to a proper use of this term 'convertitur.'

From which it must be perceived that the substance of the bread is especially converted or transubstantiated into that which is not, because it is joined to another; but, even if it were separated from others, it begins to be so by divine power under the species of the bread at the utterance of the sacramental words by the priest, with the obligatory intention, over suitable material. But of such is the flesh of Christ, and not the soul, or the blood, or some accident inhering in flesh or soul. For, if the soul were separated from the flesh, no matter how much the priest might with obligatory intention recite the sacramental words over suitable material, the soul of Christ would not begin to be there, but only the flesh.

Similarly, if the blood were separated from the flesh, the blood would not begin to be there, but only the flesh. And the judgment is the same with respect to the accidents of the flesh and the soul. And by virtue of this the Doctors say that the body of Christ is under the species of bread by virtue of the sacramental words and by the power of conversion, and by virtue of this the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ and not into soul or deity.

If however any one wishes to use the term 'conversion' or 'transubstantiation' more improperly, that he may say that the substance of the bread is converted into all that which at the pronouncing of the sacramental words begins now really to be under the species of bread, by so using the term it can be conceded that the substance of the bread is converted into the reasonable soul of Christ; this is to say, that at the utterance

verborum sacramentalium incipit anima intellectiva esse sub specie panis. Si tamen in triduo mortis Christi fuissent verba sacramentalia cum debita intentione prolata, non fuisset ibidem anima intellectiva, et ratio huius diversitatis est quia tunc erat anima intellectiva separata a corpore Christi cui nunc est unita.

Si autem omnino velint contendere de vocabulo et dicere quod substantia panis in nihil convertitur nisi quod incipiet esse sub specie panis, etiam si esset ab aliis separatum, volo sibi resistere cum de re satis patet.

of the sacramental words the reasonable soul begins to be under the species of bread. If, however, the sacramental words would have been uttered with the obligatory intention during the three days of the death of Christ, the reasonable soul would not have been in the same place; and the reason for this diversity is, because the intellectual soul was then separated from the body of Christ to which it is now united.

But if they only wish to contend about a term and to say that the substance of the bread is converted into nothing, except that which will begin to be under the species of bread, even if it were separated from others, I do not wish to oppose them since the point is sufficiently obvious.

CAPITULUM V

Quod substantia panis non remanet post consecrationem

Nunc illud considerandum est quod ista conversio seu transsubstantiatio non fit per hoc solum quod corpus Christi incipit esse sub specie panis ipsa substantia remanente; sed sic convertitur substantia panis in corpus Christi, quod virtute divina substantia panis non manet, sed tantum sub accidentibus, quae erant ante conversionem in substantia panis, manet corpus Christi; non tamen afficitur accidentibus illis ut inferius dicetur.

Est autem advertendum quod, quamvis in novo testamento reperiatur expressum quod corpus Christi sub specie panis a fidelibus est sumendum in memoriam passionis Dominicae et suorum remissionem peccaminum, tamen, quod substantia panis non manet ibi non exprimitur. Unde et de hoc fuerunt antiquitus diversae opiniones; sicut recitat Magister Sententiarum Libro IV., Distinctione XI., et Hostiensis in summa extra De Consecratione, et glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'In sacramentorum'; et glossa extra De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthae.' Unde dicunt quod circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi tres erant opiniones. "Una asserit quod illa substantia,

CHAPTER V

That the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration

The statement must now be considered that this conversion or transubstantiation does not happen through this alone, that the body of Christ begins to be under the species of bread though the substance itself remains; but the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ in such a way, that the substance of the bread does not remain by divine virtue, but the body of Christ remains only under the accidents which were in the substance of the bread before conversion; yet it is not affected by those accidents, as will be stated later.

However, it must be noted that, although it may be found expressed in the New Testament, that the body of Christ is to be received by the faithful under the species of bread in memory of the passion of the Lord and for the remission of their sins; yet it is not there clearly expressed that the substance of the bread does not remain. Whence, and in former times there have been diverse opinions concerning this, as states the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XI., and Hostiensis at the top of the page in the margin of the De Consecratione, and the gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'In sacramentorum,' and the gloss in the margin of the De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthæ.' Whence they say that there were three opinions about the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. "One opinion asserts that that

quae fuit panis primo, postea est caro et sanguis Christi. Secunda opinio tenet quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinit esse et manent accidentia tantum; scilicet, sapor, color, et pondus et similia; et sub his accidentibus incipit ibi esse corpus Christi. Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini et in eodem loco sub eadem specie est corpus Christi."

Opinionem mediam approbant doctores praenominati, et videtur esse determinatio Ecclesiae Romanae. Unde extra De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter,' dicit Innocentius in concilio generali: "Una est omnium fidelium universalis ecclesia extra quam nullus omnino salvatur; in qua ipse idem sacerdos est et sacrificium, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur transsubstantiatis pane in corpus Christi et vino in sanguinem potestate divina." Istam auctoritatem vide in praecedenti columna, scilicet, in Capitulo tertio huius operis.

Catholici autem concordantes istam opinionem mediam approbantes in modo ponendi diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim ponunt, sicut Sanctus Thomas Libro IV., Distinctione XI., Questione I, quod contradictionem includit quod substantia panis maneat cum corpore Christi sacramentaliter manente sub specie

substance, which was at first bread, afterwards is the flesh and the blood of Christ. The second opinion holds that the substance of the bread and the wine ceases to be there and the accidents only remain; namely, taste, color, weight, and similar accidents; and under these accidents the body of Christ begins to be there. The third opinion holds, that the substance of the bread and the wine remains there and the body of Christ is in the same place under the same species."

The aforesaid Doctors approve the second opinion, and it seems to be the determination of the Roman Church. Whence, in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Firmiter,' Innocent says in a general council: "There is one universal church of all believers, outside of which no one at all is saved; in which He is both priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, when the bread is transubstantiated by divine power into the body of Christ and the wine into the blood." See this passage in the preceding column; namely, in Chapter III. of this work.

But the Catholics, who agree in their approval of this second opinion, have diverse opinions concerning the mode of positing. For some posit, as Saint Thomas, in Book IV., Distinction XI., Question I., that there is a contradiction involved in the statement that the substance of the bread may remain with the body of Christ which remains sacramentally under the species

panis. Et quidam ponunt, sicut Doctor Subtilis Libro IV., Distinctione XI., Questione III., quod, quamvis substantia panis de facto non maneat cum corpore Christi, tamen contradictionem non includit quin per divinam potentiam possit manere substantia panis cum corpore Christi; et ideo concedunt isti et probant quod corpus Christi sit in sacramento altaris per mutationem factam circa corpus Christi. Et ista opinio secunda sine praeiudicio alicuius videtur mihi probabilior et magis consona theologiae, quia magis exaltat Dei omnipotentiam nihil ab ea negando nec evidenter et expresse implicat contradictionem.

De istis tamen opinionibus ad praesens supersedeo alias Deo volente ipsas diffusius tractaturus. Dico tamen quod substantia panis non manet sed desinit esse et sub illis speciebus incipit esse corpus Christi.

of bread. And certain posit, as the subtle Doctor, in Book IV., Distinction XI., Question III., that, although the substance of the bread may not really remain with the body of Christ, yet there is no contradiction involved in the statement that through divine power the substance of the bread may be able to remain with the body of Christ; and, therefore, these concede and approve the statement that the body of Christ may be in the sacrament of the altar through a change made concerning the body of Christ. And without prejudice to any other this second opinion seems to me more probable and more in accord with theology, because it rather exalts the omnipotence of God by detracting nothing from it, nor does it plainly and expressly imply a contradiction.

However, for the present I refrain from a discussion of these opinions, since I intend, God willing, to discuss the same more fully on another occasion. However, I say that the substance of the bread does not remain, but ceases to be and the body of Christ begins to be under those species.

CAPITULUM VI

Quod corpus Christi non circumscribitur loco in sacramento altaris

Quamvis autem corpus Christi realiter et veraciter contineatur sub specie panis, non tamen in sacramento altaris loco circumscribitur. Sed totum corpus Christi sub tota hostia et sub qualibet parte hostiae realiter continetur, quod Sanctorum Patrum testimoniis comprobatur. Unde beatus Ieronymus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Singuli.' "Singuli," inquit, "totum accipiunt Christum Dominum, et in singulis portionibus totus est nec per singulos minuitur sed integrum se praebet in singulis." Item beatus Hilarius Episcopus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Ubi.' "Ubi," inquit, "est pars corporis est et ibi totum." Ex quibus manifeste colligitur quod totus Christus est in tota hostia et totus in parte; ex quo sequitur quod loco non commensuratur nec circumscribitur.

Istius autem possibilitas potest aliqualiter fidelibus persuaderi. Nihil enim debet Christianus negare posse fieri virtute divina, nisi quod per rationem ex per se notis, quae nullus poterit dubitare, potest evidenter probari includere contradictionem, et nisi hoc possit elici ex Scriptura Sacra vel Doctoribus ab ecclesia sus-

CHAPTER VI

That the body of Christ is not circumscribed in a place in the sacrament of the altar

Moreover, although the body of Christ may be really and truly contained under the species of bread, yet it is not circumscribed in a place in the sacrament of the altar. But the entire body of Christ is really contained under the whole host and under each part of the host, which is confirmed by the testimony of the Holy Fathers. Whence, the blessed Jerome is quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Singuli.' "Each individual," he says, "receives the entire Christ the Lord, and He is whole in each portion and is not lessened through each; but He offers Himself entire in each." Likewise, the blessed Hilary, the Bishop, is quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Ubi.' "Where," he says, "there is a part of the body, there is also the whole." From these passages it is clearly gathered that the whole Christ is in the whole host, and the whole is in a part; from which it follows that the body of Christ is not confined or circumscribed in a place.

But the faithful can be led to believe in the possibility of this in some other way. For the Christian ought to say that anything can be accomplished by the divine virtue, except that which can be clearly proved to involve a contradiction through reasoning from things known per se, which no one could doubt, and except that which can not be elicited from Sacred Scripture

ceptis. Non enim iuxta modum causarum naturalium divinam potentiam artare debemus, cum divina potestas virtutem omnium creatorum excedat in infinitum.

Nec ad negandum aliquid posse fieri virtute divina experimenta sufficiunt, cum totum ordinem causarum naturalium posset Deus immutare. Et contra communem cursum causarum naturalium constet eum multa fecisse. Quis enim unquam experiebatur naturalem virginem sine viro concipere, duo corpora simul existere, mortuos ad vitam resurgere, accidentia sine subiecto existere, et alia innumera quae tamen constat divinitus esse facta? Non igitur debemus negare aliqua a Deo fieri posse, quia ipsa fieri naturaliter non experimur. Cum igitur aliquam substantiam duobus corporibus coexistere secundum se totam, per consequens eandem substantiam secundum se totam coexistere alicui corporeo et cuilibet parti illius non includit evidentem contradictionem quae per propositiones per se notas probari potest.

Immo certus sum quod per regulas logicales quae omni scientiae et notitiae deservire dicuntur. Concesso quod eadem substantia secundum se totam coexistat duobus corporibus vel uni corporeo et cuilibet parti eius, potest evidenter omnis contradictio evitari; quamvis non possit evidenter probari ex puris naturalibus, quod antecedens est verum. Non igitur debet Christianus negare quin Deus per potentiam suam absolutam

or the Doctors approved by the church. For we ought not to limit the divine power according to the mode of natural causes, since the divine power may infinitely exceed the virtue of all creatures.

Nor is experimental knowledge sufficient for saying that something can not be accomplished by divine virtue, since God might be able to change the entire order of natural causes. And it may be well known that He has done many things contrary to the common course of natural causes. For who ever experimentally knew of a virgin naturally conceiving without a husband, of two bodies existing at the same time, of the dead restored to life, of accidents existing without a subject, and of innumerable other things which, however, it is well known have been divinely wrought? Therefore, we ought not to say that some things can not be done by God, because we do not know by experience that they are done naturally. Therefore, since there is evidently no contradiction, which can be proven through self-evident propositions, involved in the statement that some substance a whole as regards itself coexists in two bodies, consequently the same substance a whole as regards itself coexists in some body and in each part of it.

I am, on the contrary, certain that it can be proved through the rules of logic, which are said to serve zealously all science and knowledge. Having conceded that the same substance a whole as regards itself may coexist in two bodies or in one body and in each part of it, every contradiction can evidently be avoided; although it may not be clearly proved from purely natural causes that the antecedent is true. For a Christian ought not to say that God might not

posset facere aliquam substantiam coexistere alicui corporeo, ita quod tota coexistat toti illi corporeo et cuilibet parti eius; nec oppositum potest probari. Ita enim tenemus quod anima intellectiva est tota in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius; nec oppositum potest per rationem demonstrativam probari.

Similiter etiam tenemus quod angelus est totus in aliquo loco diffinitive et in qualibet parte eius. Propter idem etiam non debet aliquis fidelis negare, quin per divinam potentiam possint duo corpora tam eiusdem speciei specialissimae quam diversae, simul eidem loco existere. Sic enim Salvator Iesus Christus ianuis clausis intravit ad discipulos et clauso utero virginis exivit in mundum et nullo diviso corpore caelesti ascendit in caelum. Si ergo nulla apparet contradictio quod duo corpora simul existant in eodem loco; nulla apparet contradictio quod duae partes eiusdem corporis in eodem loco simul existant.

Ex quo patet quod per divinam potentiam, qua ratione duae partes corporis Christi possunt eidem loco existere, pari ratione poterunt omnes partes corporis Christi simul eidem loco coexistere. Ex isto autem et priori sequitur intentum principale. Nam si non est impossibile Deo, qui plus potest facere quam nos cogitare seu intelligere, facere quod omnes partes corporis Christi eidem corporeo coexistant; nec est sibi impossi-

through His absolute power be able to make some substance to coexist with something corporeal, so that the whole may coexist with that whole body and with each part of it; nor can the opposite be proved. For we so hold that the rationable soul is a whole in a whole body and in each part of it; and the opposite can not be proved through demonstrative reasoning.

Moreover, we similarly hold that an angel is definitively a whole in any place and in each part of it. Moreover, by virtue of the same none of the faithful ought to say that two bodies of the very same identical species, as well as those of diverse species, may not be able to exist at the same time in the same place through divine power. For the Saviour, Jesus Christ, entered thus into the midst of the disciples when the doors were closed and came forth into the world from the closed womb of a virgin and ascended into heaven with undivided celestial body. If, therefore, no contradiction appears in the statement that two bodies may exist at the same time in the same place, no contradiction appears in the statement that two parts of the same body may exist in the same place at the same time.

From which it is obvious that for a reason equal to that by which two parts of the body of Christ can exist in the same place, all the parts of the body of Christ could coexist at the same time in the same place. Moreover, from this and the former statement follows the principal intention. For if it is not impossible for God, who can do more than we can think or understand, to bring it to pass that all the parts of the body of Christ may exist in the same body, and it is not impossible for Him to place the same whole sub-

bile eandem substantiam ponere totam in toto et ponere totam in qualibet parte, sicut patet de anima intellectiva et de angelo.

Sequitur manifeste quod non est impossibile Deo facere quod tota substantia corporis Christi coexistat toti hostiae et cuilibet parti eius, quod est propositum principale. Nec illud obstat quod corpus Christi habet partes organicas distinctas realiter, quarum una non est in alia, sicut digitus non est in digito; quarum etiam aliquae sunt in una parte totali et non in alia, sicut oculi non sunt in manu vel in pede, sed in capite. Nam ad distinctionem partium organicarum non requiritur localis distantia, sed realis distinctio dispositionum materialium. Nam quamvis manus retentis eisdem dispositionibus poneretur cum oculo ita quod simul in eodem loco essent et manus et oculus, adhuc tamen manus esset manus et non oculus et homo per manum non videret sed per oculum. Et ita tunc possunt organa remanere distincta et nata habere distinctas operationes quantumcumque localiter non distarent. Et ideo hoc a divina potentia non est negandum. Qualis autem sit diversitas dispositionis organorum, an sit substantialis vel accidentalis, non spectat ad praesens negotium.

Similiter etiam, quamvis organa non distarent localiter, non propter hoc sequeretur quod manus esset in pede vel econtrario; sed tantum quod illa organa essent simul in eodem loco, quod non repugnat organorum dispositioni, sicut declaratum est; cum indistantia locali unius partis ab alia stat quod una pars sit in alia

stance in a whole and to place the whole in each part, as is obvious of the rational soul and an angel.

It manifestly follows that it is not impossible for God to bring it to pass that the whole substance of the body of Christ may coexist with the whole host and with each part of it, which is the principal thesis. Nor does this obtain, that the body of Christ has organic parts really distinct, of which one is not in another, as a finger is not in a finger; of which, moreover, some are in one total part and not in another, as the eyes are not in the hand or in the foot but in the head. For local separation is not required for a distinction of organic parts, but a real distinction of material dispositions. For although the hand, if the same dispositions are retained, might be placed with the eye, so that both the hand and eye would be at the same time in the same place, yet the hand would certainly be a hand and not an eye, and a man could not see through the hand but through the eye. And so then the organs can remain distinct and created to have distinct functions, no matter how much they might not be separate locally. And, therefore, this must not be denied of the divine power. But of what kind the diversity of disposition of the organs may be, whether indeed it be substantial or accidental, does not concern the present discussion.

Similarly, also, although the organs might not be separate locally, it would not by virtue of this follow that the hand would be in the foot, or the contrary; but only that those organs would be at the same time in the same place, which is not inconsistent with the disposition of the organs, as has been shown; since with even the local inseparability of one part from another

sicut in suo toto, ad modum quo oculus est in capite sicut in toto et sicut cum indistantia locali animae intellectivae ab homine stat, quod anima intellectiva sit pars hominis; anima enim intellectiva est omnino in eodem loco in quo est homo, et tamen est pars hominis. Ita posset oculus esse pars capitis et tamen esse in eodem loco cum capite. Et sic patet possibilitas existentiae corporis Christi cum tota hostia et qualibet parte eius.

De omnibus tamen praedictis nihil assero, nisi quod est consonum doctrinae Sanctorum; si quid autem non fuerit consonum dictis eorum, tantum ad exercitandum mentes studiosas sit dictum.

it obtains that one part may be in another as in its whole, after the manner in which the eye is in the head, as in a whole; and as with the local inseparability of the rational soul from man it obtains that the rational soul may be a part of man; for the rational soul is wholly in the same place in which man is, and yet it is part of man. So the eye might be able to be a part of the head and yet be in the same place with the head. And so the possibility of the existence of the body of Christ with the whole host and with each part of it is obvious.

However, I assert nothing concerning all of the previous statements, except that which is consistent with the doctrine of the Saints; but if any statement should not be in agreement with their statements, let it be said only for the training of studious minds.

CAPITULUM VII

Quod corpus Christi non videtur a nobis in sacramento altaris oculo corporali

Hoc itaque corpus Dominicum, dictis eorum tantum desinente substantia panis, incipiens sub specie panis existere potestate divina non oculo corporali sed fide et intellectu percipitur. Quod tam auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum quam rationibus suadetur.

Unde dicit beatus Augustinus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Nos autem.' "Nos autem," inquit, "in specie panis et vini, quam videmus, res invisibiles videmus, id est, carnem et sanguinem honoramus."

Item idem Augustinus De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Qui manducant.' "Quod videtur panis," inquit, "est et calix quod etiam oculi renuntiant; quod autem fides postulat instruenda, panis est corpus Christi et calix est sanguis. Ista ideo dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur et aliud intelligitur."

Item Gregorius De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Quid sit,' dicit sic: "Magnum et pavendum," Dominus inquit, "mysterium est quia aliud videtur et aliud intelligitur."

Item Hilarius et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Ubi.' "Non est," inquit, "quantitas

CHAPTER VII

That the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is not seen by us with the bodily eye

Therefore, when at their words the substance of the bread only ceases to exist, this body of the Lord, which begins to exist under the species of bread by the divine power, is not perceived with the bodily eye but by faith and the understanding. This conclusion is drawn from passages of the Holy Fathers as well as from arguments.

Whence, the blessed Augustine says, as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Nos autem.' "But we," he says, "in the species of bread and wine which we see, behold invisible things, that is, we do honor to flesh and blood."

Likewise, the same Augustine in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Qui manducant.' "That which is seen," he says, "is the bread and the cup which also the eyes declare; but that which faith for its instruction demands, the bread is the body of Christ and the cup is the blood. These, therefore, are called sacraments, because in them one is seen and another is understood."

Likewise, Gregory in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Quid sit,' says thus: "It is a great and dread mystery," the Lord says, "because one is seen and another is understood."

Likewise, Hilary as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Ubi.' "A visible quantity," he says,

visibilis in hoc aestimanda mysterio, sed virtus sacramenti spiritualis."

Ex istis aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus patet quod corpus Christi in sacramento altaris non videtur sed intelligitur solum, quamvis species panis realiter videatur.

Ad hoc etiam non desunt rationes. Nam illud, quod in aliquo loco percipitur oculo corporali, sine omni auctoritate potest evidenter cognosci ibidem existere. Sed nullus sine omni auctoritate Salvatoris et ecclesiae teneret corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter contineri, non igitur ibi videtur oculo corporali.

Item visio corporalis omnibus aeque dispositis est aequalis, sed nullus infidelis videt corpus Christi in sacramento Altaris oculo corporali; relinquitur igitur quod nullus fidelis percipit ibi esse corpus Christi oculo corporali.

Item manifestum est quod nullus percipit ibi aliquam qualitatem sensibilem a quocumque sensu nisi qualitatem hostiae. Sicut patet de qualitatibus tangibilibus et perceptibilibus a sensu gustus et de qualitatibus visibilibus, non igitur in sacramento altaris corpus Christi videtur oculo corporali.

"is not to be considered in this mystery, but the virtue of the sacrament is spiritual."

It is obvious from these and many other passages that the body of Christ is not seen in the sacrament of the altar, but is only understood; although the species of bread may really be seen.

Moreover, for this conclusion arguments are not wanting. For that, which is perceived with the bodily eye in some place, can certainly be known to exist in the same place without any authority. But no one without the full authority of the Saviour and of the Church would hold that the body of Christ is really contained under the species of bread; therefore, it is not seen there with the bodily eye.

Likewise, bodily vision is equal in all those equally disposed; but no unbeliever sees the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar with the bodily eye; therefore, it remains that no believer perceives with the bodily eye that the body of Christ is there.

It is likewise manifest that no one perceives there any sensible quality by any sense whatsoever, unless a quality of the host. As is obvious, from qualities tangible and perceptible by the sense of taste and from visible qualities, the body of Christ is not, therefore, seen in the sacrament of the altar with the bodily eye.

CAPITULUM VIII

Quod accidentia remanentia post consecrationem non sunt in corpore Christi subiective

Postquam de existentia corporis Christi sub specie panis pauca sunt praescripta, super est ut de accidentibus remanentibus post consecrationem substantiae panis aliqua differantur.

Et primo ostendatur quod illa accidentia subiective in corpore Christi non existunt; quod patet ex hoc quod qualitates contrariae in corpore non sunt simul in corpore Christi. Qua ratione autem qualitates unius hostiae existerent subiective in corpore Christi, eadem ratione qualitates alterius hostiae idem corpus Christi afficerent. Ad sensum autem patet, quod aliquando aliquae qualitates diversarum hostiarum sibi contrariantur. Ex quibus relinquitur quod nec istae qualitates nec illae corpus Christi afficiunt.

Item corpus Christi ad qualitates sensibiles non alternatur de novo, quod tamen contingeret si accidentia panis corpus Christi informarent. Hoc etiam auctoritate Magistri Sententiarum confirmatur Libro IV., Distinctione XII. "Ibi," inquit, "non est substantia nisi corporis et sanguinis Domini quae non afficitur illis accidentibus. Non enim corpus Christi in se habet formam talem, sed qualis in iudicio apparebit."

CHAPTER VIII

That the accidents remaining after consecration are not subjectively in the body of Christ

Since little has been previously written about the existence of the body of Christ under the species of bread; it remains that some views be set forth concerning the accidents remaining after the consecration of the substance of the bread.

Let it be shown, first, that those accidents do not exist subjectively in the body of Christ; which is obvious from this, that contrary qualities in a body are not at the same time in the body of Christ. Moreover, for the same reason by which the qualities of one host might exist subjectively in the body of Christ, the qualities of another host might affect the same body of Christ. But it is obvious to sense that sometimes some qualities of diverse hosts are contrary to themselves. From which it follows that neither these qualities nor those affect the body of Christ.

Likewise, the body of Christ is not changed anew to sensible qualities, which might, however, happen if the accidents of the bread could inform the body of Christ. This is also confirmed by the passage of the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XII. "There," he says, "is no substance except that of the body and the blood of the Lord which is not affected by those accidents. For the body of Christ does not have in itself such form, but such as will appear in the judgment."

Nec etiam illa accidentia aërem circumstantem afficient; quia nullum accidens, nec secundum se totum nec secundum aliquam sui partem, distat loco et situ a subiecto suo primo. Sed ad sensum apparet quod aliqua pars accidentis hostiae loco et situ distat ab aëre circumstante et a qualibet eius parte; non est igitur idem accidens in aëre subiective, nec eadem ratione aliquod aliorum. Item numquam accidens occupat alium locum a loco sui subiecti, sed manifestum est quod hostia et aër occupant distincta loca; non igitur illa accidentia sunt subiective in aëre.

Nec etiam illa accidentia sunt subiective in substantia panis quia illa substantia non est, sicut ostensum est prius. Relinquitur igitur quod accidentia manent sine subiecto; quod confirmatur per Magistrum Sententiarum Libro IV., Distinctione XII., in principio dicentem: "Si autem quaeritur de accidentibus quae remanent, scilicet, de speciebus, 'sapore' et 'pondere,' in quo subiecto fundentur; potius mihi videtur facere ea esse sine subiecto quam esse in subiecto."

Moreover, those accidents do not affect the surrounding air; for no accident, neither as regards itself as a whole nor as regards any part of itself, is separate in place and situation from its primary subject. But to the sense it appears that some part of an accident of the host is separate in place and situation from the surrounding air and from each part of it; therefore, the same accident is not in the air subjectively, nor for the same reason is any of the others. Likewise, an accident never occupies a place other than the place of its subject, but it is manifest that the host and the air occupy distinct places; therefore, it is manifest that accidents are not subjectively in the air.

Moreover, those accidents are not subjectively in the substance of the bread, because that substance is not, as was shown previously. Therefore, it remains that the accidents remain without a subject; which is confirmed through the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XII., where he says at the beginning: "But if any inquiry is made concerning the accidents which remain; namely, of the species, 'taste' and 'heaviness,' in what subject they may be found, it seems to me to cause these accidents to be without a subject rather than to be in a subject."

CAPITULUM IX

Quod quantitas, quae praefuit in substantia panis, manet

Quod autem ista accidentia sint quanta, et quod vere remaneat quantitas post consecrationem ostendi potest multis rationibus.

Primo sic: secundum Innocentium III. extra De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthae,' distinguendum est subtiliter inter tria, quae sunt in hoc sacramento distincta; videlicet, formam visibilem, veritatem corporis, et virtutem spiritualem. Forma est panis et vini, veritas carnis et sanguinis, virtus unitatis et charitatis. Primum est sacramentum et non res. Secundum est sacramentum et res. Tertium est res et non sacramentum.

Ex quo evidenter elicitur quod forma visibilis est distincta realiter a corpore Christi et quod non est quantum quantitate corporis Christi, sicut non est visibilis per aliquam qualitatem visibilem in corpore Christi. Sed manifestum est quod illa forma visibilis est quanta, cum sit longa, lata et profunda; igitur remanet realiter aliqua quantitas praeter quantitatem corporis Christi.

Secundo sic: illa quantitas formae visibilis est realiter figurata, nihil autem est figuratum sine quantitate, et non habet figuram corporis Christi; igitur nec habet

CHAPTER IX

That the quantity, which was before in the substance of the bread, remains

Moreover, it can be shown by many reasons that those accidents may be quanta, and that a quantity may truly remain after consecration.

First thus: according to Innocent III. in the margin of the De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthæ,' a subtle distinction must be made among three things, which are distinct in the sacrament; namely, visible form, reality of the body, and spiritual virtue. The form is that of bread and wine, the reality is that of flesh and blood, the virtue is that of unity and charity. The first is the sacrament, and not the element. The second is the sacrament and the element. The third is the element and not the sacrament.

From this it is evidently inferred that the visible form is really distinct from the body of Christ and that it is not a quantum from the quantity of the body of Christ; as it is not visible through some quality visible in the body of Christ. But it is manifest that that visible form is a quantum, since it may be long, wide, and thick; therefore, some quantity besides the quantity of the body of Christ really remains.

In the second place thus: that the quantity of the visible form is really figurated, but nothing is figurated without quantity, and does not have the figure of the body of Christ; therefore, it does not have the quantity of the body of Christ; and consequently there is

quantitatem corporis Christi et per consequens est ibi aliqua alia quanta quantitate corporis Christi.

Tertio sic: aliqua quantitas videtur oculo corporali in sacramento altaris, sed nec Christus nec aliquod accidens Christi videtur a nobis in sacramento altaris oculo corporali; igitur est ibi alia quantitas manens quam quantitas corporis Christi.

Quarto sic: omne quod frangitur et cuius una pars separatur ab alia est quantum. Sed illa forma visibilis frangitur et una pars ipsius separatur ab alia; non sic autem corpus Christi, igitur, est ibi aliqua alia quantitas praeter quantitatem corporis Christi.

Quod enim forma visibilis frangatur realiter testatur Matthaeus Evangelista dicens: "Accepit Iesus panem, et benedixit ac fregit." Idem testatur Marcus: "Benedicens," inquit, "fregit." Quod etiam patet per Lucam et alios sanctos patres, quos nimis longum foret adducere. Quod autem corpus Christi non frangatur sed remaneat integrum, dicit doctor egregius beatus Augustinus et habetur De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Qui manducant.' "Manducatur," inquit, "Christus: vivit manducatus, quia surrexit occisus; nec, quando manducamus, partes de illo facimus." Et item dicit De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Invitat.' "Per partes manducatur in sacramento," inquit, "et manet integer totus in caelo; manet integer totus in corde tuo." Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod quantitas distincta a quantitate corporis Christi manet in sacramento altaris.

there some quantity other than the quantity of the body of Christ.

In the third place thus: some quantity is seen in the sacrament of the altar with the bodily eye, but neither Christ nor any accident of Him is seen by us in the sacrament of the altar with the bodily eye; therefore, there is there a quantity remaining other than the quantity of the body of Christ.

In the fourth place thus: all that which is broken and one part of which is separate from another is a quantum. But that visible form is broken and one part of it is separate from another; but the body of Christ is not thus; therefore, there is there some other quantity besides the quantity of the body of Christ.

For the Evangelist, Matthew, is a witness that the visible form may really be broken when he says: "Jesus took bread, blessed it and also brake it." Mark offers the same testimony. "Blessing it," he says, "he brake it." Which also is obvious according to Luke and other Holy Fathers, whom it would take too long to adduce. Moreover, that the body of Christ may not be broken but may remain entire, the eminent doctor, the blessed Augustine, says, as quoted in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Qui manducant.' "Christ," he says, "is eaten; though eaten, He lives; because though slain, He arose; nor, when we eat, do we make portions of Him." And he says likewise in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Invitat.' "Through parts He is eaten in the sacrament," he says, "and remains an entire whole in heaven; remains an entire whole in your heart." From all these passages it is gathered that a quantity distinct from the quantity of the body of Christ remains in the sacrament of the altar.

CAPITULUM X

Quod qualitates sensibiles manent

Non tantum autem constat quantitatem in Eucharistia manere, sed etiam manifestum est qualitates sensibiles post consecrationem ibidem subsistere. Nam nihil est visibile sine qualitate sensibili, sed manet forma ibi visibilis; igitur et qualitas sensibilis. Item sapor ibi percipitur, et albedo videtur, et qualitates tangibiles sensus tactus apprehendit. Sed nullus sensus percipit aliquam qualitatem corporis Christi; remanent igitur qualitates sensibiles quae prius erant in substantia panis et modo sunt sine subiecto. Sicut dicit Magister Libro IV., Distinctione XI.: "Species est ibi panis et vini sicut sapor. Unde aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur." Omnia praedicta possent multis aliis auctoritatibus confirmari; de quibus supersedeo ad quaedam physica properando, in quae incidi dum legendo Sententias.

Quaestiones de Eucharistia pertractavi, propter quae perscrutanda et explicanda ut notificem nescientibus 'quae' et 'qualia' et 'quomodo' et quod sine assertione et tantum recitative dixi ad exercitandum studiosorum ingenia. Propter calumniam aliquorum praesens negotium suscepi.

CHAPTER X

That the sensible qualities remain

Moreover, it is not only well known that a quantity remains in the Eucharist, but it is also manifest that sensible qualities subsist in the same place after consecration. For nothing is visible without a sensible quality, but the visible form remains there, and, therefore, a sensible quality. Taste is also perceived there, and whiteness is seen, and the sense of touch also apprehends the tangible qualities. But no sense perceives any quality of the body of Christ; therefore, the sensible qualities remain, which were before in the substance of the bread and are now without a subject. As the Master says in Book IV., Distinction XI.: "The species of bread and wine is there, as taste. Whence, one is seen, another is understood." All the previous statements might be able to be confirmed by many other passages; from quoting which I refrain, for I hasten on to certain statements of physics, upon which I happened while reading the Sentences.

I have fully investigated the questions concerning the Eucharist for the sake of thoroughly examining and explaining them that I may make known to those not understanding the 'quæ' and the 'qualia' and the 'quomodo,' and that I have spoken without assertion and only by quoting for the purpose of exercising the abilities of the studious. I have undertaken the present task because of the misrepresentation of some critics.

CAPITULUM XI

Quod omnis substantia materialis extensa componitur ex partibus substantialibus distinctis realiter

Ut autem, quae dicenda sunt, solido videantur inniti et immobili fundamento, inde sumatur exordium unde nemo rationalis debeat dubitare.

Omnis substantia materialis extensa componitur ex partibus substantialibus localiter vel situaliter distantibus. Nam lignum non componitur tantum ex materia et forma, quae sunt partes essentiales et diversarum rationum; sed etiam componitur ex partibus integralibus quarum quaelibet est lignum. Sed manifestum est quod istae partes, quarum qualibet est lignum, non sunt in eodem situ; igitur distant situ. Et tamen lignum vere componitur ex eis et non componitur ex accidentibus; igitur componitur ex partibus substantialibus situ distantibus.

Item diviso ligno in duas partes medietates nulla substantia secundum se totam nova generatur, nunc autem sunt duae substantiae distinctae localiter realiter; aliter enim diviso ligno in duas medietates in altera medietate remanerent accidentia sine subiecto; ex quo igitur nulla substantia secundum se totam nova generatur. Oportet quod illae duae substantiae, quarum utraque post divisionem est quoddam totum, praefuerunt facientes unum totum lignum et non simul fuerunt in

CHAPTER XI

That every extended material substance is composed of substantial parts really distinct

However, in order that the statements, which are to be presented, may appear to rest upon a solid and immovable foundation, an exordium may then be assumed with respect to which no rational person ought to be in doubt.

Every extended material substance is composed of substantial parts separate in place or situation. For wood is not only composed of matter and form, which are essential parts and of diverse grounds; but it is also composed of integral parts, of which each is wood. But it is manifest that these parts, of which each is wood, are not in the same situation; therefore, they are separate in situation. And yet wood is truly composed of parts and is not composed of accidents; therefore, it is composed of substantial parts separate in situation.

Again, when wood is divided into two equal parts, no substance new as regards itself as a whole is generated; but there are now two substances really distinct locally; for otherwise, when wood is divided into halves, the accidents would remain without a subject in one half; from which, therefore, no substance new as regards itself as a whole is generated. It is necessary, that those two substances, each of which is a certain whole after division, were previously making one whole wood, and were not at the same time in the

eodem loco; igitur prius fuerunt duae partes unius ligni totalis situ distantes.

Item una medietas ligni potest corrumpi, altera non corrupta; sed corruptio talis est corruptio substantialis; igitur aliqua substantia, quae prius fuit, nunc corrumpitur. Et manifestum est quod aliqua substantia, quae prius fuit, nunc manet; igitur prius fuerunt duae partes substantiales eiusdem ligni componentes unum lignum.

Item, albedo existens in ligno est tota in aliquo toto et pars in parte; aut igitur est tota in tota substantia aliqua et pars in parte, aut est tota in toto aliquo accidente et pars in parte. Si primum detur, habetur propositum, quod est aliqua substantia composita ex partibus substantialibus situ distantibus, sicut partes albedinis situ localiter distant. Si detur secundum, oportet dare aliquod subiectum primum illi accidenti, ita quod sit totum in toto subiecto et pars in parte. Et si quidem substantia sit tale subiectum, habeo propositum; si autem accidens ponatur totale subiectum illius accidentis, tunc quaero de subiecto illius sicut de priore, et oportet dare processus in infinitum vel quod sit aliquod accidens extensum habens pro subiecto primo aliquam substantiam, quod est totum in tota substantia et pars in parte, quod esse non potest nisi illa substantia habeat partes substantiales situ distantes.

Item, nisi lignum et universaliter quaelibet substantia materialis extensa haberet partes reales et substantiales situ distantes, non plus esset talis substantia extensa

same place; therefore, there were before two parts of one total wood separate in situation.

Again, one half of the wood can be corrupted, the other not corrupted; but such a corruption is a substantial corruption; therefore, some substance, which was before, is now destroyed. And it is manifest that some substance, which was before, now remains; therefore, there were before two substantial parts of the same wood composing one wood.

Again, the whiteness existing in the wood is a whole in some whole and part in part; or there is, therefore, a whole in some whole substance and part in part, or there is a whole in some whole accident and part in part. If the first be granted, the thesis is maintained, that there is some substance composed of substantial parts separate in situation, as parts of whiteness are separate in situation and place. If the second is granted, it is necessary to give some primary subject to that accident, so that there may be a whole in a whole subject and a part in a part. And if, indeed, substance be such a subject, I accept the thesis; but if an accident be considered the total subject of that accident; then I inquire about the subject of that (accident) as about the former; and it is necessary to continue the procedure indefinitely, or that there may be some extended accident having some substance for a primary subject, which is a whole in a whole substance and a part in a part, which can not be, unless that substance have substantial parts separate in situation.

Again, unless wood and any material, extended substance could universally have real and substantial parts separate in situation; there could no more be such a substance really extended than there could a rational

realiter quam anima intellectiva. Sicut enim anima intellectiva est tota in corpore toto et tota in qualibet parte; ita substantia quaelibet materialis esset tota sub tota quantitate et tota sub qualibet parte, illud autem est absurdum. Dici posset quod non est simile, quia anima non habet partes; ideo posset argui de scientia et virtute, quae habent partes intentionales.

Relinquitur igitur quod substantia materialis extensa habet partes substantiales distantes localiter quae in tantum inter se distinguuntur quod una pars potest destrui, alia non destructa, et non solum hoc; sed etiam ipsis manentibus possunt ad invicem separari et esse quaedem tota distincta; sicut diviso ligno vel lapide illa eadem numero, quae prius erant partes, nunc sunt tota et non partes; non tamen sunt alia nunc quam prius.

soul. For as a rational soul is a whole in a whole body and a whole in each part; so any material substance would be a whole under a whole quantity and a whole under each part; but that is absurd. It might be able to be said that there is no similarity, for the soul does not have parts; therefore, it might be able to be argued about knowledge and virtue, which have intentional parts.

Therefore, it remains that an extended material substance has substantial parts locally separate which are to such a degree distinguished from one another, that one part can be destroyed, another not destroyed, and not only this; but even if they remain, they can be mutually separated and can be certain distinct wholes; as when wood or stone is divided, those the same numerically, which were before parts, are now wholes and not parts; yet they are not now other than before.

CAPITULUM XII

Quod res absoluta prior potest esse sine posteriori potestate divina

Superiori fundamentali principio est aliud adnectendum, videlicet, quod infinita et incomprehensibilis Dei potentia potest omnem rem absolutam priorem naturaliter facere et conservare sine re absoluta distincta realiter secundum se totam naturaliter posteriorem. Cum enim res prior naturaliter alia minus dependeat et minus coexigat rem posteriorem quam effectus suam causam essentialem, et manifeste tenemus quod aliquando divina potentia effectum suum sine causa naturali producit, tenet et conservat, dubitare non debemus quin rem priorem naturaliter potest Deus producere et conservare sine re posteriori.

Item, res posterior non potest esse causa rei prioris. Si igitur res prior esse non potest sine re posteriori, hoc non est ponendum nisi quia res posterior est effectus naturalis naturaliter consequens rem priorem; sed manifestum est divinam virtutem aliquando actionem causae creatae suspendisse et causam sine effectu conservasse. Quis enim nisi Deus, prohibuit quod ignis fornacis succensae servos Dei proiectos in medium non combussit et tamen Caldeos mittentes interfecit flamma ignis. Infinita alia exempla reperiuntur in Sacra Scriptura et dictis Sanctorum Patrum et Martyrum gestis.

Ex quibus omnibus patet evidenter quod causae

CHAPTER XII

That an absolute thing can be prior by divine power without a posterior

To the preceding fundamental principle another must be joined; namely, that the infinite and incomprehensible power of God can make and preserve every absolute thing prior naturally, without an absolute thing really distinct as regards itself as a whole, posterior naturally. For since a thing prior naturally to another may depend less upon and require a thing posterior less than an effect its essential cause, and since we manifestly hold that sometimes the divine power produces, maintains and preserves its effect without a natural cause, we ought not to doubt but that God can produce and preserve a thing prior naturally without a thing posterior.

Again, a thing posterior can not be a cause of a thing prior. Therefore, if a thing prior can not be without a thing posterior, this must not be posited, unless because a thing posterior is a natural effect naturally following a thing prior; but it is manifest that divine virtue sometimes has suspended the action of a created cause, and preserved a cause without an effect. For who, except God, prevented the fire of the glowing furnace from consuming the servants of God who were cast into the midst, and yet the flame of fire slew the Chaldean attendants. Countless other instances are found in Sacred Scripture and in the saying of the Holy Fathers and the acts of the Martyrs.

From all these it is evidently obvious that natural

naturales per Dei virtutem a suis effectibus impediuntur, non igitur contradictionem includit rem priorem sine posteriori naturaliter generari et conservari.

Item, plus dependet accidens a suo subiecto quam res quaeque prior naturaliter a posteriori. Sed tanta est divina potentia quod, non obstante dependentia accidentis ad suum subiectum, poterit accidens per divinam potentiam sine omni subiecto existere et conservari; igitur non obstante quaque naturali consecutione rei posterioris ex priore, poterit virtute divina res prior sine posteriore conservari.

Non est igitur negandum a divina potentia quin omnem rem absolutam priorem naturaliter posset Deus conservare et facere sine re posteriori. Tanta est enim divina potentia quod de creaturis suis poterit facere quicquid sibi placuerit. Unde si faciat causam rei naturalis, non necessitatur ad faciendum effectum.

causes are prevented through the virtue of God from producing their own effects; therefore, no contradiction is involved in the statement that a thing prior naturally is produced and preserved without a posterior.

Again, an accident depends more upon its subject than any thing prior by nature upon a posterior. But so great is the divine power that notwithstanding the dependence of an accident upon its subject, the accident will be able to exist and to be preserved through divine power without any subject; therefore, notwithstanding by whatever natural sequence of a thing posterior from a prior, the thing prior could be preserved by divine virtue without a posterior.

Therefore, it must not be denied that by divine power God might be able to preserve and make any absolute thing prior naturally without a thing posterior. For so great is the divine power that concerning His creatures He could do whatever would please Him. Accordingly, if He make a cause of a natural object, He is not necessitated to make the effect.

CAPITULUM XIII

Quod omnipotentia Dei potest facere substantiam sine omni accidente absoluto formaliter inhaerente sibi

Si Creator omnium secundum bene-placitum suae voluntatis potest facere et conservare et manutenere rem priorem sine posteriore, dubium esse non debet quin eadem potentia possit substantiam quamcumque producere et conservare sine omni accidente absoluto sibi formaliter inhaerente. Si enim Dei virtus conservat et tenet accidens sine subiecto, nonne erit tantae potentiae ut conservet et teneat substantiam sine omni accidente? Cum enim substantia sit perfectior et actualior et magis appropinquans divinae subsistentiae quam sit accidens, minus etiam dependeat ab accidente quam accidens a substantia. De ratione autem substantiae sit per se existere, accidens autem naturaliter innititur alteri. Magis etiam dependet accidens a substantia quam econtrario. Nulli fideli, qui credit et tenet quod accidentia sunt in sacramento altaris sine subiecto, debet esse dubium, quin eadem virtute poterit substantia sine accidente subsistere.

Item, nulla apparet contradictio quod res absoluta sine omni illo existat, quod nec est pars illius nec essentialis eius causa. Sed nullum accidens est causa nec pars substantiae cui inhaeret; igitur contradictionem

CHAPTER XIII

That the omnipotence of God can make a substance without any absolute accident formally inhering in it

If the Creator of all, according to the good pleasure of His will, can make, preserve and maintain a thing prior without a posterior, there ought to be no doubt but that the same power may be able to produce and preserve any substance whatever without any absolute accident formally inhering in it. For if the virtue of God preserves and maintains an accident without a subject, will He not have so much power that He may preserve and maintain a substance without any accident? For since a substance may be more perfect and more actual, approaching also more nearly to divine subsistence than an accident may be, it may also depend less upon an accident than an accident upon a substance. But according to reason it may be characteristic of a substance for it to exist per se, but an accident naturally depends upon another. It also depends more upon a substance than conversely. No believer, who believes and holds that the accidents are in the sacrament of the altar without a subject, ought to doubt that a substance could by the same virtue subsist without an accident.

Again, no contradiction appears in the statement that an absolute thing may exist without all that which is neither a part of it nor an essential cause of it. But no accident is a cause nor a part of the substance in which it inheres; therefore, no contradiction is in-

non includit substantiam sine accidente posse per se subsistere.

Item omne, quod non est Deus, si esse realiter habeat, oportet quod realiter a Deo producatur; igitur producta substantia non poterit esse accidens nisi Deus sua libera voluntate dederit illi esse. | Potentia autem divina nulli oboedit creaturae; nulla igitur est contradictio quin producta substantia accidens non capiat esse si Deo placuerit.

Item si ad esse substantiae esse accidentis necessario consequatur; hoc non potest contingere nisi propter aliquam trium rationum: vel quia accidens est pars substantiae et totum sine suis partibus esse non potest; vel quia substantia est effectus accidentis et effectus suam causam praesupponit; vel quia substantia est causa naturalis accidentis, et posita causa effectus consequitur. Sed quod accidens non sit pars substantiae tam sanctis quam philosophis est manifestum. Cum notum sit omnibus quod substantia ex substantiis et non ex accidentibus componatur; nullum igitur accidens poterit esse pars alicuius substantiae.

Nec sufficit dicere quod substantia est effectus vel causa accidentis; cum superius demonstratum quod Deus omnipotens, cui perfecte oboediunt omnes creaturae, potest actionem causae naturalis suspendere et effectum sine causa secunda conservare.

Ex praedictis maxime colligitur quod omnipotenti Deo, cui non est impossibile omne verbum, non erit

volved in the statement that a substance can subsist per se without an accident.

Again, it is necessary that everything, which is not God, if it really have being, be really produced by God; therefore, if a substance is produced, an accident could not be, unless God of his own free will had given being to it. But the divine power is subject to no creature; therefore, there is no contradiction in the statement that, if a substance is created, an accident may not acquire being, if it should be pleasing to God.

Again, if for the being of a substance the being of an accident may necessarily follow, this can not happen except by virtue of one of three reasons: either because an accident is part of a substance and a whole can not be without its parts; or because a substance is the effect of an accident and an effect presupposes its cause; or because a substance is the natural cause of an accident; and, if a cause is posited, the effect follows in order. But that an accident may not be part of a substance is as manifest to the Saints as to the philosophers. Since it may be known to all that a substance may be composed of substances and not of accidents; therefore, no accident could be a part of any substance.

Nor does it suffice to say, that a substance is an effect or a cause of an accident; since it was shown before that the omnipotent God, to whom all creatures yield perfect obedience, can suspend the action of a natural cause and preserve an effect without a secondary cause.

From the previous statements, it is especially gathered, that it will not be denied that the omnipotent God, to whom every word is not impossible, will be

negandum quin substantiam sine accidente inhaerente sibi poterit conservare; sicut sibi non est impossibile conservare rem priorem sine posteriori, quod potest adhuc ratione alia confirmari. Non enim minoris est efficaciae Dei omnipotentia super omnia individua alicuius speciei quam sit virtus creata super unicum individuum eiusdem speciei.

Si igitur virtus creata potest facere hanc substantiam sine hoc accidente aliquo individuo illius speciei accidentis demonstrato, nonne poterit infinita Dei potentia facere hanc substantiam sine omni individuo alicuius speciei accidentis? Et per eandem rationem, si tantae efficaciae est virtus imperfecta creata quod poterit substantiam aliquam conservare sine omni individuo alicuius speciei accidentis, nonne erit tantae efficaciae virtus infinita ut eandem substantiam conservet sine omni individuo totius generis illius accidentis?

Cum igitur sol poterit conservare lignum sine omni qualitate tangibili, nonne poterit Deus conservare lignum sine omni colore? Et si causa naturalis, puta, ignis potest conservare aquam sine frigiditate, nonne valebit immensitas divinae potentiae conservare aquam sine omni qualitate tangibili? Ex quo videtur probabile quod, cum causae inferiores nihil potentes nisi assistente potentia divina possunt substantiam sine hoc accidente et sine illo conservare et producere, non erit Deo impossibile substantiam sine omni accidente manutenere. Et, si sibi placuerit, poterit cuique substantiae esse sine omni accidente tribuere; multa enim mirabilia et contra communem cursum naturae fecit Deus.

able to preserve a substance without an accident inhering in it; as it is not impossible for Him to preserve a thing prior without a posterior, which can be confirmed thus far by another reason. For the omnipotence of God has no less efficacy over all the individuals of some species than created virtue may have over a single individual of the same species.

Therefore, if created virtue can make this substance without this accident, if some individual of that species of accident was designated, could not the infinite power of God make this substance without any individual of any species of accident? And for the same reason, if imperfect created virtue has so much efficacy that it could preserve some substance without any individual of some species of accident, will not infinite virtue have so much efficacy that it may conserve the same substance without any individual of the whole genus of that accident?

Therefore, since the sun could preserve wood without any tangible quality, could not God preserve wood without any color? And if a natural cause; namely, fire, can preserve water without the cold, will not the immeasurableness of divine power have strength enough to preserve water without any tangible quality? From this it seems probable that since inferior causes, impotent except with the assistance of divine power, can preserve and produce a substance without this and that accident, it will not be impossible for God to maintain a substance without any accident. And if it should please God, He could bestow being upon any substance whatever without any accident; for God has made many things wonderful and contrary to the common course of nature.

CAPITULUM XIV

Quod substantia, quae est extensa, potest conservari immota localiter, quamvis omnia sua accidentia absoluta destruantur per divinam potentiam

Non solum autem non repugnat potentiae divinae rem priorem sine posteriore producere et conservare, et per consequens valebit substantiam sine accidente manutenere; sed etiam non repugnat omnipotentiae Dei substantiam existentem sub accidente absoluto inhaerente sibi sine mutatione locali substantiae et accidens illud destruere et substantiam conservare. Quis enim fidelis audeat dicere, si Deus velit accidens absolutum inhaerens subiecto separare vel destruere sine destructione substantiae, quod compellitur substantiam vel aliquam eius partem de loco ad locum transferre?

Si enim causae naturales multa accidentia absoluta expellunt et inducunt in illud passum localiter non mutatum; nonne poterit Deus substantia non mota localiter ipsam conservare et quoque accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi destruere, etiam, si voluerit, sine cuiusque alterius introductione?

Item potest Deus rem posteriorem destruere et rem priorem suae naturae dimittere ut ipsam proprium motum agere sinat. Potest igitur Deus destruere omne accidens illius ligni et substantiam ligni suae naturae dimittere, ut proprium motum agat. Quo facto, aut

CHAPTER XIV

That a substance, which is extended, can be preserved locally unmoved, although all of its absolute accidents may be destroyed through divine power

But it is not only not incompatible with the divine power to produce and preserve a thing prior without a posterior, and consequently it will be able to sustain a substance without an accident; but it is also not incompatible with the omnipotence of God to produce and preserve a substance existing under an absolute accident inhering in it without a local change of substance and to destroy that accident and to preserve the substance. For what believer may dare to say, if God wills to separate or destroy an absolute accident inhering in a subject without the destruction of the substance, that He is compelled to transfer the substance or some part of it from place to place?

For if natural causes expel many absolute accidents and introduce them into that space though not locally changed, could not God without the moving of the substance locally preserve it, and also destroy an absolute accident inhering in it; even, if He should be willing, without the introduction of any other?

Again, God can destroy a thing posterior and separate a thing prior from its nature, so that He may permit it to excite the proper motion. Therefore, God can destroy every accident of that wood and separate the substance of the wood from its nature, that He may excite the proper motion. When this has been done,

ista substantia ligni erit mota localiter et hoc est intentum; scilicet, quod omne accidens absolutum inhaerens substantiae potest destrui substantia non translata de loco ad locum nec aliqua parte eius; aut ista substantia erit mota localiter, quod dari non potest.

Ex quo ista substantia est suae naturae dimissa. Tum quia ad nullam differentiam loci poterit se transferre; non deorsum, cum principium penetrandi terram non habeat, sicut nec quando habebat accidentia sua; nec potest se movere sursum, sicut nec prius; et propter idem nec ante nec retro, nec movebitur ab aliquo agente naturali extrinseco, sicut inductive patet. Tum quia vel tota substantia mutabit totum locum, quod dari non potest, vel partes substantiae, quae prius erant distantes, concurrunt quasi in unum punctum, quod dari non potest; cum non sit ibi tale principium movendi. Et si esset, non esset maior ratio quare plus concurrerent ad unum punctum quam ad alium, non esset aliqua ratio quare plus pars media moveretur ad unum punctum medium quam ad alium punctum prope finem.

Item si Deus conservando totam substantiam illius ligni et omnia accidentia absoluta unius partis destrueret et accidentia absoluta alterius partis conservaret, quod non est Deo impossibile sicut nec est sibi impossibile destruere medietatem albedinis unius corporis albi et aliam medietatem albedinis conservare, et simul cum hoc dimittere totam substantiam ligni suae

either this substance of the wood will be locally moved, and this is the intention: namely, that every absolute accident inhering in a substance can be destroyed without transference of the substance or any part of it from place to place; or this substance will be moved locally, which can not be granted.

From which, this substance is separated from its own nature. At one time, because it could tranfer itself in respect to no difference of place; not downwards, since it may not have the principle of penetrating the earth, as neither when it had its own accidents; nor can it move itself upwards, as neither before; and by virtue of the same neither forwards nor backwards; nor will it be moved by some natural external agent, as is obvious by induction. At another time, because, either the whole substance will change the whole place, which can not be granted, or because the parts of the substance, which were before separated, come together, as it were, into one point, which can not be granted; since there may not be there such a principle of being moved. And, if there were, there could not be a stronger reason why they should meet at one point more than at another; nor could there be any reason why an intermediate part should be moved to one intermediate point more than to another point near the end.

Again, if while preserving the whole substance of that wood, God should both destroy all the absolute accidents of one part and preserve the absolute accidents of the other part, which is not impossible with God, as neither is it impossible for Him to destroy a half of the whiteness of one white body and preserve the other half of the whiteness; and at the same time while doing this separate the whole substance of wood

naturae, quo iret illa medietas illius substantiae? Numquid illa pars substantiae, cuius omnia accidentia essent destructa virtute propria, alteram partem substantiae intraret vel se totaliter ab illa parte separaret? Nullum tale potest dari quod posset virtute creata fieri. Manebit igitur illa pars substantiae derelictae suae naturae immota localiter; quamvis Deus per suam omnipotentiam omnia accidentia absoluta inhaerentia sibi auferat destruendo vel etiam separando. Potest igitur Deus substantiam immotam localiter conservare et omne accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi destruere.

Item omnis substantia materialis naturaliter est in loco vel circumscriptive vel diffinitive, maxime si sit locus ambiens ipsam. Substantia igitur existens ab accidentibus naturalibus est in loco et praesens loco; et sicut prior est naturaliter ipsis accidentibus, ita naturaliter prius est praesens ipsi loco quam sua accidentia sint praesentia eidem loco. Nullam igitur contradictionem includit quod Deus conservet substantiam praesentem loco sine translatione locali cuiusque partis substantiae sine praesentia accidentium ad illum locum. Constat itaque quod ille, qui dixit et facta sunt omnia, eadem virtute potest substantiam immotam localiter conservare et accidentia absoluta inhaerentia sibi destruere vel separare.

from its nature, where would that half of that substance go? Could that part of the substance, all of whose accidents were destroyed by a proper virtue, enter into another part of a substance or separate itself totally from that part? It is not possible to concede that any such result might be able to be done by created power. Therefore, that part of the substance separated from its nature will remain locally unmoved; although God through His omnipotence may remove all absolute accidents inhering in it by destroying or even separating them. Therefore, God can preserve a substance locally unmoved and destroy every absolute accident inhering in it.

Again, every material substance is naturally in a place either circumscriptively or definitively, especially if there be a place surrounding it. Therefore, substance existing by natural accidents is in a place and is present in a place; and as it is prior naturally to the accidents themselves, so it is naturally present in the place itself before its accidents may be present in the same place. Therefore, no contradiction is involved in the statement that God may preserve a substance present in a place without local translation of any part of a substance without the presence of accidents at that place. It is, therefore, established that He, who spake and all things were made, can by the same virtue preserve a substance immovable locally and destroy or separate the absolute accidents inhering in it.

CAPITULUM XV

Quod substantia materialis per partes suas intrinsecas est praesens loco quo circumscribitur

Iuxta illud quod superius ostensum est de distinctione partium substantialium distantium situ componentium substantiam materialem extensam, est nunc ostendendum quod substantia materialis extensa per seipsam et per partes suas, quae sunt substantiae, est praesens loco quo circumscribitur, ita quod per se totam est in toto loco et per partem in parte loci; omne namque quod est praesens, loco per seipsum vel per aliquid aliud cui ipsum est praesens, est praesens illi loco. Cum igitur substantia materialis sit praesens loco circumscribenti ipsam, oportet quod ipsa sit praesens illo loco vel per seipsam vel per aliquid aliud, cui ipsa est praesens; ergo ipsa est praesens illi loco. Non enim loquor nunc de illo per quod tamquam per causam efficientem aliquid esse praesens alicui loco; sicut vermis productus a sole est praesens loco per solem tamquam per causam efficientem; quia sol, sicut patet, facit vermem esse, ita facit eum esse praesentem loco; sed loquor de eo per quod aliquid non distans a loco est praesens loco.

Si concedatur quod substantia materialis per seipsam et per suas partes substantiales est praesens loco, habetur quod intenditur. Si autem dicatur quod substantia

CHAPTER XV

That a material substance through its intrinsic parts is present in the place in which it is circumscribed

In connection with that which has been shown before concerning the distinction of substantial parts separate in situation and composing an extended material substance, it must now be shown that an extended material substance through itself and its parts, which are substances, is present in the place in which it is circumscribed, so that through itself as a whole it is in a whole place and through a part in a part of a place; for indeed everything, which is present in a place either through itself or through something else, to which it is present, is present in that place. Therefore, since a material substance may be present in a place circumscribing itself, it is necessary that it be present in that place either through itself or through something else, to which it is present; therefore, it is present in that place. For I do not now speak of that through which as if through an efficient cause something is present in a place; as a worm produced by the sun is present in a place through the sun as if through an efficient cause; for the sun, as is obvious, makes the worm to be, so it makes it to be present in a place; but I speak of that through which something not separate from a place is present in a place.

If it be conceded that material substance through itself and through its substantial parts is present in a place, that is accomplished which is intended. But if

materialis illa, quae est extensa, est praesens loco per aliquid aliud quod nec est substantia nec pars eius, cui ipsa substantia est praesens, puta, per aliquod accidens inhaerens substantiae, quod est praesens loco et cui ipsa substantia est praesens; ex hoc deduco propositum. Nam quando aliqua duo sunt praesentia localiter indistantia, quicquid est praesens localiter uni illorum, per idem est praesens alteri illorum. Si igitur accidens substantiae et locus sint praesentia localiter, per illud idem per quod substantia ipsa est praesens ipsi accidenti, per idem erit praesens ipsi loco. Sed substantia per seipsam et per partes suas est praesens illi accidenti, ergo per easdem partes suas est praesens suo loco.

Item ipsa substantia est praesens illi accidenti per illud quod est praesens illi loco suo ita quod tota substantia est praesens illi toti accidenti et pars parti; sicut tota substantia informatur toto accidente et pars substantiae informatur parte illius accidentis; aliter enim vel substantia vel accidens non esset extensum nec quantum. Aut igitur substantia est praedicto modo praesens illi accidenti aut per aliquod accidens medium cui ipsa substantia est praesens et quod est praesens illi accidenti.

Secundum non potest dari, quia de illo medio cui substantia est praesens, quaero sicut prius de priori accidente, et erit processus in infinitum vel stabitur quod

it be said that that material substance, which is extended, is present in a place through something else which is neither substance nor part of it, to which the substance itself is present, say, through some accident inhering in a substance which is present in a place and with which the substance itself is present; from this I deduce the thesis. For when any two things locally inseparable are present, whatever is present locally with one of them, through the same is present with the other of them. Therefore, if an accident of a substance and of a place be present locally, through that same through which the substance itself is present with the accident itself, through the same it will be present in the place itself. But a substance through itself and through its parts is present with that accident; therefore, it is present in its place through its same parts.

Again, the substance itself is present with that accident through that which is present in that which is its own place, so that the whole substance is present with that whole accident and part with part, as the whole substance is informed by the whole accident and part of the substance is informed by part of that accident; for otherwise either the substance or the accident would not be extended or be a quantum. Therefore, either the substance is in the manner already stated present with that accident or through some accident intermediate with which the substance itself is present, and which is present with that accident.

The second proposition can not be conceded; for concerning that intermediate with which the substance is present, I raise the question, as before, concerning the prior accident and the process will be endless, or it will be established that substance itself through it-

ipsa substantia per seipsam est praesens illi accidenti. Et ita oportet concedere quod substantia talis, quae est extensa per seipsam, est praesens illi accidenti 'quanto,' ita quod tota est praesens toti indistans localiter et pars parti.

Quo concesso procedo ulterius sic: omnis substantia (quae per seipsam et per partes suas intrinsecas sibi est praesens alicui quanto habenti partem extra partem ita quod tota substantia est praesens illi toti habenti partem extra partem ita quod tota substantia est praesens illi, et pars sua est praesens parti illius totius per seipsam formaliter et per partes intrinsecas sibi,) habet partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte et omne tale per seipsum circumscribitur loco ambienti ipsum. Non plus enim requiritur ad hoc, quod aliquid circumscribatur loco per seipsum, nisi quod habeat esse per seipsum formaliter, quamvis habeat ab alio causaliter 'partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte'; igitur substantia seipsa et partibus intrinsecis sibi circumscribitur loco.

Ex quo sequitur quod substantia per seipsam et per partes intrinsecas sibi est praesens loco. Nec istis obstaret quod accidentia sunt praesentia loco; quia, quando plura non distant localiter, ipsa sunt praesentia eidem loco. Cum igitur substantia non distat localiter a suis accidentibus, non obstante quod substantia sit praesens loco, potuerunt ipsa accidentia esse praesentia eidem loco.

self is present with that accident. And so it is necessary to concede that such a substance, which is extended through itself, is present with that accident 'quantum,' so that the whole, locally inseparable, is present in a whole and a part in a part.

Since this is conceded, I proceed further thus: every substance (which through itself and through its parts intrinsic in it is present in some quantum having part outside of part so that the whole substance is present with that whole having part outside of part so that the whole substance is present with that, and its own part is present with a part of that whole, through itself formally and through parts intrinsic in it,) has part outside of part and part distant from part, and every such is through itself circumscribed in a place surrounding it. For nothing more is required for this, that something may be circumscribed in a place through itself, except that it may have being through itself formally, although it may have causally by another 'part separate from part and part distant from part'; therefore, a substance is circumscribed in a place by itself and by parts intrinsic to it.

From this it follows that a substance through itself and through parts intrinsic to itself is present in a place. That the accidents are present in a place would not be in opposition to these statements; for, when more are not separate locally, they themselves are present in the same place. Therefore, since a substance is not separate locally from its accidents, notwithstanding that the substance may be present in a place, the accidents themselves were able to be present in the same place.

CAPITULUM XVI

In quo praemittuntur quaedam ad probandum quod quantitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est realiter distincta a qualitatibus remanentibus

Praelibatis prioribus, quasi quibusdam immobilibus fundamentis, iuxta illa adducendae sunt aliquae rationes propter quas posset alicui videri, quod quantitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus remanentibus cum substantia corporis Christi et quod aliqua quantitas ante consecrationem praecessit quae non erat res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia panis quae post consecrationem panis non manet propter hoc quod desinit substantia panis esse.

Replico tamen per testationem praemissam in principio istius opusculi, quod licet nihil dicam assertive nisi quod Romana docet Ecclesia, paratus in omnibus propter auctoritatem eiusdem ecclesiae ingenium meum captivare ac universa, quae Romana Ecclesia explicat vel explicabit, corde credere et ore fateri; cetera autem recitanda tantum, sub quacumque forma verborum expresserim, ratione exercitii et reliquendi materiam cogitandi proponam in medium.

Sed antequam accedam ad principale propositum, ali-

CHAPTER XVI

In which certain arguments are advanced to prove that the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not really distinct from the qualities remaining

In the former statements, certain immovable fundaments, as it were, have been examined and in consequence of those statements some reasons must be adduced by virtue of which it might appear to anyone that the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining with the substance of the body of Christ, and that before the consecration there preceded some quantity, which was not an absolute thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, which does not remain after the consecration by virtue of this, that the substance of the bread ceases to be.

However, I repeat through the testimony advanced in the beginning of this little work that, although I shall say nothing assertatively except that which the Roman Church teaches, I am prepared in all things to hold in check my inclination by virtue of the authority of the same church and also to believe with the heart and to confess with the lips the universal truths which the Roman Church expounds or will expound; but others to be cited only, under whatever form of words I shall have expressed them, I shall publicly set forth for the purpose of exercise and of supplying material for thought.

But before I shall approve the principal thesis, some

qua fundamenta sunt praemittenda; videlicet, quod omnis res per se una, sive substantialis sive accidentalis, habens partem distantem a parte sive partem extra partem, est quanta, quia omnis talis res est realiter extensa. Nulla autem res potest realiter esse extensa nisi sit quanta. Sive igitur omne quantum sit per se unum habens partem extra partem sive partem distantem a parte sive non, non est modo curandum; hoc tamen omnibus videtur esse notum quod omne per se unum habens partem extra partem sive partem distantem a parte est vere et realiter quantum et extensum.

Ex quo ulterius sequitur quod, cum impossibile sit aliquid esse quantum sine quantitate (et omne quantum vel est subiective in quantitate tamquam accidens in suo subiecto vel est subiectum quantitatis vel est res indistincta a quantitate, pluribus enim modis non potest intelligi aliquid esse quantum), necesse est illud quantum, quod nec est subiective in quantitate nec est subiectum quantitatis, esse rem non distinctam realiter a quantitate.

Ex quibus colligi potest, quod omne, quod est circumscriptum in loco, est quantum; omne enim, quod est circumscriptive in loco, est totum in toto loco et pars in parte; hoc enim est circumscribi in loco. Propter hoc enim quod angelus non est totus in toto loco et pars angeli in parte loci, propter hoc angelus non est in loco circumscriptive. Illud igitur, quod est in loco circumscriptive, est totum in toto loco, et pars in parte. Omne autem tale habet partem distantem a parte, sicut partes loci distant situaliter. Sed quod habet partem

fundaments must be premised; namely, that every thing one per se, whether substantial or accidental, having part separate from part or part outside of part, is a quantum; for every such thing is really extended. But no thing can really be extended unless it be a quantum. Therefore, whether every quantum be per se one having part outside of part or part separate from part or not, makes no difference at all; yet this seems to be understood by all, that everything per se one having part outside of part or part separate from part is truly and really a quantum and is extended.

From which it further follows that, since it may be possible for something to be a quantum without a quantity, (and every quantum is either subjectively in a quantity as if in its subject or is a subject of a quantity or is a thing not distinct from quantity; for it can not be understood in several modes that something is a quantum,) it is necessary for that quantum, which is neither subjectively in a quantity nor is a subject of a quantity, to be a thing not really distinct from quantity.

From these statements it can be gathered that everything, which is circumscribed in a place, is a quantum; for everything, which is circumscriptively in a place, is a whole in a whole place and a part in a part; for this is to be circumscribed in a place. For by virtue of this, that an angel is not a whole in a whole place and part of an angel in a part of a place; by virtue of this an angel is not in a place circumscriptively. Therefore, that, which is in a place circumscriptively, is a whole in a whole and a part in a part. But every such has part separate from part, as parts of a place are separate in situation. But that which has part sep-

distantem a parte est quantum, omne igitur per se unum existens in loco circumscriptive est quantum; et propter idem patet quod omne quantum habens partem distantem a parte est circumscriptive in loco, maxime si sit aliquis locus ambiens ipsum. Nam omne tale sic est in loco quod totum est in toto loco et pars in parte, et per consequens est circumscriptive in loco.

arate from part is a quantum; therefore, everything per se one existing in a place circumscriptively is a quantum; and by virtue of the same it is obvious that every quantum having part separate from part is circumscriptively in a place; especially if there be some place surrounding it. For every such is in a place so that a whole is in a whole place and a part in a part, and consequently is circumscriptively in the place.

CAPITULUM XVII

Quod aliqua quantitas non est res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et quod aliqua quantitas non est res absoluta realiter distincta a qualitate

Istis praemissis sunt aliquae conclusiones modo probandae; quarum una est quasi communis et generalis, videlicet, quod aliqua quantitas non est res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia vel quod aliqua quantitas non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitate. Et ne videar inniti proprio sensui et a limitibus paternis discedere, auctoritatem sanctissimi patris doctoris egregii Iohannis Damasceni constituo fundamentum, qui vult quod eadem res est de genere 'substantiae' et de genere 'quantitatis'; quod non posset esse verum si omnis quantitas esset res distincta realiter a substantia. Unde dicit praefatus doctor venerabilis pater Iohannes Damascenus: "Dicimus," inquit, "igitur quoniam possibile est eandem rem secundum aliam et aliam intentionem sub aliud et aliud praedicamentum reduci, ut numerum. Quidem manifestantia, quae praedicta sunt, sub 'quantum' reducuntur, ut autem habitudinem habentia ad invicem vel ad invicem dicta sub ea quae sunt ad aliud; enim magnum et parvum ad aliud dicuntur. Magnum enim ad parvum dicitur magnum, et duplum ad dimidium; similiter et reliqua. Corpus autem, se-

CHAPTER XVII

That any quantity is not an absolute thing really distinct from substance and that any quantity is not an absolute thing really distinct from quality

Since those propositions have been advanced, some conclusions must now be proved; one of which is, as it were, common and general; namely, that any quantity is not an absolute thing really distinct from substance, or that any quantity is not an absolute thing really distinct from quality. And that I may not appear to depend upon a proper sense and to deviate from the patristic definitions, as a fundament I make use of a passage of the most Holy Father, the illustrious Doctor, John of Damascus, who asserts that the same thing is of the genus 'substance' and of the genus 'quantity'; which can not be true if every quantity were a thing really distinct from substance. Whence, says the aforesaid doctor, the venerable Father, John of Damascus: "Therefore, we say," he says, "since it is possible for the same thing to be classified as number, according to one intention under one category and according to another intention under another category. Indeed, obvious facts, which were previously mentioned, are classified under 'quantum,' as however mutually having condition or mutually classed under those which are in relation to another; for great and small are named in relation to another. For great is called great in relation to small, and double in relation to half, and similarly the rest. But a body, according to that which is

cundum quod naturale est, sub 'substantiam' reducitur, secundum autem quod est mathematicum, id est, mensuratum, sub 'quantum.' "

Ecce quam expresse vult iste Sanctus quod eadem res sub diversis praedicamentis continetur propter distinctionem intentionum. Vult etiam quod eadem res, sicut corpus, sit de genere 'substantiae' et de genere 'quantitatis.' Idem enim corpus, quia est res quaedam naturalis composita ex materia et forma, est de genere 'substantiae.' Eadem autem res, quia habet partem distantem a parte propter quod mensurari potest, est de genere 'quantitatis'; quod verum non esset si omnis quantitas esset res distincta realiter a substantia. Et sicut eadem res, quia est res quaedam naturalis composita ex materia et forma, est de genere 'substantiae,' et, quia habet partem extra partem, est de genere 'quantitatis,' ita eadem albedo, quia est quaedam res naturalis nata qualificare substantiam, est de genere 'qualitatis'; et, quia eadem albedo est res quaedam habens partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte situaliter est de genere 'quantitatis.'

Constat itaque quod, dicendo quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia et quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a qualitate, a paternis limitibus non discedo. Unde nec unquam legi quod aliquis Sanctus nec princeps philosophorum, Aristoteles, distinctionem fecerit inter 'quantum' et 'quantitatem'; immo indifferenter habens pro eodem 'quantum' et 'quantitatem.' Et hoc dico quod apud Aristotelem idem esset dicere: 'quantum est substantia'

natural, is classified under 'substance,; but according to that which is mathematical, that is, measured, under 'quantum.' "

Notice how plainly that Saint asserts that the same thing is contained under diverse categories because of a distinction of intentions. He also asserts that the same thing, as body, may be of the genus 'substance' and of the genus 'quantity.' For the same body, because it is a certain natural thing composed of matter and form, is of the genus 'substance.' Moreover, the same thing, because it has part separate from part, by virtue of which it can be measured, is of the genus 'quantity'; which could not be true if every quantity were a thing really distinct from substance. And as the same thing, since it is a certain natural thing composed of matter and form, is of the genus 'substance'; and, since it has part outside of part, is of the genus 'quantity'; so the same whiteness, since it is a certain natural thing created to qualify a subject, is of the genus 'quality'; and, since the same whiteness is a certain thing having part outside of part and part separate from part by situation, it is of the genus 'quantity.'

And so it is established that in saying that any quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance and that any quantity is not a thing really distinct from quality, I do not deviate from the patristic definitions. Whence, I have never read that any Saint or the Prince of philosophers, Aristotle, has made a distinction between 'quantum' and 'quantity'; on the contrary, he indifferently uses 'quantum' and 'quantity' as the same. And I say this, that according to Aristotle it would be the same to say, 'quantum is substance' or 'quality and

vel 'qualitas et quantitas est substantia vel qualitas.' Et ideo quod communiter dicitur quod Aristoteles dicit in primo libro Posteriorum, quod ista negativa est immediata, 'nulla substantia est quantitas,' falsum est; quia nec ibi facit penitus aliquam mentionem de substantia vel quantitate nec de aliis praedicamentis.

quantity is substance or quality.' And, indeed, that which is commonly said, that Aristotle says in the first book of the Posteriores, that this negative is immediate, 'no substance is quantity,' is false; for he does not even remotely make any mention there of substance or quantity or of other categories.

CAPITULUM XVIII

Quod omnes qualitates in sacramento altaris non sunt unum subiectum unius quantitatis

Ostensa priori conclusione tamquam aequali, nunc sunt aliquae speciales conclusiones probandae; quarum una est, quod omnes qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris non sunt unum subiectum unius quantitatis, propter quam omnes illae qualitates dicantur quantae. Sicut homo dicitur albus quia est subiectum albedinis, vel ignis dicitur calidus quia est subiectum caliditatis, nam nullum accidens unum numero per se unum potest esse primo tamquam in immediato subiecto in aliquo quod est tantum unum per aggregationem, ita quod totum accidens illud sit in quolibet illorum et non sit una pars accidentis in uno illorum et alia pars in alio; quod dico ad excludendam unam cavillationem quia dicunt aliqui quod aliquando contingit quod aliquo ligno posito in aqua ita quod una pars sit in aqua et alia in aëre vel extra aquam, convertitur pars existens in aqua in lapidem et alia remanet lignum sicut prius. Quo facto, dicunt quod aliqua quantitas existens in toto est una numero et tamen subiectum non est unum per se, cum una pars sit lapis et alia lignum. Et ita poterit aliquod accidens unum numero esse in uno subiecto quod est tantum unum per aggregationem. Sed ista cavillatio, sive contineat veritatem sive non, est exclusa per hoc quod accipitur, quod unum accidens

CHAPTER XVIII

That all the qualities in the sacrament of the altar are not one subject of one quantity

Since the former conclusion has been shown, as if uniform, some special conclusions must now be proved; one of which is, that all the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar are not one subject of one quantity by virtue of which all those qualities may be called quanta. Just as a man is called white because he is the subject of whiteness, or fire is called hot because it is the subject of heat; for no accident one numerically can be one per se in a primary as if in an immediate subject in something which is one only through aggregation, so that that whole accident may be in any one of them and may not be one part of an accident in one of them and another part in another; which I say in order to refute one sophistical cavil; for some say that sometimes it happens that, when some wood is placed in water so that one part may be in the air and the other in the air or outside of the water, the part existing in the water is converted into stone and the other part remains wood as before. When this has been accomplished, they say that any quantity existing in a whole is one numerically and yet the subject is not one per se, since one part may be stone and the other wood. And so any accident one numerically could be in one subject which is one only through aggregation. But this sophistical cavil, whether it contain the truth or not, is excluded through this which

numero non potest esse in aliquo uno per aggregationem ita tamen quod una pars illius accidentis non sit in uno illorum et alia in alio. In instantia enim adducta una pars illius quantitatis ponitur subiective in uno illorum aggregatorum et alia pars in alio. Patet igitur quod non potest reperiri instantia contra propositionem dicentem quod nullum accidens unum numero potest esse in aliquo uno per aggregationem tantum, et tamen quod una pars non sit in uno illorum et alia in alio. Sed manifestum est quod istae qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris, si sint unum, non sunt unum nisi aggregatione. Et manifestum est quod una pars illius quantitatis non est subiective in una illarum qualitatum et alia in alia. Ergo relinquitur quod omnes illae qualitates non sunt subiectum unius quantitatis numero propter quam dicantur quantae.

Item nullum accidens unum numero potest esse successive per actionem causae naturalis in diversis subiectis primis. Voco autem subiectum primum non illud quod est subiectum alicuius accidentis per partem, sicut homo dicitur subiectum albedinis, quia manus vel pes est subiectum albedinis. Sed illud dico subiectum primum quod est subiectum alicuius accidentis, et nulla pars eius est subiectum primum et adaequatum eius. Et sic accepto subiecto primo manifestum est quod nullum unum accidens numero potest naturaliter esse in diversis subiectis primis.

Quo concesso, auferatur una pars illarum qualitatum, sicut ad sensum patet quod fieri potest. Tunc quaero aut manet eadem quantitas, quae prius, aut non. Si

is accepted, that an accident one numerically can not be in something one through aggregation, so however that one part of that accident may not be in one of them and another in another. For in the instance advanced one part of that quantity is placed subjectively in one of those aggregations and another part in another. Therefore, it is obvious that an instance can not be found contrary to the proposition asserting that no accident one numerically can be in something one through aggregation only, and yet that one part may not be in one of them and another in another. But it is manifest that these qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar, if they be one, are not one except through aggregation. And it is manifest that one part of that quantity is not subjectively in one of those qualities and another in another. Therefore, it follows that all those qualities are not the subject of a quantity one numerically by virtue of which they are called quanta.

Again, no accident one numerically can be successively in diverse primary subjects through the action of a natural cause. But I consider a primary subject not that which is a subject of some accident through a part, as a man is called the subject of whiteness, because a hand or foot is the subject of whiteness. But I consider that a primary subject which is the subject of some accident, and no part of it is the primary and adequate subject of it. And if a primary subject is thus accepted, it is manifest that no accident one numerically can be naturally in diverse primary subjects.

If this is conceded, one part of those qualities may be removed, as it is obvious to sense that it can be done. Then I ask whether or not the same quantity

sic, tunc sequitur quod eadem quantitas numero est primo subiective in isto toto aggregato ex prioribus qualitatibus et postea non est in illo, quia non manet, et tamen est in aliquo; igitur est in alio et per consequens est in pluribus successive.

Si non manet eadem quantitas numero; igitur destructa albedine quaelibet aliarum qualitatum mutaret quantitatem suam, quod videtur absurdum.

Propterea, si ista quantitas una est in illo aggregato, aut est tota in toto et tota pars in qualibet parte illarum, aut tota in toto et una pars in una illarum et alia pars in alia illarum. Primum non potest dari; quia tunc idem accidens numero esset simul in pluribus subiectis, quod falsum est. Nec potest dari secundum, quia nulla pars illius quantitatis potest accipi quae plus respiciat unam qualitatem quam aliam, cum illae qualitates nullo modo distent localiter.

Ex praedictis colligitur quod, cum accidens numeretur ad numerationem subiectorum, non possunt qualitates esse distinctae nisi quantitates essent distinctae, si quaelibet illarum sit subiectum quantitatis.

remains, which was before. If so, then it follows that a quantity the same numerically is at first subjectively in this whole aggregation of prior qualities and afterwards is not in that, since it does not remain, and yet is in something; therefore, it is in another, and consequently is in several successively.

If a quantity the same numerically does not remain; therefore, when whiteness has been destroyed, any one of the other qualities might change its quantity, which seems absurd.

Furthermore, if this quantity is one in that aggregation, either it is a whole in a whole and a whole part in any part of them or a whole in a whole and one part in one of them and another part in another of them. The first can not be conceded; for then an accident the same numerically would be at the same time in several subjects, which is false. Nor can the second be conceded; for no part of that quantity can be accepted which may have more regard for one quality than for another, since those qualities may in no mode be separate locally.

From the previous statements it is gathered that, since an accident may be counted according to the enumeration of subjects, the qualities can not be distinct unless the quantities were distinct, if any one of them be the subject of a quantity.

CAPITULUM XIX

Quod non quaelibet qualitas sit subiectum immediatum quantitatis

Non tantum autem est impossibile quod illae qualitates sint unum subiectum unius quantitatis; sed etiam impossibile est dicere quod quaelibet qualitas est subiectum alicuius quantitatis, ita quod distincta qualitas est subiectum distinctae quantitatis; nam talis pluralitas quantitatum distinctarum a qualitatibus omnino est superflua et sine necessitate concessa.

Item eadem ratione ante transsubstantiationem panis substantia panis erat distinctum subiectum distinctae quantitatis ab omnibus illis quantitatibus quarum post transsubstantiationem subiecta sunt qualitates, quod est inconveniens; quia tunc sequeretur quod substantia esset quanta distincta quantitatibus; esset enim quanta una quantitate cuius esset subiectum immediatum et esset quanta aliis quantitatibus, quarum esset subiectum mediatum quia mediantibus qualitatibus illis quarum est subiectum.

Item omnes, quos vidi ponentes quod quantitas esset alia res a substantia et qualitate, habent pro inconveniente quod duae dimensions sint simul. Sed si substantia sit subiectum unius quantitatis et qualitas sit subiectum alterius quantitatis, oportet ponere quod non tantum duae dimensiones sint simul sed etiam quod

CHAPTER XIX

That not any quality may be the immediate subject of a quantity

Moreover, it is not only impossible that those qualities may be one subject of one quantity; but it is also impossible to say that any quality is the subject of some quantity, so that a distinct quality is the subject of a distinct quantity; for such a plurality of quantities distinct from qualities is altogether superfluous and is granted without necessity.

Again, for the same reason before transubstantiation the substance of the bread was a distinct subject of a quantity distinct from all those quantities whose subjects after transubstantiation are qualities, which is incompatible; for it would then follow that a substance would be a quantum with distinct quantities; for there would be a quantum with one quantity of which there would be an immediate subject and there would be a quantum with other quantities, of which there would be a mediate subject, because with those mediating qualities of which there is a subject.

Again, all, whom I have seen who posit that quantity would be a thing other than substance and quality, hold to the incongruity that two dimensions may be at the same time. But if a substance be the subject of one quantity and a quality be the subject of another quantity, it is necessary to posit that not only two dimensions may be at the same time, but even that more than two may be at the same time; from which

plures quam duae sint simul; ex quo relinquitur quod non convenienter dicunt sic dicentes.

Propterea quamvis secundum aliquos non est inconveniens ponere distincta quanta esse simul, quae sunt alterius rationis vel eiusdem rationis facientia tamen unum; tamen, quod diversae quantitates eiusdem speciei specialissime non facientes unam quantitatem numero sunt simul, naturaliter vel per potentiam creatam videtur impossibile.

Sed si quaelibet qualitas esset subiectum distinctae quantitatis, illae quantitates non facerent unam quantitatem numero nec distinguerentur specie; igitur non possunt esse simul in eodem loco; manifestum est itaque quod non quaelibet qualitas est subiectum distinctae quantitatis.

it follows that those, who talk in this fashion, do not speak consistently.

Therefore, although according to some it is not inconsistent to posit that distinct quanta are at the same time, which are of a different ground or of the same ground, making however one; nevertheless it seems impossible naturally or through created power that diverse quantities of the same species, most especially those not making a quantity one numerically, are at the same time.

But if each quality could be the subject of a distinct quantity, those quantities could not make a quantity one numerically nor could they be distinguished in species; therefore, they can not be at the same time in the same place; and so it is manifest that each quality is not the subject of a distinct quantity.

CAPITULUM XX

Quod quantitas manens non est subiective in una qualitate et non in alia

Quod autem non remaneat una sola quantitas, quae sit subiective in una sola qualitate et non in alia, ita quod reliquae qualitates non sint subiecta illius quantitatis, ex hoc sequitur quod, si una sola qualitas esset subiectum quantitatis illius, reliquae qualitates non essent quantitates nec essent subiective in quantitate, nec quantitas esset subiective in eis. Sed dictum est prius quod illud, quod nec est res realiter distincta a quantitate nec est subiective in quantitate nec est subiectum quantitatis, non est quantum; et ita reliquae qualitates ab illa qualitate, quae esset subiectum illius quantitatis, non essent quantae, quod constat esse falsum.

Etiam cum sit manifestum omnes qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris frangi et dividi et hostia divisa consimiles omnes qualitates cum utraque parte hostiae remanere, nec potest dici quod una qualitas est subiectum immediatum quantitatis, quaelibet autem alia qualitas est subiectum mediatum quantitatis, et ideo quaelibet est quanta; quia in qualitatibus est quantitas subiective mediate vel immediate.

Hoc, inquam, stare non potest; quia, si una sola qualitas esset subiectum quantitatis, una esset mediatum et alia immediatum. Hoc esse non posset, nisi quia qualitas, quae est subiectum immediatum quanti-

CHAPTER XX

That the quantity remaining is not subjectively in one quality and not in another

Moreover, that one quantity only, which may be subjectively in only one quality and not in another, may not remain so that the remaining qualities may not be subjects of that quantity, follows from this; that, if only one quality could be the subject of that quantity, the remaining qualities could not be quantities and could not be subjectively in a quantity, nor could a quantity be subjectively in them. But it was stated before that that, which is neither a thing really distinct from a quantity nor is subjectively in a quantity nor is the subject of a quantity, is not a quantum; and so the remaining qualities distinct from that quality, which might be the subject of that quantity, could not be quanta, which is well known to be false.

Besides, since it may be manifest that all the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar are broken and divided and, when the host is divided, all similar qualities remain with each part of the host, it can not be said that one quality is the immediate subject of a quantity, but each other quality is the mediate subject of a quantity; and, therefore, each is a quantum, because in qualities there is subjectively a quantity mediately or immediately.

This, I say, can not hold; since, if only one quality could be the subject of a quantity, one would be mediate and another immediate. This would not be able to be true, unless because a quality, which is the im-

tatis, esset subiective in illa qualitate quae est subiectum quantitatis mediatum. Sed hoc constat esse falsum, una enim qualitas corporalis non est subiectum alterius qualitatis corporalis; non enim color est subiectum saporis, nec econtrario. Nec calor est subiectum odoris vel coloris, tunc enim calor esset vere et realiter albus vel niger, quod est absurdum. Ex quo igitur inter cetera sequitur, quod nullum concretum alicuius qualitatis praedicitur de abstracto alterius. Manifestum enim est quod una qualitas non est subiectum alterius qualitatis.

Item hoc constat alia ratione, nam ad destructionem subiecti sive mediati sive immediati sequitur destructio accidentis. Si igitur una qualitas esset subiectum alterius qualitatis, oporteret quod destructa qualitate, quae est immediate in substantia tamquam in subiecto, omnes ceterae qualitates destruerentur. Et ita, si qualitas tangibilis esset subiectum immediatum alterius sensibilis alio sensu et illa alterius et sic ordinate procedendo, oporteret quod mutato colore alicuius corporis ceterae qualitates auferrentur.

Ex omnibus igitur praedictis potest intelligi evidenter quod quantitas non est aliquod accidens subiective existens in qualitate tamquam in subiecto.

mediate subject of a quantity, could be subjectively in that quality which is the mediate subject of a quantity. But this is clearly found to be false, for one corporeal quality is not a subject of another corporeal quality; for color is not a subject of taste, nor contrariwise. Nor is heat the subject of odor or color; for then heat would truly and really be white or black, which is absurd. From this, therefore, it follows, among other statements, that no concrete of any quality is predicated of an abstract of another. For it is manifest that one quality is not the subject of another quality.

This conclusion also obtains by another reason; for the destruction of an accident follows either mediately or immediately upon the destruction of a subject. If, therefore, one quality could be the subject of another quality, it would be necessary that, when a quality is destroyed, which is immediately in the substance as in a subject, all other qualities would be destroyed. And so, if a tangible quality could be an immediate subject of another sensible by another sense and that of another, and so by continuing in logical order, it would be necessary that, when the color of any body changed, the other qualities would be removed.

Therefore, from all the previous statements, it can evidently be understood that a quantity is not any accident existing subjectively in a quality, as in a subject.

CAPITULUM XXI

In quo probatur testimoniis doctorum Catholicorum quod qualitates non sunt subiective in quantitate alia a substantia

Post praedicta restat ostendere quod qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris post consecrationem non sunt subiective in quantitate tamquam in subiecto sustentante eas. Et haec quidem conclusio confirmanda est testimoniis doctorum venerabilium. Unde dicit doctor egregius Magister Sententiarum Libro IV., Distinctione XII., in principio cuius 'Damnamus.' Cuius doctrinam etiam approbat concilium generale extra De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Damnamus.' "Si quaeritur," inquit, "de accidentibus, quae remanent, scilicet, de speciebus, sapore et pondere, in quo subiecto fundentur, potius mihi videtur patenter eas existere sine subiecto quam esse in subiecto."

Ex quibus patet quod de intentione illius doctoris est quod tales qualitates, sapor, pondus et huiusmodi remanentes in sacramento altaris, non sunt subiective in aliquo et per consequens non sunt in quantitate tamquam in subiecto; quia tunc non essent sine subiecto sed in subiecto. Nec videtur dicere quod non intendit quod illae qualitates sunt extra omne subiectum, sed quod non sint in aliqua substantia sicut in subiecto;

CHAPTER XXI

In which it is proved by the testimony of the Catholic doctors that qualities are not subjectively in a quantity other than a substance

After the previous statements it remains to show that the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar after consecration are not subjectively in a quantity, as if in a subject sustaining them. And, indeed, this conclusion is to be confirmed by the testimony of the venerable Doctors. Whence, the illustrious Doctor, the Master of the Sentences, says in Book IV., Distinction XII., in the beginning of the Chapter, 'Damnamus.' Whose doctrine a general council, in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, 'Damnamus,' also approved. "If a question is raised," he says, "concerning the accidents which remain; namely, concerning the species, taste and heaviness, in what subject they may be found; it seems clear to me that they exist without a subject rather than that they are in a subject."

From which it is obvious that it is in accordance with the intention of that Doctor, that such qualities, taste, heaviness, and similar qualities, remaining in the sacrament of the altar, are not subjectively in something and consequently are not in a quantity as if in a subject; because then they would not be without a subject but in a subject. Nor is it sufficient to say that he does not intend that those qualities are outside of the whole subject; but that they may not be in some

unde rationem assignans quare illae qualitates sunt sine fundamento subdit quod non est ibi substantia nisi corporis et sanguinis Domini, quae non afficitur illis accidentibus.

Haec, inquam, responsio non sufficit quia nunquam sequitur aliquod accidens esse sine subiecto quamdiu subsistit in suo subiecto primo et immediato. Sed si qualitates remanentes post consecrationem essent in quantitate sicut in subiecto, quantitas esset subiectum immediatum earum et per consequens, quamdiu subsisterent in quantitate, non essent sine subiecto.

Item nunquam aliquod accidens potest dici per se existens quamdiu subsistit in suo subiecto immediato. Sed secundum eundem Doctorem qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris sunt per se subsistentes; nam loquens de qualitatibus de quibus prius dixit, quod sunt sine subiecto, ait: "Remanent illa accidentia per se subsistentia ad mysterii ritum ad gustus fideique suffragium, quibus corpus Christi habens formam suam et naturam tegitur." Liquet igitur quod de intentione illius Doctoris est quod sapor et pondus et huiusmodi, qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris, sunt per se subsistentes et sine omni subiecto. Ex quo sequitur quod non existunt in quantitate tamquam in subiecto.

Unde subdit ibidem praefatus Doctor: "Ne mireris," inquit, "nec insultes si ibi accidentia videantur frangi, cum ibi sint sine subiecto." Unde magis mirabile est

substance as if in a subject; whence, assigning a reason why those qualities are without a fundament, he adds, that there is no substance there, except that of the body and blood of the Lord, which is not affected by those accidents.

This response, I say, does not suffice because it never follows, that any accident is without a subject as long as it subsists in its primary and immediate subject. But if the qualities remaining after consecration could be in a quantity as in a subject, a quantity would be the immediate subject of them and consequently, as long as they would subsist in a quantity, they would not be without a subject.

Again, any accident can never be said to be existing per se, so long as it subsists in its immediate subject. But according to the same Doctor the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar are subsisting per se; for when he speaks of the qualities of which he spoke before, that they are without a subject, he says: "Those accidents, by which the body of Christ having its form and nature is concealed, remain subsisting per se at the celebration of the mystery, for the tasting and assent of faith." Therefore, it is apparent that it is in accordance with the intention of that Doctor that taste and weight and the like, the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar, are subsisting per se and without any subject. From which it follows that they do not exist in a quantity, as in a subject.

Whence, the aforesaid Doctor adds in the same place: "Do not be surprised or scoff," he says, "if the accidents there may appear to be broken, since they may be there without a subject." From this it

quod accidentia existant sine subiecto quam quod frangantur.

Item non est maior ratio quod una qualitas sit in quantitate tamquam in subiecto quam alia; sed aliqua qualitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est in quantitate sed in subiecto. Igitur nulla est ibi in quantitate tamquam in subiecto. Quod autem aliqua qualitas remaneat post consecrationem quae non sit in quantitate tamquam in subiecto, patet. Nam ponderositas est qualitas, quia secundum eam aliquid dicitur 'quale' et tamen ponderositas remanens in sacramento altaris non est in quantitate tamquam in subiecto; quia, si ponderositas esset in aliquo tamquam in subiecto, illud subiectum vere et realiter esset ponderosum sicut omne subiectum, in quo est albedo, est album; et omne subiectum, in quo est calor, est calidum. Sed nihil remanens post consecrationem in sacramento altaris est ponderosum illa ponderositate quae remanet in eodem sacramento; quod plane asserit quaedam glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione II, super illud capitulum, 'Si per negligentiam.' Unde obiiciens contra hoc quod dixit quod accidentia cadunt in terra, ait sic: "Sed obiicitur sic, cum sola accidentia manent ibi, et accidentia non habent pondus; quia solum corpus habet pondus; qualiter igitur accidentia dicuntur cadere cum non habeant pondus." Et solvens istam obiectionem dicit: "Dic quod ponderositas adhuc manet cum aliis accidentibus et tamen nihil est ibi ponderosum." Ex ista glossa patet a parte, quod quamvis ponderositas post consecrationem remaneat cum accidentibus aliis, tamen non est in aliquo subiecto quod possit ab illa

is more wonderful that the accidents exist without a subject than that they may be broken.

Again, there is no stronger reason that one quality may be in a quantity as in a subject, than for another quality; but any quality remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not in a quantity but in a subject. Therefore, there is nothing there in a quantity, as if in a subject. But it is obvious that some quality may remain after the consecration which may not be in a quantity as if in a subject. For heaviness is a quality; for according to it something is called 'quale'; and yet the heaviness remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not in a quantity as in a subject; for, if heaviness were in something as in a subject, that subject would truly and really be heavy, as the whole subject, in which there is whiteness, is white; and the whole subject, in which there is heat, is warm. But nothing remaining in the sacrament of the altar after consecration is heavy by that heaviness which remains in the same sacrament; which a certain gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., above that chapter, 'Si per negligentiam,' clearly asserts. Whence, objecting to this that he said that accidents fall to the earth, he says thus: "But it is likewise objected, since the accidents alone remain there, and accidents do not have weight, for body alone has weight; how, therefore, are accidents said to fall, since they may not have weight." And solving this objection he says: "Say that heaviness still remains with other accidents and yet nothing heavy is there." From this gloss it is obvious in part that, although heaviness may remain with the other accidents after consecration, yet it is not in some subject which may be able to be called

ponderositate denominari ponderosum. Et eadem ratione non est ibi aliquid album sed tantum est ibi albedo; et nihil est ibi album sicut est ibi ponderositas, et nihil est ibi ponderosum.

Et eodem modo, quamvis sit ibi sapor, non tamen est ibi subiectum sustentans saporem denominabilem a sapore. Ex quo sequitur plane quod quantitas non est subiectum informatum qualitatibus illis nec denominabilis ab eis. Si enim substaret qualitatibus illis, vere esset ponderosa, calida vel frigida, alba, dulcis vel amara, quod est contra praedictam glossam expresse.

Aliud etiam elici potest ex dicta glossa, videlicet, quod in sacramento altaris non est aliquod corpus habens pondus. Ex quo sequitur quod non est ibi quantitas habens pondus, cum omnis quantitas permanens et continua sit linea vel superficies vel corpus. Si igitur esset ibi quantitas habens pondus, tunc oporteret quod esset ibi linea habens pondus vel superficies habens pondus vel corpus habens pondus. Sed non potest dici quod linea vel superficies habet pondus, et non corpus; quia dicit glossa prae-allegata quod solum corpus habet pondus. Ex quo sequitur quod, si esset ibi aliqua quantitas habens pondus, esset ibi corpus habens pondus quod negatur; nulla est igitur ibi quantitas habens pondus. Ex quo convenit ulterius inferre quod nulla quantitas est ibi subiectum illius ponderositatis et propter illud oportet dicere quod nulla quantitas est ibi subiectum illarum qualitatum; sed omnes illae qualitates sunt ibi per se subsistentes virtute divina.

heavy from that heaviness. And for the same reason there is not something white there, but whiteness only is there, and there is nothing white there as heaviness is there, and nothing is heavy there.

And in the same manner, although taste may be there, yet there is not there a subject sustaining taste deriving its name from taste. From which it plainly follows that quantity is not a subject informed by those qualities nor deriving its name from them. For if it were under those qualities, it would truly be heavy, warm or cold, white, sweet or bitter, which is plainly contrary to the aforesaid gloss.

Another point can also be drawn from the preceding gloss; namely, that in the sacrament of the altar there is not some body having weight. From this it follows that there is not there a quantity having weight, since every permanent and continuous quality may be a line or a surface or a body. Therefore, if a quantity having weight were there, then it would be necessary that there should be there either a line having weight, or a surface having weight, or a body having weight. But it cannot be said that a line or a surface has weight, and not a body; for the previously mentioned gloss says that body alone has weight. From this it follows that, if there were there some quantity having weight, there would be there a body having weight, which is denied; therefore, there is there no quantity having weight. From this it is, furthermore, proper to infer that no quantity there is the subject of that heaviness, and by virtue of that it is necessary to say that no quantity there is the subject of those qualities; but all those qualities there are subsisting per se by divine virtue.

Item Sancta Mater Ecclesia solemnizans de corpore Christi legit sic: "Accidentia sine subiecto in eodem existunt ut fides locum habeat dum visibiliter invisibile sumitur aliena specie occultatum, et sensus a deceptione immunes reddantur, qui de accidentibus iudicant sibi notis."

Ex praedictis auctoritatibus aliisque quam plurimis plane constat quod in sacramento altaris non tantum unum accidens existat sine subiecto sed quod accidentia existunt sine subiecto, puta, qualitates omnes de quibus iudicant sensus; quod non esset verum si omnes qualitates essent in quantitate sicut in subiecto.

Unde cum ista sit sententia plurimum doctorum reverendorum, videlicet, Magistri Sententiarum, Hostiensis, Gaufridi ac aliorum plurimum glossatorum super decreta et decretales, videtur consonum fidei catholicae dicere quod omnes qualitates post consecrationem remanentes in sacramento altaris non sint in aliquo nec in quantitate nec in aliquo tamquam in subiecto. Et quod ista sit sententia doctorum apparet, nam Hostiensis in summa tituli De Celebratione Missarum, et Ganfridus eodem titulo et glossa extra De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthae,' et glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione IV., Capitulo 'In sacramentorum,' et Magister Sententiarum Libro IV., Distinctione XI., circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi tres recitant opiniones. "Una," sicut dicunt, "asserit quod illa substantia, quae primo fuit panis, est postea caro et sanguis Christi. Secunda opinio tenet quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinat esse et manent

Again, the Holy Mother Church when celebrating the sacrament of the body of Christ reads thus: "The accidents exist without a subject in the same that faith may have a place, while the invisible concealed by another species is visibly received, and the senses, which judge of accidents known to them, are rendered immune from deception."

From the preceding authorities and very many others it clearly obtains that not only one accident may exist without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, but that accidents exist without a subject, say, all the qualities of which the senses judge; which would be true if all the qualities were in a quantity as in a subject.

Whence, since this may be the opinion of many revered Doctors; namely, the Master of the Sentences, Hostiensis, Ganfridus, and of many other glossators upon the decrees and decretals, it seems consistent with the Catholic faith to say that all the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar after consecration may not be in something, neither in a quantity nor in anything as in a subject. And it appears that this may be the opinion of the Doctors; for Hostiensis at the top of the title of the De Celebratione Missarum, and Ganfridus in the same title, and the gloss in the margin of the De Celebratione Missarum, 'Cum Marthæ,' and the gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., Chapter, 'In sacramentorum', and the Master of the Sentences in Book IX., Distinction XI., cite three opinions concerning the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. "One," as they say, "asserts that that substance, which was bread at first, is afterwards the flesh and the blood of Christ. The second opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of

accidentia tantum, scilicet, sapor et color et pondus et similia; et ab illis accidentibus incipit ibi esse corpus Christi. Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini et in eodem loco et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi." Opinio media ab omnibus praedictis approbatur.

Ex quibus omnibus patet quod doctores antiqui et authentici tantum posuerunt qualitates remanere per se sine subiecto; et ideo non posuerunt quod qualitates essent in aliquo subiective.

Unde et multi ponentes qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris esse in quantitate tamquam in subiecto, multas auctoritates doctorum authenticorum adducunt ad probandum quod accidentia, puta, qualitates, sunt sine subiecto; sed nec unam quidem auctoritatem alicuius doctoris authentici possunt adducere ad probandum quod qualitates in sacramento altaris sunt in quantitate sicut in subiecto.

Unde quamvis diligenter legerim totum tractatum Magistri Sententiarum de Eucharistia et totum tractatum, qui ponitur in iure canonico de eadem materia una cum glossis et aliis doctoribus, sicut Hostiensem et Innocentium et alios, tamen non inveni quod faciunt mentionem de quantitate etiam negando eam, nisi in tribus locis; scilicet, semel De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Quia corpus,' ubi loquens homini recipienti corpus Christi dicit sic: "In mensura visibili permanens maior factus es teipso invisibiliter sine quantitatis augmento, cum idem atque ipse esses."

the wine may cease to be there and the accidents only remain; namely, taste, color, weight, and similar accidents; and by those accidents the body of Christ begins to be there. The third opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of the wine remains there and that the body of Christ is in the same place and under the same species." The second opinion is approved by all the previous authorities.

From all these it is obvious that the ancient and authorized Doctors have posited that only the qualities remain per se without a subject; and, indeed, they have not posited that qualities were subjectively in something.

These, and many, who posit that the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar are in a quantity as if in a subject, adduce many passages of the authorized Doctors to prove that accidents; namely, qualities, are without a subject; but they can not, indeed, adduce one passage of any authorized Doctor to prove that the qualities in the sacrament of the altar are in a quantity as in a subject.

Whence, although I have diligently read the entire tract of the Master of the Sentences concerning the Eucharist and the entire tract, which is found in the canonical law concerning the same matter, along with the glosses, and other Doctors, as Hostiensis, Innocent and others, yet I have not found that they mention quantity even by denying it, except in three places; namely, once in the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Quia corpus'; where, when speaking to the man receiving the body of Christ, he says thus: "Continuing in thy visible stature thou hast invisibly become greater than thyself without increase of quantity, although you yourself would also be the same."

Item glossa super illud capitulum De Consecratione Distinctione II., 'Dupliciter': "Potest intelligi, vel secundum illam formam et quantitatem quam habuit in cruce vel secundum quantitatem corporis glorificati quod spirituale videtur; quia nulli sensui subiacet."

Item in capitulo, 'Ubi,' prius dicit Hilarius: "Non est quantitas visibilis in hoc aestimanda mysterio, sed virtus sacramenti spiritualis"; ubi dicit glossa: "Non est quantitas sic aestimanda ut sub minori quantitate sit minus corpus Christi et in maiori maius; quia ubique est pars sive speciei sive corporis, id est, pes vel manus, totum corpus est."

In pluribus locis non memini me legisse quod Sancti vel Doctores authentici tractantes de sacramento Eucharistiae aliquid tangunt de quantitate.

Sed manifestum est quod ex praedictis locis nec directe nec indirecte colligi potest quod qualitates sint in quantitate tamquam in subiecto. Sed de qualitatibus, quod remanent et quod ipsae franguntur et teruntur, expresse dicunt.

Unde dicit glossa super illud, De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Ego Berengarius': "Non tantum pondus et reliquas sacramenti qualitates sensibus corporeis percipi fateor; sed etiam sub illis speciebus fractis et attritissimis partibus totum et integrum corpus Christi esse confiteor, totum manducari, totum consumi." Ecce quod species vocat qualitates quas species dicit frangi et atteri. Frustra igitur poneretur aliqua quantitas quae esset subiectum earum.

Again, the gloss over that chapter of the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Dupliciter': "It can be understood, either, according to that form and quantity which he had on the cross or according to the quantity of the glorified body which seems spiritual; for it is subject to no sense."

Again, before, in Chapter 'Ubi,' Hilary says: "A visible quantity is not to be considered in this mystery; but the spiritual virtue of the sacrament"; where the gloss says: "The quantity must not be so estimated that the body of Christ may be less under a smaller quantity and greater in a larger quantity; for, wherever there is a part whether of species or of body, that is, the foot or the hand, the whole body is."

I do not remember that I have read in very many places that the Saints or the authorized Doctors, who discussed the sacrament of the Eucharist, touch upon any thing about quantity.

But it is manifest that from the preceding places that it can neither directly nor indirectly be gathered that qualities may be in a quantity as if in a subject. But they expressly say of qualities that they remain and that they themselves are broken and are used up.

Whence, the gloss above that Chapter of the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Ego Berengarius,' says: "I not only confess that weight and the other qualities of the sacrament are perceived by the bodily senses; but I confess that under those broken species and very much wasted parts the whole and unbroken body of Christ is, that the whole is eaten, and that the whole is consumed." Notice that he calls the species, qualities, which species, he says, are broken and worn. Therefore, needlessly would there be posited any quantity, which would be the subject of them.

CAPITULUM XXII

Quod quantitas distincta realiter a substantia non sit subiectum qualitatum in sacramento altaris, confirmatur etiam per dicta philosophorum

Quod quantitas distincta realiter a substantia non sit subiectum qualitatum non tantum testimoniis sanctorum patrum sed etiam philosophorum poterit confirmari. Sufficiat autem Aristotelem principem philosophorum adducere. Ipse autem in Praedicamentis dicit quod sola substantia est susceptiva contrariorum per sui mutationem, et hoc dicit esse proprie proprium substantiae. Sed si inter substantiam et qualitates esset una quantitas media differens et sustentans qualitates sensuales et corporales, manifestum est quod illa quantitas esset susceptiva contrariorum per propriam sui mutationem. Illa enim, quandoque susciperet albedinem, quandoque nigredinem, quandoque esset calida, quandoque esset frigida, uno tempore esset dulcis, alio tempore esset amara; et ita alia res a substantia per sui mutationem esset susceptiva contrariorum.

Item secundum eundem philosophum, alteratio ad qualitatem sensibilem distinguitur a condensatione et rarefactione in tantum quod, quando aliquod corpus rarefit vel condensatur, non est necesse quod amittat omnes suas qualitates. Rarefiat igitur corpus album,

CHAPTER XXII

That a quantity really distinct from a substance may not be a subject of qualities in the sacrament of the altar, is also confirmed through the statements of the philosophers

That a quantity really distinct from a substance may not be a subject of qualities could be confirmed not only by the testimony of the Holy Fathers but also of the philosophers. Therefore, let it suffice to adduce Aristotle, the Prince of philosophers. However, he says in the Categories that substance alone is susceptive of contraries through a change of itself; and he says that this is properly characteristic of substance. But if there could be between substance and qualities one intermediate quantity differing and sustaining sensual and corporeal qualities, it is manifest that that quantity would be susceptive of contraries through a proper change of itself. For that would at one time be sweet, at another time would be bitter, when it would support whiteness, when it would support blackness, when it would be warm, and when it would be cold; and so a thing other than a substance would be susceptive of contraries through a change of itself.

Again, according to the same philosopher alteration as regards a sensible quality is distinguished from condensation and rarefaction to such a degree that, when any body is rarified or condensed, it is not necessary that it lose all its qualities. Therefore, a white body may become rarified; and, when this has been done, it

quo facto non potest dari quod amittat priorem albedinem et habeat novam; nam nihil est hic agens quod posset albedinem inducere in hoc corpus. Sed hoc stare non potest si quantitas sit res media inter substantiam et qualitates; nam, si sit res media, oportet quod substantia rarefacta habeat novam quantitatem, sicut inferius dicetur et ostendetur. Cum autem ad novitatem subiecti sequatur novitas accidentis sui, oportet quod albedo esset nova, et eadem ratione quaelibet qualitas subiective existens in illa quantitate esset nova.

can not be granted that it may lose the prior whiteness and may have a new whiteness; for there is here nothing efficient enough that would be able to induce whiteness into this body. But this can not obtain if quantity be a thing intermediate between substance and qualities; for, if it be an intermediate thing, it is necessary that a rarefied substance have a new quantity, as will be said and shown later. But since the newness of its accident may follow in consequence of the newness of the subject, it is necessary that whiteness should be new and for the same reason each quality existing subjectively in that quantity would be new.

CAPITULUM XXIII

Quod quantitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus remanentibus in eodem sacramento

Ex praedictis evidenter sequitur quod quantitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus remanentibus in eodem sacramento. Enim nihil est quantum nisi sit subiectum quantitatis, vel existens in quantitate tamquam in subiecto, vel res non distincta realiter a quantitate. Et ostensum est quod qualitas remanens non est subiectum quantitatis nec est in quantitate subiective. Et manifestum est quod qualitates post consecrationem sunt quantae, cum sint longae, latae, et profundae. Relinquitur igitur quod illae qualitates sint quantae et non per quantitatem quae sit res absoluta realiter distincta a qualitatibus illis.

Item omne habens partem distantem a parte est quantum. Sed manifestum est quod ponderositas remanens in sacramento altaris habet partem distantem a parte; et ostensum est prius quod illa ponderositas non est subiective in quantitate nec est subiectum quantitatis; igitur est quanta et non per quantitatem quae est res alia absoluta ab illa ponderositate. Et eadem ratione quaelibet alia qualitas erit quanta et non per quantitatem distinctam realiter ab illa.

CHAPTER XXIII

That the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining in the same sacrament

From the preceding statements, it evidently follows that the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining in the same sacrament. For nothing is a quantum unless it be a subject of a quantity, either existing in a quantity as in a subject or a thing not really distinct from a quantity. And it has been shown that the quality remaining is not a subject of a quantity and is not subjectively in a quantity. And it is manifest that the qualities after consecration are quanta, since they may be long, wide and thick. Therefore it remains that those qualities may be quanta, and not through quantity which may be an absolute thing really distinct from those qualities.

Again, everything having part separate from part is a quantum. But it is evident that the heaviness remaining in the sacrament of the altar has part separate from part; and it was shown before that that heaviness is not subjectively in a quantity nor is it the subject of a quantity; therefore, it is a quantum and not through a quantity, which is an absolute thing other than that heaviness. And for the same reason any other quality will be a quantum and not through a quantity really distinct from it.

CAPITULUM XXIV

Quod ante consecrationem fuit una quantitas quae non erat res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia panis

Viso quod quantitas remanens in sacramento altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus ibidem manentibus, restat nunc aliquas persuasiones adducere propter quas posset alicui videri quod ante consecrationem praecessit una quantitas, quae non erat res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia panis, quae post consecrationem non manet sicut nec substantia panis manet.

Et hoc quidem primo et ultimo dictis poterit persuaderi. Si enim qualitas poterit esse quanta sine quantitate distincta realiter, hoc non potest esse nisi propter hoc quod qualitas habet partes distinctas realiter natas situ distare. Sed tanta est distinctio partium substantiae materialis quanta est distinctio partium qualitatis; ita etiam natae sunt distare situaliter partes substantiae sicut partes qualitatis. Immo naturaliter et virtute creata sicut partes qualitatis esse non possunt sine substantia, ita nec distare possunt sine distantia partium substantialium. Si igitur qualitates sint quantae sine quantitate distincta realiter a qualitatibus, necesse est dicere quod sola substantia poterit esse quanta sine

CHAPTER XXIV

That before consecration there was one quantity, which was not an absolute thing really distinct from the substance of the bread

Since it has been seen that the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining in the same place, it now remains to adduce some convincing arguments by virtue of which anyone might be able to see that before consecration there preceded one quantity which was not an absolute thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, which does not remain after consecration, as the substance of the bread does not remain.

And this could, indeed, be regarded as settled from the statements in the first and the last Chapters. For if a quality could be a quantum without a quantity really distinct, this could not be except by virtue of this, that a quality has parts really distinct and created to be separate in situation. But the distinction of parts of a material substance is as great as is the distinction of parts of a quality; so also the parts of a substance are created to be separate in situation, as the parts of a quality. On the contrary, by nature and by created virtue, as the parts of a quality can not be without a substance, so they can not be separate without separation of substantial parts. If, therefore, qualities be quanta without a quantity really distinct from qualities, it is necessary to say that a substance alone could

quantitate addita distincta realiter, et illa substantia panis fuit quanta non per quantitatem, quae erat alia res a substantia et per consequens erat eadem. Et ideo, sicut substantia panis non manet, ita quantitas illa non manet. Item substantia panis non erat quanta quantitate quae erat realiter eadem cum qualitate et post consecrationem non manet aliqua quantitas distincta realiter a qualitate, sicut probatum est.

Igitur oportet dicere quod aliquod accidens corrumpitur quando corpus Christi consecratur, quod dictis sanctorum patrum repugnare videtur, vel oportet dicere quod substantia panis erat quanta quantitate quae non est res distincta realiter a substantia panis et per consequens non manet, sicut nec substantia panis manet.

be a quantum without an added quantity really distinct, and that that substance of the bread was a quantum not through a quantity, which was a thing other than a substance and consequently was the same. And, indeed, as the substance of the bread does not remain, so that quantity does not remain. Again, the substance of the bread was not a quantum from a quantity, which was really the same as a quality, and any quantity really distinct from a quality does not remain after consecration, as was proved.

Therefore, it is necessary to say that some accident is corrupted when the body of Christ is consecrated, which seems to refute the statements of the Holy Fathers, or it is necessary to say that the substance of the bread was a quantum from a quantity, which is not a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread and consequently does not remain, as the substance of the bread does not remain.

CAPITULUM XXV

Quod substantia potest esse quanta sine omni re absoluta distincta realiter addita sibi

Ut autem magis pateat principale propositum, volo nunc iuxta superiora dicta illa probare quod substantia potest esse quanta sine omni re absoluta distincta realiter addita sibi. Nam prius ostensum est quod omnem substantiam potest divina potestas facere et conservare sine omni accidente absoluto inhaerente sibi. Probatum est etiam quod, si placuerit divinae voluntati, potest aliquam substantiam nunc extensam et substantem accidentibus suis in posterum conservare et omnia accidentia separare vel destruere sive annihilare, et non compellitur divina potentia propter hoc substantiam de loco ad locum transferre seu mutare localiter.

Ex quibus elicio talem propositionem: istam substantiam, quae nunc est quanta, potest divina potentia conservare immotam localiter secundum se totam et quamlibet partem sui substantialem, quamvis libere et contingenter, et destruat omnem quantitatem distinctam realiter ab ista substantia inhaerentem sibi. Immo etiam et sine ratione videtur artare divinam potentiam dicere quod si Deus velit priorem substantiam naturaliter cum omni accidente inhaerente sibi in esse conservare et destruere accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi, quod oportet Deum necessario illam substantiam mutare localiter et de uno loco ad alium transmutare.

CHAPTER XXV

That a substance can be a quantum without any absolute thing really distinct added to it

However, that the principal thesis may appear more obvious, I desire now to prove, besides those former statements, that a substance can be a quantum without any absolute thing really distinct added to it. For it was shown before that the divine power can make and preserve a whole substance without a whole absolute accident inhering in it. It was also proved that, if it should have pleased the divine will, it is possible to preserve in the future any substance now extended and present under its accidents and to separate or destroy or annihilate all the accidents; and the divine power is not compelled by virtue of this to transfer a substance from place to place or to change it locally.

From which I deduce such a proposition: that the divine power can preserve however freely or contingently, this substance, which is now a quantum, unmoved locally as regards itself as a whole and each substantial part of it, and it may destroy a whole quantity really distinct from this substance and inhering in the substance. On the contrary also, and without reason, it seems to curtail the divine power to say that, if God wills to preserve in being a substance prior naturally with every accident inhering in it and to destroy an absolute accident inhering in it, it is necessary for God necessarily to change the substance locally and to transfer it from one place to another.

Cum frequenter videamus etiam agens naturale sine destructione et mutatione locali subiecti aliquod accidens eiusdem subiecti destruere, non est igitur negandum a Dei potentia, cui perfecte subduntur omnia, quin possit sine destructione illius ligni et mutatione locali eiusdem destruere omnem quantitatem quae est accidens absolutum inhaerens isti ligno. Quo facto, oportet dicere quod ista substantia est quanta cum habeat partem extra partem, sicut prius; nisi enim partes illius substantiae distarent, sicut prius, non esset tota substantia in toto loco et pars in parte, sicut prius, ante destructionem accidentis; et per consequens ista substantia esset mota localiter, quod est contra positum.

Est igitur ista substantia quanta et positum est quod nullum accidens inhaeret sibi, quod est accidens absolutum, quia per positum omne tale per potentiam divinam est destructum; igitur ista substantia sine quantitate, quae sit accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi, est quanta.

Quod autem illo casu posito ista substantia remaneat quanta, potest adhuc persuaderi; nam manifestum est quod ex quo, ista substantia tota conservatur in esse per divinam potentiam, nulla pars eius corrumpitur seu destruitur; remanent igitur partes substantiales eaedem quae prius.

De quibus partibus quaero, aut distant localiter situ, (quo concesso habetur propositum, cum probatum sit prius quod omne per se unum habens partes distantes loco et situ est quantum;) aut illae partes non distant

Since we may also frequently see that a natural agent destroys any accident of the same subject without the destruction and local change of a subject; it must not, therefore, be said that it may be impossible for the divine power, to which all things are completely subjected, to destroy a whole quantity which is an absolute accident inhering in this wood, without the destruction of that wood and without local change of the same. When this has been done, it is necessary to say that this substance is a quantum, since it may have part outside of part, as before; for unless the parts of that substance could be separate, as before, there could not be a whole substance in a whole place and part in part, as before, before the destruction of the accident; and consequently this substance would be moved locally, which is contrary to the thesis.

This substance is, therefore, a quantum and it is posited that no accident, which is an absolute accident, inheres in it; for according to the thesis every such is destroyed through the divine power; therefore, this substance is a quantum without a quantity, which may be an absolute accident inhering in it.

However, if that event is posited, it can not as yet be concluded that this substance may remain a quantum; for it is manifest from this statement, this whole substance is preserved in being through divine power, that no part of it is corrupted or destroyed; therefore, the same substantial parts remain which were before.

I ask concerning those parts; whether they are separate locally in situation; (if this is conceded, the thesis is maintained, since it may have been proved before that every thing per se one having parts separate in place and situation is a quantum;) or

loco et situ, quod dari non potest; quia ex hoc sequeretur quod essent mutatae localiter. Si enim nunc non distant localiter et prius distabant localiter nec unum conversum est in aliud, cum utrumque vere maneat, oportet quod alterum illorum sit mutatum localiter.

Item accipio unam partem illius substantiae, puta, A, et quaero, aut A coexistit illi parti loci cui prius coexistebat, aut non coexistit illi parti loci. Si A coexistit illi parti loci, eadem ratione alia pars illius substantiae coexistit alteri parti loci cui prius coexistebat. Ex quo sequitur quod tota substantia coexistit toti loco et pars toti parti, et per consequens tota ista substantia habet partes distantes a partibus situ, sicut partes loci, quibus coexistunt, distant situ. Si autem A non existit illi parti loci cui prius coexistebat; igitur illa pars mutata est localiter, quia omne, quod est praesens alicui primo et postea manens non est praesens illi loco, necessario transfertur de loco ad locum; cum non sit extra locum et ita pars mutaret locum, quod est contra positum.

Nec valet dicere quod ista substantia non est in loco nisi per quantitatem quae est accidens illius substantiae; et ideo, quando destruitur quantitas, illa nec est substantia in loco nec mutatur localiter; quia illud non est catholice dictum. Nam secundum sanctos et doctores authenticos, et satis est de intentione scripturae

whether these parts are not separate in place and situation, which can not be granted; for it would follow from this that they would be changed locally. For if they are not now separate locally and were formerly separate locally and one is not converted into another, since both may truly remain, it is necessary that one of them be changed locally.

Again, I take one part of that substance, say, A, and I ask, whether A coexists with that part of the place with which it previously coexisted, or does not coexist with that part of the place. If A does coexist with that part of the place; for the same reason another part of that substance coexists with another part of the place with which it coexisted before. From which it follows that the whole substance coexists with the whole place and part with a whole part; and consequently, this whole substance has parts separate from parts in situation; as parts of a place, with which they coexist, are separate in situation. But if A does not exist with that part of a place with which it coexisted before; therefore, that part is changed locally; for everything, which is present in a thing at first and remaining afterwards is not present in that place, is necessarily transferred from place to place; since it may not be outside a place and so a part would change the place, which is contrary to the thesis.

Nor is it sufficient to say that this substance is not in a place unless through a quantity which is an accident of that substance; and, indeed, when a quantity is destroyed, that substance is neither in a place nor is it changed locally; for that is not stated catholicly. For according to the Holy Fathers and the authorized Doctors, and it is satisfactory according to the inten-

canonicae, angelus est in loco et transfertur de uno loco ad alium quantumcumque non sit quantus sed indivisibilis carens omnibus partibus natis distare localiter.

Igitur multo magis substantiae habenti partes natas distare localiter poterit competere esse in loco et mutari localiter, quamvis non habeat quantitatem quae sit accidens absolutum distinctum realiter ab ea et inhaerens sibi. Immo quantumcumque substantia separetur ab omni accidente, adhuc erit in loco nisi poneretur extra mundum. Et non tantum tota substantia erit in loco, immo quaelibet pars eius erit in loco. Et tunc quaero de ista parte A, aut est in loco in quo prius, et habetur intentum, aut est in alio et per consequens mutatur localiter, quod est contra positum.

Nec valet dicere quod ista substantia non est in loco circumscriptive sed diffinitive, quia hoc dicere est concedere propositum. Nam priori casu posito, ex hoc ipso quod ista substantia est in loco diffinitive, erit in loco circumscriptive. Cuius ratio est; quia si illa substantia est in aliquo loco diffinitive; ex quo sequitur quod A, quod est pars illius substantiae, sit in loco diffinitive. Tunc quaero, aut A est in illa parte loci diffinitive aut non. Si detur quod sic, eadem ratione alia pars erit in alia parte diffinitive; ex quo sequitur quod istae partes distant localiter et situaliter. Omne autem totum habens partes distantes localiter est circumscrip-

tion of the canonical scriptures, an angel is in a place and is transferred from one place to another, in as much as it may not be a quantum but indivisible lacking all the parts created to be separate locally.

Therefore, it would be much more suitable for a substance having parts created to be separate locally to be in a place and to be changed locally, although it may not have a quantity which may be an absolute accident really distinct from it and inhering in it. On the contrary, no matter how much a substance may be separate from every accident, thus far it will be in a place unless it were placed outside of the world. And not only the whole substance will be in a place, but indeed each part of it will be in a place. And then I ask about this part A; whether it is in the place in which it was before, and is held intent, or is in another place and consequently is changed locally, which is contrary to the thesis.

Nor is it sufficient to say that this substance is not in a place circumscriptively but definitively; for to say this is to concede the thesis. For if the prior case is posited; from this very statement that this substance is in a place definitively, it will be in a place circumscriptively. The reason for this is; because if that substance is in some place definitively; from this it follows that A, which is part of that substance, may be in a place definitively. Then I ask, whether or not A is in that part of a place definitively. If it be granted that it is, for the same reason another part will be in another part definitively; from which it follows that these parts are separate locally and in situation. But every whole having parts separate locally is in a place circumscriptively. Therefore, this whole

tive in loco. Igitur ista tota substantia sic est circumscriptive in loco. Si autem detur quod A non est diffinitive in loco vel in illa parte loci in quo prius fuit, vel hoc est quia est alibi diffinitive et per consequens mutata est localiter, vel quia non est alibi, quod concedi non potest, cum etiam angelus alicubi sit ponendus; hoc etiam dato sequitur quod mutata est localiter, ex quo non est diffinitive nec circumscriptive in illo loco in quo prius; et tamen manet realiter in rerum natura.

Sic igitur, cum possit divina potentia conservare substantiam in eodem loco et destruere omne accidens inhaerens sibi quod est accidens absolutum, non est contradictio quod substantia sit quanta sine quantitate accidente inhaerente sibi.

substance is thus in a place circumscriptively. But if it be granted that A is not definitively in a place or in that part of a place in which it was before, either this is because it is elsewhere definitively and consequently is changed locally, or because it is not anywhere, which can not be conceded, since even an angel must be placed somewhere; however, if this is granted, it follows that it is changed locally, from which it is not definitively nor circumscriptively in the place in which it was before; and yet in the nature of things it really remains.

So, therefore, since the divine power may be able to preserve a substance in the same place and destroy every accident inhering in it, which is an absolute accident, there is no contradiction involved in the statement that a substance may be a quantum without a quantity, though an accident inhere in it.

CAPITULUM XXVI

In quo adducuntur aliae rationes ad probandum eandem conclusionem quam prius, scilicet, quod substantia potest esse quanta sine quantitate distincta addita sibi

Iuxta superiorem rationem aliis rationibus potest concludi, quod substantia potest esse quanta sine quantitate distincta addita sibi; nam non minoris virtutis est conservare duas substantias natas facere et constituere unam substantiam sine omnibus accidentibus absolutis inhaerentibus sibi, quando non faciunt nec constituunt unam totam substantiam quam quando constituunt unam totam substantiam; sicut acceptis duabus aquis, puta, A et B, non minoris virtutis est conservare A et B in distinctis locis sine omnibus accidentibus inhaerentibus absolutis eis, quando non faciunt unam aquam totalem quam quando fiunt partes unius aquae. Sed omnipotentia Dei potest separare A et B ab omnibus accidentibus suis et conservare A et B in distinctis locis, sicut A hic et B Romae, si sibi placet. Enim, si omnipotentia Dei separaret unam aquam Romae ab omni accidente suo et aliam hic existentem ab omni accidente suo, non oportet quod Deus transferret illam aquam, quae est Romae, usque hic vel istam aquam usque Romam; nec oporteret quod transferret eas ad aliquem locum medium, sed posset conservare ibi eam et istam hic. Igitur aeque faciliter, si sibi placeret, si

CHAPTER XXVI

In which other reasons are adduced to prove the same conclusion, which was stated before; namely, that a substance can be a quantum without a distinct quantity added to it

Besides the former reason, it can be concluded from other reasons, that substance can be a quantum without a distinct quantity added to it; for it requires no less virtue to preserve two substances created to make and constitute one substance without all the absolute accidents inhering in it, when they do not make or constitute one whole substance, than when they constitute one whole substance; as when two bodies of water are taken, say, A and B, it requires no less virtue to preserve A and B in distinct places without all the absolute accidents inhering in them, when they do not make one total body of water than when they make parts of one water. But the omnipotence of God can separate A and B from all their accidents and preserve A and B in distinct places; as A here, and B at Rome, if it pleases Him. For, if the omnipotence of God could separate the one water at Rome from its every accident, and another here existing from its every accident, it is not necessary that God should transfer that water, which is at Rome, even here, or this water even to Rome; nor would it be necessary that He should transfer them to some intermediate place; but He might be able to preserve that there and this here. Therefore, with equal facility, if it should please Him,

A et B coniungerentur et constituerent unam aquam, posset omnipotentia Dei conservare A et B in distinctis partibus loci, quamvis separaret A et B ab omnibus suis accidentibus absolutis. Quo posito illa substantia totalis haberet partes distantes situ, et A et B essent partes suae quae distarent situ, et per consequens illa substantia totalis esset quanta et tamen sine quantitate distincta realiter ab ipsa substantia.

Confirmatur ratio; quia nulla apparet contradictio quin posset Deus per suam infinitam potentiam, sicut voluntarie et libere creavit totam aquam oceani sub accidentibus suis, conservare illam substantiam et accidentia destruere. Sed nunquam hoc posito necessitaretur Deus partem oceani, quae est in occidente, transferre usque ad aliam partem quae est in oriente, vel econtrario, vel ambas partes transferre ad aliquem locum in medio. Non enim videtur theologice dictum quod ad hoc necessitaretur Deus; posset igitur Deus totam aquam oceani conservare in rerum natura et destruere omne accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi, et tamen alias aquas, quae sunt in oriente et occidente, conservare ubi prius. Quo facto tota aqua illa haberet partes distantes sine aqua addita sibi, et per consequens esset quanta sine quantitate addita.

Item quando subiectum et accidens habent partes correspondentes sibi ita quod distinctis partibus accidentis correspondent partes substantiae distinctae, non minoris potentiae est conservare partes accidentis de-

if A and B should be joined together and constitute one water, the omnipotence of God might be able to preserve A and B in distinct parts of a place, although He could separate A and B from all their absolute accidents. If this is posited, that total substance would have parts separate in situation, and A and B would be their own parts which were separate in situation; and consequently that total substance would be a quantum and yet without a quantity really distinct from the substance itself.

The argument is confirmed; for there appears to be no contradiction to the statement that God might be able through His infinite power to preserve that substance and destroy the accidents, as He voluntarily and freely created the whole water of the ocean under its accidents. But, if this is posited, God would never be necessitated to transfer the part of the ocean, which is in the West, even to the other part, which is in the East, or the opposite; or to transfer both parts to some intermediate place. For it does not appear to be in accord with theological statement that God would be necessitated to this; therefore, God might be able in the nature of things to preserve the whole water of the ocean and destroy every absolute accident inhering in it and yet preserve other waters, which are in the East and the West, where they were before. If this is done, that whole water would have parts separate without water added to it, and consequently would be a quantum without a quantity added.

Again, when subject and accident have parts corresponding to themselves so that the distinct parts of the substance correspond to the distinct parts of the accident, it requires no less power to preserve the parts

struendo substantiam sine mutatione locali accidentis vel alicuius partis suae, quam conservare partes substantiae sine mutatione locali destruendo accidens absolutum. Sed substantia materialis et accidens simul sunt ita quod distinctis partibus accidentis correspondent distinctae partes substantiae. Nam alia pars accidentis est in alia parte substantiae ita quod distinctae partes accidentis sunt in distinctis partibus substantiae, sicut patet per hoc quod probatum est prius, scilicet, quod substantia materialis habet partes substantiales distantes situ.

Potest autem Deus conservare accidens absolutum in eodem loco et situ destruendo substantiam, sicut patet in sacramento altaris; igitur non includit contradictionem Deum conservare substantiam in eodem loco destruendo quodcumque accidens absolutum inhaerens sibi. Quo facto substantia illa erit circumscriptive in loco, sicut prius, et per consequens erit quanta sine quantitate addita sibi.

Nec oportet maliciose calumniari dicendo quod contra fidem est dicere quod in sacramento altaris substantia panis corrumpitur; hoc enim dictum meum non est, sed est dictum doctorum catholicorum. Unde dicit glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Quia corpus.' Glossa super verbo, 'convertuntur,' dicit: "Benedicit: convertuntur vel transsubstantiantur vel transeunt" (supple: terrena et mortalia in Christi substantiam), "sed non fiunt nec incipiunt; nihil enim fit vel incipit esse corpus Christi; potest tamen concedi quod

of an accident by destroying the subject without local change of the accident or some part of it, than to preserve the parts of the substance without local change by destroying an absolute accident. But a material substance and an accident are at the same time, so that the distinct parts of an accident correspond to the distinct parts of a substance. For one part of an accident is in another part of a substance; so that distinct parts of an accident are in distinct parts of a substance, as is obvious through this which was proved before; namely, that material substance has substantial parts separate in situation.

For God can preserve an absolute accident in the same place and situation by destroying the substance, as is obvious in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, there is no contradiction involved in the statement that God preserves a substance in the same place by destroying whatever absolute accident inheres in it. If this is done, that substance will be circumscriptively in a place, as before, and consequently will be a quantum without a quantity added to it.

Nor is it necessary maliciously to misrepresent by saying that it is contrary to the faith to say that the substance of the bread is corrupted in the sacrament of the altar; for this is not my statement but it is the statement of the Catholic doctors. Whence, the gloss says on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Quia corpus.' The gloss above the word 'convertuntur' says: "It well states: they are converted or transubstantiated, or pass over" (supply: earthly and mortal things into the substance of Christ); "but they do not become or begin to be; for nothing becomes or begins to be the body of Christ; yet it can be conceded that

de pane fit et conficitur corpus Christi, sicut de aqua fit crystallus, non tamen est crystallus. Sed securius non conceditur hoc; et ubicumque invenitur panis vel de pane fit vel conficitur corpus Christi. Sic intelligitur: fit, id est, transit in corpus Christi; ut infra ea, 'Panis': vel ex pane fit, id est, sub specie panis est vel latet vel incipit esse vel latere corpus Christi, ubi ante consecrationem non erat; si enim panis fieret corpus Christi, singulis diebus adderetur ei aliquod quod non erat prius; et sic semper augmentaretur." Et subdit: "Non intelligas igitur quod aliquod augmentum sumatur ex tali conversione, nec eo modo quo cibus convertitur in carnem; sed est ibi corruptio, id est, desinit ibi esse substantia panis et vini, nulla tamen generatio."

Item glossa De Consecratione, Distinctione II., 'Ante benedictionem': "Licet verba successive proferantur, non tamen successive fit consecratio; sed in uno instanti corrumpitur panis, scilicet, in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum; et licet dicitur panis fit corpus Christi; momentanea tamen est corruptio eius."

Item glossa eadem distinctione, capitulo, 'Panis est,' dicit quod "substantia panis desinit esse in consecratione subveniente," et cetera, ibidem. Non est igitur contra Catholicam fidem dicere quod in sacramento

the body of Christ becomes and is formed from the bread, as a crystal becomes from water, yet it is not a crystal. But it is safer not to concede this; and wherever the bread is found, the body of Christ either becomes or is produced from the bread. It is thus understood: it becomes, that is, it passes over into the body of Christ, as later this, 'Panis': the body of Christ either becomes from the bread, that is, it is under the species of bread, or it lies concealed or begins to be or to lie concealed, where it was not before consecration; for if the bread should become the body of Christ, there would be added to it on each single day something which was not before, and thus it would be constantly augmented." And the gloss adds: "Do not understand, therefore, that any augmentation may be assumed from such conversion, nor in the same mode in which food is converted into flesh; but there is corruption there, that is, the substance of the bread and of the wine ceases to be there, yet there is no generation."

Again, the gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., 'Ante benedictionem': "Although the words may be uttered successively, yet the consecration does not become successively; but the bread is corrupted in one instant; namely, in the last instant of the utterance of the words; and, although the bread becomes the body of Christ, yet the corruption of it is instantaneous."

Again, the gloss in the same distinction of the Chapter, 'Panis est,' says that "the substance of the bread ceases to be in the subvening consecration," et cetera, in the same place. Therefore, it is not contrary to the Catholic faith to say that the substance of the bread

altaris substantia panis corrumpitur sive destruitur. Cum igitur Deus conservet accidens in eodem loco destruendo substantiam, non est impossibile sibi conservare substantiam eodem loco accidens corrumpendo, et sic erit substantia quanta sine accidente tali.

Item si Deus destrueret medietatem cuiuslibet accidentis absoluti informantem medietatem unam illius ligni et conservaret aliam medietatem accidentis informantem aliam medietatem illius substantiae, istae duae partes substantiae distarent et tamen una istarum careret omni accidente informante eam. Ex quo sequitur quod pars substantiae potest distare a parte substantiae sine accidente informante eam, et per consequens poterit substantia esse quanta sine quantitate addita sibi.

Item non maiorem contradictionem includit quod substantia habens partes distinctas realiter natas distare localiter sit sine omni accidente addito sibi in omni loco divisibili, ita quod tota sit in toto loco et pars in parte quam quod aliqua substantia carens omni parte tali sit in aliquo loco divisibili, ita quod tota in toto loco et tota in qualibet parte. Sed angelus carens omni parte integrali sine omni accidente absoluto addito sibi potest esse totus in aliquo loco divisibili et totus in qualibet parte; igitur non est contradictio quod aliqua substantia habens partes natas distare localiter sit tota in toto loco divisibili et pars in parte sine quantitate aliqua sibi addita. Ex quo sequitur quod erit circumscriptive in loco sine quantitate addita sibi. Confirmatur haec ratio.

is corrupted or destroyed in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, since God may preserve an accident in the same place by destroying a substance, it is not impossible for Him to preserve a substance in the same place by corrupting an accident, and thus a substance will be a quantum without such an accident.

Again, if God could destroy a half of any absolute accident informing one half of that wood and could preserve the other half of the accident informing the other half of that substance, these two parts of the substance would be separate and yet one of these would be lacking every accident informing it. From this it follows that a part of a substance can be separate from a part of a substance without an accident informing it, and consequently a substance could be a quantum without a quantity added to it.

Again, it involves no greater contradiction (to say) that a substance having parts really distinct created to be separate locally may be without a whole accident added to it in a whole divisible place, so that the whole may be in a whole place and a part in a part, than that some substance lacking every such part may be in some divisible place so that a whole may be in a whole place and a whole in each part. But an angel, lacking every integral part without every absolute accident added to it, can be a whole in any divisible place and a whole in each part; therefore, it is not a contradiction that some substance having parts created to be separate locally may be a whole in a whole divisible place and a part in a part without some quantity added to it. From this it follows that it will be circumscriptively in a place without a quantity added to it. This reason is confirmed.

Non magis includit contradictionem substantiam corpoream esse in loco modo sibi convenienti sine omni re addita sibi, quam substantiam incorpoream esse in loco modo sibi convenienti sine omni re addita. Proprius autem modus essendi in loco conveniens substantiae corporeae est esse in loco circumscriptive sicut proprius modus essendi in loco conveniens substantiae incorporeae est esse in loco diffinitive; sed substantia incorporea potest esse in loco diffinitive sine omni re absoluta addita sibi. Igitur contradictionem non includit substantiam corpoream esse in loco circumscriptive sine omni re absoluta addita sibi, et sic est quanta sine omni re absoluta addita sibi. Nullam igitur, ut videtur, includit contradictionem quod aliqua substantia sit quanta sine omni accidente absoluto addito sibi.

It involves no more of a contradiction that a corporeal substance is in a place in a mode consistent with itself without any thing added to it than that an incorporeal substance is in a place in a mode consistent with itself without an entire thing added. But the proper mode of being in a place consistent with a corporeal substance is to be in a place circumscriptively, as the proper mode of being in a place consistent with an incorporeal substance is to be in a place definitively; but an incorporeal substance can be in a place definitively without any absolute thing added to it. Therefore, it involves no contradiction that a corporeal substance is in a place circumscriptively without an entire absolute thing added to it; and so there is a quantum without an entire absolute thing added to it. Therefore, as it appears, it involves no cotradiction that any substance may be a quantum without every absolute accident added to it.

CAPITULUM XXVII

Quod eadem conclusio, quae prius, videtur sequi ex dictis adversariorum

Praeter rationes priores possunt aliquae adduci partim fundatae in dictis aliorum doctorum catholicorum negantium tamen praedictam conclusionem. Videtur enim istam propositionem sequi ex dictis aliquorum adversariorum, 'omnis res absoluta existens sub aliquo accidente absoluto per informationem ita quod totum subiectum sit sub toto accidente et pars sub parte,' potest per divinam potentiam coexistere eidem sine informatione et inhaerentia ista, patet. Nam secundum multos negantes substantiam posse esse quantam sine accidente inhaerente sibi, respectus extrinsecus adveniens sibi potest auferri extremis manentibus. Et secundum eosdem respectus inhaerentiae accidentis ad subiectum est respectus extrinsecus adveniens; igitur non includit contradictionem substantiam et illam rem, quam dicunt quantitatem, manere sine respectu talis inhaerentiae. Sed hoc posito tota substantia coexistit toti illi quantitati quae est accidens; igitur sicut ista quantitas habet partem distantem a parte ita illa substantia habebit partem distantem a parte, et ita illa substantia est quanta sine quantitate informante eam. Nec possunt dicere quod, ablato respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad substantiam, substantia non erit praesens quantitati, ita quod tota sit praesens toti quantitati, et pars parti.

CHAPTER XXVII

That the same conclusion, which was stated before, seems to follow from the statements of adversaries

Aside from the former reasons, some can be adduced based partly on the statements of other Catholic doctors who, however, deny the previous conclusion. For it appears that that proposition follows from the statements of some adversaries, 'every absolute thing existing under any absolute accident through information so that a whole subject may be under a whole accident and a part under a part,' can through divine power coexist with the same without information and this inherence, as is obvious. For according to many who say that substance can not be a quantum without an accident inhering in it, the extrinsic respect advening to it can be taken from the extremes remaining. And according to the same the respect of inherence of an accident to a subject is an extrinsic advening respect; therefore, it does not involve a contradiction that a substance and that thing, which they call quantity, remain without respect of such inherence. But if this is posited, the whole substance coexists with that whole quantity which is an accident; therefore, as this quantity has part separate from part so that substance will have part separate from part, and so that substance is a quantum without a quantity informing it. Nor can they say that, when a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance is removed, the substance will not be present in the quantity so that the whole may

Non possunt, inquam, sic evadere. Nam secundum eosdem respectus praesentialitatis substantiae ad quantitatem est prior respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad substantiam et similiter respectus praesentialitatis partis substantiae ad partem quantitatis est prior respectu inhaerentiae partis quantitatis ad partem substantiae. Quod potest probari per hoc, quod impossibile est quod sit respectus inhaerentiae quantitatis ad substantiam sine respectu praesentialitatis quantitatis ad substantiam et per consequens sine respectu praesentialitatis substantiae ad quantitatem, quia istae praesentialitates mutuae secundum principia eorum simul sunt natura. Sed respectus praesentialitatis potest esse sine respectu inhaerentiae; multis enim est substantia praesens vel esse potest quae non informant eam nec inhaerent sibi. Sed secundum eos per divinam potentiam prior potest esse sine posteriori; non igitur includit contradictionem quod conservetur respectus praesentialitatis totius substantiae ad totam quantitatem illam quae ponitur accidens inhaerens sibi, et respectus praesentialitatis partis substantiae ad illam partem quantitatis sine respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad substantiam et sine respectu inhaerentiae partis quantitatis ad partem substantiae.

Quo posito, tota substantia est praesens toti quantitati et pars substantiae est praesens parti quantitatis sine respectu inhaerentiae; et per consequens sine hoc, quod substantia informetur quantitate. Et sic habebit

be present in the whole quantity and a part in a part.

They can not, I say, thus evade the issue. For according to the same the respect of presentiality of a substance to a quantity is prior to the respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance, and similarly the respect of presentiality of part of a substance to part of a quantity is prior to a respect of inherence of part of a quantity to a part of a substance. This can be proved through this, that it is impossible that there may be a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance without the respect of presentiality of a quantity to a substance, and consequently without the respect of presentiality of a substance to a quantity; for these mutual presentialities are by nature at the same time according to their principles. But the respect of presentiality can be without the respect of inherence; for a substance is present or can be in many which do not inform it nor inhere in it. But according to these writers a prior can be through divine power without a posterior; therefore, it involves no contradiction that there may be preserved a respect of presentiality of a whole substance to that whole quantity which is considered an accident inhering in it, and a respect of presentiality of a part of a substance to that part of a quantity without a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance and without a respect of inherence of a part of a quantity to a part of a substance.

If this is posited, a whole substance is present in a whole quantity and a part of a substance is present in a part of a quantity without a respect of inherence; and consequently without this, that a substance may be informed by a quantity. And so this substance will

ista substantia partem distantem a parte sine quantitate informante eam, et per consequens erit quanta sine quantitate informante eam; nulla enim res per se una habet partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte nisi sit quanta.

Item respectus praesentialitatis substantiae ad 'ubi' secundum istos non dependet ex respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad suum subiectum, quia destructo respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad istam substantiam, adhuc poterit ista substantia esse praesens loco, et eadem ratione respectus praesentialitatis partis substantiae ad partem loci non dependet ex respectu inhaerentiae partis quantitatis ad partem substantiae. Et tamen secundum eos omne, quod non dependet ab alio, potest conservari per divinam potentiam sine eo.

Poterit igitur respectus praesentialitatis totius substantiae ad totum locum et partis substantiae ad partem loci conservari sine respectu inhaerentiae quantitatis ad substantiam. Quo facto, substantia erit praesens toti loco et pars parti, et per consequens erit circumscriptive in loco et tamen non informabitur aliqua quantitate quae sit res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia; et ita substantia erit quanta sine quantitate tali.

have a part distinct from a part without a quantity informing it, and consequently there will be a quantum without a quantity informing it; for no thing per se one has part outside of part and part separate from part unless it be a quantum.

Again, the respect of presentiality of a substance in relation to 'ubi,' according to those writers, does not depend upon the respect of inherence of a quantity to its subject; for, if the respect of inherence of a quantity to this substance is destroyed, still this substance could be present in a place, and for the same reason the respect of presentiality of a part of a substance to a part of a place does not depend on the respect of inherence of a part of a quantity to a part of a substance. And yet according to those writers, everything, which does not depend upon another, can be preserved through divine power without it.

Therefore, the respect of presentiality of a whole substance to a whole place and of a part of a substance to a part of the place could be preserved without the respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance. When this is done, a substance will be present in the whole place and part in a part; and consequently will be circumscriptively in a place, and yet will not be informed by some quantity which may be an absolute thing really distinct from a substance; and so a substance will be a quantum without such a quantity.

CAPITULUM XXVIII

Quod substantia sit quanta per suas partes substantiales sine omni quantitate quae dicitur res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate

Restat post hoc ostendere quod non solum substantia potest esse quanta sine quantitate addita sibi, sed etiam quod substantia est quanta per suas partes substantiales sine omni quantitate quae sit alia res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate.

Quod primo persuadetur sic: frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; hoc enim est principium quod negari non debet, quod nulla pluralitas est ponenda nisi per rationem vel experientiam vel auctoritatem illius, qui non potest falli nec errare, potest convinci. Sed ex quo substantia potest esse quanta et similiter qualitas potest esse quanta sine tali quantitate distincta a substantia et qualitate. Nec per rationem nec per experientiam potest convinci, quod sit talis quantitas alia. Nec hoc invenitur expressum ab aliquo auctore qui non potest errare, quia non invenitur a Deo fuisse revelatum. Igitur non est necesse ponere talem quantitatem; et ita frustra poneretur; omnia enim, quae possunt salvari per talem rem, possunt salvari sine ea per hoc quod substantia habet partes substantiales distinctas realiter natas distare localiter, quae

CHAPTER XXVIII

That a substance may be a quantum through its substantial parts without every quantity which is called a thing really distinct from substance and quality

After this it remains to show that not only a substance can be a quantum without a quantity added to it, but also that a substance is a quantum through its substantial parts without every quantity which may be another absolute thing really distinct from a substance and a quality.

In the first place it is settled thus: that, which can be accomplished through fewer, is needlessly accomplished through more: for this is a principle which ought not to be denied, that no plurality ought to be posited, unless it can be demonstrated through reason or through experience or through the authority of that one who can not be deceived or err. But from this a substance can be a quantum and similarly a quality can be a quantum without such a quantity distinct from a substance and a quality. It can be demonstrated neither through reason nor through experience, that there may be another such quantity. Neither is this found expressed by any author who can not err; for it is not found to have been revealed by God. Therefore, it is not necessary to posit such a quantity; and so it would be posited needlessly; for all, which can be saved through such a thing, can be saved without it through this, that a substance has substantial parts really distinct created to be separate locally, which

partes tam substantiae quam qualitatum virtute causae efficientis et finalis, sicut in esse producuntur, ita fiunt distantes. Eadem enim virtute, qua diversae partes substantiae et qualitatum de non esse procedunt ad esse, etiam in distinctis locis capiunt esse. Et ideo, sicut nihil praeter causam efficientem, formalem, finalem, et materialem necessario requiritur nec prae-exigitur ad hoc, quod substantia et partes substantiae de non esse producantur ad esse, ita nihil praeter praedictas causas adquiritur necessario ad hoc, quod una pars substantiae sit extra aliam partem vel distans ab alia parte. Mirum enim videtur quod unum accidens posterius substantia et partibus eius posset facere unam partem substantiae esse extra aliam partem, et tamen causae essentiales rei non possent hoc facere sine accidente tali; non enim ad distantiam aliquarum rerum requiritur accidens tale, cum duae substantiae possint distare et si essent ab accidentibus omnibus separatae. Nec ad hoc, quod aliquae partes constituant aliquod totum, requiritur accidens tale, cum nulla videatur ratio quare partes priores naturaliter omni accidente non possunt constituere totum, cuius natae sunt esse partes sine accidente tali.

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod quantitas de genere 'accidentis' nec requiritur ad distantiam localem illarum quae natae sunt constituere unam substantiam, nec requiritur ad constitutionem totius, cum sit posterius toto et ita partes distantes possunt constituere

parts of the substance as well as of the qualities, as they are brought into being, so they become separate by virtue of an efficient and a final cause. For by the same virtue by which different parts of a substance and of qualities proceed from non-being to being, they also take on being in distinct places. And, indeed, as nothing is necessarily required aside from an efficient, formal, final, and material cause; nor is it previously demanded for this, that a substance and parts of a substance may be brought from non-being to being; so nothing aside from the previous causes is necessarily acquired for this, that one part of a substance be outside of another part or separate from another part. For it appears wonderful that one accident later than a substance and the parts of it might be able to make one part of a substance to be outside another part, and yet the essential causes of a thing would not be able to make this without such an accident; for such an accident is not required for a separation of some things, since two substances may be able to be separate, even if they were separated from all the accidents. And such an accident is not required for this, that some parts which may contribute some whole, since there may appear to be no reason why parts naturally prior to every accident can not constitute a whole, the parts of which were created to be without such an accident.

From all these statements it is gathered that a quantity of the genus 'accident' is neither required for the local separation of those which are created to constitute one substance; nor required for the constitution of the whole, since it may be later than the whole, and so separate parts can constitute another substance with-

aliam substantiam absque tali accidente. Ex quo patet quod omnia, quae possunt salvari posita tali quantitate, possunt sine ea aeque bene salvari. Ita enim salvabitur quod partes substantiae et qualitates informantes substantiam distant localiter, quod tam substantia quam qualitates sunt quantae quia habent partem extra partem sine tali quantitate per hoc, quod causae essentiales producunt rem substantialem et qualitatem et producunt partes substantiae et qualitatum in locis distinctis sicut si ponatur talis quantitas consequens substantiam iam productam. Quis enim prohiberet Deum producere unam substantiam vel qualitatem sine omni accidente distincto a substantia et qualitate; et quis prohiberet Deum ponere unam partem illius substantiae et qualitatis extra aliam absque dissolutione illius substantiae et qualitatis absque re alia absoluta distincta realiter, si possit hoc facere mediante tali re distincta? Hoc enim videtur nimis artare divinam potentiam dicere quod una re producta a Deo habente partes distantes realiter Deus non posset facere eas distare localiter, nisi dando eis rem novam vel nisi unitatem earum rumpat vel dissoluat.

Item quod substantia sit quanta per suas partes substantiales intrinsecas sibi, sic ostendo. Illud, quod per partes suas intrinsecas est in loco circumscriptive, per suas partes intrinsecas est quantum; quia ostensum est prius quod omne quod est circumscriptive in loco, est quantum. Omnis autem substantia materialis per suas partes substantiales est in loco circumscriptive; quia,

out such an accident. From this it is obvious that all things, which can be saved by the assumption of such a quantity, can be equally well saved without it. For it will be so saved that the parts of the substance and the qualities informing the substance are separate locally, and that the substance as well as the qualities are quanta; for they have part outside of part without such a quantity through this, that essential causes produce a substantial thing and a quality and produce parts of a substance and of qualities in distinct places, as if there be posited such a quantity following a substance already produced. For who could prevent God from producing one substance or quality without every accident distinct from substance and quality; and who could prevent God from placing one part of that substance and quality outside of another without the dissolution of that substance and quality without another absolute thing really distinct, if He be able to do this with such a distinct mediating thing? For this seems to limit too much the divine power to say that, although one thing having parts really distinct was produced by God, God could not be able to make them separate locally, except by giving to them a new thing or unless He break asunder or destroy the unity of them.

Again, that a substance may be a quantum through its substantial parts intrinsic in it, I show thus. That, which is circumscriptively in a place through its intrinsic parts, is a quantum through its intrinsic parts; for it was shown before that every thing, which is circumscriptively in a place, is a quantum. But every material substance is circumscriptively in a place through its substantial parts; for, as was shown be-

sicut ostensum est prius, omnis substantia materialis, quae est extensa, per suas partes essentiales est praesens in loco, ita quod tota substantia est praesens toti loco, et pars substantiae est praesens parti loci. Sed omne tale est circumscriptive in loco, et ita omnis talis substantia per suas partes sibi intrinsecas est quanta.

Nec valet dicere quod substantia non habet partes nisi per quantitatem quae est res distincta a substantia, nam substantia non dependet ab aliquo suo accidente, nec per consequens partes substantiae dependent a partibus accidentis. Si igitur quantitas sit accidens substantiae, partes substantiae non dependent nec a quantitate nec a partibus quantitatis, et ita substantia habet partes non per quantitatem. Quod confirmatur, nam per idem habet res 'esse' et 'esse distinctum'; per illud ergo per quod sunt partes substantiae, per illud etiam distinguuntur istae partes. Sed partes substantiae non sunt per quantitatem; igitur nec distinguuntur per quantitatem; non igitur substantia habet partes per quantitatem, quae est alia res a substantia.

Item si quantitas sit alia res a substantia, igitur non facit partem substantiae distare a parte substantiae, nisi sit causa efficiens vel finalis. Sed causalitas efficientis vel finalis faciens partes distare non excludit quin illa res per partes suas intrinsecas sibi sit quanta; tunc enim, cum Deus tamquam causa efficiens et finalis faciat partes cuiuscumque quantitatis distare, nulla

fore, every material substance, which is extended, is present in a place through its essential parts, so that a whole substance is present in a whole place, and a part of a substance is present in a part of a place. But any such is in a place circumscriptively, and so every such substance is a quantum through its parts intrinsic in it.

Nor is it sufficient to say that a substance does not have parts except through quantity which is a thing distinct from substance; for a substance does not depend on any accident of its own, and consequently the parts of a substance do not depend upon the parts of an accident. Therefore, if quantity may be an accident of substance, the parts of a substance do not depend either upon a quantity or upon parts of a quantity; and so substance does not have parts through quantity. Which conclusion is confirmed, for a thing has 'being' and 'being distinct' through the same; therefore, through that through which there are parts of a substance, through that those parts are also distinguished. But the parts of a substance are not through quantity; therefore, they are not distinguished through quantity; therefore, substance does not have parts through quantity, which is a thing other than substance.

Again, if quantity be a thing other than substance, then it does not make a part of a substance to be separate from a part of a substance, unless it be an efficient or final cause. But the causality of an efficient or final making parts to be separate does not prevent that thing from being a quantum through its parts intrinsic to it; for then, since God as an efficient and final cause may make the parts of any quantity at all

quantitas per partes suas esset 'quanta' nec 'habens partem extra partem.'

Ex quo patet quod quantumcumque substantiae illi, quae habet partem extra partem, esset addita una quantitas alia; adhuc illa substantia per rem ipsam et per partes suas intrinsecas esset quanta; sicut partes substantiae seipsis et per nihil aliud nisi per suas causas extrinsecas, puta, efficientem et finalem, distant localiter.

Nec sufficit dicere quod quantitas, quae est accidens, est causa formalis qua substantia est quanta, sicut albedo est causa formalis quare aliquid est album. Hoc non valet, quia ostensum est prius quod omnis res una numero habens partem distantem localiter vel situaliter a parte est quanta. Istud igitur, per quod res nec est una numero nec per quod partes rei distant situaliter, non est causa formalis quare illa res est quanta. Quantitas autem, quae est accidens, non est illud formaliter per quod substantia est una numero; per idem enim substantia est et est una numero. Nullum autem accidens est causa formalis quare suum subiectum est unum nec erit, igitur causa formalis quare subiectum suum est unum. Nec etiam quantitas est causa formalis per quam partes substantiae distant localiter, sicut aliquid est album per albedinem; tunc enim, sicut impossibile est quod aliqua sint alba sine albedine sive sint separata ad invicem et sint quaedem tota per se existentia sive sint partes constituentes aliquod totum, ita impossibile esset quod illae res, quae modo distant situaliter per quantitatem quae est accidens sicut corpus est

to be separate, no quantity could be 'quantum' or 'having part outside of part' through its parts.

From this it is obvious that no matter to what extent one other quantity might be added to that substance, which has part outside of part, that substance would still be a quantum through a thing itself and its intrinsic parts; as parts of a substance are locally separate from themselves and through nothing else except through their intrinsic causes, say, efficient and final.

Nor is it sufficient to say that quantity, which is an accident, is a formal cause by which a substance is a quantum, as whiteness is a formal cause why something is white. This does not obtain; for it was shown before that every thing one numerically having part separate locally or in situation from part is a quantum. Therefore this, through which a thing is neither one numerically nor through which parts of a thing are separate in situation, is not a formal cause why that thing is a quantum. But a quantity, which is an accident, is not that formally through which a substance is one numerically; for through the same a substance is and is one numerically. But no accident is a formal cause why its subject is or will not be; therefore, the formal cause why its subject is one. Nor, indeed, is quantity a formal cause through which the parts of substance are separate locally, as something is white through whiteness; for then as it is impossible that some may be white without whiteness, whether they be separate from one another and be certain wholes existing per se or may be parts constituting some whole, so it would be impossible that those things, which are merely separate in situation through quantity, which is an accident, as a body is white through

album per albedinem, distarent situaliter vel localiter sine tali quantitate; etiam si essent separata ad invicem et essent quanta tota non facientia unum totum, quod falsum est.

Possit enim omnipotentia Dei dividere primo lignum in duas partes et ponere unam illarum Romae et aliam hic, et postea separare illa ab omnibus accidentibus suis absolutis. Quo facto ista distarent localiter et tamen non haberent talem quantitatem, quia separata sunt ab illa per casum. Ex quo patet quod partes substantiae non distant per talem quantitatem, sicut corpus est album per albedinem.

whiteness, could be separate in situation or in place without such a quantity; even if they were mutually separate and were whole quanta not making one whole, which is false.

For the omnipotence of God may be able at first to divide a piece of wood into two parts and place one of them at Rome and the other here, and afterwards separate them from all their absolute accidents. When this has been done, they would be separate locally and yet would not have such a quantity; for they are separate from that per casum. From which it is obvious that parts of a substance are not separate through such a quantity, as a body is white through whiteness.

CAPITULUM XXIX

Probatur eadem conclusio, quae prius, per argumenta sumpta a dictis doctorum catholicorum

Superioribus rationibus adiciendae sunt aliquae aliae partim fundatae in dictis aliorum doctorum catholicorum, qui tamen ponunt talem quantitatem mediam inter substantiam et qualitatem. Dicit enim quidam doctor, quem probabilem reputo, quia nihil volo negare a Dei omnipotentia cum plus possit facere quam nos possumus cogitare vel intelligere, nisi videam evidentem contradictionem sequi. Dicit enim doctor ille, scilicet, Scotus, Libro Sententiarum, IV., Distinctione X., Quaestione IV., quod infinita Dei potentia posset conservare corpus Christi sub specie panis sacramentaliter absque hoc, quod in caelo vel alibi haberet esse localiter et circumscriptive. Ponatur igitur quod corpus Christi sit sub specie panis sacramentaliter et desinat esse in caelo localiter et nullibi incipiat esse localiter et circumscriptive. Quo facto quaero aut ista quantitas, quae prius erat distincta a substantia et qualitate, manet aut non manet, sed corrumpitur. Non potest dici quod illa quantitas est destructa; nam secundum illos ibidem absolutum non variatur propter variationem respectivi, et per consequens nec absolutum destruitur

CHAPTER XXIX

The same conclusion, which was stated before, is proved through arguments taken from the statements of Catholic doctors

In addition to the preceding reasons, some others must be added, based partly on the statements of other Catholic doctors, who, however, posit such a quantity intermediate between substance and quality. For a certain Doctor, whom I think reputable, says it; for I have no desire to detract anything from the omnipotence of God since He may be able to do more than we are able to think or understand, unless I may see that an evident contradiction follows. For that Doctor, namely, Scotus, says in Book IV. of the Sentences, Distinction X., Question IV., that the infinite power of God might be able to preserve sacramentally the body of Christ under the species of bread without this, that it could have being locally and circumscriptively in heaven or elsewhere. Therefore, let it be posited that the body of Christ may be sacramentally under the species and that it may cease to be in heaven locally and that it may begin to be nowhere locally and circumscriptively. When this has been done, I ask, whether this quantity, which was before distinct from substance and quality, remains or does not remain but is corrupted. It can not be said that that quantity is destroyed; for according to those writers in the same place an absolute is not altered by virtue of a variation of respective, and consequently an absolute thing is

propter variationem respectivi. 'Ubi' autem in caelo non est nisi respectus secundum eosdem. Igitur propter hoc quod corpus Christi cessat esse in caelo localiter, non oportet ponere quod aliqua res absoluta destruatur realiter. Remanet igitur omnis res absoluta quae prius erat, et ita remanet quantitas illa; cum igitur secundum eos illa substantia est quanta per illam quantitatem, sicut corpus est album per albedinem.

Sicut impossibile est et contradictionem includit quod aliquod corpus sit informatum albedine inhaerente sibi et tamen quod non sit album, ita impossibile est quod illa substantia sit informata illa quantitate inhaerente sibi, nisi sit quanta. Oporteret ergo istum dicere quod illud corpus Christi posito priori casu vere et realiter esset illa quantitate quantum.

Sed quod hoc non debeat concedi, persuadeo primo sic: illud, quod non habet partem distantem a parte, non est quantum. Sed posito priori casu substantia corporis Christi non habet partem distantem a parte; quia si sic, tunc illud corpus coexisteret speciei panis. Sequitur quod distinctae partes corporis coexistunt distinctis partibus illius speciei.

Probatio consequentiae; nam, si partes corporis Christi distant localiter, accipio illas duas partes, puta, A et B. Tunc de A quaero aut coexistit toti hostiae et cuilibet parti, aut coexistit alicui uni parti et non alii. Si dicas quod coexistit toti hostiae et cuilibet parti; eadem ratione B coexistit toti hostiae et cuilibet parti,

not destroyed by virtue of a variation of respective. But according to the same writers 'ubi' is not in heaven except as a respect. Therefore, it is not necessary to posit that some absolute thing may really be destroyed by virtue of this, that the body of Christ ceases to be in heaven locally. Therefore, every absolute thing, which was before, remains, and so that quantity remains; since, therefore, according to them that substance is a quantum through that quantity, as a body is white through whiteness.

As it is impossible and involves a contradiction, that any body may be informed by the whiteness inhering in it and yet that it may not be white; so it is impossible that that substance may be informed by that quantity inhering in it, unless it be a quantum. Therefore, it would be necessary to say this, that that body of Christ would truly and really be a quantum by that quantity, if the prior case is posited.

But that this ought not to be conceded, I am convinced, first, thus: that, which does not have part separate from part, is not a quantum. But, if the prior case is posited, the substance of the body of Christ does not have part separate from part; for, if so, then that body would coexist with the species of bread. It follows that distinct parts of a body coexists with distinct parts of that species.

It is the proof of consequence; for, if parts of the body of Christ are separate locally, I take those two parts, say, A and B. Then I ask concerning A, whether it coexists with the whole host and with each part, or whether it coexists with any one part and not another. If you say that it coexists with the whole host and with each part; for the same reason B co-

et per positum corpus Christi non est alibi quam sub specie panis. Igitur cuicumque coexistit una pars, eidem coexistit et alia, et per consequens non sunt distincta localiter. Si autem dicas quod A coexistit uni parti hostiae et non alteri, et B tunc coexisteret alteri parti et non illi, et ita distinctae partes corporis Christi coexisterent distinctis partibus speciei panis, quod falsum est; quia ex isto sequeretur quod non totum corpus Christi esset in qualibet parte hostiae, immo in nulla parte hostiae esset totum corpus Christi. Sequeretur etiam quod corpus Christi esset circumscriptive in loco, quae omnia falsa sunt. Relinquitur igitur quod illo casu posito corpus Christi nullibi haberet partem distantem situaliter a parte nec haberet partem extra partem, et per consequens non esset quantum, quod est propositum.

Sed ad illud et consimilia innuunt isti unam responsionem dicentes, quod positio, quae est differentia quantitatis, necessario est in quanto vel inest quanto continuo permanenti, et illam oportet salvare in proposito, quae scilicet dicit ordinem partium in toto.

Nec est enim bene intelligibile aliquod esse quantum dimensivum, quin sit signare in toto ordinem huius partis ad illam secundum quantitatem interiacentem. Positio autem, quae ponitur a quibusdam, praedicamentum aliud addit. Praesupposito enim ordine partium in toto ponit ultra ordinem partium ad locum seu

exists with the whole host and with each part; and through position the body of Christ is not elsewhere than under the species of bread. Therefore, with whatever one part coexists, with the same another part also coexists, and consequently they are not distinct locally. But if you say that A coexists with one part of the host and not with another, B would then also coexist with a second part and not with the former, and so distinct parts of the body of Christ would coexist with distinct parts of the species of bread, which is false; since from that it would follow that not the whole body of Christ would be in each part of the host; on the contrary the whole body of Christ would be in no part of the host. It would also follow that the body of Christ would be in a place circumscriptively, all of which are false. Therefore, it remains that, if that case is posited, the body of Christ would nowhere have part separate from part in situation, nor would it have part outside of part, and consequently could not be a quantum, which is the thesis.

But they suggest one response to that and similar arguments, when they say that position, which is a difference of quantity, necessarily is in a quantum or is in a quantum continuous and permanent; and it is necessary for that to be saved in a thesis, namely, which speaks of the order of the parts in a whole.

For it is not well understood that something is a measurable quantum, but that it may be to designate in a whole the order of this part in relation to another according to the intervening quantity. But position, which is posited by certain persons, adds another category. For, if the order of the parts in a whole is presupposed, it further posits an order of parts in re-

ad partes loci vel locantis. Hoc est certum, quod partes coextenduntur partibus sicut totum dicitur primo commensurari toti loco, in quo habet suum 'ubi,' ita quod 'positio' praedicamentum praesupponit 'positionem' differentiam quantitatis, et specificat 'ubi.' Et hanc positionem possibile est Deum separare a quanto manente prima positione non solum per negationem 'ubi,' sicut posset facere aliquod corpus extra universum et tunc non haberet istam secundam positionem quia non haberet aliquod continens, cuius partibus partes contenti commensurarentur. Sed posito etiam termino cui praesenti posset fieri commensuratio seu coextensio alteri corpori Christi. Possibile esset Deum salvare quantum et coexistentiam eius ad aliud quantum, et tamen sine ista coexistentia partium unius ad partes alterius quam dicit positio ista secunda.

Ista sunt subtiliter dicta, nullus tamen amator veritatis debet offendi si causa veritatis inquirendae et exercitii impugnentur. Si enim vera sunt, expedit audire obiectiones ut solvantur ut sic veritas clarius innotescat. Si falsa sunt, expedit ut convincantur. Quod autem ista responsio non sit sufficiens, potest persuaderi primo sic: si positio, quae est differentia quantitatis, dicit ordinem partium in toto et sufficiens est ad hoc, quod aliquod sit quantum; quaero qualis est iste ordo partium in toto; aut est ordo partium situalis ita quod una pars est inferior et alia superior, una ante et alia

lation to place or to parts of a place or locality. This is certain, that parts are coextended with parts, as a whole is said at first to be commensurate with the whole place, in which it has its 'ubi,' so that 'position' as a category presupposes 'position' as a difference of quantity and specifies 'ubi.' And it is possible for God to separate this position from a quantity remaining in the first position not only through the negation of 'ubi,' as He would be able to make some body outside of the universe, and then it could not have this second position; for it would not have some thing continuous with whose parts the parts contained would be commensurate. But even if a terminus is posited to that which is present, a commensuration or coextension might be able to be made with another body of Christ. It would be possible for God to save a quantum and the coexistence of it in relation to another quantum; and yet without this coexistence of the parts of one in relation to the parts of another which this second position says.

These points have been subtly stated, yet no lover of truth ought to be offended if they are assailed for the cause of seeking the truth and of training. For, if they are true, it is profitable to hear objections in order that they may be explained that the truth may thus be more clearly known. If they are false, it is expedient that they be refuted. But, that this response may not be sufficient, it can in the first place be proved thus: if position, which is a difference of quantity, indicates the order of parts in a whole and is sufficient for this, that something may be a quantum; I ask, of what kind is this order of parts in the whole; whether it is an order of parts situated so that one part is lower

retro, una versus orientem et alia versus occidentem; aut est ordo perfectionis quia scilicet una pars sit perfectior et alia imperfectior; aut est ordo totius et partis sicut oculus est pars capitis; aut est ordo causalitatis et una pars est causa alterius; aut est ordo originis vel naturae quia scilicet una pars prius natura producitur et est prius in rerum natura quam alia. Alio enim modo, ut videtur, potest intelligi quod sit ordo partium in toto; si autem ordo partium in toto qui importatur per positionem quae est differentia quantitatis.

Sit primus ordo, scilicet, situalis. Manifestum est quod ille non potest esse sine locali distantia partium, et ita numquam est aliquid quantum nisi partes situaliter distent. Cum igitur posito primo casu partes corporis Christi non distent situaliter, corpus Christi illo concesso non erit quantum. Aliis autem modis non potest ordo partium in toto intelligi, qui est positio quae est differentia quantitatis; nam quilibet talis ordo ita poterit competere substantiae corporis Christi si tota substantia corporis Christi esset separata ab omni quantitate, quod est Deo possibile facere secundum illos, sicut quando est coniuncta cum quantitate. Conservata enim tota substantia corporis Christi absque hoc, quod sit quanta, ita esset una pars substantiae perfectior alia sicut nunc est; non plus enim est nunc una

and another higher, one part before and another behind, one towards the East, another towards the West; or is it an order of perfection, for surely one part may be more perfect and another more imperfect; or is it an order of whole and of part, as the eye is part of the head; or is it an order of causality, and one part is the cause of another; or is it an order of origin or of nature; for surely one part prior by nature is produced and is in the nature of things prior to another. For in another mode, as it appears, it can be understood that there may be an order of parts in a whole; if however an order of parts in a whole which is occasioned through position, which is a difference of quantity.

Let it be the first order; namely, situal. It is manifest that that order can not be without local separation of parts, and so there never is any quantum unless the parts be separate in situation. Since, therefore, if the first case is posited, the parts of the body of Christ may not be separate in situation; the body of Christ will not be a quantum if that is conceded. But the order of parts in a whole, which is position which is a difference of quantity, can not be understood by other modes; for any such order could be so suitable to the substance of the body of Christ, if the whole substance of the body of Christ were separate from an entire quantity, which it is possible for God to do according to those writers, as when it is joined with a quantity. For if the whole substance of the body of Christ is preserved without this, that it be a quantum; so there would be one part of a substance more perfect than another, as it now is; for one part is not now any more a part of another, nor is one part any more

pars pars alterius, nec plus est una pars causa alterius ubi prior natura alia quam esset tunc; et ita patet quod nullus ordo partium in toto potest competere partibus substantiae quando est coniuncta quantitati, quin potest eis competere quando non est coniuncta quantitati praeter illum ordinem qui est situalis, et ita solus ordo partium situalis sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit quantum. Talis autem ordo partium requirit distantiam partium localem, et per consequens nihil est quantum continuum et permanens, nisi subiectum habeat partes distantes situaliter.

Item omne quantum situatum est longum; sed nullum 'longum' est sine distantia locali partium vel situali. Si igitur corpus Christi priori casu posito sit quantum, oportet quod sit longum; et per consequens una pars distabit ab alia et una erit extra aliam, et non est verum retento primo casu.

Item omne quantum est extensum sed nihil est extensum, nisi una pars distet ab alia et sit extra aliam; non enim ad extensionem sufficit praesentia rei alicui quanto, tunc enim anima intellectiva esset quanta cum coexistat et sit praesens toti corpori et cuilibet parti eius. Constat itaque quod, si corpus Christi esset quantum in sacramento altaris, retento primo casu, haberet partem extra partem quia vere esset extensum et ita haberet positionem quae dicit ordinem partium in loco.

Item omne quantum continuum et permanens finitum est figuratum, ad figuram autem requiritur ordo partium in loco, si sit praesens loco; nec sufficit aliquis

the cause of another when more prior by nature than another would then be; and so it is obvious that no order of parts in a whole can be suitable to the parts of a substance when it is joined with a quantity without its being able to be suitable to them when it is not conjoined with a quantity aside from that order which is situal; and so a situal order of parts alone suffices for this, that something may be a quantum. But such an order of parts requires local separation of parts, and consequently nothing is a quantum continuous and permanent, unless it have parts separate in situation.

Again, every situate quantum is long; but no 'long' is without local or situal separation of parts. If, therefore, the body of Christ be a quantum when the prior case is posited, it is necessary that it be long; and consequently one part will be separate from another and one will be outside of another, and it is not true if the first case is held.

Again, every quantum is extended, but nothing is extended, unless one part be separate from another and be outside of another; for the presence of a thing in some quantum is not sufficient for extension, for then the rational soul would be a quantum since it may coexist and be present in the entire body and in each part of it. And so it is well known that, if the body of Christ were a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, if the first case is held, it would have part outside of part, since it would truly be extended and so would have position which indicates the order of parts in a place.

Again, every finite quantum continuous and permanent has form; but an order of parts in a place is required for form, if it be present in a place; nor does

alius ordo partium in toto ad figuram, quod patet ex hoc; nam facta sola mutatione locali partium possibile est figuram mutari. Si enim omnes partes humani corporis mutarentur localiter ita quod manus, ita quod venter poneretur super caput vel pedes super ventrem vel fieret aliqua talis mutatio localis partium; manifestum est quod mutaretur figura, et tamen non esset nisi alius ordo partium in loco vel aliqua diversa positio situalis requiritur. Et ita manifeste patet quod ordo partium situalis requiritur ad figuram. Unde, si partes non distent localiter, manifestum est quod non est figura ibi. Si enim Deus per suam omnipotentiam crearet de novo substantiam ligni cum omnibus suis accidentibus absolutis sub specie panis absque hoc, quod alibi esset localiter, quod est Deo possibile secundum ipsos; cuius quaeso figurae esset illud lignum. Non potest assignari ratio quare plus sit quadratum quam triangulare vel rotundum necque plus potest poni pedalis quantitatis quam bipedalis, cum possit rarefieri et condensari et aliquando esse maioris et aliquando minoris quantitatis. Nec posset poni quod illud lignum esset rarum vel densum cum non posset dici quod partes propinque vel non propinque iacerent, cum tamen secundum sententiam sapientis rarum sit illud cuius partes remote iacent.

Item corpus homogenium vere est quantum et per consequens vere habet positionem quae est differentia quantitatis. Sed manifestum est quod partium homogeniarum nullus est ordo nisi situalis. Circumscripto

any other order of parts in a whole suffice for form, which is obvious from this; for it is possible for form to be changed if a local change alone of parts is made. For if all the parts of the human body were changed locally so that the hand, or so that the stomach could be placed above the head or the feet above the stomach or any such local change of parts could be made, it is manifest that the form would be changed; and yet it could not be unless another order of parts in a place or some diverse situal position is required. And so it is manifestly obvious that a situal order of parts is required for form. Whence, if parts may not be separate locally, it is manifest that form is not there. For if God could through His own omnipotence create anew the substance of wood with all its absolute accidents under the species of bread without this, that it would be elsewhere locally, which is possible for God according to those writers; I ask of what form would that wood be. For no reason can be assigned why it may be square more than triangular or round, and a foot of quantity can not be posited any more than two feet, since it may be able to be rarefied and condensed, and sometimes be of a greater quantity and sometimes of a less quantity. Nor could it be able to be posited that that wood would be rare or dense, since it would not be able to be said that the parts would lie near or not near; although however according to the opinion of the wise, that may be rare whose parts lie remote.

Again, a homogeneous body is truly a quantum and consequently truly has position which is a difference of quantity. But it is manifest that there is no order of homogeneous parts except situal. For, if a situal

enim ordine partium talium situali nulla poterit esse prior alia nec una posterior alia cum omnino sint eiusdem rationis, non igitur alia est positio situalis ab illa, quae est ordo partium in loco vel quae est ordo partium situalis, et requiritur ad hoc, quod aliquid sit realiter quantum. Unde qui dicit quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit quantum, sufficit quidam ordo partium in toto qui non est ordo partium situalis. Oportet exprimere qualis sit ordo ille partium; et videtur quod nullus poterit assignari quin possunt esse secundum eos inter substantiales partes circumscripta quantitate tali.

Ex praedictis colligitur quod, si corpus Christi esset praecise sub specie panis sacramentaliter et nullibi localiter et circumscriptive, non esset quantum aliqua quantitate distincta a substantia et qualitate. Si tamen vocetur quantum omne unum numero habens partes distinctas realiter natas distare localiter et natas produci ab agente naturali in distinctis locis, potest concedi quod illo casu posito corpus Christi esset quantum.

Item per principia praedictorum ostendo quod substantia materialis per suas partes substantiales est quanta. Nam secundum eos sicut tota substantia est prior tota quantitate, ita partes substantiae sunt priores partibus quantitatis; prius igitur sunt partes substantiae quam partes quantitatis. Tunc quaero aut in illo priori sunt in eodem loco aut in distinctis locis. Non in

order of such parts is circumscribed, no part could be prior to another nor one part after another, since they may be entirely of the same ground; therefore, a situal position is not other than that, which is the order of parts in a place or which is a situal order of parts, and is required for this, that something may really be a quantum. Whence, he, who says that for this, that something may be a quantum, a certain order of parts in a whole is sufficient, which is not a situal order of parts. It is necessary, to indicate of what sort that order of parts may be; and it appears that no order could be assigned but that according to those they can be among the substantial parts, after such a quantity is circumscribed.

From the previous statements it is gathered that, if the body of Christ were precisely under the species of bread sacramentally and nowhere else locally and circumscriptively, it would not be a quantum by any quantity distinct from substance and quality. If however everything one numerically, having parts really distinct, created to be separate locally and created to be produced by a natural agent in distinct places, be called a quantum; it can be conceded that, the body of Christ would be a quantum if that case is posited.

Again, I intend to show through the principles of those previously mentioned, that material substance is quantum through its substantial parts. For according to those writers as a whole substance is prior to a whole quantity, so the parts of a substance are prior to the parts of a quantity; therefore, the parts of a substance are before the parts of a quantity. Then I ask; whether they are in that prior in the same place or in distinct places. They are not in the same place, for

eodem loco, quia non plus in uno quam in alio; igitur in illo priori sunt in distinctis locis; sed substantia habens partes existentes in distinctis locis circumscribitur loco; substantia igitur in illo priori circumscribitur loco et per consequens in illo priori est quanta et ita substantia per seipsam et per partes suas intrinsecas est quanta.

Item omne, quod per seipsum et per partes suas intrinsecas substantiales circumscribitur loco, per illud idem est quantum. Substantia autem materialis per seipsam et per partes intrinsecas circumscribitur loco, quod patet ex principiis eorum; nam circumscriptio passiva locati secundum eos non est nisi quidam respectus. Respectus autem variatur ad variationem fundamenti, quod est terminus, secundum sic opinantes. Cum igitur substantia et quantitas distinguantur realiter, 'circumscriptio passiva qua circumscribitur substantia' et 'circumscriptio passiva qua circumscribitur quantitas' erunt distinctae; et ita alia circumscriptione passiva est substantia in loco et alia quantitas; et per consequens substantia seipsa et partibus suis substantialibus circumscribitur fundamentaliter loco et circumscriptione propria formaliter circumscribitur loco. Sed haec duo omnibus aliis circumscriptis sufficiunt ad hoc quod aliquid sit quantum; igitur substantia sine quantitate absoluta distincta realiter est quanta.

Item alia est distantia localis unius partis substantiae ab alia parte substantiae et alia est distantia unius partis quantitatis ab alia parte quantitatis; quia ex quo

they are not more in one place than in another; therefore, in that prior they are in distinct places; but a substance having parts existing in distinct places will be circumscribed in a place; therefore, a substance in that prior is circumscribed in a place, and consequently is a quantum in that prior and so a substance is a quantum through itself and through its intrinsic parts.

Again, everything, which is circumscribed in a place through itself and through its intrinsic substantial parts, through that same is a quantum. But a material substance is circumscribed in a place through itself and through its intrinsic parts, which is obvious from the principles of those writers; for according to them there is not a passive circumscription of location except a certain respect. But according to those holding such an opinion, a respect is altered according to a variation of a fundament which is a terminus. Therefore, since substance and quantity may really be distinguished, 'a passive circumscription, by which substance is circumscribed,' and 'a passive circumscription by which a quantity is circumscribed,' will be distinct; and so a substance is in a place by one passive circumscription, and quantity by another; and consequently substance is fundamentally circumscribed in a place by itself and its substantial parts and is formally circumscribed in a place by a proper circumscription. But, when all the others are circumscribed, these two are sufficient for this, that something may be quantum; therefore, substance is a quantum without an absolute quantity really distinct.

Again, there is one local distance of one part of a substance from one part of a substance and there is another distance of one part of a quantity from an-

fundamentum et terminus sunt distincta fundamenta unius respectus et alterius secundum eos. Oportet quod respectus distinguantur, istae igitur distantiae distinguuntur. Sed distantia localis partium constituentium aliquod totum non potest esse sine quantitate; igitur cum prius partes substantiae distent localiter quam partes quantitatis, sicut prius sunt, prius erit substantia quanta quam illa quantitas alia ponatur in esse.

Ex praemissis itaque multisque aliis, quae propter brevitatem obmitto, posset alicui videri quod quantitas non est nisi extrapositio partium seu distantia localis seu situalis partium facientium unum totum ad quam extrapositionem seu distantiam localem seu situalem partium non requiruntur nisi partes illae quae distant, et causae essentiales intrinsecae, si habeant causas intrinsecas, et causae extrinsecae, puta, efficiens et finalis; et ita per consequens partes substantiae facientes unum possunt distare situaliter et una esse extra aliam virtute suarum causarum naturalium.

Quantitas autem, quae est alia res absoluta a substantia, non est causa nec intrinseca nec extrinseca illarum partium; propter quod ad illam extrapositionem seu distantiam situalem partium non requiritur quantitas talis.

Unde ex principiis multorum potest sic argui: ad existentiam realem respectus fundamentum et terminus sufficiunt et causae extrinsecae; secundum istos autem distantia situalis partium sive extrapositio partium substantiae ultra ipsas partes non addit respectum, qui non

other part of a quantity; for from this fundament and terminus are distinct fundaments of one respect and of another respect according to them. It is necessary that respects be distinguished, therefore, these distances are distinguished. But the local distance of parts constituting any whole can not be without a quantity; therefore, since the parts of a substance may be separate locally before the parts of a quantity, as they are before; the substance will be a quantum before that other quantity may be posited in being.

And so from the arguments advanced and from others which I omit by virtue of brevity, it would seem to anyone that there is not a quantity except the extraposition of parts or the local or situal distance of parts making one whole for which extraposition, whether local or situal distance of parts, parts are not required, except those which are separate, and essential intrinsic causes, if they have intrinsic causes, and extrinsic causes; say, efficient and final; and so consequently the parts of a substance making one can be separate in situation and one can be outside of another by virtue of its natural causes.

But quantity, which is an absolute thing other than substance, is neither an intrinsic nor an extrinsic cause of those parts; by virtue of which such a quantity is not required for that extraposition or situal distance of parts.

Whence, from the principles of many writers it can be argued thus: respect, fundament, and terminus suffice for real existence, and extrinsic causes; but according to these situal distance of parts or extraposition of parts of a substance beyond the parts themselves does not add a respect, which it does not have,

habet, pro fundamento vel termino, nisi illas partes substantiae. Positis igitur ipsis partibus substantiae et causis extrinsecis facientibus ipsas distare, sufficienter ponetur ille respectus. Si ergo requiritur ad illam distantiam partium substantiae alia quantitas quae sit alia res a substantia, illa quantitas vel erit fundamentum vel terminus illius respectus quod non potest dari, sicut ostensum est prius, vel est causa extrinseca illius respectus et per consequens sine ea potest poni ille respectus. Cum quicquid potest Deus mediante causa secunda extrinseca, potest Deus immediate per se; sine igitur omni tali quantitate distincta potest poni illa extrapositio seu distantia situalis partium substantialium. Sed posita extrapositione seu distantia locali partium vel situali habetur quantitas; quia habetur aliquod totum habens partem extra partem, igitur sine quantitate tali posset esse quantitas, et ita videtur omnino superfluere quantitas alia a substantia et qualitate.

Et multa praecedentia, per quae probatum est quod substantia potest esse quanta sine quantitate alia a substantia, possunt applicari ad probandum quod quantitas potest esse quanta sine quantitate alia, quorum pertractationem causa brevitatis transeo.

Ex omnibus tamen praedictis elici potest quod nulla est necessitas ponendi quantitatem aliam a substantia et qualitate; quia ad hoc, quod tam substantia quam qualitas sit quanta, sufficit quod virtute causarum essentialium producantur substantia et qualitates et quod

in place of fundament and terminus, except those parts of the substance. Therefore, when the parts themselves of substance and the extrinsic causes which make them to be separate are assumed, that respect will be sufficiently posited. Therefore, if there is required for that distance of parts of a substance another quantity, which may be a thing other than a substance, that quantity either will be a fundament or a terminus of that respect; which can not be granted, as has been shown before, or it is the extrinsic cause of that respect, and consequently without it that respect can be posited. Since whatever God can do by a mediating and extrinsic secondary cause, God can accomplish immediately per se; therefore, without any such distinct quantity that extraposition or situal distance of substantial parts can be posited. But when the extraposition or local or situal separation of parts is posited, it is considered quantity; for it is considered some whole having part outside of part; therefore, without such a quantity there might be able to be a quantity; and so a quantity other than a substance and a quality seems to be entirely superfluous.

And many of the preceding arguments, through which it was proved that substance can be a quantum without a quantity other than substance, can be employed to prove that quantity can be a quantum without another quantity; the discussion of which I pass over for the sake of brevity.

Yet from the previous arguments it can be deduced that there is no necessity for positing a quantity other than substance and quality; because for this, that substance as well as quality may be a quantum, it suffices that substance and qualities be produced by virtue

partes earum virtute earundem causarum sine cuiuslibet alterius productione in locis distinctis producantur, sive quod una pars extra aliam capiat esse. Non enim videtur alia res requiri ad hoc, quod una pars substantiae vel qualitatis extra aliam capiat esse, nisi sit causa eius intrinseca vel extrinseca. Quantitas autem talis non potest poni causa intrinseca nec extrinseca substantiae vel qualitatis; et ita ad hoc, quod una pars producatur in esse extra aliam, talis quantitas non requiritur, frustra igitur ponitur.

of essential causes, and that parts of these are produced in distinct places by virtue of the same causes without the production of any other, or that one part may take on being outside of another. For another thing does not seem to be required for this, that one part of a substance or of a quality may take on being outside of another, unless it be an intrinsic or extrinsic cause of it. But such a quantity can not be posited as an intrinsic or extrinsic cause of substance or of quality; and so for this, that one part may be brought into being outside of another, such a quantity is not required; therefore, it is needlessly posited.

CAPITULUM XXX

De obiectionibus contra praedicta

Ad maiorem explanationem praedictorum sunt obiectiones aliquae proponendae. Quod enim omnis quantitas sit alia res a substantia, a diversis diversae rationes tam theologicae quam philosophicae adducuntur, de quibus recitabo paucas; quia, si illae potuerunt solvi, reliquae faciliter dissolverentur. Arguitur autem sic: si aliqua quantitas non esset alia res absoluta a substantia, sicut tunc substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, sic similiter aliqua quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi.

Item sicut tunc panis convertitur in corpus Christi, ita substantia panis convertetur in corpus Christi et per consequens quantitas corporis Christi virtute sacramenti incipiet esse sub specie panis; ex quo sequitur quod virtute conversionis corpus Christi esset quantum et localiter ac circumscriptive in sacramento altaris, quod falsum est.

Item si aliqua quantitas non esset res distincta a substantia, non maneret quantitas in sacramento altaris sicut non manet ibi substantia panis, quod falsum est.

Item nullum accidens est idem realiter cum substantia; omnis autem quantitas accidens est, quod esse de intentione sanctorum et philosophorum eorum testi-

CHAPTER XXX

Concerning objections contrary to the previous statements

For a fuller explanation of the preceding statement some objections must be raised. For from various sources diverse reasons theological as well as philosophical, of which I shall cite a few, are adduced to prove that every quantity may be a thing other than substance; for, if they could be solved, the remaining reasons would easily be refuted. But it is argued thus: if any quantity could not be an absolute thing other than a substance, then as the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so similarly some quantity is converted into the body of Christ.

Again, as the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so the substance of the bread will be converted into the body of Christ and consequently the quantity of the body of Christ will begin to be under the species of bread by virtue of the sacrament; from which it follows that the body of Christ would be a quantum both locally and circumscriptively in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of conversion; which is false.

Again, if any quantity were not a thing distinct from substance, a quantity would not remain in the sacrament of the altar, as the substance of the bread does not remain there, which is false.

Again, no accident is really the same as a substance; but every quantity is an accident, which is proved to be in accordance with the intention of the Saints and the philosophers by their testimony. For the blessed

moniis approbatur. Dicit enim beatus Augustinus, De Trinitate V., Capitulo V.: "In rebus creatis atque in mutabilibus, quod non secundum substantiam dicitur restat ut secundum accidens dicatur: omnia enim accidunt eis quae vel amitti possunt vel minui, et magnitudines et qualitates; et quod sequitur ad aliquid sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates, et si qua huiusmodi, et situs et habitus, et locus et tempora."

Item idem in eodem Libro, Capitulo X.: "In rebus," inquit, "quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt, quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnum esse; sicut magna domus, magnus mons, magnus animus; in his igitur rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab eadem magnitudine magnum est; et prorsus non hoc est magnitudo quod est magna domus."

Item Aristoteles ponit novem praedicamenta accidentium inter quae quantitatem connumerat. Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod magnitudo est accidens et per consequens est res distincta a substantia.

Item hoc, quod est contra communem opinionem doctorum, non est igitur tamquam catholicum recipiendum. Item est contra experientiam; quia cum substantia corporea dividatur absque conversione alicuius rei in illam, efficitur minoris quantitatis absque alicuius suae partis amissione, quod esse non posset si quantitas alia non esset res a substantia distincta realiter.

Item in diversis substantiis differentibus specie est eadem quantitas specie; non enim est alia longitudo

Augustine says in the De Trinitate, Book V., Chapter V.: "In created and also in changeable things it remains that that, which is not said according to substance, may be said according to accident; for all are accidental to those, which can be either lost or diminished, both magnitudes and qualities; and that which follows in relation to anything, as friendships, relationships, services, likenesses, equalities, and if anything else of the kind; both situations and conditions, both place and times."

Again, the same writer in the same book in Chapter X.: "In things," he says, "which are great by participation of magnitude, to which it is one thing to be, another to be great; as a great house, a great mountain, a great mind; in these things, therefore, magnitude is one thing, that which is great from the same magnitude is another; and certainly this, which is a great house, is not magnitude."

Again, Aristotle posits nine categories as accidents, among which he enumerates quantity. From all of these statements it follows that magnitude is an accident and consequently it is a thing distinct from substance.

Again, this, which is contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors, is not, therefore, to be received as if a Catholic opinion. It is also contrary to experience; for, since a corporeal substance may be divided without the conversion of anything into that, it is effected of a less quantity without the loss of any of its part; which could not be, if quantity were not another thing really distinct from substance.

Again, in diverse substances differing in species there is a quantity the same in species; for there is

seu latitudo specie in pugillo aëris et ignis, quod non esset verum si longitudo non esset distincta realiter a substantia. Item quod nulla quantitas sit eadem realiter cum qualitate, ostenditur sic; nam secundum philosophum qualitas non est quanta nisi per accidens; sed si qualitas esset eadem cum quantitate realiter, tunc per se sine addito esset quanta.

Item impossibile est naturaliter unum corpus, quod est quantitas, esse simul cum alio corpore quod est quantitas; quia dimensiones mutuo se expellunt. Sed qualitas simul est cum substantia. Si igitur aliqua quantitas esset indistincta realiter a qualitate et aliqua esset indistincta realiter a substantia, duae quantitates essent naturaliter simul, et ita duae soliditates seu profunditates et duae longitudines et duae latitudines essent simul; immo multo plures quam duae; quia qua ratione albedo haberet suam propriam quantitatem, eadem ratione et sapor haberet suam, et calor suam, et humiditas suam, et siccitas suam; et sic de aliis. Et ita tot essent corpora longa, lata et profunda quot qualitates sunt simul, et ita in sacramento altaris multa corpora essent simul. Quo concesso potest quaeri quomodo illae qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris manent simul, quandocumque moventur. Ex quo nulla illarum est in alia tamquam in subiecto, nec omnes sunt in aliquo uno subiecto, si quantitas non sit unica et subiectum earum; sic igitur patet quod propter praedicta et alia oportet ponere quantitatem differentem a substantia et qualitate.

not a longitude or a latitude other than species in a handful of air and of fire; which would not be true if longitude were not really distinct from substance. It is also thus shown that no quantity may really be the same as quality; for according to the philosopher, quality is not a quantum except through accident; but if quality were really the same as quantity, then it would be a quantum per se without addition.

Again, it is naturally impossible for one body, which is a quantity, to be at the same time with another body which is quantity; for dimensions mutually expel one another. But quality is at the same time with a substance. Therefore, if some quantity were really not distinct from quality and some quantity were really distinct from substance, two quantities would naturally be at the same time, and so two solidities or depths, and two longitudes and two latitudes would be at the same time; indeed many more than two; since for whatever reason whiteness would have its proper quantity, for the same reason taste would have its own, and heat its own, and humidity its own, and dryness its own; and thus of others. And so as many bodies would be long, wide, and thick as there are qualities at the same time, and so in the sacrament of the altar there would be many bodies at the same time. If this is conceded, it is possible to inquire how those qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar remain at the same time, whenever they are moved. From this none of them is in another as if in a subject, nor are all in any one subject, if quantity may not be the only one and the subject of them; so then it is obvious that by virtue of the preceding and other arguments, it is necessary to posit a quantity differing from substance and quality.

CAPITULUM XXXI

In quo ponuntur responsiones ad praedictas obiectiones

Quod autem omnes istae rationes non communicant sufficienter quod sit aliqua quantitas distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, nunc restat ostendere.

Quando enim primo deducitur ad hoc inconveniens, quod aliqua quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi, primo potest dici quod oppositum illius in sacra scriptura non invenitur; numquam enim legi nec in scripturis sacris nec in iure canonico nec in aliquo scripto authentico quod quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi. Utrum enim quantitas convertatur in corpus Christi vel non convertatur, nullam faciunt penitus mentionem, sicut nec utrum quantum convertatur in corpus Christi; quamvis aliqui, quos negare licitum est quia mutuo se reprobant, asserant quod quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi.

Secundo, etiam quamvis inveniretur quod quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi, non oporteret concedere quod quantitas est alia res a qualitate et substantia, modus enim significandi impedire posset talem praedicationem 'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi' sicut secundum multos. Licet 'humanitas' non sit res distincta ab 'homine' realiter; tamen concederetur ista, 'homo est albus,' et negatur ista, 'humanitas est alba';

CHAPTER XXXI

In which replies are posited to the previous objections

But it now remains to show that all these reasons do not sufficiently agree that there may be some quantity really distinct from substance and quality.

For when it is first deduced to this inconsistency, that some quantity is converted into the body of Christ, it can first be said that the opposite of that is not found in sacred scripture; for I have never read either in the Sacred Scriptures or in the canonical law or in any authorized work that quantity is not converted into the body of Christ. For they make no mention at all whether a quantity may be converted into the body of Christ or may not be converted, as they make no mention whether a quantum may be converted into the body of Christ; although some, whom one is permitted to contradict because they mutually condemn one another, may assert that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.

In the second place, although it might be found that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ, it would not be necessary to concede that quantity is a thing other than quality and substance; for the mode of signification might be able to preclude such a predication, 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ,' as according to many writers. Although 'humanity' may not be a thing really distinct from 'man'; yet this could be conceded, 'man is white,' and this may be denied, 'humanity is white'; not be-

non quia 'humanitas' sit aliqua res distincta realiter ab 'homine,' sed quia alium modum significandi, scilicet, grammaticalem vel logicalem habet hoc nomen 'humanitas' et hoc nomen 'homo.' Qualiter autem sit possibile quod praedicatio sit falsa propter diversos modos significandi 'grammaticales' vel 'logicales' sine distinctione rerum importatarum, alibi debet ostendi.

Tertio, posset dici quod quantumcumque haec concedetur, quod 'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi'; hoc tamen accidit quod haec sit vera, 'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi'; hac existente vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi.' Et frequenter ab auctoribus illa negantur quae per accidens sunt; quamvis de virtute significationis negari non debeant. Unde quantumcumque aliqua quantitas non sit res distincta realiter a substantia panis, ista tamen duo stant simul: 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' et 'nulla quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi.' Sicut secundum multos et solemnes doctores catholicos 'fundamentum' et 'relatio' non sunt res distinctae et per consequens 'albedo' et 'similitudo' non sunt res distinctae realiter, tamen ista duo stant simul: 'albedo est,' et 'similitudo non est.' Qualiter autem, non obstante quod aliqua quantitas non sit res realiter distincta a substantia, potest haec esse vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' hac existente falsa, 'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi,' potest sic declarari.

cause 'humanity' may be some thing really distinct from 'man,' but because this name 'humanity' and this name 'man' have another mode of signification; namely, grammatical or logical. For it ought to be shown elsewhere how possible it may be that predication may be false, without a distinction of the things introduced by virtue of diverse modes of signifying 'gramaticales' or 'logicales.'

In the third place, it might be able to be said that no matter how much this will be conceded, that 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ'; yet this happens, that this may be true, 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ'; while this appears true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ.' And frequently those may be denied by writers, which are through accident; although according to the virtue of signification they may not be under obligation to deny them. Wherefore, no matter how much some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, yet these two stand at the same time: 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' and 'no quantity is converted into the body of Christ.' Just as according to many writers and appointed Catholic doctors 'fundament' and 'relation' are not distinct things and consequently 'whiteness' and 'likeness' are not things really distinct; yet these two stand at the same time: 'whiteness is,' and 'likeness is not.' But, notwithstanding that some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from substance, how can this be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' while this appears false, 'quantity is converted into the body of Christ,' can be explained thus. Although some quan-

Quamvis quantitas aliqua non sit alia res a substantia, tamen hoc nomen 'quantitas' connotat unam partem esse extra aliam sive unam partem distare ab alia parte. Hoc autem nomen 'substantia' non connotat unam partem distare ab alia parte situaliter; et propter quod non video quod includit contradictionem, quod haec sit vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' hac existente falsa, 'substantia panis habens partem extra partem vel distantem a parte convertitur in corpus Christi.' Immo potest esse falsa, alia existente vera, quia potest implicare falsum, scillicet, 'unam partem panis distare situaliter ab alia parte.'

Unde si Deus, qui omnia potest, faceret aliquam substantiam panis esse alicubi praecise illo modo, quo corpus Christi est sub specie panis, ita quod illa substantia illius panis nullibi esset localiter nec circumscriptive; tunc esset haec vera, 'ista res est substantia,' et haec falsa, 'ista res est substantia habens partem distantem a parte.' Et ita, si tunc illam substantiam converteret Deus in corpus Christi quod posse fieri a Deo non reputo a Christiano debere negari, haec esset vera, 'substantia panis est conversa in corpus Christi,' et haec falsa propter falsam implicationem, 'substantia panis habens partem distantem a parte situaliter convertebatur in corpus Christi'; et per consequens eius opposita est vera, 'substantia panis habens partem distantem a parte non convertebatur in corpus Christi.' Ex qua sequitur ista, 'quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi.' Patet ergo quod, quamvis sit ista modo

tity may not be a thing other than substance, yet this name 'quantity' connotes that one part is outside of another or that one part is separate from another part. But this name 'substance' does not connote that one part is separate in situation from another part; and by virtue of which I do not see that it involves a contradiction that this may be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' while this appears false, 'the substance of the bread having part outside of part or separate from part is converted into the body of Christ.' On the contrary, it can be false, while another appears true; for it can implicate a fallacy; namely, 'one part of the bread is separate in situation from another part.'

Whence, if God, who can make all things, should make some substance of bread to be somewhere precisely in that mode, in which the body of Christ is under the species of bread, so that that substance of that bread would be nowhere locally or circumscriptively; then this would be true, 'this thing is substance,' and this false, 'this thing is a substance having part separate from part.' And so, if God could then convert that substance into the body of Christ, which I do not think a Christian ought to say could not be done by God, this would be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' and this is false by virtue of a false implication, 'the substance of the bread having part separate from part in situation was converted into the body of Christ'; and consequently the opposite of it is true, 'the substance of the bread having part separate from part was not converted into the body of Christ.' From which this follows, 'a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.' There-

vera, 'substantia panis' modo est 'substantia panis habens partem distantem a parte'; ista tamen poterit esse vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' hac existente falsa, 'substantia panis habens partem distantem a parte convertitur in corpus Christi'; et per consequens, hac existente vera, 'substantia panis habens partem distantem a parte non convertitur in corpus Christi,' quae negativa poterit esse vera, prima etiam existente vera propter istam causam veritatis, scilicet, 'substantia panis non habet partem distantem a parte'; et ita faciliter potest dici quod quamvis haec sit modo vera, 'aliqua quantitas non est res distincta a substantia panis,' tamen haec poterit esse vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' hac existente vera, 'quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi.' Et tota causa est, quia, quamvis haec sit modo vera, 'substantia est res realiter eadem cum quantitate aliqua,' tamen haec poterit esse vera, 'substantia panis non est eadem res realiter cum quantitate'; sicut, quamvis haec sit modo vera, 'substantia panis est substantia habens partem distantem a parte,' tamen haec poterit esse vera, 'substantia panis non est substantia habens partem distantem a parte,' quia sequitur ex ista possibili, 'substantia panis non habet partem distantem a parte,' etiam hac existente vera, 'substantia panis est.'

Patet ergo ex praemissis quod hoc nomen 'quantitas' aliquid connotat vel dat intelligere quod non denotatur vel datur intelligi per hoc nomen 'substan-

fore, it is obvious that, although this may in a mode be true, 'the substance of the bread' is in a mode 'the substance of the bread having part separate from a part'; yet this could be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' while this appears false, 'the substance of the bread having part separate from part is converted into the body of Christ'; and consequently while this appears true, 'the substance of the bread having part separate from part is not converted into the body of Christ,' which negative could be true, while the first also appears true by virtue of this cause of reality; namely, 'the substance of the bread does not have part separate from part'; and so it can easily be said that although this may in a mode be true, 'some quantity is not a thing distinct from the substance of the bread'; yet this could be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' while this appears true, 'a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.' And the whole cause is; because, although this may be in a way true, 'the substance is really the same as some quantity'; yet this could be true, 'the substance of the bread is really not the same thing as a quantity'; as, although this may in a mode be true, 'the substance of the bread is a substance having part separate from part'; yet this could be true, 'the substance of the bread is not a substance having part separate from part'; for it follows from this possible, 'the substance of the bread does not have part separate from part,' even while this appears true, 'the substance of the bread is.'

Therefore, it is obvious from the premises that this name 'quantity' connotes something, or permits one to understand that which is not denoted or permitted to

tia'; quia hoc nomen 'quantitas' dat intelligere quod illud, de quo praedicatur, sit 'habens partem distantem a parte'; hoc autem nomen 'substantia' nec in propositione nec extra propositionem connotat quod illud, de quo verificatur, sit 'habens partem distantem a parte.' Et ideo quantumcumque haec modo sit vera, 'substantia est quantitas,' tamen posset esse falsa etiam substantia remanente; sicut haec modo est vera, 'substantia panis est substantia habens partem distantem a parte,' et tamen ista substantia remanente poterit esse falsa. Sicut aliqui dicunt quod hoc nomen 'similitudo' connotat duas qualitates eiusdem rationis simul existere in rerum natura, hoc autem nomen 'albedo' non connotat duas qualitates simul existere in rerum natura, et tamen dicunt multi catholici quod 'albedo' et 'similitudo' aliqua sunt una res et non sunt res distinctae realiter, quamvis haec possit esse vera, 'albedo est,' hac existente falsa, 'similitudo est.' Et ideo quamvis concederent quod haec esset vera, 'albedo' et 'similitudo' dicuntur esse duae albedines existentes in rerum natura'; haec tamen posset esse falsa manente albedine, 'albedo est (albedo,' 'alba est) similitudo,' quia implicaret falsum, scilicet, 'duas albedines realiter esse extra animam.'

Patet itaque ex praedictis quod, quamvis aliqua quantitas non sit res distincta realiter a substantia panis; tamen poterit haec esse vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi,' hac existente falsa, 'quanti-

be perceived through this name 'substance'; for this name 'quantity' permits one to understand that that, of which it is predicated, may be 'having part separate from part'; but this name 'substance' does not connote either in a proposition or outside a proposition that that, of which it is verified, may be 'having part separate from part.' And, indeed, no matter how much this may in a mode be true, 'substance is quantity'; yet it might be able to be false, even though a substance remains; as this is in a mode true, 'the substance of the bread is a substance having part separate from part'; and yet, though a substance remains, this could be false. Just as some say that this name 'likeness' connotes that two qualities of the same ground exist at the same time in the nature of things; but this name 'whiteness' does not connote that two qualities exist at the same time in the nature of things, and yet many Catholics say that 'whiteness' and some 'likeness' are one thing and are not things really distinct; although this may be able to be true, 'whiteness is,' while this appears false, 'likeness is.' And, indeed, although they might concede that this could be true, 'whiteness' and 'likeness,' are said to be two whitenesses existing in the nature of things; yet this might be able to be false, while whiteness remains, 'whiteness (is whiteness,' 'white) is likeness'; for it would imply a fallacy, namely, 'two whitenesses are really outside of the mind.'

Therefore, it is obvious from the previous statements that, although some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread; yet this could be true, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,' though this appears

tas convertitur in corpus Christi'; et hoc propter diversum modum significandi vel consignificandi illorum duorum nominum, 'substantia' et 'quantitas.'

Per hoc patet quod, quamvis non inveniatur expressum in canone Bibliae nec in iure canonico nec in dictis Sanctorum approbatorum a Romana Ecclesia quod substantia panis non convertitur in quantitatem corporis Christi, quia de hoc non faciunt mentionem, tamen propter diversum modum significandi vel consignificandi istorum nominum, 'substantia' et 'quantitas,' posset haec verificari, 'substantia panis convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi,' quamvis haec esset falsa, 'substantia panis convertitur in quantitatem corporis Christi'; sicut propter diversum modum significandi istorum nominum, 'substantia' et 'quantitas,' posset haec esse falsa, 'substantia est quantitas' quamvis substantia et quantitas aliqua non essent res distinctae realiter.

Et quod hoc non sit etiam contra fidem ecclesiae patet in simili; dicunt enim multi doctores catholici quod 'relatio' non est res distincta realiter a suo 'fundamento.' Non enim puto quod aliquis sanae mentis, nisi ille, qui vellet solus vocari rabbi, velit dicere quod omnes tenentes quod relatio non est res distincta realiter a suo fundamento sunt haeretici. Non est igitur haereticum dicere, quod relatio est res distincta a suo fundamento. Numquam igitur haereticum est dicere quod substantia panis convertitur in relationem, etiam dicere quod haec est vera, 'substantia panis convertitur in

false, 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ'; and this by virtue of a diverse mode of signifying or of consignifying of those two names 'substance' and 'quantity.'

Through this it is obvious that, although it may not be found expressed in the canon of the Bible, nor in the canonical law, nor in the writings of the Saints approved by the Roman Church, that the substance of the bread is not converted into the quantity of the body of Christ; for they do not make mention of this; yet in virtue of the diverse mode of signifying or consignifying of these names 'substance' and 'quantity,' this might be able to be verified, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ'; although this would be false, 'the substance of the bread is converted into the quantity of the body of Christ,' as by virtue of the diverse mode of signifying these names 'substance' and 'quantity,' this would be able to be false, 'substance is quantity,' although substance and some quantity would not be things really distinct.

And that this may not even be contrary to the faith of the church is obvious in a similar case; for many Catholic doctors say that 'relation' is not a thing really distinct from its 'fundament.' For I do not think that anyone of sane mind, unless he, who alone would wish to be called a rabbi, wishes to say that all, who hold that relation is not a thing distinct from its fundament, are heretics. It is, therefore, not heretical to say that relation is a thing distinct from its fundament. It is, therefore, never heretical to say that the substance of the bread is converted into a relation, even to say that this is true, 'the substance of the bread is con-

corpus Christi,' et haec falsa, 'substantia panis non convertitur in relationem'; non obstante quod aliqua relatio, puta, relatio dependentiae ipsius ad Deum non est alia res a corpore Christi.

Et ita manifeste patet, quod ita faciliter potest salvari tota veritas circa sacramentum Eucharistiae; quamvis concedatur quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia, sicut concedo quod aliqua relatio non est realiter distincta a substantia, quod concedunt multi catholici. Non enim plus reperitur in sacra scriptura quod quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi vel quod substantia non convertitur in quantitatem corporis Christi, quam quod relatio non convertitur in corpus Christi vel quod substantia panis non convertitur in relationem. Et ideo sicut catholice potest poni quod aliqua relatio non est res distincta realiter a substantia panis et aliqua relatio non est res distincta realiter a substantia corporis Christi; et tunc vel oportet concedere quod aliqua relatio seu aliquis respectus convertitur in corpus Christi et substantia panis convertitur in relationem tamquam 'sequens,' vel oportet assignare aliquem modum significandi vel consignificandi diversum illorum nominum, 'substantia' et 'relatio,' propter quod potest aliquid vere attribui uni et vere negari ab altero; et similiter alterum illorum potest vere attribui uni et alterum vere negari ab eodem. Ita potest catholice poni quod aliqua quantitas non est res realiter distincta a substantia; et tunc vel oportet concedere tamquam non repugnans fidei quod

verted into the body of Christ,' and this is false, 'the substance of the bread is not converted into a relation'; notwithstanding that some relation, say, relation of dependence itself upon God is not a thing other than the body of Christ.

And so it is manifestly obvious that the whole truth concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist can so easily be saved; although it may be conceded that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance, as I concede that some relation is not really distinct from substance, which many Catholics concede. For it is no more to be found in sacred scripture that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ or that a substance is not converted into the quantity of the body of Christ, than that a relation is not converted into the body of Christ or that the substance of the bread is not converted into a relation. And, indeed, as it can be posited according to the Catholic faith that some relation is not a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, and some relation is not a thing really distinct from the substance of the body of Christ; and then it is necessary to concede that some relation or some respect is converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of the bread is converted into relation as 'next,' or it is necessary to assign some mode of signifying or of consignifying the diversity of those names 'substance' and 'relation' by virtue of which some thing can truly be attributed to one and truly denied of another; and similarly one of them can truly be attributed to one, and the other truly denied of the same. So a Catholic can posit that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance; and then either it is necessary to concede as

'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi' et 'substantia panis convertitur in quantitatem corporis Christi,' vel assignare aliquem diversum modum significandi istorum nominum, 'substantia' et 'quantitas'; propter quem una potest concedi, alia non concessa, quantumcumque aliqua quantitas non sit alia res a substantia, quod facile est facere sicut alibi est ostensum.

Nec est plus hoc difficile facere quam ostendere quomodo aliqua quantitas non sit res distincta a substantia; et tamen quod haec sit falsa, 'quantitas est substantia'; sed quia hoc pertinet ad logicum magis quam ad theologum, ideo pertranseo.

Ad illud quod ultimo infertur in secundo argumento; scilicet, si aliqua quantitas corporis Christi inciperet esse in sacramento altaris virtute sacramenti, quod tunc virtute sacramenti corpus Christi esset quantum et localiter ac circumscriptive in loco in sacramento altaris, dicendum est quod non sequitur. Sicut enim secundum aliquos non valet, 'quantitas corporis Christi' sive 'corpus Christi existens localiter in loco est in sacramento altaris,' igitur corpus Christi est ibi quantum et localiter in loco. Ita non sequitur, 'quantitas corporis Christi virtute sacramenti incipit esse in sacramento altaris,' igitur virtute sacramenti esse ibi incipit localiter. Unde seu ista concedatur, 'quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis incipit esse sub specie panis, seu non concedatur, istam tamen simpliciter nego, 'cor-

if not opposed to the faith, that 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ' and 'the substance of the bread is converted into the quantity of the body of Christ,' or to assign some diverse mode of signifying those names, 'substance' and 'quantity'; by virtue of which one can be conceded, another can not be conceded; no matter how much some quantity may not be a thing other than a substance, which it is easy to do, as was shown elsewhere.

Nor is this more difficult to do than to show how some quantity may not be a thing distinct from substance; and yet that this may be false, 'quantity is substance'; but because this pertains more to logic than to theology, I, therefore, pass on.

With reference to that which is introduced under the last head in the second argument, it must be said that this does not follow; namely, that, if some quantity of the body of Christ could begin to be in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of the sacrament, then by virtue of the sacrament the body of Christ could be a quantum both locally and circumscriptively in a place in the sacrament of the altar. For as it is not established according to some writers that 'the quantity of the body of Christ' or 'the body of Christ existing in a place locally is in the sacrament of the altar'; therefore, the body of Christ there is a quantum and is locally in a place. So it does not follow that 'the quantity of the body of Christ begins to be in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of the sacrament'; therefore, by virtue of the sacrament it begins to be there locally. Whence, whether this be conceded or not, 'the quantity of the body of Christ begins to be under the species of bread by the power of conversion'; yet

pus Christi ex vi conversionis est quantum sub specie panis.' Et ideo hoc assero, quod corpus Christi nec ex vi conversionis nec ex vi sacramenti est quantitas nec quantum; sicut non obstante quod ista sit vera, 'corpus Christi habens partem distantem a parte,' puta, in caelo, ex vi conversionis est ibi sub specie panis; haec tamen est simpliciter falsa, 'corpus Christi ex vi conversionis habet partem distantem a parte sub specie panis.' Unde qui vellet concedere quod de virtute sermonis haec esset concedenda, 'aliqua quantitas est substantia,' posset faciliter respondere ad omnia argumenta de ista materia concedendo vel negando propositiones et consequentias ponendo loco huius nominis 'quantitas,' hoc totum, 'res habens partem distantem a parte,' quia tunc haberent dicere, quod ista duo, 'quantitas continua et permanens' et 'res habens partem distantem a parte,' essent convertibilia; immo unum esset diffinitio exprimens quid nominis alterius, si esset aliquod nomen convertibile cum isto, 'quantitas continua et permanens.' Et ideo respondendo ad quamcumque propositionem vel consequentiam in qua poneretur hoc nomen, 'quantitas,' ponendum esset loco illius nominis hoc totum, 'res habens partem distantem a parte'; et faciliter videretur, si propositio vel consequentia esset concedenda vel neganda, et tunc ista propositio esset concedenda, 'quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi' sicut ista, 'res habens partem distantem a parte convertitur in corpus Christi.' Similiter ista esset con-

this I simply deny, 'the body of Christ is a quantum under the species of bread by the power of conversion.' And, indeed, I make this assertion, that the body of Christ is a quantity or a quantum neither by the power of conversion nor by the power of the sacrament; as notwithstanding that this may be true, 'the body of Christ having part separate from part,' say, in heaven, is there under the species of bread by the power of conversion; yet this is simply false, 'the body of Christ by the power of conversion has part separate from part under the species of bread.' Whence, he who would desire to concede that this would need to be conceded by virtue of language, 'some quantity is substance,' could easily reply to all the arguments about this matter by conceding or denying the propositions and by positing the consequences in place of this name 'quantitas,' this whole, 'a thing having part separate from part'; since they would then have to say that these two, 'quantity continuous and permanent' and 'a thing having part separate from part,' would be convertibles; in fact, one would be a definition expressing something of another name, if there could be some name convertible with this, 'quantity continuous and permanent.' And, therefore, in replying to whatever proposition or consequence in which this name 'quantity' would be posited, it would be necessary to posit in place of this name this whole 'a thing having part separate from part'; and it could be easily seen, if the proposition or consequence were to be conceded or denied; and then this propositioin would necessarily be conceded, 'a quantity is converted into the body of Christ,' as this, 'a thing having part separate from part is converted into the body of Christ.' Similarly,

cedenda, 'substantia panis convertitur in quantitatem,' sicut ista concedenda est, 'substantia panis convertitur in rem habentem partem distantem a parte,' quamvis in specie panis non habeat ista res partem distantem a parte, quia non est ibi localiter et circumscriptive in loco sed alibi.

Et certe fateor numquam me legisse nec in scripturis canonicis nec in originalibus sanctorum nec in decretis alicuius summi pontificis, nec in aliquo concilio generali, nec in aliquo authentico scripto talem propositionem, 'quantitas non convertitur in corpus Christi,' 'substantia panis non convertitur in quantitatem,' nec aliquem consimilem; quamvis sententiam contrariam multos doctores modernos se mutuo reprobantes video ponere, et ideo eorum scripta non sunt authentica; immo etiam aliquorum multae opiniones in universitatibus solemnibus sunt damnatae quia tales propositiones approbare praesumpserunt. Ista tamen est omni modo falsa, 'panis convertitur in corpus Christi quod est quantitas sub specie panis.'

Et si dicas, si isti concedunt tales propositiones, hoc non fecerunt nisi moti ex sacra scriptura vel saltem ab aliqua scriptura authentica; respondeo quod multa dixerunt pro quibus nec scripturam sacram nec authenticam aliquam habuerunt. A qua quaeso scriptura authentica habuerunt, quod accidentia in sacramento altaris non subsistunt per se sine subiecto et quod omnes qualitates sunt in subiecto. A qua quaeso scriptura authentica habuerunt, quod in sacramento altaris est ali-

this would necessarily be conceded, 'the substance of the bread is converted into a quantity,' as this must be conceded, 'the substance of the bread is converted into a thing having part separate from part'; although this thing may not have part separate from part in the species of bread; for it is not there locally and circumscriptively in a place, but is elsewhere.

And I certainly confess that I have never read either in the canonical law or in the original sources of the Saints or in decrees of any High Pontiff or in any general council or in any authorized writing, such a proposition, 'quantity is not converted into the body of Christ,' 'the substance of the bread is not converted into quantity,' or any similar proposition; although I seem to posit an opinion contrary to many modern Doctors who mutually condemn one another, and, indeed, their writings are not authoritative; on the contrary, many opinions of some have even been condemned in the established universities; for they have presumed to approve such propositions. However, this is in every mode false, 'the bread is converted into the body of Christ, which is a quantity under the species of bread.'

And if you say; if they concede such propositions, they have not done this unless influenced by sacred scripture or at least by some authentic scripture; I reply that they have said many things for which they did not have either sacred scripture or any authentic scripture. I ask from what authentic scripture have they the statement that the accidents in the sacrament of the altar do not subsist per se without a subject, and that all qualities are in a subject. I ask from what authentic scripture have they the statement that in the

quod subiectum ponderositatis quod est ponderosum. A qua etiam scriptura habuerunt, quod Deus non potest facere plurimos angelos in eadem specie, quod Deus non potest facere hominem nec asinum sine accidente absoluto inhaerente sibi, quod qualitas non potest esse sine subiecto, quod non sunt plures formae substantiales in homine, quod voluntas nihil potest velle contra iudicium rationis, et multa talia quae scripturis authenticis dissentiunt et rationi.

Unde quaeso moti sunt moderni vel quam scripturam authenticam habent per se ad ponendum quod est aliqua res quam Deus non potest causare, quod est aliqua res quam Deus non potest destruere per suam omnipotentiam, quod homo mortuus est homo, et innumeralia quae scripturis authenticis manifeste repugnant.

Sic igitur facile est videre quod non repugnat fidei Christianae ponere quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia propter hoc, quod tunc quantitas convertitur in corpus Christi et substantia panis convertitur in quantitatem; sic tamen quod non convertatur in substantiam quae sit ibi quantitas.

Nec obstat quod post adducitur, quod tunc quantitas non maneret in sacramento altaris; nam, quamvis aliqua quantitas transeat, puta, quantitas illa quae non erat res distincta a substantia panis; tamen una alia manet, scilicet, quae non est distincta realiter a qualitate.

Nec videtur plus repugnare dictis sanctorum patrum quod una quantitas, quae non est res alia a substantia,

sacrament of the altar there is some subject of ponderosity, which is ponderous. Also from what scripture have they the statement that God can not make several angels in the same species, that God can not make a man or an ass without an absolute accident inhering in it, that a quality can not be without a subject, that there are not many substantial forms in man, that the will can will nothing contrary to the judgment of reason; and many such statements, which disagree with authentic statements and reason.

Whence, I ask, are the modern writers inspired, or what authentic scripture do they have per se for positing that there is some thing of which God can not be the cause, that there is some thing which God can not destroy through His omnipotence, that a dead man is a man, and innumerable statements which are manifestly not in accord with the authentic scriptures.

So then it is easy to see that it is not contrary to the Christian faith to posit that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance by virtue of this, that a quantity is then converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of the bread is converted into a quantity; so however that it may be converted into a substance which may be a quantity there.

Nor does it contradict the statement which is afterward adduced, that a quantity would not then remain in the sacrament of the altar; for, although some quantity may pass over, say, that quantity which was not a thing distinct from the substance of the bread; yet one other remains, namely, that which is not really distinct from quality.

Nor does it seem more in conflict with the statements of the Holy Fathers that one quantity, which

transeat; et alia, quae non est res alia a qualitate, maneat, quam quod una relatio sive respectus, qui non est realiter alia res a substantia, transeat, et alia relatio sive alius respectus, qui non est realiter alia res a substantia, transeat, et alia res sive alius respectus, qui non est alia res realiter a qualitate, maneat. Qualiter autem duae quantitates possunt esse simul inferius, ostendetur.

is not a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another, which is not a thing other than a quality, may remain, than that one relation or respect, which is not really a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another relation or another respect, which is not really a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another thing or another respect, which is not really a thing other than a quality, may remain. But in what way two quantities can be at the same time will be shown later.

CAPITULUM XXXII

In quo ostenditur quod stant simul, aliqua quantitas non est alia res distincta realiter a substantia et quantitas est accidens

Nunc superest ostendere, quod aliqua quantitas non est alia res realiter distincta a substantia; non obstante quod concedatur tam a philosophis quam a sanctis quod quantitas est accidens et quod quantitas aliquod est praedicamentum aliud a substantia.

Ut autem innitar solido fundamento, incipiam ab una distinctione huius nominis 'accidens' quae elici potest ex verbis venerabilis patris Anshelmi. Unde hoc nomen 'accidens' tripliciter accipi potest; scilicet, stricte et large et largissime.

Stricte sumendo hoc vocabulum 'accidens,' sic accidens signat distinctam rem a substantia inhaerentem illi rei, scilicet, substantiae, et sine qua potest illa substantia saltem per potentiam divinam existere, ita quod contradictionem non includit illam substantiam existere et illo accidente distincto realiter non informari.

Et tunc dicitur accidens res realiter adveniens alteri rei et recedens ab ea vel potens recedere sine illius rei substantialis corruptione, non faciens per se unum cum illo cui realiter advenit, quod addo propter materiam

CHAPTER XXXII

In which it is shown that both propositions stand at the same time; some quantity is not another thing really distinct from substance, and quantity is an accident

It now remains to show that any quantity is not another thing really distinct from substance; notwithstanding that it may be conceded by the philosophers as well as by the Saints that quantity is an accident and that quantity is some category other than substance.

But that I may rest upon a solid foundation, I shall begin from one distinction of this name 'accident' which can be deduced from the words of the venerable Father Anselm. According to this source this name 'accident' can be taken in a three-fold sense: namely, strictly, liberally, and very liberally.

By taking this term 'accident' in the strict sense, accident signifies thus a thing distinct from substance and inhering in that thing, namely, substance, and without which that substance can exist at least through divine power, so that there is no contradiction involved in the statement that that substance exists and is not informed by that accident really distinct.

And then an accident is called a thing really advenient to another thing and receding from it, or able to recede without the destruction of that substantial thing, not making one per se with that to which it really advenes: which I add by virtue of matter and

et formam substantialem. Accidens autem tale nullo modo potest subiecto accedere et recedere a subiecto sine omni mutatione illius subiecti. Inimaginabile est enim quod aliquod subiectum nunc informetur una re distincta realiter ab illa et postea non informetur illa eadem re vel econtrario, et tamen quod nullo modo mutetur. Omnis igitur res realiter adveniens alteri rei et recedens ab ea realiter aliquam mutationem facit circa rem illam.

'Accidens' autem large accepto vocabulo vocatur omne praedicabile de aliquo contingenter quod potest successive affirmari et negari ab illo propter realem transmutationem illius et non tantum propter realem transmutationem alterius, quamvis non semper oportet quod successive verificetur et negetur ab illo propter transmutationem illius, sed possit successive affirmari et negari propter transmutationem alterius. Et sic similitudo dicitur accidens Sortis; non quod similitudo sit quaedam res realiter distincta a Sorte et qualitate Sortis, informans realiter Sortem vel qualitatem Sortis; sed quia ista possunt successive verificari, 'Sortes est similis,' 'Sortes non est similis,' propter transmutationem Sortis. Si enim Plato sit albus et Sortes niger, et postea Sortes fiat albus et transmutetur de nigredine ad albedinem propter hoc solum, quod Sortes transmutatur a nigredine ad albedinem et Plato non transmutetur, haec est propositio vera, 'Sortes non est similis Platoni'; et postea ista, 'Sortes est similis Platoni,' et ita tunc similitudo sic advenit Sorti propter transmutationem Sortis, quamvis sibi possit competere sine

substantial form. But such an accident can in no mode accede to a subject or recede from a subject without an entire change of that subject. For it is unthinkable that some subject may now be informed by one thing really distinct from it and afterwards may not be informed by that same thing, or conversely; and yet that it may in no mode be changed. For every thing really advening to another thing or receding from it really makes some change about that thing.

But 'accident,' when used in the liberal acceptation of the term, is called everything predicable of something contingently, which can be successively affirmed and denied of that by virtue of a real transmutation of that and not so much by virtue of a real transmutation of another; although it is not always necessary that it be successively verified and denied of that by virtue of a transmutation of that; but it can be successively affirmed and denied by virtue of the transmutation of another. And so likeness is called an accident of Sortes; not that likeness may be a certain thing really distinct from Sortes and from a quality of Sortes, really informing Sortes or a quality of Sortes; but because these can be successively verified, 'Sortes is similar,' 'Sortes is not similar' by virtue of the transmutation of Sortes. For if Plato be white, and Sortes black, and afterwards Sortes may become white and may be transmuted from blackness to whiteness by virtue of this alone, that Sortes is transmuted from blackness to whiteness, and Plato may not be transmuted; this proposition is true, 'Sortes is not similar to Plato'; and afterwards this, 'Sortes is similar to Plato'; and so then likeness thus advenes to Sortes by virtue of the transmutation of Sortes, although it

transmutatione Sortis propter transmutationem Platonis. Ex hoc enim ipso quod Plato fieret niger et transmutaretur de albedine ad nigredinem Sorte semper remanente nigro et non mutato, esset haec propositio vera, 'Sortes non est similis Platoni,' et postea haec, 'Sortes est similis Platoni.' Et ita patet quod ista relatio 'similitudo' potest advenire et recedere a Sorte per mutationem Sortis et sine mutatione Sortis. Hoc est dictum, 'Sortes potest primo esse similis et postea non est similis,' et econtrario et Sorte mutato et Sorte non mutato. Et illud vocatur 'accidens' large sumpto vocabulo.

Largissime vero vocatur 'accidens' omne illud quod potest aliquando competere alicui et aliquando non competere sibi sive posset sibi competere et non competere tam propter mutationem propriam quam alienam, sive non posset sibi successive competere et non competere per mutationem propriam, sed praecise per mutationem alienam.

Et sic accepto vocabulo non est inconveniens concedere aliquod accidens competere Deo, quia tale accidens nullam mutationem nec actualem nec possibilem infert Deo.

'Accidens' primo modo sumptum propriissime est accidens; 'accidens' secundo modo est sumptum minus proprie; sed tertium est improprie accidens. Et ne aliquis credat istam distinctionem ex capite meo procedere, legat venerabilem Anshelmum in Monologio Capitulo XXV., dicentem: "Omnium quippe, quae ac-

may be able to happen to him without a transmutation of Sortes by virtue of a transmutation of Plato. For from this very fact, that Plato could become black, and could be transmuted from whiteness to blackness, while Sortes remains black and not changed; this proposition would be true, 'Sortes is not similar to Plato,' and afterwards this, 'Sortes is similar to Plato.' And so it is obvious that this relation 'likeness' can advene to or recede from Sortes through a change of Sortes and without a change of him. This is said, 'Sortes can be similar at first and afterwards is not similar'; and conversely, both with a change of Sortes and without a change of Sortes. And that is called 'accident' when using the term in a liberal sense.

In a very free use of the term, 'accident' is called all that which can be suitable to something at one time and at another time can not be suitable to it, or might be able to be suitable to it and not suitable by virtue of a proper change as well as an inadequate change, or might not be able to be successively suitable to it and not be suitable through a proper change but specially through an inadequate change.

And in thus accepting the term it is not inconsistent to concede that some accident is suitable to God, for such an accident occasions no change either actual or possible in God.

'Accident' taken in the first way is most properly an accident; 'accident' taken in the second way is less properly an accident; but the third way is not properly an accident. And lest some one may believe that this distinction procedes from my head, let him read the venerable Anselm in his Monologium in Chapter XXV., where he says: "Of all things, surely, which

cidentia dicuntur, alia non nisi cum aliqua participantis variatione adesse et abesse posse intelliguntur, ut omnes colores; alia nullam omnino vel accedendo vel recedendo mutationem circa illud de quo dicuntur, efficere noscuntur, ut quaedam relationes. Constat namque quod homini post annum praesentem nascituro, nec maior nec minor nec aequalis sum nec similis; omnes autem has relationes utique, cum natus fuerit, sine omni mei mutatione ad illum habere potero et amittere secundum quod crescet vel per qualitates diversas mutabitur.

Palam itaque fit, quod eorum quae accidentia dicuntur, quaedam aliquatenus contrahunt commutabilitatem, quaedam vero nullatenus subtrahunt immutabilitatem. Sicut igitur Summa Natura accidentibus mutationem efficientibus numquam in sua simplicitate locum tribuit; sic secundum ea, quae nullatenus summae incommutabilitati repugnant, aliquando dici aliquid non respuit, et tamen aliquid eius essentiae, unde ipsa variabilis possit intelligi, non accidit.

Unde hoc quoque includi potest, quod nullius accidentis susceptibilis est. Quippe quemadmodum illa accidentia, quae mutationem aliquam accedendo vel recedendo faciunt, ipso suo effectu vere accidere rei, quam mutant, perpenduntur; sic illa, quae a simili effectu deficiunt, improprie dici accidentia deprehenduntur."

Ex istis verbis colligi potest praedicta distinctio. Cum enim dicit quod sunt aliqua accidentia quae mutationem aliquam accedendo vel recedendo faciunt, quae non nisi cum aliqua participantis variatione adesse

are called accidents, some are understood to be able to be present or absent not except with some variation of the participant, as all colors; others are known not to effect any change at all about that of which they are said, either by acceding or receding, as certain relations. For it is, indeed, well known that I am neither older nor younger nor equal nor like the man who will be born after the present year; but I shall undoubtedly, be able to have and to lose all these relations to him, when he will have been born, without any change of myself, in proportion as he shall grow, or will be changed through diverse qualities.

And so it becomes plain, that of those, which are called accidents, certain to a certain degree bring commutability, but certain by no means impare immutability. Therefore, as the Supreme Nature in its own simplicity has never attributed a place to accidents effecting a change; so it sometimes does not disdain to say something about those accidents which by no means resist the supreme immutability; and yet there is nothing accidental about its essence, whence variableness itself can be conceived.

Whence, this can also be drawn, that it is susceptible of no accident. Surely, according to this mode those accidents, which by acceding or receding make some change, by this very effect are considered truly to happen to the thing which they change; so those, which are deficient by a similar effect, are discovered to be improperly called accidents."

From these words the previous distinction can be deduced. For when he says that there are some accidents, which make some change by acceding or receding, which are not conceived to be able to be present

et abesse posse intelliguntur, ut omnes colores, ostendit quod aliqua accidentia, quae mutationem aliquam faciunt, sunt res distinctae realiter a suis subiectis inhaerentes eisdem. Color enim est qualitas quaedam distincta realiter a substantia inhaerens sibi. Per hoc autem quod dicit, alia sunt quae nullam omnino vel accedendo vel recedendo mutationem circa illud, de quo dicuntur, efficere noscuntur, ut quaedam relationes. Evidenter ostendit quod est accidens quod non est res distincta realiter a subiecto extra adveniens illi subiecto et realiter recedens ab illo. Impossibile est enim quod aliqua res realiter et veraciter inhaereat et informet aliquam rem distinctam realiter et postea eam non informet nisi res illa commutetur. Hoc idem etiam innuit per hoc quod dicit, quod sunt aliqua accidentia quae nullam omnino subtrahunt immobilitatem.

Ex quo patet quod non omne accidens realiter recipitur in suo subiecto; dicit enim Anshelmus quod Summa Natura, "secundum illa accidentia quae nullatenus summae incommutabilitati repugnant, aliquando dici aliquid non respuit; et tamen aliquid eius essentiae, unde quod ipsa variabilis intelligi possit, non accidit." Nihil enim illi Summae Naturae accidit per realem inhaerentiam et realem informationem et tamen aliquod accidens sibi convenire non negat Anshelmus sed concedit.

Ex quo patet quod non omne accidens realiter suscipitur in subiecto, dicente Anshelmo; unde hoc quoque concludi potest, quod nullius accidentis susceptibilis est scilicet Summa Natura; quamvis enim accidens aliquod competat Deo, nullum tamen suscepit realiter

and absent except with some variation of the participant, as all colors, it shows that some accidents, which produce some change, are things really distinct from their subjects and inhere in the same. For color is a certain quality really distinct from substance, and inherent in it. But through this, which he says, there are some which either by acceding or receding are known to effect no change at all about that of which they are said, as certain relations. It evidently shows that there is an accident which is not a thing really distinct from a subject outside advening to that subject and really receding from that. For it is impossible that some thing may really and truly inhere and inform some thing really distinct and afterwards may not inform it unless that thing be commuted. The same writer also gives assent to this through this which he says, that there are some accidents which do not at all impair immobility.

From this it is obvious that not every accident is really retained in its subject, for Anselm says that the Supreme Nature "sometimes does not disdain to say something about those accidents which by no means resist the highest immutability; and yet nothing is accidental about its essence, whence variation itself can be conceived." For nothing is accidental to that Supreme Nature through real inherence and real information; and yet Anselm does not deny but concedes that some accident is suitable to it.

From which, according to the statement of Anselm, it is obvious that not every accident is really sustained in a subject; whence, this can also be concluded, that surely Supreme Nature is susceptible of no accident; for although some accident may be suitable to God,

in se; et sicut est de accidente, quod convenit Deo quod non realiter in Deo suscipitur, ita accidens, quod nullam facit mutationem circa illud de quo dicitur, non realiter suscipitur in subiecto.

Si enim realiter reciperetur in subiecto tamquam res distincta in re distincta, necessario subiectum mutaretur; vere enim et realiter haberet in se inhaerentem sibi aliquam rem, ad quam erat prius in potentia, quia sine omni mutatione esse non potest. Omne enim, quod habet primo unam rem et postea aliam, vel primo caret aliqua re et postea informatur realiter illa, vel econtrario necessario vadit de uno ad aliud et per consequens mutatur; quia secundum sanctum Gregorium, "mutare est de uno ad aliud ire"; et secundum philosophum "mutare est aliter se habere nunc quam prius."

Patet igitur quod accidens, quod advenit sine omni mutatione illi de quo dicitur, non realiter suscipitur in subiecto; tunc enim natura divina alicuius accidentis esset susceptibilis. Et ideo quando dicit Anshelmus quod "aliqua accidentia accedendo vel recedendo nullam faciunt mutationem omnino," non intelligit quod talia accidentia realiter tamquam res distinctae accedant ad subiectum informando illud et recedant per destructionem vel separationem unius rei ab alia; quando enim Sorte existente nigro Plato de nigro fit albus, nulla res separatur a Sorte; sed dicitur tunc illa similitudo recedere, qua Sortes erat similis Platoni, quia Sortes desinit esse similis Platoni. Unde similitudinem

yet He really sustains none in Himself; and as it is of an accident, which is suitable to God, which is not really sustained in God, so an accident, which makes no change about that of which it is said, is not really sustained in that subject.

For if it could really be retained in a subject, as if a distinct thing in a distinct thing, the subject would necessarily be changed; for it would truly and really have in itself some thing inhering in itself, to which it was potentially prior, for it can not be without any change. For every thing which has at first one thing and afterwards another, either at first is deprived of some thing and afterwards may really be informed by it, or on the contrary it necessarily passes rapidly from one thing to another and consequently is changed; for according to Saint Gregory "to change is to go from one to another"; and according to the philosopher, "to change is to have yourself now otherwise than before."

Therefore, it is obvious that an accident, which advenes to that, of which it is said, without any change, is not really sustained in a subject; for then the divine nature would be susceptible of some accident. And, indeed, when Anselm says that "some accidents make no change at all by acceding or receding," he does not understand that such accidents may really accede as distinct things to a subject in informing it and may recede through the destruction or separation of one thing from another; for when, although Sortes appears black, Plato becomes white from black, no thing is separated from Sortes; but then that likeness is said to recede, by which Sortes was similar to Plato; for Sortes ceases to be similar to Plato. Whence, for

accedere et recedere Sorti, non est aliud nisi quod Sortes aliquando incipit esse similis et aliquando desinit esse similis; et tamen propter hoc non oportet quod Sortes aliquam rem in se suscipiat vel desinat in se habere; sicut Deus sine susceptione cuiusque rei in se et sine amissione alicuius existentis in Deo, aliquando incipit esse iustificans peccatorem et aliquando desinit esse iustificans peccatorem.

Sic itaque clare constat quod de intentione Anshelmi est ponere aliquod accidens quod est realiter res distincta a subiecto realiter in illo recepta; sicut color realiter recipitur in corpore tamquam res distincta in re distincta. Aliquod autem accidens non est res distincta suscepta realiter in subiecto sed ideo dicitur accidens; quia contingenter praedicatur de eo etiam posita constantia subiecti. Et quod aliquod illorum potest accedere et recedere per mutationem illius, de quo dicitur, et etiam per mutationem alienam, sicut patet manifeste; nam quod per mutationem alienam patet de accidentibus relativis, quae dicit Anshelmus posse advenire sibi per hoc quod alius cresceret vel per diversas qualitates mutabitur. Quod autem possit advenire mihi per mutationem meam propriam, est etiam manifestum, sicut declaratum est de similitudine adveniente Sorti. Quod autem aliquod accidens non possit advenire illi, de quo dicitur, nisi per mutationem alienam patet per hoc quod ponit quod aliquod accidens potest advenire Deo, et cum Deus nullo modo mutabilis intelligi potest.

likeness to accede to Sortes and to recede, is nothing other than that Sortes sometimes begins to be similar and sometimes ceases to be similar; and yet by virtue of this it is not necessary that Sortes receive some thing into himself or cease to have some thing in himself; as God, without the assumption of any thing into Himself and without the loss of anything existing in God, sometimes begins to be the justifier of the sinner and sometimes ceases to be the justifier of the sinner.

And so it is thus clearly established that it is according to the intention of Anselm to posit some accident which is a thing really distinct from the subject, really retained in that subject; as color is really retained in a body as a distinct thing in a distinct thing. But any accident is not a thing really sustained in a subject but is, indeed, called an accident; for it is contingently predicated of that, even if the constancy of the subject is posited. And that any of them can accede and recede through a change of that of which it is said, and even through an inadequate change, as is manifestly obvious; for that is obvious of relative accidents through an inadequate change, which Anselm says can advene to itself either through this, that another might increase or will be changed through diverse qualities. But that any may be able to advene to myself through a proper change of myself is also manifest, as was declared of likeness advening to Sortes. But that some accident may not be able to advene to that, of which it is said, except through an inadequate change is obvious through this which posits, that some accident can advene to God, even though God can in no mode be considered mutable.

Et ita patet quod hoc vocabulum 'accidens' tripliciter accipi potest; quamvis illud, quod non potest alicui competere nisi per mutationem alienam, dicatur improprie accidens illi sicut dicit Anshelmus.

And so it is obvious that this term 'accident' can be accepted in a three-fold sense; although that, which can not be suitable to anything except through an inadequate change, may improperly be called an accident to it, as Anselm says.

CAPITULUM XXXIII

Quomodo quantitas est accidens declarat et quomodo cum hoc stat quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta a substantia

Iuxta distinctionem propositam declarandum est quomodo quantitas est accidens. Quo ostenso patebit, quomodo ista stant simul, 'aliqua quantitas non est res realiter distincta a substantia' et 'quantitas est accidens.' Unde sciendum est quod sicut non omnis relatio est accidens primo modo quia non omnis relatio est res distincta realiter a substantia inhaerens sibi, sicut dicunt multi catholici doctores antiqui et nonnulli moderni catholici consentiunt eis.

Et ideo non omnis relatio est accidens primo modo accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'accidentis'; nec etiam omnis relatio est accidens secundo modo accipiendo 'accidens,' quia aliqua relativa competunt Deo ex tempore; aliquando competunt et aliquando non competunt; sed hoc non est possibile per mutationem Dei, sed praecise per mutationem creaturae; et tamen conceditur quod relatio est accidens et quod est unum praedicamentum accidentis.

Ita potest dici de quantitate, quod non omnis quantitas est res distincta realiter a substantia et tamen quod quantitas est accidens. Pro quo intelligendum est quod non omnis quantitas est res distincta realiter a substantia inhaerens sibi; sicut nec omnis res habens

CHAPTER XXXIII

It declares how quantity is an accident, and how it obtains with this, that some quantity is not a thing distinct from substance

Besides the proposed distinction, it must be declared how quantity is an accident. When this has been shown, it will be obvious how these obtain at the same time, 'some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,' and 'quantity is an accident.' Whence, it must be known that, as, for instance, not every relation is an accident in the first mode; for not every relation is a thing really distinct from substance inhering in it, as many ancient Catholic doctors say and some modern Catholics agree with them.

And, indeed, not every relation is an accident in the first mode of accepting the term 'accident,' nor even is every relation an accident in the second mode of accepting 'accident'; for some relatives are suitable to God according to circumstances; sometimes suitable and sometimes not suitable; but this is not possible through a change of God, but precisely through a change of a creature; and yet it is conceded that relation is an accident and that it is one category of accident.

So it can be said of quantity, that not every quantity is a thing really distinct from substance and yet that a quantity is an accident. For which it must be understood that not every quantity is a thing really distinct from a substance inhering in it; as neither is

partem extra partem situaliter seu habens partem distantem a parte est res realiter distincta a substantia.

Et ideo sicut 'habere partem distantem a parte' non est accidens primo modo dictum, ita non omnis quantitas est accidens primo modo dictum; sed 'habere partem distantem a parte' est accidens secundo modo dictum. Quia si aliquid idem substantiale potest primo 'habere partem distantem a parte' et postea per mutationem propriam potest non 'habere partem distantem a parte,' (sicut aliqui catholici dicunt. Et iam recitatum est prius, quod corpus Christi habet modo 'partem distantem a parte,' quia) est in caelo localiter et circumscriptive; et idem corpus non destructum potest desinere esse localiter et circumscriptive et incipere esse sacramentaliter sub specie panis; et ita tunc non haberet partem distantem a parte, ipsa tamen substantia corporis Christi non destruitur. Et ita, cum eadem substantia per sui mutationem aliquando habeat 'partem distantem a parte' et aliquando non habet 'partem distantem a parte,' est accidens; et tamen non est res semper distincta et inhaerens substantiae tamquam rei distinctae realiter a substantia; ita etiam quantitas est accidens non primo modo sed secundo modo. Nam, quamvis aliqua quantitas nunc non sit res distincta realiter a substantia; immo aliqua quantitas est eadem realiter cum substantia tamen ipsa substantia manente.

Manifeste potest haec esse vera, 'nulla quantitas est eadem realiter cum substantia'; nam posito quod sic fiat a Deo, quod non habeat partem situaliter distantem

every thing having part outside of part in situation or having part separate from part a thing really distinct from a substance.

And, indeed, as 'to have part separate from part' is not called an accident in the first mode; so not every quantity is called an accident in the first mode; but 'to have part separate from part' is called an accident in the second mode. For, if something substantially the same can at first 'have part separate from part' and afterwards can not 'have part separate from part' through a proper change (as some Catholics say. And it has already been mentioned before, that the body of Christ has in a mode 'part separate from part'; for) it is locally and circumscriptively in heaven; and the same body though not destroyed can cease to be locally and circumscriptively and can begin to be sacramentally under the species of bread; and so then it does not have part separate from part, yet the substance itself of the body of Christ is not destroyed. And so, when the same substance has at one time 'part separate from part' through a change of itself, at another time does not have 'part separate from part,' it is an accident; and yet it is not a thing always distinct and inhering in substance as if a thing really distinct from a substance; so also quantity is an accident not in the first mode, but in the second mode. For, although some quality may not now be a thing really distinct from substance; on the contrary some substance is really the same as substance, the substance itself however remaining.

This can manifestly be true, 'no quantity is really the same as substance'; for when it is assumed that God can thus bring it to pass, that it may not have part

a parte, sicut modo corpus Christi est sub specie panis; tunc haec est vera, 'nulla substantia est quantitas,' nec aliqua quantitas est tunc eadem realiter cum substantia. Sic tunc haec est vera, nulla substantia 'habens partem distantem a parte' est realiter eadem cum ista substantia, habet enim istam causam veritatis. Ista substantia non est 'habens partem distantem a parte' situaliter; et ita substantia 'habens partem distantem a parte' situaliter potest vocari accidens, isto secundo modo sumpto vocabulo 'accidentis'; quia aliquando est haec vera, ista substantia est substantia 'habens partem distantem a parte' et aliquando non est vera sine corruptione illius substantiae; quamvis ad hoc, quod illa contradictoria successive verificentur, requiritur mutatio localis illius substantiae. Ita ista stant simul, 'aliqua quantitas non est alia res a substantia' et 'quantitas est accidens.' Ita enim dicunt multi, quod aliqua relatio non est alia res a substantia et tamen quod relatio est accidens.

Et hoc quia successive possunt ista contradictoria verificari propter mutationem illius substantiae: 'ista substantia est eadem realiter cum quantitate,' 'ista substantia non est eadem realiter cum quantitate.' Sed ad verificationem talium contradictorium non requiritur nisi mutatio localis illius substantiae et nulla alia. Et ideo non oportet quod omnis quantitas sit aliqua res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia; et certe ad omnia talia, nisi displiceret fastidientibus logicam, posset breviter et faciliter dici quod haec est vera, 'quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia,' si quantitas supponat significative vel personaliter; haec autem, 'quantitas est accidens,' vera est, si quantitas sup-

separate from part in situation, as in a mode the body of Christ is under the species of bread; then this is true, 'no substance is a quantity'; and some quantity is then not really the same as substance. So then this is true, 'no substance having part separate from part' is really the same as that substance, for it has that cause of reality. This substance is not 'having part separate from part' in situation; and so a substance 'having part separate from part' in situation can be called accident, if the term 'accident' is accepted in the second mode: for sometimes this is true, 'this substance is substance having part separate from part,' and sometimes it is not true without the corruption of that substance; although for this, that those contradictories may be successively verified, there is required a local change of that substance. So these obtain at the same time, 'any quantity is not a thing other than a substance,' and 'quantity is an accident.' For so many state, that any relation is not a thing other than a substance, and yet that relation is an accident.

And this, for these contradictories can be successively verified by virtue of a change of that substance: 'this substance is really the same as quantity,' 'this substance is not really the same as quantity.' But for the verification of such contradictories nothing is required except a local change of that substance and no other. And, therefore, it is necessary that every quantity be some absolute thing really distinct from substance; and certainly for all such, unless it should displease those loathing logic, it might be able to be briefly and easily stated that this is true, 'quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,' if quantity be substituted significatively or personally; but this is

ponat simpliciter, et etiam si supponat personaliter; quia indefinita est verificabilis pro una singulari. Sic enim ponit Iohannes Damascenus in Logica sua capitulo tricesimo tertio, quod "numerus est accidens" et tamen ponit quod "ipse numerus est res numeratae"; unde dicit sub 'discretione': "Ad quantum reducitur numerus et sermo in numerum, autem dicimus haec 'numerata.'" Ex quo colligitur quod numerus, cum sit quantitas, ponitur accidens; et tamen numerus est ipsa res numerata. Sic etiam dicimus quod album est accidens et tamen aliquod album est homo. Sic etiam dicimus quod homo et album differunt et tamen dicimus quod homo est albus. Unde per istum modum potest faciliter et evidenter ostendi quod, quamvis istae duae concedantur, 'aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia' et 'aliqua quantitas est accidens,' non oportet concedere quod eadem res sit substantia et accidens. Unde omnia argumenta, quae possunt fieri contra haec, sophisticalia sunt, nec aliter habent absolvi nisi per fallaciam aequivocationis, quia alium defectum non habent.

true, 'quantity is an accident,' if quantity be substituted simply, and even if it be substituted personally; for an indefinite is verifiable for one singular. For thus John of Damascus posits in his Logic in Chapter XXXIII., that "number is an accident" and yet he posits that "number itself is things enumerated." Whence, he says under 'discretion': "Number is reduced to a quantum and language is reduced into number, but we call these 'enumerated.'" From which it is gathered that number, since it may be a quantity, is called an accident; and yet number is itself a thing enumerated. So we also say that white is an accident and yet something white is man. Thus we also say that man and white differ and yet we say that man is white. Whence, through this mode it can easily and evidently be shown that, although these two may be conceded; 'some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,' and 'some quantity is an accident'; it is not necessary to concede that the same thing may be substance and accident. Whence all arguments, which can be offered against these, are sophistical; nor do they not have any other way of being solved except through the fallacy of equivocation; for they do not have another defect.

CAPITULUM XXXIV

In quomodo respondendum ad auctoritates Augustini supra Capitulo XXX. inductae in quarto et quinto argumento

Viso quomodo ista stant simul, 'aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia' et 'quantitas est accidens,' sequitur ostendere quod auctoritas Augustini non contradicit praedictis quia Augustinus non intendit quod magnitudines sunt accidentia distincta realiter a substantiis inhaerentes eis. Mirum enim videtur quod unum accidens posset unam partem facere distare ab alia et tamen Deus non posset hoc facere, nisi coniungeret unam aliam rem partibus substantiae. Quis enim prohiberet Deum duabus rebus distinctis productis in esse facere unam esse extra aliam, quamvis nullam aliam rem coniungeret eis? At ita tota illa res composita ex eis posset esse magna, quamvis nulla alia res causaretur in ea. Ponit autem beatus Augustinus quod magnitudo est accidens quia ipsa substantia per mutationem propriam substantiae potest esse maior vel minor, secundum quod potest habere partes magis vel minus distantes, quod potest contingere sine omni re inhaerente de novo ipsi substantiae. Producta enim substantia habente partes distantes actu et situ, possunt illae partes sine omni re addita inhaerente eis magis

CHAPTER XXXIV

In what way it must be replied to the passages of Augustine, introduced before in Chapter XXX, in the fourth and the fifth arguments

Having seen how these obtain at the same time: 'some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,' and 'quantity is an accident'; it remains to show that the opinion of Augustine does not contradict the previous statements; for Augustine does not intend that magnitudes are accidents really distinct from substances and inhering in them. For it seems wonderful that one accident might be able to make one part to be separate from another and yet God might not be able to do this, unless He would join one other thing to the parts of a substance. For when two distinct things are brought into being, who could prevent God from making one to be outside another, although He could join no other thing to them? And so that whole thing composed of them might be able to be great, although no other thing would be produced in it. For the blessed Augustine posits that magnitude is an accident; for a substance itself can be larger or smaller through a proper change of substance, according to that which can have parts more or less separate, which can touch without every thing inhering de novo in the substance itself. For when a substance having parts separate in act and in situation is produced, those parts can be still more separate without any added thing inherent in them, and then that substance is con-

adhuc distare, et tunc dicitur illa substantia maior quia substantiam esse maiorem non est aliud quam habere partes magis distantes situaliter. Possunt etiam illae partes virtute causae agentis minus distare et tunc etiam est minor, quia substantiam esse minorem non est aliud quam habere partes minus distantes; et quod illiud non sit mirabile, potest ostendi per opinionem contrariam. Nam si quantitas sit res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, rarefiat aër; quo facto aut tota quantitas praecedens corrumpitur, aut non tota quantitas praecedens corrumpitur.

Non potest dari; primum, quia tunc in qualibet rarefactione infinitae res absolutae secundum se totas distinctae non facientes unum numero essent destructae. Cum enim sit infinita substantia in quolibet tempore continuo, infinitae tales quantitates essent destructae in tempore illo quo aliquid continue rarefit; quia, ex quo illa rarefactio est continua in quolibet instante, esset distincta quantitas secundum se totam distinctam a quantitate priori et posteriori. Quod autem non faciant unum numero, patet, quia una non manet cum alia.

Nec valet dicere quod illae quantitates non fuerunt in actu sed in potentia tantum. Nam omne accidens distinctum realiter denominans suum subiectum, quod non est pars alterius, est in actu; huiusmodi autem fuerunt istae quantitates continuae iam corruptae; sequitur igitur quod infinita in actu secundum se totum distincta non facientia unum essent iam corrupta, quod satis videtur absurdum.

sidered larger; because for a substance to be larger is nothing other than to have parts more separate in situation. Moreover, those parts can be less distant by virtue of an active cause, and then the substance is also smaller, because for a substance to be smaller is nothing other than to have parts less separate; and that this is not surprising, can be shown through a contrary opinion. For if quantity be an absolute thing really distinct from substance and quality, air may be rarefied; if this is done, either the total preceding quantity is corrupted or the total preceding quantity is not corrupted.

It is not possible to grant; first, for in any rarefaction infinite absolute things distinct as regards themselves as wholes, not making one numerically, would then be destroyed. For since there may be an infinite substance in each continuous time, such infinite quantities would be destroyed in that time in which something without interruption becomes rarefied; because, from this, that rarefaction is continuous in each instant, there would be quantity distinct according to itself as a whole and distinct from a prior and posterior quantity. But it is obvious that they do not make one numerically; for one does not remain with another.

Nor is it sufficient to say that those quantities have not been actually, but potentially only. For every accident really distinct and denominating its subject, which is not part of another, is actually; but these continuous quantities now corrupted were of this kind; therefore, it follows that things infinite actually, distinct according to themselves as a whole, not making one, would now be corrupted, which seems sufficiently absurd.

Nec etiam potest dari agens quod destrueret unam quantitatem et generaret aliam, quare etiam non posset Deus conservare unam illarum quantitatum adveniente alia. Non igitur videtur rationabile dicere, quod tota quantitas praecedens corrumpitur et tota nova generatur quando rarefit aër vel aliud corpus, sequeretur enim tunc quod omnes qualitates corrumperentur quantumcumque aliquod corpus rarefieret; si enim quantitas, quae ponitur subiectum qualitatum, corrumpitur et destructo subiecto immediato alicuius accidentis destruitur ipsum accidens, oportet quod omnes qualitates immediatae inhaerentes quantitati illi destruantur. Si autem velis dicere quod non tota quantitas praecedens corrumpitur sed manet aliquid, autem igitur illa praecise manet sine omni parte nova aut est aliqua pars nova quae non praefuit. Quod autem non sit alia pars nova quantitatis quae non praefuit, dici non potest, quia illa pars esset in aliquo subiecto recepta; et manifestum est quod non recipitur nisi in aliqua parte aëris vel ignis, vel igitur tunc est simul cum illa quantitate quae praecessit in eadem parte, vel illa quantitas recedit et non amplius informat illam partem quam prius informavit, et tamen ipsa non corrumpitur.

Cum non sit maior ratio quod una pars quantitatis praecedentis corrumpitur quam alia, sequitur quod illa pars quantitatis vel remanet sine subiecto vel migrat ab illo subiecto, in quo prius fuit, ad aliud, quorum quodlibet est irrationabile. Relinquitur igitur quod in

Nor can an agent even be granted that could destroy one quantity and generate another; for which reason God would not even be able to preserve one of those quantities while another is advening. Therefore, it does not appear reasonable to say, that a whole preceding quantity is corrupted and a whole new quantity is generated when air or another body becomes rarefied; for then it would follow that all the qualities would be corrupted no matter how much some body would become rarefied; for if quantity, which is posited as a subject of qualities, is corrupted and an accident itself is destroyed by the destruction of the immediate subject of some accident, it is necessary that all the immediate qualities inhering in that quantity be destroyed. But if you wish to say that not the whole preceding quantity is corrupted but something remains, now then that specially remains without any new part, or there is some new part which was not before. But that there may not be another new part of quantity which was not before, can not be said; since that part would not be retained in any subject, and it is manifest that it is not retained unless in some part of air or of fire; therefore, either it is then at the same time with that quantity which preceded in the same part, or that quantity recedes and no longer informs that part which it informed before; and yet it itself is not corrupted.

Since there may be no greater reason that one part of a preceding quantity is corrupted than another, it follows that that part of the quantity either remains without a subject or withdraws from that subject, in which it was before, to another; each one of these is unreasonable. Therefore, it remains that in rarefac-

rarefactione non est aliqua pars quantitatis nova sed praecise illa quae praefuit; et tamen hoc non obstante eadem quantitas numero est primo minor et postea maior, quia partes eiusdem quantitatis primo, quando aër erat densus, minus distabant situaliter, postea autem, quando aër est rarescens, magis distant situaliter. Constat itaque quod eadem res numero habens partes distinctas sine omni re absoluta nova adveniente sibi potest aliquando esse maior et aliquando minor. Et si hoc sit possibile de quaque quantitate, nihil videtur inconveniens hoc concedere de substantia, quia ipsa habens partes aliquando fit maior, aliquando fit minor sine omni re absoluta adveniente sibi.

Nunc autem Augustinus vocat omne 'accidens' quod propter mutationem rei potest verificari et non verificari de re et quod potest variis modis verificari de re. Unde quia eadem substantia potest esse maior et potest esse minor et potest esse magna, quae prius non erat magna, et econtrario; et hoc propter mutationem illius substantiae. Propter hoc dicit Augustinus quod magnitudines sunt accidentia secundo modo, non primo, quia eadem substantia propria per mutationem propriam potest aliquando esse maior et aliquando esse minor cum omni re absoluta addita sibi. Magnitudo non est accidens tale quod sit res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia inhaerens sibi.

Sed forte dicas: quomodo potest substantia mutari nisi aliqua res nova sit addita sibi? Dico quod haec est differentia inter mutationem substantialem et mu-

tion there is not some new part of a quantity but precisely that which was before; and yet notwithstanding this that a quantity the same numerically is at first smaller and afterwards larger; for parts of the same quantity were at first less separate in situation when the air was dense; but afterwards are more separate in situation when the air is rare. And so it is established that a thing numerically the same having parts distinct without any absolute new thing advening to it can be larger sometimes and sometimes smaller. And if this be possible of any quantity, there seems to be nothing inconsistent in conceding this of substance; for substance itself having parts sometimes becomes larger, sometimes becomes smaller, without any absolute thing advening to it.

But now Augustine calls everything 'accident' which can or can not be affirmed as true of a thing by virtue of a change in the object, and which can be affirmed as true of a thing according to the various modes. Whence, because the same substance can be larger and can be smaller, and can be great, which before was not great, and conversely; and this by virtue of a change of that substance. By virtue of this Augustine says that magnitudes are accidents in the second mode, not in the first; for the same proper substance through a proper change can be larger sometimes and sometimes can be smaller without any absolute thing really distinct added to it. Magnitude is not such an accident which may be an absolute thing really distinct from a substance inhering in it.

But, perhaps, you may say: how can a substance be changed unless some new thing be added to it? I say that this is the difference between substantial

tationem quae est proprie alteratio, et mutationem localem; quod per primas duas advenit aliqua res inhaerens mutato. Per mutationem vero localem non oportet quod mutato adveniat res inhaerens mutato; sed sufficit sibi quod res adquirat sibi locum quem non habuit prius. Unde ex hoc ipso quod res est in loco quiescente in quo prius non erat, sed erat in alio sine omni re alia media inter locum et locatum, et est res illa mutata. Et si quaeras: quid est rem locatam esse in loco? Potest faciliter dici quod rem locatam esse in loco est nullam rem corpoream esse mediam inter locatum et locum ita quod ipsis non mutatis localiter ab uno ad aliud non potest esse motus localis.

Patet igitur ex praedictis quomodo potest salvari magnitudinem esse accidens secundum intentionem beati Augustini, quamvis magnitudo non sit res alia distincta realiter a substantia inhaerens sibi. Sicut enim ponit Augustinus quod "ad aliquid" ut "propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates, et huiusmodi" sunt accidentia; non tamen secundum multos catholicos huiusmodi relationes sunt quaedam res distinctae realiter ab absolutis. Sicut enim ponit venerabilis Anshelmus quod multae relationes sunt accidentia quae tamen sine omni mutatione possunt advenire alicui et per consequens non sunt res distinctae inhaerentes sibi; sic etiam ponit idem Anshelmus aliquod accidens convenire Deo, et tamen nulla res dis-

change, and change which is properly alteration, and local change; that through the first two some thing inhering in the changed advenes. But through a local change it is not necessary that a thing inhering in the changed may advene to the changed; but it suffices for it that a thing acquire for itself a place which it did not have before. Whence, from the very statement that a thing is in a place quiescent in which it was not before, but was in another without any other thing intermediate between the place and the thing placed; and there is that thing which is changed. And if you ask: what is it for a thing to be located in a place? It can easily be said that for a thing to be located in a place is for no corporeal thing to be intermediate between a thing placed and a place, so that, when the things themselves have not been changed locally from one place to another, there can not be local motion.

Therefore it is obvious from the previous statements how it can be safely held that magnitude is an accident according to the intention of the blessed Augustine, although magnitude may not be another thing really distinct from substance inhering in it. For as Augustine posits that accidents are in relation to "something," as "relationships, services, likenesses, equalities and anything else of the kind"; yet according to many Catholics relations of this kind are not certain things really distinct from absolutes. For as the venerable Anselm posits that many relations are accidents which however can advene to something without any change, and consequently are not distinct things inhering in it; thus also the same Anselm posits that some accident is suitable to God, and yet no thing really distinct from

tincta realiter a Deo in eo recipitur per realem inhaerentiam seu informationem.

Unde breviter numquam legi in aliquo sancto, quod ponat quantitatem plus esse accidens et distingui a substantia quam ponat quod 'ad aliquid' et 'relationes' sunt accidentia et distinctae a substantia. Et ideo sicut secundum multos catholicos non repugnat dictis sanctorum dicere quod 'relatio' non est alia res a suo fundamento, sic non repugnat fidei catholicae dicere quod aliqua quantitas non est alia res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia; et simul cum hoc dico, quod aliqua quantitas est aliqua res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia; quia aliqua quantitas est eadem realiter cum qualitate quae distinguitur realiter a substantia.

Per praedicta potest exponi alia auctoritas eiusdem beati Augustini; non enim intendit dicere quod omnis magnitudo sit quaedam res absoluta inhaerens substantiae distincta realiter ab ea, sed intendit dicere quod aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magnum est pro tanto, quia potest ipsa res manere quamvis non sit magna; quod dupliciter contingere potest.

Unde uno modo per condensationem; si enim res magna condensetur, ita quod fiat parvae quantitatis, per hoc solum quod partes substantiae, quae multum distabant localiter, fiunt parum distantes situaliter sine omni re nova generata, et sine omni re antiqua destructa; tunc non est res magna et tamen res ipsa

God is retained in Him through real inherence or information.

Whence, in short, I have never read in any sacred writer, that he posits that quantity is an accident and is distinguished from substance any more than that he posits that 'ad aliquid' and 'relations' are accidents and distinct from substance. And, therefore, as according to many Catholics it is not inconsistent with the statements of the Saints to say that 'relation' is not a thing other than its fundament, so it is not inconsistent with the Catholic faith to say that some quantity is not another absolute thing really distinct from substance; and at the same time with this I say, that some quantity is another absolute thing really distinct from substance; for some quantity is really the same as quality which is really distinguished from substance.

Through the previous statements another opinion of the same blessed Augustine can be posited; for he does not intend to say that every magnitude may be a certain absolute thing inhering in substance and really distinct from it; but he intends to say that one thing is magnitude, another is that which is great by means of it in proportion to so much, for the thing itself can remain, although it may not be great; which can occur in a two-fold manner.

Whence, it may occur in one mode through condensation; for if a large thing be condensed, so that it become an object of small quantity, through this alone that the parts of the substance, which were locally much separated, become less separate in situation without any new thing having been generated and any old thing having been destroyed; then the thing is not great and yet the thing itself remains. And so it is

manet. Et sic aliud est rem esse et aliud rem magnam esse, quia potest res esse quamvis non sit magna.

Aliter potest hoc contingere per omnipotentiam Dei, si faceret, sicut dicunt multi quod est possibile Deo facere, quod res magna prius, postea fieret illo modo alibi quo corpus Christi est sub specie panis, et tamen nullibi esset localiter nec circumscriptive; tunc enim, quia res non haberet partes distantes situaliter, non esset magna; et ita potest esse res quamvis non sit magna. Et hoc solum intendit sanctus Augustinus, et sic patet quod non est dictum beati Augustini contra praedicta.

Aliter etiam potest declarari quod beatus Augustinus non contradicit praedictis, nam beatus Augustinus loquitur de magnitudine quae relatio est, nam sicut magnum est relativum, sicut magnitudo est relatio. Nunc autem secundum multos catholicos non est contrarium dictis sanctorum quod relatio non est alia res distincta realiter a re absoluta; non est ergo contrarium catholicae fidei dicere quod magnitudo, de qua loquitur beatus Augustinus, non est alia res a substantia; cum hoc tamen stat quod verum dicit beatus Augustinus quando dicit magnitudinem esse accidens, quia accidentaliter praedicatur de re naturali; sic igitur exponi potest sanctus Augustinus.

Aliter igitur exponi potest quod per magnitudinem, qua res creatae sunt magnae, non intelligit unum acci-

one thing for a thing to be, and another for a thing to be great; for a thing can be although it may not be great.

This can happen in another way through the omnipotence of God, if He should bring it to pass; as many say, that it is impossible for God to bring it to pass, that a thing formerly great might afterwards come to be somewhere in that mode in which the body of Christ is under the species of bread; and yet would be nowhere locally or circumscriptively; for then, because the thing might not have parts separate in situation, it would not be great; and so it can be a thing, although it may not be great. And Saint Augustine intends this alone, and thus it is obvious that there is no statement of the blessed Augustine contrary to the previous statements.

In another way it can be declared that the blessed Augustine does not contradict the previous statements, for the blessed Augustine speaks of magnitude, which is a relation; for, as for instance, great is relative, a magnitude is relation. But now according to many Catholics it is not contrary to the statements of the Saints, that relation is not another thing really distinct from an absolute; therefore, it is not contrary to the Catholic faith to say that magnitude, of which Augustine speaks, is not a thing other than substance; yet with this it is established that the blessed Augustine says the truth when he says that magnitude is an accident, since it is accidentally predicated of a natural thing; therefore, the blessed Augustine can thus be explained.

In still another way it can be explained that through magnitude, by which created things are great, he does

dens absolutum inhaerens rebus creatis; sed per illam magnitudinem intelligit causam efficientem facientem eas esse magnas, de qua non est dubium quin alia res sit a rebus creatis quae participatione illius magnitudinis non quidem per informationem sed per realem dependentiam ad eam magnae sunt; et quod istam sententiam habeat, ultima verba eius sonant, quae ibi subdit, V., De Trinitate, Capitulo X. Unde dicit quod "illa est vera magnitudo, qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est, et qua mons est magnus quisquis magnus est; sed etiam qua magnum est quicquid aliud magnum dicitur; ut aliud sit illa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magnitudine magna dicuntur, quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt. Deus autem quia non est magnus ea magnitudine quae non est ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit Deus, tamen magnus est; alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam Deus. Deo autem non est aliquod maius; ea igitur magnitudine est magnus qua ipse est eadem magnitudo."

Ex istis verbis colligi potest quod beatus Augustinus loquitur de magnitudine qua res creatae causaliter magnae sunt; tamen quia loquitur de magnitudine "qua magnum est quicquid aliud magnum dicitur," sive sit res corporalis sive sit res spiritualis. Unde loquitur de magnitudine, sicut prius praemisit, qua magna est domus, qua magnus est mons, qua magnus est animus,

not understand one absolute accident inhering in created things; but through that magnitude he understands an efficient cause making these to be great, of which there is no doubt that there may be a thing other than created things, which are great by the participation of that magnitude, not indeed through information but through real dependence upon it; and that he may hold this opinion, his last words declare, which he adds there in the De Trinitate, V., Chapter X. Whence, he says that "that is true magnitude, by which not only great is a house which is great, and by which, whatever mountain is great, is great; but also by which great is whatever else is called great; as that magnitude may be one thing, another those which are called great from that magnitude; which magnitude certainly is primarily great and in a much more excellent way than those which are great by partaking of it. But since God is not great by this magnitude which is not Himself, so that God may be, as it were, a partaker of it, God is however great; otherwise that will be magnitude greater than God, but there is not anything greater than God; therefore, He is great by this magnitude by which He Himself is the same magnitude."

From these words it can be gathered that the blessed Augustine speaks of magnitude by which created things are causally great; for however he speaks of magnitude "by which great is whatever else is called great," whether it be a corporeal thing, or it be a spiritual thing. Whence, he speaks of the magnitude, as he premised before, by which a home is great, by which a mountain is great, by which a mind is great,

qui est res spiritualis, quamvis domus et mons sint res corporales.

Manifestum est autem quod nulla est magnitudo inhaerens substantiae tamquam subiecto, qua omne aliud magnum est quod magnum dicitur sive sit corporale sive sit spirituale. Non loquitur igitur de magnitudine quae inhaeret substantiae; sed de magnitudine quae est causa omnium magnorum et a qua "magnum est quicquid magnum dicitur." Quia sine ea nulla res magna multo magna est. Tamen quia loquitur beatus Augustinus de magnitudine quae "primitus est magna multoque excellentius quam" alia, qualis magnitudo non est aliquod accidens inhaerens substantiae, sicut enim nihil prius potest esse quam substantia, sic nihil naturaliter potest esse prius magnum quam substantia. Tum quia loquitur de magnitudine quae maior est illo quod est magnum quando magnitudo non est illud quod est magnum, constat quod nullum accidens inhaerens substantiae potest esse magis substantia cuius est accidens.

Patet igitur quod beatus Augustinus loquitur de magnitudine quae est causa quare aliae res creatae magnae sunt. Unde vult beatus Augustinus ostendere ibidem quod Deus nec causaliter nec aliquo modo magnus est aliqua magnitudine quae non est ipse Deus. Sed creaturae magnae sunt aliqua magnitudine quae facit eas esse magnas; quae tamen magnitudo non est ipsa res creata sed est "primitus magna multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione illius magnitudinis magna sunt."

Unde hoc vocabulum 'participatio' multum aequivoce accipitur in diversis locis tam a philosophis quam

which is a spiritual thing, although home and mountain may be corporeal things.

But it is manifest that there is no magnitude inhering in a substance as if in a subject, by which every other is great, which is called great, whether it be corporeal or it be spiritual. Therefore, he does not speak of magnitude which inheres in substance; but of magnitude which is the cause of all great things and by which "great is whatever is called great." For without it no thing great is by far great. However, because the blessed Augustine speaks of magnitude, which is "primarily great and in a much more excellent way than" another, magnitude of such a kind is not any accident inhering in a substance; for as nothing can be before substance, so nothing can naturally be great before substance. Then because he speaks of magnitude which is greater than that which is great when magnitude is not that which is great, it is established that no accident inhering in a substance can be more than the substance of which it is an accident.

Therefore, it is obvious that the blessed Augustine speaks of the magnitude which is the cause why other created things are great. Whence, the blessed Augustine wishes to show in the same place that God is neither causally nor in any mode great by some magnitude which is not God Himself. But creatures are great by some magnitude which makes them to be great; which magnitude is, however, not itself a created object, but "is primarily great and in a much more excellent way than those which are great by participation of that magnitude."

Whence, this term 'participation' is often accepted equivocally in various places by the philosophers as

a sanctis, de illi tamen modo causa brevitatis pertranseo.

Constat itaque quod duobus modis exponi potest beatus Augustinus; et altero illorum modorum exponi possunt omnes auctoritates sanctorum, quae videntur sonare vocaliter quod quantitas vel magnitudo est alia res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, et possunt expositiones probari per processus eorundem sanctorum in aliis locis, de quibus tamen ad praesens supersedeo. Nec est inconveniens exponere dicta sanctorum cum omnes posteriores eis hoc faciant; quamvis nonnulli non habeant intentionem sanctorum et diversi diversimode sentiant de intentione eorum, quamvis neutri reputentur haeretici.

well as by the Saints; yet for the sake of brevity I pass by the discussion of that mode.

And so it is well known that the blessed Augustine can be explained in two modes; and all the passages of the Saints can be explained by the second of those modes, which passages appear to call out loudly, that quantity or magnitude is another thing really distinct from substance and quality; and the expositions can be proved through the processes of the same Saints in other places; yet for the present I refrain from discussing them. Nor is there any inconsistency in explaining the statements of the Saints, since all the writers later than they make this statement, although some may not have the intention of the Saints, and various writers may think differently of the intention of them, although neither may be considered heretical.

CAPITULUM XXXV

Quomodo quantitas est distinctum praedicamentum a qualitate et substantia, non obstante quod nulla quantitas sit distincta a parte rei, a substantia et qualitate. In quo respondet ad sextum ostendens quod praedicamenta sunt signa de rebus praedicabilia

Illud quoque considerandum est: quomodo quantitas est distinctum praedicamentum a qualitate et substantia, non obstante quod nulla quantitas sit res distincta realiter a parte rei, a substantia et qualitate; quod potest declarari in simili ex dictis multorum catholicorum doctorum; nam, sicut saepe dictum est, relatio est praedicamentum distinctum a ceteris praedicamentis, et tamen secundum multos eorum relatio non est alia res distincta a rebus absolutis; poterit igitur quantitas esse distinctum praedicamentum, quamvis nulla quantitas sit alia res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate.

Item non est magis inconveniens praedicamenta distingui, quamvis distinctae res non correpondeant eis, quam species distingui quae distinctas res contentas sub se non habent; sed aliquando contingit species esse diversas, quamvis eadem res sub illis speciebus collocetur. Quod testimonio Iohannis Damasceni probatur, ait enim: "Locus est superficies aëris"; ex quo patet quod eadem res est locus et superficies; (hoc tamen non

CHAPTER XXXV

How quantity is a category distinct from quality and substance; notwithstanding that no quantity may be distinct from part of a thing, from substance and quality. In which there is a reply to the sixth argument, showing that categories are signs predicable of things

This must also be considered: how quantity is a category distinct from quality and substance, notwithstanding that no quantity may be a thing really distinct from part of a thing, from substance and quality, which can be declared in a similar way according to the statements of many Catholic doctors: for, as has often been said, relation is a category distinct from other categories, and yet according to many of them relation is not another thing distinct from absolute things: therefore, quantity could be a distinct category, although no quantity may be another thing really distinct from quality and substance.

Again, it is not more inconsistent for categories to be distinguished, although distinct things may not correspond to them, than for species to be distinguished, which do not have distinct things content under themselves; but it sometimes happens that species are diverse, although the same thing may be arranged under those species. Which is proved by the testimony of John of Damascus, for he says: "Place is a surface of air"; from which it is obvious that the same thing is a place and a surface; (yet, notwithstanding this, the

obstante, idem doctor cum aliis ponit locum et superficiem esse distinctas species quantitatis), et quantitas etiam continua et quantitas discreta sunt distinctae species; nulla tamen res correspondet quantitati continuae quin correspondeat alteri; nullum enim est continuum quin cum alio constituat numerum, secundum intentionem praesentis doctoris.

Idem etiam in diversis praedicamentis collocatur secundum eundem sanctum, sicut allegatum est prius; nullum est igitur inconveniens quod quantitas sit distinctum praedicamentum a qualitate et substantia, et tamen quod omnis quantitas sit res absoluta indistincta realiter a substantia et qualitate. Unde sciendum quod praedicamenta non sunt nisi quaedam praedicabilia et signa rerum, propter quod convenienter dicit Iohannes Damascenus: "Oportet cognoscere quod decem sunt omnia praedicamenta, id est, genera generalissima sub quibus refertur omnis vox simpliciter dicta." Unde vult idem sanctus, quod omnis vox, quae potest esse extremum propositionis vel esse illud per quod respondetur convenienter ad aliquam quaestionem factam per quamcumque interrogationem, sub aliquo praedicamento collocatur; et, per quae ad distinctas tales quaestiones per diversa interrogativa factas respondetur, sub diversis praedicamentis collocatur.

Unde omnia, per quae convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam de aliqua substantia per 'ubi,' collocantur in genere 'ubi'; et omnia, per quae convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quando,' reponuntur in genere 'quando'; et omnes voces, per quas respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quale,'

same Doctor posits with others that place and surface are distinct species of quantity), and also a continuous quantity and a discrete quantity are distinct species; yet no thing corresponds to a continuous quantity that may not correspond to the other; for nothing is continuous that may not constitute number with another, according to the intention of the present Doctor.

Again, the same thing is also placed in diverse categories according to the same Saint, as was asserted before; therefore, there is no inconsistency that quantity may be a category distinct from quality and substance, and yet that every quantity may be an absolute thing really not distinct from substance and quality. Whence, it must be known that there are no categories except certain predicables and signs of things, by virtue of which John of Damascus fittingly says: "It is necessary to know that there are in all ten categories; that is, very general genera under which every word simply stated belongs." Whence, the same Saint wishes, that every word, which can be called the extreme of a proposition or can be that through which an answer may be conveniently made to any question raised through any interrogation whatever, is placed under some category, and is placed under diverse categories through which an answer is made to such distinct questions raised through diverse interrogatives.

Whence, all words, through which an answer is conveniently made to the question raised concerning some substance per 'ubi,' are placed in the same genus, 'ubi'; and all words, through which an answer is conveniently made to the question raised per 'quando,' are arranged under the genus, 'quando'; and all words, through which an answer is made to the question

sunt in praedicamento 'qualitatis'; et omnes voces, per quas respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quantum' vel per 'quot' vel per aliquod tale interrogativum quod ponitur a grammaticis interrogativum quantitatis, collocantur in genere 'quantitatis.'

Et sic est de aliis vocibus collocatis in diversis praedicamentis, nisi forte deficiant nobis talia interrogativa, quia magnam penuriam vocabulorum habemus. Collocantur autem in diversis praedicamentis non tantum nomina sed etiam verba et aliae partes orationis, et aliquando voces compositae ex diversis partibus orationis, sicut frequenter voces compositae ex diversis praepositionibus et casualibus suis; propter quod postquam memoratus doctor dixit in Logica sua, Capitulo XXXII.: "Quod omnis vox, scilicet, incomplexa sub illa praedicamenta refertur." Exemplicat dicens: "Sunt autem haec: 'substantia' ut lapis; 'quantitas' ut duo et tria; 'ad aliquid' ut pater et filius; 'qualitas' ut album et nigrum; 'ubi' ut in Tyro et Damasco, hoc autem loci ostensio est; 'quando' ut heri, cras, hoc autem temporis ostensum est; 'habere' ut vestimentum induere; 'situm' esse ut sedere vel stare; 'facere' ut urere; 'pati' ut uri." Ex quo colligitur quod adverbia, ut 'heri,' 'cras'; verba, ut 'urere,' 'uri'; composita ex praepositionibus et casualibus suis ut 'in Tyro' et 'in Damasco,' sub aliquo illorum praedicamentorum continentur. Et ideo praedicamenta non sunt nisi quaedam praedicabilia et signa rerum et incomplexa, ex quibus fiunt complexiones verae et falsae; huiusmodi autem incomplexa possunt esse distincta in tantum quod praedicatio unius de altero est impossibilis; quamvis nulla

raised per 'quale,' are in the category 'qualitas'; and all words through which an answer is made to the question raised per 'quantum' or per 'quot' or any such interrogative which is posited by the grammarians as an interrogative of quantity, are placed in the genus 'quantity as.'

And thus it is of other words placed in diverse categories, unless, per chance, such interrogatives may fail us, because we have a great dearth of terms. But not only nouns are placed in diverse categories, but even verbs and other parts of speech, and sometimes words composed of diverse parts of speech, as frequently words composed of diverse prepositions and their cases; by virtue of which the celebrated Doctor afterwards stated in his Logic in Chapter XXXII.: "That every word, namely, simple, belongs under those categories." He further explains, saying: "They are indeed these: 'substance' as stone; 'quantity' as two or three; 'relation' as father and son; 'quality' as white and black; 'place' as in Tyre in Damascus, but this is a manifestation of place; 'time' as yesterday, tomorrow, but this is a manifestation of time; 'possession' as to put on a garment; 'situation' as to sit or to stand; 'action' as to burn; 'passion' as to be burned." From this it is gathered that adverbs as 'yesterday,' 'tomorrow'; verbs as 'to burn,' 'to be burned'; composites of prepositions and their cases as 'in Tyre,' 'in Damascus,' are contained under one of those categories. And indeed there are no categories except certain predicables and signs of things and simple terms; from which are made combinations true and false; but simple terms of this kind can be distinct to such a degree that the predication of one of another is

res una per unum significatur quin eadem significetur per reliquum, sicut nulla res substantialis nec accidentalis significatur per hoc nomen 'angelus,' quin significetur per hoc nomen 'angeli,' nec econtrario. Ista tamen est impossibilis, 'angelus est angeli,' et econtrario; et ideo nullum inconveniens est ponere quod distincta praedicamenta eandem rem important; non obstante, igitur quod substantia, qualitas et quantitas sint distincta praedicamenta; poterit tamen omnis quantitas esse res non distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate. Est autem advertendum quod talia praedicamenta non sunt tantum signa ad placitum instituta, cuiusmodi sunt voces, sed etiam sunt conceptus seu intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturaliter significantia res; et ideo sicut voces possunt distingui non obstante idemptitate signatorum, ita conceptus seu intentiones animae possunt distingui, quamvis distinctas res non significant. Et sic distinguuntur haec nomina 'substantia,' 'qualitas' et 'quantitas,' sint distinctae quamvis res significatae non sint distinctae. Nec propter hoc sunt nomina synonyma, nam hoc nomen 'quantitas' aliquid connotat vel dat intelligere, scilicet, partem rei situaliter distare a parte, quod nec per hoc nomen 'substantia,' nec per hoc nomen 'qualitas' connotatur vel datur intelligi; propter quod ista esset vera, 'tam substantia quam qualitas est,' non obstante, quod haec sit falsa, 'quantitas est.'

impossible; although no thing one through one is signified, but that the same thing may be signified by the rest; as no substantial or accidental thing is signified through this name 'angelus' but that it may be signified through this name 'angeli,' and conversely. Yet this is impossible, 'angelus is angeli,' and conversely; and indeed it is not inconsistent to posit that distinct predicables imply the same thing; notwithstanding, therefore, that substance, quality, and quantity may be distinct categories; yet every quantity could be a thing not really distinct from substance and quality. But it must be observed that such categories are not only signs fixed arbitrarily, of whatever kind the words are; but are also concepts or intentions of the mind which are signs naturally signifying things; and indeed as words can be distinguished, notwithstanding the identity of the things signified, so concepts or intentions of the mind can be distinguished, although they do not signify distinct things. And thus these names 'substance,' 'quality,' and 'quantity' may be distinct, although the things signified may not be distinct. Nor are names synonyms by virtue of this; for this name 'quantity' connotes or enables one to understand something; namely, part of a thing separate in situation from a part, which is connoted or is able to be understood neither through this name 'substance' nor through this name 'quality'; by virtue of which this could be true, 'substance as well as quality is'; notwithstanding that this may be false, 'quantity is.'

CAPITULUM XXXVI

Quod non debet praedicta opinio abiici tamquam haeretica, contra quosdam opinionem illam tamquam haereticam condemnantes; et per hoc solvitur VII ratio supra Capitulo XXX. adducta

Post praedicta restat videre et ostendere quod non oportet istam opinionem abiicere tamquam haereticam, quamvis multi doctores moderni scribentes illam improbent et impugnent. Primo, quia nullus doctor multum reputatus istam opinionem tamquam haereticam damnat quamvis neget eam sicut ceteras opiniones theologicas et philosophicas quas non intelligit esse veras. Immo quidam doctor innuit istam opinionem probabilem esse, scilicet, Scotus Libro IV., Distinctione XII., Quaestione II., et dat modum solvendi multa argumenta quae possent fieri contra eam, sicut patebit inferius. Idem etiam doctor recitat eam et improbat sicut ceteras opiniones theologorum catholicorum, quas credit esse falsas.

Item quamvis repugnaret eam esse haereticam, sicut nullus eorum facit, non esset standum eorum iudicio, cum ad solam Romanam Ecclesiam pertineat quaestionem fidei terminare, dicente Innocentio Papa, Causa XXIV., Quaestione I., Capitulo XII., 'Quotiens.' "Quotiens," inquit, "fidei ratio ventilatur, arbitror omnes

CHAPTER XXXVI

That the previous opinion ought not to be rejected as heretical, contrary to certain writers who condemn that opinion as heretical; and through this the seventh reason, adduced before in Chapter XXX, is explained

After the previous statements it remains to see and to show that it is not necessary to reject this opinion as heretical, although many modern Doctors writing of that may condemn and oppose it. First, because no doctor of much reputation condemns this opinion as heretical, although he may deny it as he may deny other opinions of theology and of philosophy, which he does not understand to be true. On the contrary, a certain Doctor intimates that that opinion is probable; namely, Scotus, in Book IV., Distinction XII., Question II., and he presents a mode of explaining many arguments which might be offered against it, as will appear later. Moreover, the same Doctor cites it, and disapproves of it, as of other opinions of Catholic theologians, which he believes are false.

Again, although he might oppose this opinion as heretical, as none of them does, it would not necessarily be settled by their judgment, since it may belong to the Roman Church alone to determine a question of faith, as Pope Innocent says in Causa XXIV., Quæstione I., Capitulo XII., 'Quotiens.' "As often," he says, "as a ground of faith is under discussion, I think that all our brothers and our fellow bishops

fratres et coepiscopos nostros non nisi ad Petrum, id est, sui nominis auctoritatem et honoris debere referre, veluti nunc retulit vestra dilectio, quod per totum mundum possit ecclesiis omnibus prodesse." Contra quod obiiciens glossa ibidem dicit. Videtur contra hoc esse extra De Haereticis, 'Ad abolendam.' "Nam ibi innuitur quod illi vitandi sunt tamquam haeretici, quos episcopi vitandos dixerunt." Unde dicit ibidem Lucius Papa: "Universos, qui de sacramento corporis et sanguinis Domini nostri Iesu Christi vel de baptismate seu de peccatorum remissione per debitam confessionem aut de matrimonio seu de reliquis ecclesiasticis sacramentis, aliter docere aut sentire non metuerunt quam sacrosancta Ecclesia Romana praedicat et observat, et generaliter quoscumque eadem Romana Ecclesia vel singuli episcopi per diœceses suas sum concilio clericorum vel clerici episcopi sede vacante cum concilio, si oportuerit, vicinorum episcoporum haereticos nuntiaverunt, vinculo perpetui anathematis innodamus."

Ex istis verbis colligi potest quod ad episcopos et clericos pertinet sede vacante quaestionem fidei terminare. Sed ad illud respondet prae-allegata glossa dicens: "Quod illud intelligendum est quando tale quid dicunt quod certum est esse haeresim; hic vero ubi dubium est." Argumentum ad hoc extra De Haereticis, 'Cum Christus,' in glossa.

Ex qua colligi potest quod episcopi, de haereticis asserentibus aliquid quod manifestum est esse haere-

ought to report only to Peter, that is, to the authority of his name and position, just as now your love prompted, that it may be able to be of profit to all the churches throughout the whole world." In the same place a gloss objecting states the opposite of this. The opposite of this seems to be in the margin of the De Hereticis, 'Ad abolendum': "For there it is intimated that those must be shunned as heretics, whom the bishops have declared are to be shunned." Whence, Pope Lucian says in the same place: "All who, concerning the sacrament of the body and the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ or concerning baptism or concerning the remission of sins through obligatory confession or concerning matrimony or the rest of the ecclesiastical sacraments, have not feared to teach or to think otherwise than the Sacrosanct Roman Church prescribes and observes, and in general whomsoever the same Roman Church, either each bishop individually throughout his diocese with a council of clergy, or the clerical bishops in a vacant See with a council of neighboring bishops, if it will have been necessary, have declared heretics, we condemn with a bond of perpetual anathema."

From these words it might be gathered that it pertains to the bishops and to the clergy in a vacant See to determine a question of faith. But the gloss previously cited replies to that when it states: "That that must be understood, when they decide any such question, which is certain to be heresy; but this when there is doubt." The argument for this is in the margin of the De Hereticis, 'Cum Christus,' in the gloss.

From which it can be concluded that with respect to heretics asserting something which is manifestly a

sim, possunt inquirere et eos confessos vel convictos condemnare tamquam haereticos, qui ex tunc auctoritate Papae excommunicantur. Sed quaestionem motam de aliquo articulo, de quo sunt opiniones inter sapientes catholicos; non est eis licitum terminare; dicente glossa ubi prius: "Aliud est quaestionem de fide motam terminare quod nulli praeterquam Romanae sedi permittitur sicut hic dicitur; aliud est ipsam sine defensione ventilare, quod patriarchae et primates possunt facere." Et sic respondunt ad illud Clementis Papae qui videtur innuere quod ad episcopos pertinet quaestionem fidei terminare, Distinctione LXXX., 'In illis,' ubi dicit sic: "In illis vero civitatibus, in quibus olim apud ethnicos primiflamines eorum atque primi legis doctores erant, episcoporum primates atque patriarchas beatus Petrus poni praecepit, qui reliquorum episcoporum causas et maiora negotia in fide agitarent." Ex ista auctoritate posset aliquis credere, quod ad episcopos pertinet quaestionem fidei terminare, quod non est verum. Unde respondet ibidem glossa: "In fide, id est, fideliter," et quod "quaestio fidei sit" ad sedem apostolicam "referenda," ut probat illud, Causa XVI., Quaestione I., 'Frater noster,' et ideo dicit: "Sed expone hoc, 'in fide, id est, fideliter'; vel possunt agitare causas fidei sed non procedere ad sententiam vel di-

heresy, the bishops can examine and condemn as heretics those who have confessed or have been convicted, who are then to be excommunicated by the authority of the Pope. But it is not allowed them to determine a question raised about some article concerning which there are opinions among the Catholic sages; where the gloss before says: "It is one thing to decide a question raised concerning the faith, which is the privilege of no one other than the Roman See, as is here said; it is another thing to discuss it without a defense, which the Patriarchs and Primates can do." And thus they reply to that decree of Pope Clement, who seems to intimate that it belongs to the bishops to decide a question of faith, in Distinction LXXX., 'In illis,' where he says as follows: "But in those states in which formerly their chief priests and also the chief doctors of the law were among the heathen, the blessed Peter advised that the primates of the bishops and also the patriarchs be appointed, who should consider the causes of the other bishops and the more important matters of the faith." According to this authority anyone might believe that it belongs to the bishops to decide a question of faith; which is not true. Whence, the gloss in the same place replies: "In faith, that is, faithfully," and that "a question of faith" must be referred to the Apostolic See, as Causa XVI., Question I., 'Frater noster' proves that; and for that reason it says: "But explain this, 'in faith, that is, faithfully'"; either they can discuss the causes of faith, but they can not proceed to a decision, or they can distinguish who are those who doubt; for if they are laymen, it appears that the bishops can decide according to the gloss in the margin

stinguere qui sunt illi qui dubitant; nam si laici sunt, videtur quod episcopi possunt determinare extra De Haereticis, 'Ad abolendam'; si clerici, Papa; extra eodem titulo, 'Cum Christus' "; haec glossa.

Patet igitur quod, cum controversia sit inter theologos de aliquo articulo an sit consonus an dissonus fidei Christianae, ad summum pontificem est recurrendum. Cum enim officium inquisitionis de haeretica pravitate aliquando simplicibus vel non magnis doctoribus committatur, absurdum videtur quod ad talem inquisitionem pertinet quamcumque quaestionem difficilem et profundam de articulis quibuscumque pertinentibus ad theologiam auctoritate propria terminare, et quemcumque magnum et in theologia famosum et dignum tam ratione vitae quam scientiae doctoris officio per universitatem solemnem approbatum, si suae opinioni contradiceret, tamquam haereticum condemnare. Videtur igitur ad Romanum pontificem recurrendum, quando quaestio ventilatur de aliquo quod non est in scripturis canonicis expressum, nec est per Romanam Ecclesiam determinatum, quod etiam videmus fieri modernis temporibus.

Non ergo standum est iudicio modernorum aliquorum, qui damnant praedictam opinionem, maxime cum multi doctores Catholici scientia et vita laudabiles hanc opinionem tenuerunt; et, ut per relationem fide dignam intellexi, quidam doctor magnus, archiepiscopus Lugdunensis, per Romanam Ecclesiam canonizatus hanc opinionem tenuit et in scriptis reliquit; cuius ta-

of the De Hereticis, 'Ad abolendum'; and if the clergy, the Pope; in the margin of the same title, 'Cum Christus,' this gloss.

It is, therefore, obvious that, when there may be a controversy among theologians concerning some article as to whether it may agree or disagree with the Christian faith, it must be referred to the Supreme Pontiff. For when the office of inquisition of heretical perversity may be at any time entrusted to the unlearned or inferior teachers, it seems absurd that it belongs to such an inquisition to decide by proper authority any difficult and profound question concerning any articles whatever pertaining to theology, and to condemn as a heretic any one great and famous in theology and worthy because of his understanding of life as well as the office of a doctor of science, and approved by an established university, if he should contradict its opinion. Therefore, it appears that it must be referred to the Roman Pontiff, when a question is discussed concerning something which is not expressed in the canonical scriptures and is not determined through the Roman Church, which we also see is done in modern times.

Therefore, it must not stand upon the judgment of any modern writers who condemn the previous opinion, especially since many Catholic doctors, praiseworthy because of knowledge and of life, have held this opinion; and, as I have understood through a relation worthy of faith, a certain great Doctor, the Archbishop of Lyons, canonized by the Roman Church, held this opinion and left it in his writings; whose book containing the aforesaid opinion I have

men librum praedictam opinionem continentem non vidi, sed spero in brevi recipere.

Item multo magis licitum est negare dicta illorum qui mutuo se reprobant et quorum nonnulli doctrinam suspectam et ab universitatibus solemnibus condemnatam tenent quam Sanctorum Patrum dicta antequam sint a Romana Ecclesia authenticati, quod tamen licitum est, quam dicta Sanctorum Patrum postquam sint a sede apostolica approbata. Quo modo debeat firma fide tenere, dicente Innocentio extra De Constitutionibus super illud capitulum 'Ne innitaris.' "Nota," inquit, "quod dictis Sanctorum Patrum vel aliorum ab ecclesia receptorum stare licet."

Et qui dicit, quod ipsi dicunt, non potest determinate redargui nisi eadem retractaverunt, sicut Augustinus multa retractavit de dictis suis vel nisi sint per ecclesiam correcta. Si vero diversas opiniones inter se habent ut de corpore beatae Mariae Virginis assumpto vel de Salomone damnato, licitum est cuicumque quod vult dicere; si vero nulla diversitas inter sanctos invenitur, necesse est usque ad minimum iota servare quod dicunt, postquam opuscula eorum sunt a sancta ecclesia authenticata. Olim autem antequam essent authenticata, licitum erat ea tenere vel non. Non igitur potest aliquis redargui quamvis doctores non authenticos ab Ecclesia Romana neget. Unde est aliquorum modernorum detestanda praesumptio, qui se supra se

not, however, seen; but I hope to receive it in a brief time.

It is also much more permissible to deny the statements of those who mutually condemn one another and of whom some hold a doctrine suspected and condemned by the established universities than the statements of the Holy Fathers before they be approved by the Apostolic See, which however is permitted, than the statements of the Holy Fathers after they may be approved by the Apostolic See. How one may be obligated to hold with devout faith, Innocent says in the margin of the De Constitutionibus on that Chapter, 'Ne innitaris.' "Observe," he says, "that it is permitted to stand upon the statements of the Holy Fathers or of others acknowledged by the Church."

And he, who says that which they themselves say, can not be determinately contradicted, unless they have retracted the same, as Augustine has retracted many of his statements, or unless they be corrected by the Church. If indeed they among themselves have diverse opinions, as concerning the assumption of the body of the blessed Virgin Mary or concerning the condemnation of Salome, it is permitted to anyone to say what he pleases; if indeed no diversity is found among the Saints, it is necessary to observe even to the smallest iota that which they say, after their little works are authorized by the Holy Church. But formerly, before they were authorized, it was permitted to hold these opinions or not. Therefore, any one can not be contradicted, although he may deny the Doctors not authorized by the Roman Church. Whence, the presumption of some modern writers must be depreciated, who puffing themselves above themselves, de-

extollentes, cupientes soli vocari rabbi, omnem opinionem a suis dogmatibus dissentientem agitati invidia depravantes. Quia per rationem nesciunt improbare tamquam periculosam et haereticam, caninis latratibus lacerant incessanter non attendentes quod pater sanctissimus et doctor eximius beatus Augustinus nec suis litteris nec aliorum episcoporum sic voluit inserviri, quin aliqua possent in eis iusto iudicio et nulla temeritate culpari. Unde dicit sanctus Augustinus et habetur De Constitutionibus, Distinctione IX., 'Noli': "Noli," inquit, "litteris meis quasi canonicis scripturis inservire."

Item idem libro primo De Trinitate Capitulo II.: "Nec pigebit," inquit, "me, si ubi haesito quaerere nec pudebit, si ubi erro, discere."

Item ibidem Capitulo III.: "Qui vero," inquit, "haec legens dicit: intelligo quicquid dictum sit, sed non vere dictum est; asserat, ut placet, sententiam suam, et redarguat meam, si potest. Quod si cum charitate et veritate fecerit, mihique etiam, si in hac vita maneo, cognoscendum curaverit facere, uberrimum fructum huius mei laboris cepero. Quod si mihi non potuerit, quibus illud, ut poterit, me volente ac libente praestiterit. 'Lego' tamen 'in lege Domini meditor,' si non 'die ac nocte, saltem, quibus temporum particulis possum,'" et cetera.

Item idem in epistola ad Vincentium et habetur De

siring that they alone be called rabbi, inspired by envy, condemning every opinion dissenting from their teachings. Since they do not know how through reason to refute it as dangerous and heretical, they are incessantly rending it to pieces by their dog-like barkings, not considering that the most Holy Father and the illustrious Doctor, the blessed Augustine, wished thus to be devoted neither to his own writings nor to those of other bishops, but that some things in their writings might be able to be censured by a just judgment and with no rashness. Whence, Saint Augustine says as cited in Distinction IX., 'Noli.': "Do not," he says, "servilely regard my writings as though canonical scriptures."

Again, the same writer in the first book of the De Trinitate in the second Chapter: "I shall not be ashamed to ask," he says, "if in any place I am undecided; nor shall I be ashamed to learn, if in any place I am in error."

Again, in the same book in Chapter III.: "Indeed he, who," he says, "on reading these statements says: I understand whatever may be said, but it has not been truly said, asserts, as it pleases, his own opinion, and refutes mine, if he can. But if he would do this with charity and truth and would take care to make it known to me also, if I am still alive, I shall then have received the most abundant fruit of this my task. But if it would not be possible for me to know; willingly and gladly would I be that he should be responsible for informing them, as he will be able. I, however, meditate on the law of the Lord, if not day and night, at least during those moments of time I can," et cetera.

Again, the same author says, as cited in a letter to

Constitutionibus, Distinctione IX., 'Negare': "Negare," inquit, "non possum, nec debeo; sicut in ipsis maioribus, ita multa esse in tam multis opusculis meis, quae possunt iusto iudicio et nulla temeritate culpari." Item idem, Distinctione IX., Capitulo 'Ego solus': "Alios autem," inquit, "ita lego ut quantalibet sanctitate qualibet doctrinave polleant, non ideo verum putem quia ipsi ita senserunt; sed quia mihi per alios auctores vel per canonicas scripturas vel probabiles rationes, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt."

Item idem de unico baptismo et habetur Distinctione IX., 'Quis': "Quis nesciat" per "episcoporum," inquit, "litteras quae post confirmatum canonem vel scriptae sunt vel scribentur, et per sermonem forte sapientiorem cuiuslibet in ea re peritioris, et per aliorum episcoporum graviorem auctoritatem doctioremque prudentiam et per concilia licere reprehendi, si quis forte in eis a veritate deviatus est."

Item idem in epistola ad Vincentium et habetur Distinctione IX., 'Noli frater': "Non enim sic," inquit, "leguntur scripta sanctorum episcoporum, tamquam ita ex eis testimonium proferatur, ut contra sentire non liceat, sic ubi forte aliter sapuerint quam veritas postulat. In eo quippe numero sumus, ut non dedignemur etiam nobis dictum ab Apostolo accipere. Et si quid aliter sapitis, hoc quoque vobis Deus revelabit."

Vincent in the De Constitutionibus, Distinction IX., 'Negare': "I can not deny," he says, "nor ought I, as in the larger works themselves, so there are many statements in so many of my smaller works which can be censured with judgment and with no rashness." Again, the same author in Distinction IX., Chapter 'Ego solus': "I read others," he says, "so that no matter with how much sanctity or with whatever doctrine they may prevail, I may not indeed think a thing true because they themselves think so; but because they have been able to convince me through other authors or through the canonical or through probable reasons, that they do not swerve from the truth."

Again, the same author says of individual baptism, as cited in Distinction IX., 'Quis': "Who may not know," he says, "through the letters of the bishops which either were written after the canon was confirmed or will be written, and through, perhaps, the wiser language of any one more experienced in this thing, and through the weightier authority and more acute sagacity and through councils of some of the bishops, that it is permitted to censure anyone who, among them, perchance, is diverted from the truth."

Again, the same author in a letter to Vincent says, as cited in Distinction IX., 'Noli frater': "The writings of the Holy Bishops," he says, "are not thus read, as if testimony may be so cited from them, that it may not be permitted to think the opposite, where, perchance, they may thus have been understood other than the truth demands. We are indeed in this number, that we may not disdain even to take to ourselves the saying of the Apostle. And if you are wise in any other matter, this also God will reveal to you."

Item in epistola ad Fortunatum idem Augustinus et habetur Distinctione IX., 'Neque quorumlibet': "Neque," inquit, "quorumlibet disputationes, quamvis catholicorum et laudatorum hominum, veluti scripturas canonicas, habere debemus, ut nobis non liceat salva honorificentia, quae illis debetur hominibus, aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare atque respuere, si forte inveniremus, quod aliter senserint quam veritas habet, divino adiutorio vel ab aliis intellecta vel a nobis. Talis ego sum in scriptis aliorum, quales volo esse intellectores meorum."

Ex istis auctoritatibus pluribusque aliis evidenter colligi potest quod scripta quorumcumque antequam sint a Romana Ecclesia authenticata licitum est improbare atque respuere. Et ideo quamvis multi teneant oppositum propositae opinionis, non oportet eam contemnere, maxime cum sit consona dictis sanctorum et doctorum ab ecclesia receptorum. Hoc tamen fateor, quod si posset ostendi quod sit de mente cuiuscumque doctoris ab apostolica sede recepti, quod quantitas est alia res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, paratus sum hoc defendere et tenere, quamvis nolim propter dictum cuiuslibet de plebe meum intellectum captivare et contra dictamen rationis aliquid affirmare, nisi Romana Ecclesia hoc doceat esse tenendum, quia maior est Ecclesiae Romanae auctoritas quam tota ingenii humani capacitas.

Again, in a letter to Fortunatus the same Augustine says, as cited in Distinction IX., 'Neque quorumlibet': "We ought," he says, "not to regard the discussions of each and every one, even though Catholics and noteworthy men, as we ought to hold the canonical scriptures, that it may not be allowed to us with the proper regard which is due those men, to reject and also to condemn anything in their writings, if we, perchance, might discover that they should think otherwise than the truth has it, as understood either by others or by us with divine help. Such as I am with respect to the writings of others, such I wish the judges of my own writings to be."

According to these authorities and very many others it evidently can be gathered that it is permitted to censure and also to condemn the writings of any one before they may be authorized by the Roman Church. And indeed although many may hold the opposite of the opinion proposed, it is not necessary to condemn this opinion, especially since it may thus concur with the statements of Saints and Doctors accepted by the Church. Yet I confess this, that if it could be able to be shown that it may be from the mind of any Doctor accepted by the Apostolic See, that quantity is another absolute thing really distinct from substance and quality, I am prepared to defend and to hold this, although I am unwilling by virtue of the dictum of any one of the plebs, to hold in check my intellect and to affirm something contrary to a dictate of reason, unless the Roman Church may teach that this view must be held; for the authority of the Roman Church is greater than the whole capacity of human genius.

CAPITULUM XXXVII

Quod praedicta opinio non contradicit experientiae, et solvitur ratio octava supra Capitulo XXX. recitata

Ex superioribus faciliter videri potest, quod ponere quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate experientiae non contradicit; nam, divisa substantia sine partis amissione, non oportet plus quantitatem quam substantiam perdi. Ita enim potest quantitas dividi sine partis amissione sicut substantia; non enim quandocumque lignum subdividitur, oportet aliquam partem absolutam corrumpi.

Possibile est etiam quod substantia, quae primo est maioris quantitatis, fiat minoris sine cuiuscumque rei absolutae corruptione, quod in condensatione rei patet. Nam re aliqua densata inconveniens est ponere quod tota quantitas praecedens corrumpatur; oportet igitur quod quantitas aliqua praecedens remaneat; aut igitur tota sine novitate cuiuscumque partis manet; et tunc res fit minoris quantitatis sine corruptione alicuius rei absolutae, et per consequens propter hoc non oportet quantitatem distingui a substantia, aut remanet quantitas praecedens ita tamen quod aliqua praecedentis quantitatis corrumpatur pars quod stare non potest. Quia si aliqua pars praecedentis quantitatis corrumpatur, accipio illam partem substantiae quae primo erat primum subiectum illius quantitatis sive illius partis

CHAPTER XXXVII

That the previous opinion is not contrary to experience, and the eighth reason, cited before in Chapter XXX, is explained

From the previous arguments it can easily be seen that it is not contrary to experience to posit that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality; for, when substance is divided without the loss of a part, it is not more necessary for quantity than for substance to be destroyed. For quantity, as substance, can be thus divided without the loss of part; for whenever wood is divided, it is not necessary for any absolute thing to be destroyed.

It is also possible that a substance, which at first is of a greater quantity, may become that of a smaller without the corruption of any absolute thing; which is obvious in the condensation of a thing. For when anything is condensed, it is inconsistent to posit that the whole preceding quantity may be corrupted; therefore, it is necessary that some preceding quantity may remain, or therefore, the whole remains without the newness of any part; and then a thing becomes a smaller quantity without the corruption of any absolute thing, and consequently by virtue of this it is not necessary for quantity to be distinguished from substance; or the preceding quantity remains so, however, that some part of the preceding quantity may be corrupted, which can not stand. Because if any part of a preceding quantity be corrupted, I take that part of a substance which was at first the primary subject of

quantitatis; et quaero aut modo remanet sine quantitate; quod dari non potest quia tunc naturaliter substantia vel pars substantiae, quae prius erat quanta, fieret non quanta ipsa manente, quod est falsum et impossibile; aut est subiectum alicuius quantitatis partis, et tunc vel novae, quod dari non potest, quia non est maior ratio quod una pars condensati recipiat novam quantitatem quam alia; et ita oportet quod vel tota substantia secundum quamlibet sui partem recipiat novam quantitatem vel secundum naturam; vel est subiectum alicuius partis prae-existentis, quod stare non potest, quia tunc aliqua pars quantitatis transmutaret a subiecto in subiectum quod est impossible per naturam quamvis Deus posset hoc facere; sed Deus res administrat ut eas proprios motus agere sinat.

Relinquitur igitur ex omnibus praedictis quod, quando res aliqua densatur et fit minoris quantitatis, non deperditur res aliqua absoluta nec corrumpitur; sed sine omni corruptione rei absolutae eadem res, quae primo erat maioris, quantitatis, est postea minoris quantitatis per hoc, quod partes eiusdem rei magis distabant situaliter prius quam nunc. Et ita patet evidenter quod propter talem experientiam non oportet ponere quantitatem esse aliam rem absolutam a qualitate et substantia.

Immo propter experientiam oportet ponere quod quantitas non est alia res absoluta deferens qualitates et distincta realiter a substantia, cuius substantiae aliqua pars vel tota perdatur quando aliqua substantia

that quantity or of that part of the quantity; and I ask whether it now remains without quantity, which can not be granted; for then a substance or part of a substance, which was before a quantum, would naturally not become a quantum, if it itself remains, which is false and impossible; or it is the subject of some part of a quantity, and then even of a new part, which can not be granted; for there is no greater reason that one part of a condensed may take on a new quantity than another; and so it is necessary that either a whole substance according to any part of itself or according to nature take on a new quantity, or is the subject of some pre-existing thing, which can not obtain; for then some part of a quantity would pass from subject into subject, which is impossible through nature, although God could be able to do this; but God administers things that He may allow them to control their own proper movements.

Therefore, according to all the previous statements it remains that, when some thing is condensed and becomes a smaller quantity, no absolute thing is lost or corrupted; but the same thing, which was at first a greater quantity, is afterwards a smaller quantity without the entire corruption of an absolute thing through this, that parts of the same thing were before more separate in situation than now. And so it is evidently obvious that by virtue of such an experience it is not necessary to posit that quantity is an absolute thing other than quality and substance.

On the contrary, by virtue of experience it is necessary to posit that quantity is not another absolute thing bearing qualities and really distinct from substance, of whose substance some part or the whole

sit minoris quantitatis quam prius. Nam per experientiam patet quod aliquando aliqua res fit minoris quantitatis, quamvis nulla pars albedinis vel saporis vel alia talis qualitatis deperdatur. Quo concesso quaero, aut quaelibet pars quantitatis praecedentis manet nunc sicut prius, aut non. Si dicas quod quaelibet pars quantitatis praecedentis manet, oportet te concedere quod, quando res fit minoris quantitatis, nulla pars quantitatis deperditur, quod est propositum. Si autem dicas quod aliqua pars quantitatis praecedentis deperditur vel corrumpitur, et manifestum est quod non est maior ratio quod una pars corrumpitur quam alia; igitur tota corrumpitur, quod est inconveniens.

Similiter sive tota quantitas praecedens corrumpatur sive pars tantum. Cum ad destructionem subiecti primi et immediati sequatur destructio accidentis in eo existentis, sequitur quod vel tota albedo vel pars eius corrumpitur quandocumque res aliqua condensatur. Et similiter oportet hoc concedere de sapore et de qualibet qualitate sensibili, quod est contra experientiam; est itaque contra experientiam dicere quod, quandocumque aliqua substantia condensatur vel fit minoris quantitatis, aliqua res absoluta deferens qualitates deperdatur. Et ideo consonum est experientiae quod, quando aliqua substantia sine amissione alicuius partis substantiae fit minoris quantitatis per condensationem vel per alium modum, nulla res absoluta deferens qualitates corrumpitur nec secundum se totam nec secundum partes eius; sicut consonum est experientiae quod

may be destroyed, when some substance may be a quantity smaller than before. For it is obvious through experience that sometimes some thing becomes a less quantity, although no part of whiteness or of taste or of another like quality may be lost. If this is admitted, I ask whether or not each preceding part remains now as before. If you say that each part of the preceding quantity remains, it is necessary to concede that, when a thing becomes a smaller quantity, no part of the quantity is lost, which is the proposition.

But if you say that some part of the preceding quantity is lost or corrupted, and it is manifest that there is no greater reason that one part is corrupted than another; therefore, the whole is corrupted, which is inconsistent.

Similarly I ask whether the entire preceding quantity be corrupted or only a part. Since, at the destruction of a primary and immediate subject, there may follow a destruction of an accident existing in that, it follows that either the whole whiteness or a part of it is corrupted whenever any thing is condensed. And similarly it is necessary to concede this of taste and of any sensible quality, which is contrary to experience; and so it is contrary to experience to say that whenever any substance is condensed or becomes a smaller quantity, some absolute thing bearing qualities may be destroyed. And, indeed, it is in harmony with experience that, when any substance becomes a smaller quantity through condensation or through another mode without the loss of any part of a substance, no absolute thing bearing qualities is corrupted, neither as regards itself as a whole nor as regards its parts; as it is in agreement with experience that then many

qualitates multae tunc nec secundum se totas nec secundum partes suas destruuntur vel amittuntur. Et ideo substantia illa non fit minoris quantitatis per alicuius accidentis absoluti deperditionem sed per hoc, quod partes illius substantiae minus distant situaliter nunc quam prius; et eodem modo partes qualitatum extensarum in ista substantia minus distant nunc quam prius sine cuiuscumque accidentis absoluti destructione vel amissione.

Et si quaeras quare nunc est substantia minoris quantitatis quam prius, si nullam rem perdidit, dicendum est quod hoc est virtute causae agentis quae, sicut rem aliquam potest movere localiter, ita potest appropinquare partes ad invicem quae prius magis distabant. Et ideo istam rem esse minoris quantitatis nunc quam prius, non est aliud quam partes illius rei minus distare localiter vel situaliter nunc quam prius.

Nec ad hoc non relinquitur aliquid nisi partes, quae distant, et agens faciens effective ipsas distare una cum causa finali. Immo mirum videtur quod una res vilis creata posset distendere istas partes substantiae; et tamen omnipotentia Dei non posset facere ipsas easdem partes speciei distare nisi coniungeret unam talem rem distinctam ab eis.

qualities neither as regards themselves as wholes nor as regards their parts are destroyed or lost. And indeed that substance does not become a smaller quantity through the destruction of any absolute accident, but through this, that parts of that substance are now less separate in situation than before; and in the same mode the parts of extended qualities in this substance are now less separate than before without the destruction or loss of any absolute accident at all.

And if you ask in what way substance is now a quantity smaller than before, if it has lost no thing, it must be said that this is by virtue of an active cause which, as it can move some thing locally, so it possible for parts reciprocally to approach which were before more separate. And, therefore, for this thing to be a smaller quantity now than before, is not other than for the parts of that thing to be less separate locally or in situation now than before.

Nor is any thing required for these except parts, which are separate, and an agent effectively causing them to be separate, together with a final cause. On the contrary, it appears wonderful that a single cheap created thing might be able to distend those parts of a substance; and yet the omnipotence of God might not be able to make the very same parts of a species to be separate, unless He should join one such thing distinct from them.

CAPITULUM XXXVIII

Quomodo omnes longitudines sunt eiusdem speciei et quomodo aliquae differunt specie, et solvitur IX. ratio Capitulo XXX. adducta

Post haec videndum est quomodo omnes longitudines sunt eiusdem speciei; et quomodo aliquae differunt specie. Unde notandum est quod, sicut probatum est per Iohannem Damascenum, eadem res secundum aliam et aliam intentionem potest esse in diversis praedicamentis. Et per consequens duae res eiusdem praedicamenti possunt esse in diversis praedicamentis; nam secundum praedictum doctorem eadem res secundum unam intentionem est in genere 'substantiae' et secundum aliam intentionem est in praedicamento 'quantitatis'; et per consequens acceptis talibus duabus rebus quarum utraque per aliam et aliam intentionem colligitur in praedicamento 'substantiae,' et in praedicamento 'quantitatis'; illae res sunt eiusdem praedicamenti quia utraque est in praedicamento 'substantiae,' et tamen sunt in diversis praedicamentis secundum memoratum doctorem et sanctum; ita possibile est quod aliquae res contineantur sub una specie vel sub diversis speciebus propter quod illae res, quarum utraque est 'longitudo,' possunt contineri sub hac specie quantitatis 'longitudo'; et tamen poterunt contineri sub diversis speciebus substantiae.

Nec est hoc maius inconveniens quam concedere quod eaedem res, quae sunt in uno praedicamento, simul cum hoc sub diversis praedicamentis continentur.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

How all lengths are of the same species, and how some differ in species; and the ninth reason, adduced in Chapter XXX, is explained

After these statements it must be seen how all lengths are of the same species; and how some differ in species. Whence, it must be noticed that, as it was proved through John of Damascus, the same thing can be in diverse categories according to one or another intention. And consequently two things of the same category can be in diverse categories; for according to the aforesaid Doctor the same thing is in the genus 'substance' according to one intention, and is in the category 'quantity' according to another intention; and consequently when two such things are accepted, each of which is classified in the category 'substance' and in the category 'quantity' according to one or another intention; those things are of the same category, because each is in the category 'substance,' and yet they are in diverse categories according to the illustrious Doctor and Saint; so it is possible that some things may be contained under one species and under different species, by virtue of which those things, each of which is 'length,' can be contained under this species of quantity 'length'; and yet they could have been contained under different species of substance.

Nor is this a greater inconsistency than to concede that the same things, which are in one category, are at the same time contained with this under diverse

Concedendum est igitur quod longitudo aëris et longitudo aquae sunt eiusdem speciei in praedicamento 'quantitatis,' et tamen sunt diversarum specierum in genere 'substantiae'; sicut multi catholici posuerunt, quod diversae relationes eiusdem speciei in genere 'relationis' sunt res indistinctae realiter a fundamentis distinctis in specie.

Unde albedo, calor, dulcedo, nigredo, et tales qualitates distinguuntur specie; et tamen omnes similitudines, quae non sunt res distinctae realiter, extra animam, ab illis qualitatibus, continentur sub una specie in genere 'relationis.' Ita potest esse de longitudinibus quae non sunt aliae res a substantia et qualitate, et tamen continentur sub una specie in genere 'quantitatis.' Sciendum est tamen quod numquam tales species distinctae non subalternatim positae praedicantur de aliqua re sive de pronomine demonstrante illam rem extra in quid et per se primo modo. Et per hoc possunt multae auctoritates philosophorum solvi, quae videntur esse contra praedicta, sicut alibi est ostensum.

categories. Therefore, it must be conceded that length of air and length of water are of the same species in the category 'quantity'; and yet they are of diverse species in the genus 'substance'; as many Catholics have posited, that diverse relations of the same species in the genus 'relation' are things really not distinct from the fundaments distinct in a species.

Whence, whiteness, heat, sweetness, blackness, and such qualities are distinguished in species; and yet all similitudes, which are not things outside the mind really distinct from those qualities, are contained under one species in the genus 'relation.' So it can be of lengths which are not things other than substance and quality; and yet they are contained under one species in the genus 'quantity.' However, it must be perceived that such distinct species not subordinately placed are never predicated of any thing or of a pronoun indicating that thing extra in quid et per se in the first mode. And through this many passages of the philosophers can be explained, which seem to be contrary to the previous statements, just as is shown elsewhere.

CAPITULUM XXXIX

De diverso modo praedicandi quantitatis de diversis praedicamentis; solvens X. rationem supra positam Capitulo XXX.

De diverso modo praedicandi quantitatis de diversis praedicamentis post haec dicendum est. Unde sciendum est quod quamvis 'per se' diversis modis a philosophis accipiatur in diversis locis. Unde in uno loco vult Aristoteles quod tantum necessaria sunt 'per se' et in alio loco vult quod lignum est album 'per se' cum tamen sit contingenter album; tamen ad propositum unus modus accipiendi sufficit. 'Per se' uno modo accipitur quando praedicatum non connotat vel significat aliquid quin aliquid consimile connotetur vel detur intelligi per subiectum. Et ideo quando subiectum est mere absolutum et nihil connotat vel dat intelligere aliquid, et praedicatum est connotativum et aliquid dat aliquid aliud intelligere, tunc talis propositio non dicitur esse 'per se.' Et sic accipiendo 'per se' semper ad hoc, quod propositio sit 'per se,' requiritur quod propositio non possit esse falsa cum constantia subiecti; hoc est, si 'esse' 'existere' praedicatur de subiecto significative sumpto; sicut impossibile est quod haec sit vera, 'Sortes est,' hac existente falsa, 'Sortes est homo.' Et ideo ista consequentia est bona: 'Sortes est,' igitur

CHAPTER XXXIX

Concerning a diverse mode of predicating quantity according to diverse categories, explaining the tenth reason posited before in Chapter XXX

After these there must be a discussion of a diverse mode of predicating quantity according to diverse categories. Whence, this must be understood, although 'per se' be taken in diverse modes in different places by the philosophers. Whence Aristotle in one place holds that only the necessary are 'per se,' and in another place holds that wood is white 'per se,' although it may however be contingently white; yet one mode of acceptation suffices for the thesis. 'Per se' is taken in one way when the predicate does not connote or signify something, but that something similar may be connoted or may be allowed to be understood through a subject. And indeed when a subject is purely absolute and connotes nothing and does not enable one to understand something, and the predicate is connotative and enables one to understand something else, then such a proposition is not said to be 'per se.' And in thus accepting 'per se' always for this, that the proposition may be 'per se,' it is required that the proposition can not be false with the constancy of the subject; that is, if 'to be' is called 'to exist' in relation to a subject significatively assumed, as it is possible that this may be true, 'Sortes is,' though this appears false, 'Sortes is a man.' And, therefore, this consequence is good: 'Sortes is,' therefore, 'Sortes is a man.'

'Sortes est homo.' Et similiter sequitur: 'homo est,' igitur 'homo est animal.'

Et sic accipiendo 'per se,' haec non est 'per se,' 'qualitas est quanta'; neque illa est 'per se,' 'substantia est quanta'; sed illa, 'quantitas est quantum,' est 'per se.' Et huius ratio est secundum philosophum, quia hoc nomen 'quantum' connotat partem rei esse extra partem. Nihil autem tale connotat vel dat intelligere hoc nomen 'qualitas,' nec hoc nomen 'substantia'; sed hoc nomen 'quantitas' ita dat intelligere partem distare a parte, sicut hoc nomen 'quantum.' Et propter hoc haec est 'per se,' 'quantitas est quanta,' et nulla talis est 'per se': 'substantia est quanta,' 'qualitas est quanta,' 'albedo est quanta,' 'homo est quantus.'

Immo possibile est quod haec sit vera, 'qualitas est,' hac existente falsa, 'qualitas est quanta.' Similiter possibile est quod haec sit vera, 'homo est,' hac existente falsa, 'homo est quantus.' Si enim omnipotentia Dei conservaret substantiam hominis eodem modo praesentem speciei panis quo conservat corpus Christi praesens subiecto panis et tamen nullibi esset illa substantia localiter et circumscriptive, et simul cum hoc destrueret omne accidens absolutum existens in homine; tunc haec esset vera, 'homo est,' et haec esset falsa, 'homo quantus est.' Et eodem modo posset omnipotentia Dei conservare quamcumque substantiam et quamcumque qualitatem, quantumcumque quaelibet talis esset falsa: haec, 'substantia est quanta'; haec, 'qualitas est quanta.' Et pro tanto dicunt philosophi et sancti,

And similarly it follows: 'man is,' therefore, 'man is an animal.'

And in accepting 'per se' thus, this is not 'per se,' 'quality is a quantum'; nor is that 'per se' 'substance is a quantum,' but that, 'quantity is a quantum' is 'per se.' And the reason for this is according to the philosopher; for this name 'quantum' connotes that part of a thing is outside of part. But nothing such connotes or enables one to understand this name 'quality,' nor this name 'substance'; but this name 'quantity' thus enables one to understand that part is separate from part, as this name 'quantum.' And by virtue of this, this is 'per se,' 'quantity is a quantum,' and no such is 'per se,' 'substance is a quantum,' 'quality is a quantum,' 'whiteness is a quantum,' 'man is a quantum.'

On the contrary, it is possible that this may be true, 'quality is,' while this appears false, 'quality is a quantum.' Similarly it is possible, that this may be true, 'man is,' while this appears false, 'man is a quantum.' For if the omnipotence of God could preserve the substance of man present in the same mode in the species of bread in which He may preserve the body of Christ present in the subject of the bread, and yet that substance would be nowhere locally and circumscriptively and at the same time with this could destroy every absolute accident existing in man; then this would be true, 'man is,' and this would be false, 'man is a quantum.' And in the same mode the omnipotence of God would preserve any substance and any quantity, no matter how much any such might be false: this, 'substance is a quantum'; this, 'quality is a quantum.' And to that extent do the philosophers and the Saints say

quod 'substantia est quanta per accidens,' et similiter 'qualitas est quanta per accidens'; sed haec est 'per se,' 'quantitas est quanta,' et similiter ista, 'longitudo est quanta,' et similiter de aliis. Impossibile enim est quod haec sit vera, 'longitudo est,' hac existente falsa, 'longitudo est quanta,' et similiter de aliis. Impossibile enim est quod haec sit vera, 'longitudo est,' hac existente falsa, 'longitudo est quanta'; et similiter de aliis. Impossibile est quod haec sit vera, 'quantitas est,' hac existente falsa, 'quantitas est quanta.' Sed ex hoc non sequitur igitur quod quantitas est alia res absoluta a substantia et qualitate; sed ostenditur quod ista est possibilis, 'quantitas non est eadem res absoluta cum substantia et qualitate,' quam concedo esse possibilem. Et posito quod tam substantia quam qualitas sit in rerum natura; sicut quantumque haec sit modo vera, 'res habens partem distantem a parte est tam substantia quam qualitas'; tamen haec est possibilis, 'nulla res habens partem distantem a parte est substantia vel qualitas.' Et si dicatur quod ista sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest esse sine alio, sed possibile est quod substantia sit quantitate non existente; igitur substantia et quantitas sunt distincta realiter.

Dico quod in omni tali modo arguendi est fallacia figurae dictionis; eo quod commutatur absolutum purum in connotativum, sicut haec, 'illa sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest esse, alio non existente.' 'Homo' potest esse, 'musico' non existente; igitur 'homo' et 'musicus' sunt distincta realiter. Et similiter haec, 'ista sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest

that 'substance is a quantum through accident'; and similarly, 'quality is a quantum through accident'; but this is 'per se,' 'quantity is a quantum'; and likewise this, 'length is a quantum'; and so of others. For it is impossible that this be true, 'length is,' while this appears false, 'length is a quantum'; and similarly of others. For it is impossible that this may be true, 'length is,' while this appears false, 'length is a quantum'; and similarly of others. It is impossible that this may be true, 'quantity is,' while this appears false, 'quantity is a quantum.' But it does not follow from this, therefore, that quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality; but it is shown that this is possible, 'quantity is not the same absolute thing as substance and quality,' which I concede to be possible. And supposing that substance as well as quality be in the nature of things; as no matter how much this may be in a way true, 'a thing having part separate from part is as much substance as quality'; yet this is possible, 'no thing having part separate from part is substance or quality.' And if it be said that these are really distinct, one of which can be without the other; but it is possible that substance may be, though quantity does not exist; there substance and quality are really distinct.

I say that there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in any such mode of arguing; for this reason, that the purely absolute is changed into the connotative; as this, 'those are really distinct, one of which can be, while the other does not exist.' 'Man' can be, though 'musician' does not exist; therefore, 'man' and 'musician' are really distinct. And similarly this, 'those are really distinct one of which can be without another.'

esse sine alio.' Sed 'Deus' potest esse, 'beatificante' non existente. Quia ista stant simul; quia 'Deus est,' et tamen 'beatificans non est'; igitur 'Deus' et 'beatificans' sunt distincta realiter. Qualiter autem in tali modo arguendi est fallacia figurae dictionis ad logicum pertinet; et alibi dixi de hoc, ideo nunc causa brevitatis pertranseo.

But 'God' can be, though 'making happy' does not exist. Because these obtain at the same time; for 'God is,' and yet 'making happy is not'; therefore, 'God' and 'making happy' are really distinct. But in what mode there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in such a mode of arguing pertains to logic; and I have spoken elsewhere of this; therefore, I now pass on for the sake of brevity.

CAPITULUM XL

Qualiter diversae quantitates possunt esse subiective in substantia cum duo corpora non possint naturaliter esse simul; et solvitur ratio ultima

Qualiter autem diversae quantitates possunt esse subiective in substantia, cum duo corpora naturalium non possunt esse simul, nunc est considerandum. Unde notandum est quod corpus dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro individuo per se existente in genere 'substantiae,' quod non est natum esse pars alterius existentis per se in genere; vel magis universaliter pro omni eo quod potest naturaliter per se existere absque hoc, quod sit pars alterius vel innitens alteri, quod tamen componitur ex partibus natis distare situaliter; et talia duo corpora esse simul est impossibile per naturam. De tali autem corpore loquuntur omnes auctores qui ponunt duo corpora non posse simul esse; et de tali corpore loquitur glossa allegata prius, quando dicit quod solum corpus habet pondus loquendo naturaliter; tale autem corpus non est materia prima nec forma substantialis nec aliqua qualitas.

Aliter autem accipitur corpus pro omni illo quod per partes intrinsecas sibi est longum, latum et profundum, et sic raro vel numquam accipitur corpus. Si tamen sic accipiatur, non est impossibile talia duo corpora, quorum unum natum est esse forma alterius,

CHAPTER XL

In what manner diverse quantities can be subjectively in a substance, since two bodies may not be able to be naturally at the same time; and the last reason is explained

Moreover, in what manner diverse quantities can be subjectively in a substance, since two natural bodies can not be at the same time, must now be considered. Whence, it must be observed that body is accepted in a two-fold sense. In one way as an individual existing per se in the genus 'substance,' which was not created to be part of another existing per se in a genus; or more universally for all that which can exist naturally per se without this, that it may be part of another or depending on another, which however is composed of parts created to be separate in situation; and it is impossible through nature for two such bodies to be together. But all authors, who posit that two bodies can not be at the same time, speak of such a body; and the previously mentioned gloss speaks of such a body when it says in speaking naturally that body only has weight; but such a body is not primary matter nor substantial form nor any quality.

But in another sense body is taken for all that which is long, wide, and thick through parts intrinsic to it; and thus body is rarely or never accepted. If it be, however, thus accepted, it is not impossible for two such bodies, of which one was created to be the form of the other, to be at the same time; nor is it impos-

esse simul; nec est impossibile alia multa, quae nata sunt informare unum subiectum, esse simul. Et ideo plures longitudines tales et plures soliditates esse simul non est impossibile, quia tamen plures soliditates, quae naturaliter possunt existere, quamvis non sint partes alicuius nec in aliis tamquam in subiectis, esse simul est impossibile per naturam. Quales soliditates non sunt qualitates, quia nulla qualitas potest per se existere virtute creata, quamvis possit virtute divina. Si dicis quod duo corpora non possunt esse simul, hoc est propter repugnantiam illarum dimensionum; igitur nullae dimensiones possunt esse simul.

Dicendum est quod non quaecumque dimensiones repugnant esse simul, sed solae dimensiones quae possunt per se naturaliter subsistere. Et solae tales non possunt naturaliter simul existere, sed mutuo se expellunt de loco si sibi ipsis relinquantur, quamvis per divinam potentiam quaecumque dimensiones possunt esse simul. Reliquas autem dimensiones, quae natae sunt informare aliam et quarum una potest informare aliam, esse simul non est impossibile.

Nec oppositum umquam legi in scriptura sacra. Et si quaeras qualiter plus repugnant istae dimensiones ut non sint simul per naturam quam aliae, sufficit mihi respondere ad praesens, quia nulla talis distinctio rei est, quod mihi constat partim per rationem, partim per experientiam. Per rationem enim constat faciliter quod substantia et qualitas nata informare eam non habent aliquam rem mediam distinctam deferentem qualitatem.

sible for many others, which have been created to inform one subject, to be at the same time. And indeed it is not impossible for more such lengths and more solidities to be at the same time; for it is however impossible through nature for more solidities, which can naturally exist, to be at the same time, although they may not be parts of something nor in others as in subjects. Solidities of such a kind are not qualities; for no quality can exist per se by created virtue although it can by divine virtue. If you say that two bodies can not be at the same time, this is by virtue of the repugnance of those dimensions; therefore, no dimensions can be at the same time.

It must be said that not any dimensions resist being at the same time; but only the dimensions which can naturally subsist per se. And such alone can not naturally exist at the same time; but they mutually expel each other from a place, if they be left to themselves, although some dimensions can be at the same time through divine power. But it is not impossible for the remaining dimensions, which were created to inform another and one of which can inform another, to be at the same time.

Nor have I ever read the opposite in sacred scripture. And if you ask in what manner these dimensions more than others resist that they may not be at the same time through nature, it suffices for me at present to reply; because there is no such distinction of thing, which is plain to me, partly through reason, partly through experience. For it is easily established through reason that substance and quality created to inform it do not have any intermediate and distinct thing bearing quality.

Ex quo patet quod ad hoc, quod tam substantia quam qualitas sit extensa, sufficit quod habeat partes distinctas distantes realiter natas distare situaliter cum causa agente quae potest producere illas partes effective in distinctis locis, et sic facere eas distare localiter et in eodem statu conservare easdem. Oportet etiam confirmare ex hoc, quod prius naturaliter producuntur partes substantiae in locis distinctis ab agente quam informentur sub aliquo accidente absoluto. Per experientiam etiam patet, quod substantia et qualitas sunt simul situaliter; et similiter per experientiam constat quod uno corpore existente per se naturaliter et ingrediente aliquem locum, aliquod consimile corpus cedit sibi.

Et si dicas quod per similem experientiam patet quod in accidentibus in sacramento altaris cedit corpus per se subsistens, potest dici quod hoc est vel quia qualitas prae-existens non est nata informare subiectum in quo numquam producta fuit, vel quia corpus illud habet consimiles qualitates, vel quia hoc est voluntate Dei volente quod aliquid contra communem cursum naturae evidenter appareat sensui, et hoc ut mereamur quia fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet experimentum.

Unde multi catholici ponunt ibi multa fieri a solo Deo ne evacuetur meritum fidei; sicut reductionem substantiae, creationem novae quantitatis, et huiusmodi. Et de hoc vide Scotum Libro IV., Distinctione XII., Quaestione IV. et VI. Et ideo de omnibus istis

From which it is obvious that for this, that substance as well as quality may be extended, it suffices that it have distinct parts really distant created to be separate in situation with an active cause which can effectively produce those parts in distinct places, and thus cause them to be separate locally and preserve the same in the same condition. From this it is necessary to confirm, that the parts of the substance are naturally produced in distinct places by an agent before they may be informed under some absolute accident. It is also obvious through experience, that substance and quality are at the same time in situation; and it is similarly established through experience that, when one body exists per se naturally and enters into some place, some body very similar to it withdraws.

And if you say that it is obvious through similar experience that a body subsisting per se in the accidents in the sacrament of the altar withdraws, it can be said that this is either because a preexisting quality was not created to inform a subject in which it never was produced, or because that body has very similar qualities, or because this is by the will of God, willing that something contrary to the common course of nature may evidently appear to the sense; and this that we may be entitled to merit; for faith does not have merit for him for whom human reason provides experiment.

Whence, many Catholics posit there that many things are done by God alone, that the merit of faith may not be made of no avail, as reduction of substance, creation of a new quantity, and any other of the kind. And concerning this, see Scotus in Book IV., Distinction XII., Questions IV. and VI. And indeed it can

potest aeque faciliter dici quod Deus ordinavit quod omnia apparentia sensui quae fiunt circa hostiam non consecratam, fiant etiam circa hostiam consecratam. Et ideo illa, quae non possunt fieri virtute creata, disposuit facere immediate per seipsum.

Ex praedictis colligi potest quomodo illa accidentia manent simul, quamvis non sint in aliquo uno subiective nec unum sit subiectum alterius; quia sive hoc possit fieri virtute creata sive non, non debet esse dubium quin possit fieri virtute divina.

Et eodem modo sive virtute creata possit illa ponderositas remanens in sacramento altaris movere secum alias qualitates, quibus est coniuncta, sive non, non est dubium quin hoc possit fieri virtute divina. Et ideo sicut quidam dicunt quod mota hostia movetur simul corpus Christi a solo Deo, ita quod virtus creata corpus Christi movere non potest, quantumcumque hostia moveatur. Ita potest faciliter dici, quod mota ponderositate moventur ceterae qualitates vel virtute creata vel virtute divina. Sic etiam omnes transmutationes, quas videmus fieri circa qualitates remanentes in sacramento altaris, possumus salvare quod illae, quae non possunt fieri virtute creata, possunt fieri virtute Dei, sicut multi ponunt de multis.

Et ita omnia, quae apparent sensui, possunt aeque salvari ponendo cum antiquis doctoribus approbatis, quod sapor, pondus, color, et ceterae qualitates huiusmodi in sacramento altaris sunt per se subsistentes

be said with equal facility of all these that God has ordained that all things apparent to the sense, which are done about the host when not consecrated, may also be done about the host when consecrated. And indeed those, which can not be done by created virtue, He has arranged to do immediately through Himself.

From the previous statements it can be concluded how those accidents remain at the same time, although they may not be in some one subjectively nor one be the subject of another; for whether this may be able or not to be done by created virtue, there ought not to be doubt but that it can be done by divine virtue.

And in the same way whether that heaviness remaining in the sacrament of the altar can or can not move with itself other qualities with which it is joined, by created virtue, there is no doubt but that this may be able to be done by divine virtue. And, therefore, as certain say that, when the host is moved, the body of Christ is moved at the same time by God alone, so that created virtue can not move the body of Christ, no matter how much the host may be moved. So it can easily be said that, when heaviness is moved, other qualities are moved either by created virtue or by divine virtue. Thus also we can save all transmutations, which we see are made about the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar, that those, which can not be made by created virtue, can be done by the virtue of God, as many writers posit about many things.

And so all, which are apparent to the sense, can be equally saved by positing with the approved ancient Doctors, that taste, weight, color, and the other qualities of this kind, in the sacrament of the altar are

sine subiecto, sicut ponendo quod omnes qualitates sunt in subiecto et non per se subsistentes, quamvis sequendo antiquos rationabile sit ponere multas transmutationes ibi fieri sine virtute divina, quae ab aliis ponuntur fieri virtute creata. Nec credo aliquem debere damnari quia Deo attribuit quod creaturae convenire non potest.

subsisting per se without a subject; as by positing that all qualities are in a subject and not subsisting per se, although in following the ancient writers it may be reasonable to posit that many changes are done there by the divine virtue, which are posited by others to be accomplished by created virtue. Nor do I believe that anyone ought to be condemned because he attributes to God that which can not be ascribed to a creature.

CAPITULUM XLI

De solutione quorundam argumentorum contra praedicta

Contra praedictam opinionem adducuntur quaedam rationes quas, ut ea intellexi, volo nunc recitare et dissolvere; illas clarius et plenius recitaturus et responsurus, si mihi plenius innotescant. Arguunt autem adhuc quidam sic: si aliqua substantia et aliqua quantitas sunt idem realiter, igitur, ubicumque est illa substantia, est ibi illa quantitas. Cum igitur substantia corporis Christi sit in sacramento altaris, sequitur quod quantitas corporis Christi erit in sacramento altaris. Unde arguitur sic, ut intellexi: quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque est unum illorum, ibidem erit reliquum. Sed per praedictam opinionem substantia corporis Christi et quantitas corporis Christi sunt idem realiter, igitur ubi unum et reliquum; et per consequens sicut substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris, ita quantitas corporis Christi essent in sacramento altaris.

Item arguitur sic: quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque aliquid est unum illorum, ibidem est reliquum illorum; sed substantia corporis Christi et quantitas corporis Christi sunt realiter idem per prae-

CHAPTER XLI

Concerning the explanation of certain arguments contrary to the previous statement

Contrary to the previous opinion, certain reasons are adduced which, as I have understood them, I now wish to review and refute; others I intend to review and answer more clearly and more fully if they become more fully known to me. But as yet certain writers argue thus: if some substance and some quantity are really the same; then, wherever that substance is, there that quantity will be. Therefore, since the substance of the body of Christ may be in the sacrament of the altar, it follows that the quantity of the body of Christ will be in the sacrament of the altar. Whence, it is thus argued, as I have understood: whenever some are really the same, wherever one of them is, the remainder will be in the same place. But according to the previous opinion the substance of the body of Christ and the quantity of the body of Christ are really the same; therefore, where one is, the rest is; and consequently, as the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar, so the quantity of the body of Christ would be in the sacrament of the altar.

Again, it is argued thus: whenever some are really the same; wherever any one of them is, the remainder of them is in the same place; but the substance of the body of Christ and the quantity of the body of Christ are really the same according to the previous opinions.

dicta. Sed substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris; igitur et quantitas ex vi conversionis est ibi quanta, et ultra; igitur substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris quantitas, et ultra; igitur substantia corporis Christi est ex vi conversionis quanta in sacramento altaris, et ultra; igitur substantia corporis Christi in sacramento altaris est 'habens partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte,' quod est haereticum.

Ad primam illorum concedo ultimam conclusionem qua deducitur, scilicet, quod quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris.

Ad secundam sine praeiudicio potest dici multipliciter. Uno modo, quod propositio assumpta, scilicet, ista, quandocumque aliqua, et cetera, intellecta de creaturis, cuius sunt substantia, quantitas, qualitas, est falsa de virtute sermonis propter falsam implicationem. Implicat enim quod aliqua sint aliqua, et tamen quod sint idem realiter, quod est impossibile; quia numquam aliqua creata sunt aliqua et unum realiter, quia ex hoc ipso, quod sunt aliqua, sunt multa; et si sint multa, non sunt idem realiter. Tamen de personis divinis concedendae sunt quod sunt plures personae et tamen quod sint una res simplex. Sed de creaturis non potest hoc concedi.

Aliter dico quod concessa illa propositione sub bono intellectu fit in forma arguendi fallacia figurae dictionis, ex hoc quod accipitur sub 'unus terminus connotativus,' scilicet, 'quantitas.' Unde sicut non sequitur,

But the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar; and, therefore, a quantity is a quantum there by the power of conversion, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is 'having part outside of part and part separate from part,' which is heretical.

As regards the first of these, I concede the last conclusion by which it is deduced; namely, that the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.

As regards the second it can be stated variously without prejudice. In one mode, that the proposition assumed, namely, this, whenever some, et cetera, are understood of creatures of which are substance, quantity and quality, is false according to the virtue of language by virtue of a false implication. For it implies that some may be some, and yet that they may really be the same, which is impossible; for some creatures are really never some and one; because of this itself, that there are some, there are many; and if there be many, they are not really the same. Yet of divine persons these must be conceded; that there are more persons and yet that they may be one simple thing. But this can not be conceded of creatures.

I say that, if that proposition is conceded under a good meaning, it becomes in another manner a fallacy of a figure of speech in the form of arguing; from this which is accepted under 'one connotative term,' namely,

quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque est aliquid unum illorum, ibidem etiam est reliquum illorum. Sed 'corpus Christi' et 'corpus Christi habens partem extra partem vel partem distantem a parte' sunt idem realiter; quia 'corpus Christi' est realiter 'habens partem distantem a parte,' et aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris corpus Christi; igitur aliqua substantia in sacramento altaris est corpus Christi 'habens partem distantem a parte'; vel sumatur in minori sic: 'corpus Christi' et 'existens circumscriptive in loco' sunt idem realiter. Et similiter non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque est aliquid unum illorum, ibidem est reliquum illorum. 'Corpus Christi' in hostia et 'existens circumscriptive in loco' sunt idem realiter; et aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris corpus Christi; igitur aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris 'existens circumscriptive in loco.'

Ita etiam non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque est aliquid unum illorum, est ibidem reliquum illorum. Sed substantia corporis Christi et aliqua quantitas sunt idem realiter et aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris substantia corporis Christi, igitur aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris quantitas. Unde dico quod, quamvis haec sit vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; haec tamen est falsa, 'substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris quantitas'; sicut, quamvis haec sit vera, 'corpus Christi habens partem distantem

'quantity.' Whence, as it does not follow, whenever some are really the same, wherever there is any one of them, the rest of the others is also in the same place. But the 'body of Christ' and 'the body of Christ having part outside of part or part separate from part' are really the same; for 'the body of Christ' is really 'having part separate from part,' and some substance is in the sacrament of the altar the body of Christ; therefore some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the body of Christ 'having part separate from part'; or it may be taken in a narrower sense, thus: 'the body of Christ' and 'existing circumscriptively in a place' are really the same. And it does not similarly follow: whenever some are really the same, wherever there is any one of them, the rest of them is in the same place. 'The body of Christ' in the host and 'existing circumscriptively in a place' are really the same; and some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the body of Christ; therefore, some substance in the sacrament of the altar is 'existing circumscriptively in a place.'

So also it does not follow: whenever some are really the same; wherever there is any one of them, the rest of them is in the same place. But the substance of the body of Christ and some quantity are really the same, and some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore, some substance in the sacrament of the altar is a quantity. Whence, I say that, although this may be true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; this is however false, 'the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is a quantity'; as, although this may be true, 'the body of Christ having part separate from part is in

a parte est in sacramento altaris,' et tamen haec est falsa, 'corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris habens partem distantem a parte.' Similiter haec est vera, 'aliqua substantia circumscripta loco est in sacramento altaris'; haec tamen est falsa, 'aliqua substantia est in sacramento altaris circumscripta loco.' Sed forte dices quod ista responsio non valet; tamen quia non est simile in arguendo de abstractis et de concretis. 'Quantitas' autem est quoddam abstractum habens esse circumscriptum in loco et huius sunt concreta. Et ideo, quamvis talis modus arguendi non valet accipiendo sub concreta, valet tamen accipiendo sub abstracta; tamen quia tales sunt falsae, 'corpus Christi' et 'corpus Christi habens partem distantem a parte' sunt idem realiter. Similiter 'corpus Christi' et 'circumscriptum loco' sunt idem realiter.

Sed primum illorum non obstat, quia causa, quare in tali modo arguendi est fallacia figurae dictionis, non est quia accipitur sub nomen 'concretum' sed quia accipitur sub 'terminus connotativus.' Nunc autem 'quantitas' est 'terminus connotativus,' sicut 'habens' vel 'quantum' vel aliquid tale; et ideo desit talis modus arguendi accipiendo sub 'quantitatem,' sicut accipiendo sub 'habens partem distantem,' et cetera, vel 'circumscriptum in loco,' vel aliud tale concretum.

Unde nec apud philosophos nec apud sanctos invenitur quod fecerunt tantam distinctionem inter multa concreta et abstracta sicut faciunt aliqui moderni. Unde numquam inveni in aliquo sancto nec philosopho quod fecerunt distinctionem inter 'quantitatem' et 'quantum,' sed indifferenter ponunt 'quantitatem' pro

the sacrament of the altar'; yet this is false, 'the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is having part separate from part.' Similarly, this is true, 'some substance circumscribed in a place is in the sacrament of the altar'; yet this is false, 'some substance in the sacrament of the altar is circumscribed in a place.' But perhaps you will say that this response is not so valid; for it is not however similar in arguing of abstracts as of concretes. But 'quantity' is a certain abstract having being circumscribed in a place and of this kind are concretes. And, therefore, although such a mode of arguing is not valid in accepting under concretes, yet it is valid in accepting under abstracts; for such however are false, 'the body of Christ' and 'the body of Christ having part separate from part' are really the same. Similarly, the 'body of Christ' and 'circumscribed in a place' are really the same.

But the first of those does not oppose; for the cause, why there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in such a mode of reasoning, is not because it is accepted under the name 'concrete,' but because it is accepted under a 'connotative term.' But now 'quantity' is a 'connotative term,' as 'having' or 'quantum' or any such; and indeed such a mode of arguing fails in accepting under 'quantity,' as in accepting under 'having part distant' et cetera, or 'circumscribed in a place,' or another such concrete.

Whence, neither among the philosophers nor among the Saints it is found that they have made so much distinction between many concretes and abstracts, as some modernists do. Whence, I have never found in any Saint or philosopher that they have made a distinction between 'quantity' and 'quantum,' but they

'quanto,' et econtrario; et aliquando praedicamentum, quod distinxerunt ab ipsis ceteris praedicamentis, vocaverunt 'quantum,' et aliquando 'quantitatem,' non distinguentes inter nomina ista.

Secundum etiam non obstat quia manifestum est quod ista est vera, 'corpus Christi' et 'corpus Christi habens partem distantem a parte' sunt idem realiter; et similiter quaelibet alia est, et est eadem probatio pro omnibus talibus.

Quod autem ista, 'corpus Christi' et 'corpus Christi circumscriptum loco' sunt idem realiter, sit vera, patet manifeste; nam sequitur corpus Christi est circumscriptum loco; igitur 'corpus Christi' est idem realiter 'alicui quod est circumscriptum loco,' et ultra. Igitur 'aliquid, quod est realiter circumscriptum loco,' est idem realiter cum 'corpore Christi' et ultra; quia ista convertuntur: 'circumscriptum loco' et 'quod est circumscriptum loco'; et sequitur, 'aliquid circumscriptum loco' est idem realiter cum 'corpore Christi'; igitur 'circumscriptum loco' et 'corpus Christi' sunt idem realiter. Sic potest probari quaelibet talis; unde omnes tales verae sunt, quamvis unus terminus aliquid importat quod non importatur per reliquum. Hoc tamen non obstante potest unus illorum terminorum vere praedicari de aliquo cum aliqua determinatione 'verbi,' de quo tamen reliquum cum eadem determinatione non praedicatur. Sicut haec est vera, 'risibile' et 'homo' sunt idem realiter; et tamen haec est vera, 'Sortes primo modo per se est homo'; et haec falsa, 'Sortes per se primo modo est risibilis.' Similiter haec est

indifferently posit 'quantity' for 'quantum,' and conversely; and sometimes the category, which they have distinguished from the other categories themselves, they have called 'quantum,' and sometimes 'quantity,' not distinguishing between these names.

Moreover, the second does not oppose; for it is manifest that this is true, 'the body of Christ' and 'the body of Christ having part separate from part' are really the same; and similarly is any other, and there is the same proof for all such.

But it is manifestly obvious that this may be true, 'the body of Christ' and 'the body of Christ circumscribed in a place' are really the same; for it follows that the body of Christ is circumscribed in a place; therefore, 'the body of Christ' is really similar to 'something which is circumscribed in a place,' et ultra. Therefore, 'something which is really circumscribed in a place,' is really the same as 'the body of Christ,' et ultra; because these are convertible: 'circumscribed in a place' and 'that which is circumscribed in a place'; and it follows that 'something circumscribed in a place' is really the same as 'the body of Christ'; therefore, 'circumscribed in a place' and 'the body of Christ' are really the same. Thus any such proposition can be proved; whence, all such are true, although one term signifies another which is not signified through the rest. Notwithstanding this, however one of those terms can truly be predicated of something with some determination of a 'verb,' of which the rest however is not predicated with the same determination. As this is true, 'risible' and 'man' are really the same; and yet this is true, 'Sortes is a man' per se in the first mode; and this is false, 'Sortes is risible'

vera, 'homo' et 'Filius Dei' sunt idem realiter, quia iste 'homo' demonstrando Filium Dei et 'Filius Dei' sunt idem realiter; et tamen haec est vera, 'iste semper fuit Filius Dei,' et haec falsa, 'iste semper fuit homo.'

Ita est in proposito; quia haec est vera, 'aliqua substantia corporis Christi' et 'aliqua quantitas' sunt idem realiter; et tamen haec est vera, 'haec substantia est substantia corporis Christi in sacramento altaris'; et haec est falsa, 'haec substantia est quantitas in sacramento altaris.' Et sicut haec est falsa, 'substantia corporis Christi in sacramento altaris est quantitas'; ita haec est falsa, 'substantia corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est quanta in sacramento altaris.' Et ideo haec est falsa, 'substantia corporis Christi habet partem distantem a parte in sacramento altaris'; et ita patet quod illud argumentum non valet; sicut non sequitur, quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, quod ubique est aliquid unum illorum, ibidem erit reliquum illorum. 'Aliquod quantum' et 'corpus Christi' sunt idem realiter, et substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris corpus Christi, igitur est in sacramento altaris quanta. Et si dicas quod non est simile arguendo in terminis concretis et abstractis, respondeo quod 'quantum' non est plus concretum quam 'quantitas' quando ad significationem, quamvis non terminetur in 'tas,' sicut hoc nomen 'quantitas' terminetur in 'tas.' Et ita desinit modus arguendi accipiendo sub hoc nomen 'quantitas,' sicut accipiendo sub hoc nomen 'quantum.'

per se in the first mode. Similarly, this is true, 'man' and 'Son of God' are really the same; for this 'man' in designating the Son of God and 'Son of God' are really the same; and this also is true, 'He was always the Son of God,' and this is false, 'He was always man.'

So is it in the thesis; because this is true, 'some substance of the body of Christ' and 'some quantity' are really the same; and yet this is true, 'this substance is the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar'; and this is false, 'this substance is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar.' And as this is false, 'the substance of the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar'; so this is false, 'the substance of the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion.' And indeed this is false, 'the substance of the body of Christ has part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar'; and so it is obvious that that argument is not valid; as it does not follow, when some are really the same, that wherever any one of them is, the rest of them will be in the same place. 'Some quantum' and 'the body of Christ' are really the same, and the substance of the body of Christ is the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, there is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar. And if you say that arguing in concrete and abstract terms is not similar, I reply that 'quantum' is not more concrete than 'quantity' when for signification; although it may not terminate in 'tas,' as this name 'quantitas,' may terminate in 'tas.' And so the mode of arguing fails in accepting under this name 'quantitas,' as in accepting under this name 'quantum.' And so it is

Et ita patet quod hoc sophisma non concludit contra praedictam opinionem, cum deficiat penes fallaciam figurae dictionis.

Sed acceptis quibusdam propositionibus veris potest evidenter reduci contra istam. Unde accipiendo istam propositionem, 'quando aliqua res informans aliam nata est denominare eam,' ubicumque illa res habet illam natam denominare eam, ibi est tale; sicut ubicumque aliquid habet albedinem, ibi omne est album; et ubicumque aliquid habet informative calorem, ibi est calidum. Igitur si quantitas sit alia res distincta a corpore Christi, ubicumque substantia corporis Christi habet illam quantitatem, ibi vere est quanta. Sed corpus Christi in sacramento altaris habet quantitatem, quia non separatur ibi ab quantitate; igitur corpus Christi in sacramento altaris realiter est quantum, et ultra; igitur corpus Christi in sacramento altaris habet partem distantem a parte, quod est haereticum. Si dicas quod corpus Christi est quantum ibi, non tamen est ibi modo quantitativo.

Tunc arguo contra eos servando eorum modum loquendi, quia quaero de isto modo quantitativo, aut est res distincta realiter a quantitate aut non. Non potest dici quod non est alia res a quantitate, quia principium eorum est quod, si unum manet et non reliquum, quod sunt distinctae res; sed quantitas manet et non manet modus quantitativus, igitur sunt distinctae res. Sed, quod non sint distinctae res, potest probari; quia, si sint distinctae res, aut est alia res absoluta aut alia

obvious that this does not include a sophism contrary to the previous opinion, although it may fail in the presence of a fallacy of a figure of speech.

But if certain propositions are accepted as true, a conclusion can evidently be deduced contrary to this opinion. Whence, in accepting this proposition, 'when some thing informing another is created to designate this'; wherever that thing has that which is created to designate this, there is such; as wherever something has whiteness, everything there is white; and wherever something informatively has heat, everything there is warm. Therefore, if quantity be another thing distinct from the body of Christ, wherever the substance of the body of Christ has that quantity, there truly is a quantum. But the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar has quantity, for it is not separated there from quantity; therefore, the body of Christ is really a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, et ultra; therefore, the body of Christ has part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar, which is heretical. If you say that the body of Christ is a quantum there, it is not however there in a quantitative mode.

Then I argue against those writers by preserving their mode of speaking; for I ask about this quantitative mode, whether or not it is a thing distinct from quantity. It can not be said that it is not a thing other than quantity; for the principle of them is that, if one remains and not the rest, they are distinct things; but quantity remains and a quantitative mode does not remain; therefore, they are distinct things. But, that they may not be distinct things, can be proved; for, if they be distinct things, either one is an absolute thing

respectativa. Nec est absoluta, quia tunc esset qualitas vel quantitas vel substantia, quorum quodlibet est falsum; nec est res relativa, quia non potest sibi assignari nec fundamentum nec terminus; nec potest in aliquo aliorum, id est, generum collocari; quia non in 'quando,' nec in 'actione' et 'passione,' nec in genere 'relationis,' nec in 'positione,' nec in 'habere,' nec in 'ubi,' de quo magis videretur, quod ille modus quantitativus potest esse sine omni 'ubi.' Si enim Deus crearet quantum aliquod sine omni alia re, vere esset modus quantitativus et tamen sine omni 'ubi.'

Praeterea ostensum est prius, quod omne quantum continuum et permanens habet partem distantem a parte, sicut prius patuit per Iohannem Damascenum, vel saltem ista sunt convertibilia, 'quantum continuum et permanens,' et 'habens partem distantem a parte.'

Ex quo arguo sic: impossibile est quod aliquid sit 'quantum continuum et permanens' nisi habeat partem distantem a parte, et econtrario; igitur ubicumque aliquid est 'continuum quantum et permanens,' habet ibi partem distantem a parte. Si igitur corpus Christi sit quantum in sacramento altaris, corpus Christi erit 'habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento altaris.' Praeterea, si corpus Christi sit quantum in sacramento altaris, igitur est longum, latum et profundum; sed impossibile est quod aliquid alicubi sit longum nisi sit ibi extensum; et non potest esse extensum alicubi nisi habeat partem extra partem ibi. Igitur si corpus Christi in sacramento altaris sit quantum, ibi habebit partem distantem a parte.

or the other respective. It is not absolute; for then there would be a quality or a quantity or a substance, any one of which is false; nor is it a relative thing, for neither fundament nor terminus can be assigned to itself; nor can it be classified in any of the others, that is, genera, because not in 'time' nor in 'action' and in 'passion,' nor in the genus 'relation,' nor in 'position,' nor in 'possession,' nor in 'place'; from which it might the more appear that that quantitative mode can be without any 'ubi.' For if God could create some quantum without any other thing, it would truly be a quantitative mode and yet without any 'ubi.'

Besides, it was shown before, that every continuous and permanent quantum has part separate from part, as was obvious before through John of Damascus, or at least these are convertibles: 'quantum continuous and permanent,' and 'having part separate from part.'

From which I argue thus: it is impossible that something may be a 'quantum continuous and permanent' unless it have part separate from part, and conversely; therefore, wherever something is 'a quantum, continuous and permanent,' there it has part separate from part. Therefore, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, the body of Christ will be 'having part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar.' Besides, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, it is, therefore, long, wide and thick; but it is impossible that something may anywhere be long unless it be extended there; and it can not be extended anywhere unless it have there part separate from part. Therefore, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, it will have there part separate from part.

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Et si dicas quod corpus Christi non est ibi quantum; contra, corpus Christi habet ibi quantitatem inhaerentem sibi; igitur ibi erit quantum, sicut ubicumque est aliquid habens albedinem inhaerentem sibi, est ibi album; videtur ergo derogare veritati sacramenti Eucharistiae dicere, quod corpus Christi in sacramento altaris habet unam quantitatem vel extensionem inhaerentem sibi; tunc enim esset ibi extensum et haberet partem distantem a parte, quod est falsum. Et ideo quantumcumque ista concederetur, 'corpus Christi est quantitas,' ista tamen debet omnino negari, 'corpus Christi est realiter quantitas in sacramento altaris'; sicut ista est vera, 'corpus Christi est realiter habens partem distantem a parte,' et tamen haec est simpliciter falsa, 'corpus Christi est realiter habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento altaris.'

Stat igitur praedicta opinio in hoc, quod quantitas continua et permanens non est, nisi partes extra se positae sive partes distantes situaliter sive illae partes sint partes substantiae sive sint partes qualitatum. Et ideo, sicut haec est vera, 'corpus Christi habens partes distantes situaliter est in sacramento altaris'; et haec tamen est falsa, 'corpus Christi habet partes distantes situaliter in sacramento altaris.' Ita posito, quod haec concederetur, 'quantitas, quae est realiter corpus Christi, est in sacramento altaris'; haec tamen est absolute neganda, 'corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento altaris'; sicut haec est vera, 'aliquis homo, qui

And if you may say that the body of Christ is not a quantum there: on the contrary, that the body of Christ has there quantity inhering in itself: it will, therefore, be a quantum there; as wherever there is something having whiteness inhering in itself, the white is there; therefore, it seems to detract from the reality of the sacrament of the Eucharist to say, that the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar has one quantity or extension inhering in itself; for then it would be extended there and it would have part separate from part, which is false. And indeed no matter how much this might be conceded, 'the body of Christ is a quantity'; yet this ought to be utterly denied, 'the body of Christ is really a quantity in the sacrament of the altar'; just as this is true, 'the body of Christ is really having part separate from part'; yet this is simply false, 'the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is really having part separate from part.'

Therefore, the previous opinion stands on this, that there is no continuous and permanent quantity, unless parts may be placed outside of themselves, whether the parts may be separate in situation or those parts may be parts of a substance or may be parts of qualities. And indeed, as this is true, 'the body of Christ having parts separate in situation is in the sacrament of the altar'; and yet this is false, 'the body of Christ has parts separate in situation in the sacrament of the altar.' So, suppose that this could be conceded, 'a quantity, which is really the body of Christ, is in the sacrament of the altar'; yet this must be absolutely denied, 'the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar'; as this is true, 'some man, who is

est Filius Dei, semper fuit Deus'; haec tamen simpliciter est falsa, 'Filius Dei semper fuit homo.'

Et ita in talibus multum refert ponere aliquid a parte subiecti et a parte praedicati quod maxime verum est de nominibus connotativis. Quale nomen est 'quantitas,' quia hoc nomen 'quantitas' signat rem signando partes illius rei distare situaliter; propter quod haec est vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; haec tamen est simpliciter falsa, 'corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento altaris.'

Explicit; benedictio Deo.

COLOPHON

Explicit tractatus gloriosus de corpore Christi et in primis de puncti, lineae, superficiei, corporis, quantitatis, qualitatis, et substantiae distinctione; venerabilis inceptoris magistri Guilhelmi de Ockham Anglici, veritatis indagatoris profundissimi, sacrae theologiae professoris doctissimi, de ordine Fratrum Minorum, post lecturam Oxoniensem, catholice editus; impressus Argentine anno Domini, MCCCCXCI.; finitus post festum Epiphaniae Domini.

the Son of God, always was God'; yet this is simply false, 'the Son of God always was man.'

And so in such it is of much importance to posit something from a part of a subject and from a part of a predicate, which is especially true of connotative names. Such a name is 'quantity'; for this name 'quantity' signifies a thing by signifying that parts of that thing are separate in situation; by virtue of which this is true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; yet this is simply false, 'the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar.'

It is ended; praise be to God.

COLOPHON

The famous tract concerning the body of Christ, and especially concerning the distinction of point, line, surface, body, quantity, quality, and substance, is ended; edited for all readers on the basis of the Oxonian lecture of the Venerable Inceptor, Master William of Ockham, of England, a most profound investigator of reality, a most learned Professor of Sacred Theology, of the order of Friars Minor: printed at Strassburg, A. D. MCCCCXCI; completed after the Feast of the Epiphany of the Lord.

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9 Corpus Gratiani; Lucas Antonius de Giunta Florentinus Venitiis impressit; anno salutis; M.D. XIIII. die XX. Maii. Leone Decimo Pontifice Maximo Sanctissimoque, et Venetiis Leonardo Lauretano Serenissimo Principe; fol. ccccccxi. (Unless otherwise stated, all references to a Corpus will refer to this Corpus.)

12 Ibid; fol. ccccccxx Ibid; fol. ccccccxvi.

18 Ibid; fol. ccccccxvii.

21 Corpus Gratiani; Friedburg, C. I. C., Book I. Tit. I.

PAGE 4

2 Ibid.

PAGE 8

11 "An ostensive conception indicates how an object is constituted." Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy.

PAGE 10

8 Emphasized by Plotimus; Plotini Ennead, IV., 2, I: *ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ ἐν ὁτῳ οὖν αὐτοῦ ὅλη.*

PAGE 12

14 Occam repeatedly takes refuge in the arbitrary and inscrutable power of God.

PAGE 34

7 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. I. Cap. II.

PAGE 36

29 Occam's Nominalism,—Suppositio, "The word, or term never did and never could adequately express the thought, but it might be supposed to do so, and, whenever the supposition was made, the term might be used on all occasions and in every way for the thought. . . . A universal was made to stand instead of, and was used instead of, the reality which it adequately expressed." Prof. J. M. Lindsay, William Occam and His Connection with the Reformation; British Quarterly Review, July, 1872.

Aristotelis Posteriora, Lib., I. Cap. IV.: Quid universaliter decimus, determinemus.

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6 Aristotelis Posteriora; Lib. I. Cap. IV. Aristotelis Stagiritae, Philosophorum Omnium facile Principis: Opera quae quidem

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extant omnia. Lodovici Viris Valentini, de libris Aristotelicis censura.

De Vita Aristotelis digne genere philosophiae, ac scriptis eiusdem, per Philippum Melanchthonem; Basileae, 1538.

16 Aristotelis Praedicamenta; Cap. VI., De Quantitate.

21 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. I., Cap. II.

25 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. IV., Cap. I.

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1 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. II.; Lib. VI., Cap. I.: Si autem ea continua sunt, ut antea definivimus, quorum ultima sunt unum, ea tangentia quorum fines sunt simul.

8 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. VI., Cap. I.

14 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. VI., Cap. I.: Si linea quidem continuum punctum autem indivisibile sit.

16 Ibid: Impossibile est ex indivisibilibus continuum quicquam constare, ut ex punctis lineam.

19 Ibid: Cum igitur indivisibile partibus careat, totum ipsum tangat necesse est.

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3 The following arguments are based upon Aristotle's Phisica, which is commented upon by Ockham in his Summulae in Lib. Phisicorum.

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16 Phisica; Lib. I., Cap. I., et II.

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26 Phisica; Lib. I., Cap. II., De Substantia.

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6 Praedicamenta; Cap. V., De Substantia: Praeterea primae substantiae ideo quod aliis omnibus subiiciuntur, et omnia alia de ipsis vel praedicantur, vel in ipsis sunt, ea gratia primae substantiae maxime dicuntur. Secundae vero substantiae, species hac, in quibus quas imprimis substantias appellabamus, insunt, dicuntur.

Merito igitur post primas substantias, solae aliorum omnium species generaque secundae substantiae dicuntur.

8 Aristotelis Metaphisica; Lib. VII., Cap. X., XI., XVI.: Quod igitur nec earum quicquam, quae universalia dicuntur, substantia sit, nec ulla sit substantia ex substantiis patet; also, Posteriora; Lib. I., Cap. IV.

21 Praedicamenta; Cap. VI., De Quantitate: Linea vero continuum est, sumi namque communis terminus, quo partes lineae copulentur, punctum potest; itidem ut superficiei linea; ff.

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24 Metaphisica; Lib. IV., Cap. II.: Si itaque ens, et unum idem. . . . Patet autem quod non separatur ens nec in generatione, nec in corruptione, similiter et de uno; ff.

Averröis Cordubensis comments as follows: Unum autem et ens cum sint idem, et habeant eandem naturam, consecutio utriusque ad alterum est, sicut consecutio principis, et causae unius ad alterum, non quia eadem definitio significat utrumque. Nulla autem differentia est inter ea, et se existimantes fuerimus tali existimatione; Vol. VIII., Aristotelis Metaphisica; Venice, 1574; Lib. IV., Cap. II.

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8 Posteriora; Lib. I., Cap. VIII.; Cap. XXI.

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8 Primi Quotlibet Ockam (Ed. 1491); Quaestio Quarta: Circumscriptive esse in loco, est aliquid esse in loco, cuius pars est in parte loci, et totum in toto loco. Diffinitive autem esse in loco est quando totum est in toto loco et non extra, et totum est in qualibet parte illius loci, quomodo corpus Christi est in loco diffinitive in Eukaristia, quia totum eius corpus coexistit toti loco speciei consecratae, et totum coexistit cuilibet parti loci.

13 In commenting upon Aristotle's Phisica I., Ockham says: Idem numero existens in loco circumscriptive non est simul in diversis locis distantibus, sed materia est circumscriptive in loco ex quo est quanta, ergo non est simul in diversis locis. Summulae in Lib. Phisicorum; 1506.

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7 Ockham's Law of Parcimony; 'Occam's Razor.' W. M. Thorburn: Occam's Razor, Mind, April, 1915, p. 287; The Myth of Occam's Razor, Mind, July, 1918, p. 345; C. Delisle Burns, Occam's Razor, Mind, 1915, p. 592.

D'Ailli; IV., Quaest. III., A, fol. 268: Quia frustra ponitur fieri per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora.

28 Quodl. I., Quaestio Quarta: Dico quod angelus est secundo modo in loco per suam substantiam, quia tota sua substantia est in toto loco et tota est in qualibet parte loci, non tamen sic quod substantia angeli sit praesens loco sicut Deus est praesens loco; ff.

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19 Quodl. I., Quaestio Quarta: Et ideo sicut corpus locatum est in loco, ita angelus sibi et omnibus partibus suis praesens est in loco, licet tamen corpus sit circumscriptive, angelus tamen diffinitive.

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5 Si autem quaeritur de accidentibus quae remanent, id est, de speciebus et sapore et pondere, in quo subjecto fundentur, potius mihi videtur fatendum existere sine subjecto, quam esse in subjecto, quia ibi non est substantia, nisi corporis, et sanguinis dominici, quam non afficitur illis accidentibus.
Magistri Sententiarum; Libri Quatuor Petro Lombardo Episcopo; Venetiis, 1566.

18 Found at the beginning of the discussion.

28 Lib. IV., Dist. XII., A.

PAGE 114

3 Praedicamenta; Cap. V.; Substantia autem una eodemque numero contrariorum est susceptiva; ff.

PAGE 118

7 Aristotelis Phisica; Lib. VI., Cap. I.

PAGE 122

8 Aristotelis Praedicamenta; Cap. VIII.

PAGE 124

25 Augustine; Homilia super Johannem.

PAGE 130

10 Aristotelis Praedicamenta; Cap. VIII., 10^a, 20.

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2 Aristotelis Praedicamentis; Cap. VI.

3 Phisica; Lib. VI., Cap. I.

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25 Duns Scotus; Lib. IV., Sententiarum, Dist. XI., Quaestio III.

PAGE 158

20 "Occam's willingness to waive his personal opinion and to adhere to the dogma of the Church is characteristic of the writers of this period."
T. M. Lindsay; British Quarterly Review, July, 1872.

PAGE 162

12 De Capt. Bab. Eccl.: Esse videlicet verum corpus verumque vinum in quibus Christi vera caro verusque sanguis non aliter nec minus sit quam ille sub accidentibus suis ponunt. Trans; Wace and Buchheim; p. 311.

13 D'Ailli; Sent. IV., Quaest. VI., Art. I., E.; fol. cclxv.: Tertio opinio fuit quod substantia panis remanet, et hoc potest dupliciter imaginari. Uno modo sicut recitat magister;

Line

scilicet, quod remaneat ibidem ubi corpus Christi incipit esse et sic diceretur substantia panis transire in substantiam corporis quia, ubi est hoc, incipit esse illa. Alio modo posset imaginari quod substantia panis recederet subito de primo loco ad alium locum et remanerent accidentia in eodem loco sine subiecto et corpus Christi eis coexisteret ibidem. Haec autem opinio quo ad primum modum est possibilis, quia valde possibile est substantiam panis coexistere substantiae corporis nec est magis impossibile duas subtantias coexistere quam duas qualitates; quare, et cetera.

PAGE 164

7 Decretal. D. Gregorii Papae IX., Titulus I., Cap. I. Gloss is found in Corpus; De Consecratione, Dist. II.; fol. ccccccxi.

PAGE 166

1 Luther's Bekenntniz vom Abendmahl (ed. 1747). Throughout this work is found an argument for the existence of the body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

PAGE 168

19 Corpus; Causa I., Questio I., fol. clxxv.
24 Corpus; fol. ccccccxii.
25 Gabriel Biel; Lectio 85, I: Memoriale dignissimum; F: Tum quia illius sacrificii veri et immolationis sanctae factae in cruce representativa est et memoriale.

Ibid.; Exposit. Can. Miss. 85, O: Quod est passionis Christi memoriale.

Ibid.; X.: Tertias effectus est inflammare seu accendere mentem in eo quod est Dominicae passionis memoriale, . . . Memoriale inquam non minus re ipsa memoranda.

Ibid.; Y.: In eo siquidem quod sacramentum illud memoriale est patientis Dominici.

29 Corpus; fol. ccccccxviii.

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3 Corpus; fol. ccccccxxvi.
8 Corpus; Causa I., Quaestio I., fol. clxxvi.

PAGE 172

5 No scriptural basis for the doctrine of transubstantiation; Magister Sententiae; Lib. IV., Dist. XI., D.:

Item Gregorius ait: Quis fidelium habere dubium possit, in ipsa immolationis hora ad sacerdotis vocem coelos aperiri. In illo Christi mysterio angelorum choros adesse, summa et ima sociari, unum quid ex invisibilibus atque visibilibus fieri. Idem (ait): Eodem momento et in coelum rapitur ministerio

Line

angelorum consociandum corpori Christi, et ante oculos sacerdotis in altari videtur.

11 Corpus; fol. ccccccxvi. The gloss on the text says: Quod ad prolationem istius hoc est corpus, et cetera; transsubstantiatur panis in corpus vinum convertitur in sanguinem.

PAGE 180

2 D'Ailli Sententiae; Lib. IV., Quaest. V., Art. II. B.; fol. ccliii: Quia secundum Doctores si hoc sacramentum fuisset consecratum in triduo mortis Christi, ipse habuisset ibi solum corpus materiale; id est, materiam cum qualitativis dispositionibus et non animam et per consequens non habuisset ibi corpus in genere substantiae nec in genere quantitatis, ut post patebit.

Hoc addito quod Christus in illo triduo habuisset corpus in sacramento et non alibi, vel quod nullibi fuisset nisi sacramentaliter, hoc enim est absolute possibile sicut probat Scotus contra Tho.; Lib. IV., Dist. X., Quaest. IV.

PAGE 182

16 Ibid.; Lib. IV., Dist. XI.:

A. Si autem quaeritur: Qualis sit illa conversio; an formalis, an substantialis, vel alterius generis, definere non sufficio. Formalem tamen non esse cognosco; quia species rerum quae ante fuerant, remanent, et sapor, et pondus. (Quibusdam esse videtur substantialis, dicentibus sic substantiam converti in substantiam, ut haec essentialiter fiat illa; cui sensui praemissae authoritates consentire videntur.)

B. Sed huic sententia sic opponitur ab aliis, si substantia panis, inquiunt, vel vini converitur substantialiter in corpus vel sanguinem Christi (quotidie fit aliqua substantia corpus vel sanguis Christi, quae ante non erat corpus; et hodie est aliquid corpus Christi, quod heri non erat: et quotidie augetur corpus Christi atque formatur de materia, de qua in conceptione non fuit factum).

C. Alli vero concedunt illud, quod erat panis vel vinum, post consecrationem esse corpus et sanguinem; non tamen sequitur; 'panis est caro Christi,' vel 'unum est sanguis'; quia substantia panis vel vini postquam facta est caro Christi vel sanguis; non est substantia panis vel vini, sed caro et sanguis.

22 Corpus; fol. ccccccxi.

PAGE 184

10 Corpus; Decretal D. Gregorii IX.; Titulus, Cap. I. Gloss on the sentence "Una," etc. is: Ipse Jesus Christus Sacerdos est et sacrificium, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continetur. Transsub-

Line

stantialis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina.

22 Thomas Aquinas; Solutio I.

Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod haec positio, quae ponit substantiam panis ibi removere post consecrationem simul cum vero corpore, incompetens est huic sacramento, et impossibilis, et haeretica.

Scotus, L. IV. D. XI. Quaest. III., E., fol. 115.

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1 Duns Scotus; Liber Sententiarum, IV., Dist. XI., Quaest. III., Art. E. fol. 155: "Transubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina."

15 Ockham; Quotl. IV., Quaest. XXXV: Tertia opinio esset multum rationabilis, nisi esset determinatio ecclesiae in contrarium, quia illa opinio salvat et vitat omnes difficultates quam consequuntur ex separatione accidentium ex subjecto. Nec contrarium illius habetur in canone Bibliae; nec includit aliquam contradictionem corpus Christi plus coexistere substantiae panis quam eius accidentibus, nec repugnat rationi. Tum quia tamen repugnat quantitas quantitati quantum substantia substantiae; sed duae quantitates possunt simul existere in eodem loco, sicut patet de duobus corporibus existentibus in eodem loco. Tum quia substantia Christi potest esse in eodem loco cum quantitate hostiae, ergo eodem ratione cum substantia eiusdem. Ad argumentum principale dico quod aliquando sunt ponenda plura miracula circa aliquod ubi posset fieri per pauciora, et hoc placet Deo, et hoc constat ecclesiae per aliquam revelationem, ut suppono, et ideo sic determinavit.

Scotus; Liber Sent. IV., Dist. XI., Quaest. III, A, fol. 113: Pro opinione secunda potest argui per rationes similes aliquibus praedictorum: quia tres primae satis videntur posse adduci pro ista. Tum quia plura miracula ponuntur ponendo transubstantionem quam negando.

PAGE 188

3 Biel; Sententiae, Lib. I., D. xxxvii., Quaest., Unica, C: Supponitur etiam ex textis quod aliquid tripliciter contingit esse in loco; scilicet, commensurative sive circumscriptive, cuius, scilicet, partes commensurantur partibus loci, quo modo corpus quantitative in loco.

Secundo modo terminative sive diffinitive quod, scilicet, est realiter ubi est locus; non natum simul esse alibi indifferenter; sive quod sic certo loco terminatur quod existens in illo non est simul aptum natum esse in alio loco distanti ab illo . . . ut corpus Christi in sacramento, ff.

Hoc modo spiritus angelici et animae rationales sunt loco.

Line

Tertio modo repletive; quod scilicet licet realiter sit in certo loco per indistantiam, non tamen terminatur illo loco quin simul sit in omni alio loco.

7 Corpus; fol. ccccccxxiv.

12 Corpus; ccccccxxiv.

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15 Magister Durandi; Lib. IV., Dist. XI. Quaest I., II.; Venetiis, 1571: Quantum ad tertium dicendum est quod quamvis iste modus sit de facto tenendus; scilicet, quod corpus Christi est in hoc sacramento altaris conversa substantia panis in ipsum; non est tamen negandum quin alius modus sit Deo possibilis; videlicet, quod Deus posset facere quod remanere substantia panis corpus Christi esset in hoc sacramento quia secundum omnes Deus potest facere quicquid non implicat contradictionem, sed corpus Christi esse in hoc sacramento sine conversione substantiae panis in ipsum, non plus implicat contradictionem quam ipsum esse in sacramento facta conversione, ergo sicut unum est possibile ita et aliquum, ff.

Biel; Sect. XLI., H: Sic si panis maneret, diceretur Christum contineri sub pane quanto et quali, et tamen non adorari panem sed Christum contentum in pane.

Ibid.; J: Tenenda est ergo haec veritas quod panis substantia non manet, sed convertitur in corpus Christi propter ecclesiae determinationem.

D'Ailli; Sententiae, Lib. IV. Quaest. VI., Art. I, fol. cclxvi, F: Quia valde possibile est substantiam panis coexistere substantiae corporis nec est magis impossibile duas substantias coexistere quam duas qualitates. Sed utrum corpus Christi posset coexistere substantiae panis per unionem, dubium est. Et posset dici quod, si sit possibile, quod una creatura sustentet aliam ut dicunt aliqui et satis apparet non repugnare nec videtur posse reprobari evidenti ratione, tunc possibile est corpus Christi assumere substantiam panis per unionem. Quicquid tamen sit de hoc patet quod ille modus est possibilis nec repugnat rationi nec auctoritati Bibliae; immo est facilior ad intelligendum et rationabilior quam aliquis altorum quia ponit quod substantia (panis deserat accidentia et non substantia) corporis Christi. Et sic non ponit accidentia sine subiecto quod est unum de difficilibus quae hic ponuntur.

Ibid.; H: Si autem dicatur quod magis difficile videtur duas substantias corporeas esse simul, dico quod non quia non est magis difficile quam duas qualitates aut quantitates esse simul vel unam substantiam et quantitatem, ff.

Luther was profoundly impressed with the view of D'Ailli. He refers to his writing in the following passage: De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae Praeludium, 1520: Dedit mihi quondam, cum Theologiam scholasticam haurirem occa-

Line

sionem cogitandi D. Cardinalis Cameracensis libro sententiarum quarto, acutissime disputans, multo probabilius esse et minus superfluorum miraculorum poni.

. . . si in altare verus panis verumque vinum, non autem sola accidentia esse astruerentur, nisi Ecclesia determinasset contrarium.

PAGE 198

7 Corpus; fol. ccccccxvii.
11 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxx.
17 Ibid.; fol. cccccciii.
21 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxxiiii.

PAGE 200

10 Corpus; fol. ccccccvii: 'Ego Berengarius': Sed etiam verum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Jesu Christi esse et sensualiter non solum sacramentum sed veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, fidelium dentibus atteri.

13 D'Ailli; Quaest. V., Art. III., B, fol. 263.

'Ego Berengarius': Ubi confitetur verum corpus Christi manibus sacerdotum sensualiter tractari et frangi et dentibus fidelium atteri. Item vulgo dicitur hodie vidi corpus Christi, et cetera. Hic dico quod istae propositiones; 'video corpus Christi,' vel 'tango,' et cetera, non sunt vere nisi ad istum sensum, video et tango species sub quibus est corpus Christi, et cetera.

PAGE 202

7 D'Ailli; Quaest. V., Art. II. C, fol. ccxlvi: Dico tertio quod possibile est per divinam potentiam contraria simul loco et tempore inesse eidem subiecto secundum se totum. . . . Contraria sunt quae non possunt naturaliter simul inesse eidem vel esse in eodem, quia nulla res est alteri contraria formaliter et necessario sed solum naturaliter, et de cursu naturae a Deo libere ordinato, ideo naturaliter contraria possunt non esse contraria, id est, esse simul in eodem et carere naturali conditione quando placet Deo.

18 Dist. XII., A.

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15 Dist. XII., A.

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4 Corpus; Decretal. Gregor. IX.; Lib. III., Tit. XL.

5 Gloss; Corpus; fol. ccccccxi: "Continenti autem tria in hoc sacramento; forma visibilis panis et vini; veritas corporis et sanguis Christi; et virtus spiritualis, id est, virtus unitatis et charitatis. . . . Primum est sacramentum tantum et non res sacramenti: secundum est sacramentum et res sacramenti; tertium est res sacramenti tantum et non sacramentum; et hoc est quod dicitur extra De Cele. Mis. 'Cum Marthae.' Distinguendum."

Line

14 D'Ailli; Sententiae, Lib. IV., Quaest. V., Art. II., B, fol. 254: Secunda conclusio est haec quod licet corpus Christi quantum corporea Christi quantitas sit in coelo et in sacramento, tamen non est corpus Christi quantum aut corporea quantitas in sacramento.

19 Ibid.; C, fol. 256.
Igitur corpus Christi non est in sacramento quantum corporeum.

PAGE 208

3 Ibid.; E, fol. 254.
Non valet: Quantitas continua Christi corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est sub specie panis, igitur ipsa ex vi conversionis est quantitas continua sub specie panis. Similiter ista non valet: Substantia corporis Christi et eius quantitas idem sunt realiter, et substantia corporis Christi in sacramento est substantia; igitur est ibi quantitas continua sive corpus.

20 Corpus: fol. ccccccxx.

24 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxxii.

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3 D'Ailli; Sententiae, Liber IV., Art. III., C, fol. 263: Non sunt verae nisi ad istum sensum, video et tango species sub quibus est corpus Christi et sic intelligitur illud capitulum.

11 Dist. XI., D.

PAGE 212

4 D'Ailli; Sententiae, Lib. IV., Quaest. V., Art. II., G, fol. 252: . . . supponit pro aliqua re sive sit substantia composita ex materia et forma sive sit materia sive forma substantialis vel accidentalis connotando tamen talem rem habere partem situaliter distantam a parte, et esse longam, latam, et profundam.

6 Aristotle's conception of matter and form—the individuating and universalizing principles.

PAGE 216

1 D'Ailli; E, fol. 253: Quod eadem anima intellectiva simul coexistat secundum se totam in toto corpore et in qualibet parte vel quod unus angelus existens in aliquo loco existit in qualibet eius parte et unum ponimus secundum veritatem theologicam et physicam.

13 Inorganic matter can be separated without the destruction of its essence; but an organism may be destroyed by a division of its parts.

PAGE 218

9 Secondary causes may, in the providence of God, disappear.
D'Ailli; Sententiae, Lib. IV., Quaest V., Art. III., H, fol. 266: Item Deus posset quam libet qualitatem conservare sine alia causa secunda, ergo sine quantitate ab ea distincta.

Line

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7 D'Ailli; ibid., Quaest. V., Art. III., E, fol. 258:
Sequitur quod non omne accidens realiter reciptur in subiecto dicente Anselmo ubi prius quod nullius accidentis susceptibilis est; scilicet, Summa Natura. Quamvis enim aliquod accidens competat Deo, scilicet, capiendo accidens tertio modo, tamen nullum accidens in se recipit Deus.
Ibid.; E, fol. 262:
Quia stat quod de potentia Dei absoluta illud corpus potest habere aliqua accidentia in uno loco et carere in alio licet in utroque sit circumscriptive.

PAGE 224

12 D'Ailli; ibid.; Quaest. V., Art. III., E, fol. 258: Hoc nomen accidens tripliciter potest capi. Primo modo stricte pro aliqua re inhaerente subiecto quae non est substantia. Secundo modo magis large pro aliquo praedicabili de aliquo contingenter quod potest successive affirmari et negari de illo propter realem mutationem illius. Tertio modo quando potest successive affirmari et negari de aliquo propter mutationem alterius.

PAGE 226

20 D'Ailli; ibid.; Quaest. V., Art. III., H, fol. 267:
Unde si esset hic aliquis ignis sine accidentibus et possemus ipsum intuitive videre, tunc possemus experiri utrum substantia possit generare substantiam sine accidentibus currentibus; sed, quia hoc naturaliter non possumus, ideo de hoc non potest homo certificari pro statu isto, sed remanet conclusio neutra.

PAGE 238

25 D'Ailli; Quaest. V., Art. III., I., fol. 266:
Sed breviter haec opinio est falsa quia si accidentia sint aliquae res distinctae a substantiis Deus potest unam ab alia separare et sic conservare.

PAGE 242

4 D'Ailli; Quaest. V., Art. II., A, fol. 258:
Quod omnis res habens partem distantem a parte est quanta per suas partes essentiales vel integrales sine quantitate quae sit distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate.
24 D'Ailli; ibid.; D, fol. 253:
Unde aliquid esse circumscriptive in loco est commensurari loco et habere unam partem in una parte loci et aliam in alia.
25 Ibid.; D, fol. 257:
Sed quando extenditur tunc est totum cum toto et pars cum parte, et non totum cum qualibet parte.
26 Ibid.; D, fol. 253:
Quantum ad primum non videtur maior difficultas, quod idem corpus numero coexistat pluribus locis secundum se

Line

totum quam quod eadem anima intellectiva simul coexistat secundum se totam in toto corpore et in qualibet parte vel quod unus angelus existens in aliquo loco existat in qualibet eius parte et unum ponimus secundum veritatem, theologicam et physicam.

PAGE 244

7 Gabriel Biel; Sententiae, Lib. I., Quaest. I., C:

Supponitur etiam et textu quod aliquid tripliciter contingit esse in loco; scilicet, commensurative sive circumscriptive, cuius; scilicet, partes commensurantur partibus loci; quo modo corpus quantitative est in loco. Secundo modo terminative sive diffinitive; quod, scilicet, est realiter ubi est locus; (non natum simul esse alibi indifferenter, sive quod sic certo loco terminatur quod existens in illo non est simul aptum natum esse in alio loco distanti ab illo. Dicitur notanter aptum natum; quia et si corpus vel spiritus per potentiam Dei possit replicari in diversis locis, ut corpus Christi in sacramento; hoc tamen non est secundum propriam aptitudinem est, quid potentia supernaturalis non confert aptitudinem in natura. Hoc modo spiritus angelici et animae rationales sunt in loco. Et iste modus est superior ad primum). Tertio modo repletive, quod, scilicet, licet realiter sit in certo loco per indistantiam, non tamen terminatur illo loco quin simul sit in omni alio loco, etiam secundum propriam naturam. (Lectio XLV., Quaest. R., et.)

PAGE 246

8 D'Ailli; A, fol. 258. D'Ailli quotes this passage from possibile—reduci. R. Seeberg states: Der Lombarde hat die Dogmatik des Damasceners gekannt und fleiszig benützt.

PAGE 248

15 D'Ailli; G, fol. 252. See similar reference in quotation used in Cap. XI.

PAGE 250

1 Ibid.; A, fol. 253:

Quod omnis quantitas continua est substantia vel qualitas; et ideo iste terminus 'corpus Christi,' ut est de genere 'substantiae' et ut est de genere 'quantatis,' supponit pro eodem licet diversa connotando.

3 Lib. I., Cap. XVII., Cap. XVIII.

PAGE 266

6 Petrus Lombardus; Dist. XII., A.

PAGE 268

17 Ibid.; Dist. XII., A.

25 Ibid.; Dist. XII., E.

Line

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23 Decretal, Gregor, IX.; Lib. III., Tit. XLV., De Celebratione Missarum, Cap. VI. See Cap. V. for the gloss; Corpus, fol. ccccccxv.
24 Corpus; Dist. II., fol. ccccccxi.
25 Petrus Lombardus; Dist. XI. Five views are given.
27 This is substantially the same as found in the gloss on the De Consecratione.
D'Ailli. See Cap. V. for the quotation.

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5 Duns Scotus; Libro IV., Distinctione XI., Quaestio III., fol. 112, 113.
20 Petrus Lombardus.
21 Corpus Juris Canonici.
26 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxvi. Corpus reads farther: Cum idem atque idem ipse esses multo alter fidei processionibus exististi.

PAGE 278

1 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxix: Dupliciter intelligitur caro Christi et sanguis. Corpus reads spiritualiter.
8 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxxiv.
22 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxvii. Gloss: Attrititis and profiteor. See Cap. V., for fuller quotations.

PAGE 280

5 Cap. V., De Substantia: Substantiae enim ipsae sui mutatione contrariorum sunt susceptivae, ff. Quare substantiae proprium erit, ipsam unum idemque numero permanentem, mutatione sui susceptivum esse contrariorum.
11 Cap. VI., Cap. XIII.
14 D'Ailli; C, fol. 256: Ut quod idem secundum se totum sit calidissimum et frigidissimum, quia non implicat contradictionem; quod deus in eodem subiecto simul tempore ponat summam caliditatem et summam frigiditatem.
Ibid.; F, fol. 266: Ut ex uno contrario fit aliud, scilicet, ex nigro album et ex albo nigrum, primo modo illud ex quo fit aliquid non annihilatur sed secundo modo annihilatur, si desinit esse simpliciter sicut est in proposito.

PAGE 282

5 Ibid.; A, fol. 268: Ad tertiam patet quod sic quia videmus ad sensum quod rare-fiunt et condensantur sed tenendo opinionem quod quantitas non sit res alia a re quanta patet dici quod ibi est rarefactio et condensatio sine quantitate de novo acquisita. Ita quod rarefieri et condensari nihil aliud est nisi tales species occupare locum maiorem vel minorem propter maiorem vel minorem distantiam partium; scilicet, quod tres partes rari coexistunt tribus partibus loci, post ea per motum localem condensatione coexistunt uni parti loci.

Line

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16 D'Ailli; H, fol. 257: Ideo potest habere partem distantem a parte et per consequens esse quanta per primam propositionem absque hoc quod ipsa sit subiective in quantitate vel subiectum quantitatis.

PAGE 296

16 See reference in Cap. VI.; for quotation from D'Ailli.

PAGE 304

24 Corpus; fol. ccccccxvi. The gloss in the Corpus is substantially the same and reads as follows: Bene dicit convertuntur vel transsubstantiantur ut alii transeunt vel transeant; sed non fiunt nec incipiunt; nihil enim fit vel incipit esse corpus Christi; potest tamen concedi quod de pane conficiatur vel fiat corpus Christi sicut de aqua fit cristallus non tamen est cristallus sed securius non conceditur hoc; et ubicumque invenitur panis vel de pane fit vel conficitur corpus Christi. Sic intelligitur, id est, transit in corpus Christi; ut, id est, ea panis; vel ex pone sic, id est, sub specie panis vel latet vel incipit esse vel latere corpus Christi ubi ante consecrationem non erat; si enim panis corpus Christi fieret singulis diebus ei adderetur aliquod quod prius non erat, et sic semper augmentaretur.

PAGE 306

10 Ibid.; Gloss of Corpus reads: "Desinit ibi esse substantia panis et vini, nulla tamen generatio."
15 Ibid.; fol. ccccccxvii.
21 Corpus; fol. ccccccxx. Text has primo rather than LV. Gloss on text reads: "Ita substantia panis desinit esse in consecratione superveniente."

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3 Luther; De Cap. Bab. Ecc.: Cur autem non possit Christus corpus suum intra substantiam panis continere sicut in accidentibus. Ecce ignis et ferrum duae substantiae sic miscentur in fero ignito, ut qualibet pars sit ferrum et ignis cur non multo magis corpus gloriosum Christi sic in omni parte substantiae panis esse possit.

PAGE 318

6 Occam's Law of Parcimony. D'Ailli; A, fol. 258: Frustra ponitur fieri per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora.

PAGE 320

2 Aristotle's four causes.
4 From potentiality to actuality: that is, matter has taken on form.

Line

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9 Scotus contra Thomam Aquinatis; Lib. IV., Dist. X., Quaest. I., Art. III. 3: Ergo est sicut in circumscriptive, 4. Ergo corpus Christi circumscribitur speciebus illis.

Sed contra. . . . Ergo non est ibi sicut in loco circumscriptive. . . . Ergo non continetur eis circumscriptive. Quaestumcula II., I. Ergo multo fortius corpus Christi est definitive sub speciebus illis.

2 Ergo est definitive sub speciebus.

5 Sed contra, omne quod est definitive alicubi, ita est ibi quod non alibi. Sed corpus Christi non ita est sub speciebus quod non alibi. Ergo non est definitive sub eis.

10 Discusses in Quaest. IV.; but in Quaest. III. is found: Potest aliquando etiam localiter Christus non esse ibi, movendo se de illo loco, et multo fortius potest esse alibi, et sacramentaliter et localiter per divinam actionem absolute absque deperditione illius ubi in caelo, sicut modo tenemus illud corpus praesens esse in Euchristia non localiter.

13 D'Ailli; Lib. IV., Sententiarum, Quaest. V., Art. II., G, fol. 252: Corpus, supponit pro aliqua re sit substantia composita ex materia et forma sive sit materia sive forma substantialis sive accidentalis connotando tamen talem rem habere partem situaliter distantem a parte, et esse longam, latam, et profundam.

15 D'Ailli; Lib. IV., Sent., Quaest. V., Art. II., D, fol. 253: Prima sit haec, quod licet, corpus Christi idem sit localiter in caelo et realiter in Euchristiae sacramento, tamen ipsum est circumscriptive in caelo et diffinitive in sacramento. Prima pars est responsiva ad quaesitum quae non potest naturali ratione probari; sed supponitur ex fide, sed pro secunda parte sciendum est quid est circumscriptive vel diffinitive esse in loco. Unde aliquid esse circumscriptive in loco est commensurari loco et habere unam partem in una parte loci et aliam in alia. Aliquid autem esse diffinitive in loco est esse totum in loco et totum in qualibet parte loci. Primo modo nullum indivisibile est in loco sed bene secundo modo.

Illo ergo primo modo corpus Christi est in caelo, quia est ibi commensuratum loco suo, sed illo modo non est in sacramento immo secundo modo quia non est ibi extensum nec commensuratum sacramento; sed totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte, quod autem sic sit ibi non potest ratione probari, nec evidenter, sequitur ex Scriptura sed quod ita sit creditur ex auctoritate ecclesiae. Huius autem potestas seu quod ita posse esse non implicet contradictionem potest aliqualiter persuaderi.

PAGE 334

4 D'Ailli; B, fol. 255: Secundo sequitur quod licet dictinctio de ordine partium in toto vel de ordine partium in loco non habeat locum in materia de existentia Christi sub sacramento,

Line

tamen possibilis est ordo partium in toto absque ordine partium in loco. . . . Quia si Deus crearet unum corpus continuum extra coelum et sine loco, illud non obstante habueret ordinem partium in toto, et tamen non esset ibi ordo partium in loco. Et ideo patet quod per prius naturaliter est ordo partium in toto quam in loco et per consequens haec distinctio non est omnino superfluo, sicut quandoque videtur innuere Guillermus Ockam.

Ibid.; B, fol. 259: Tenens contra Ockam oppositum secundae partis huius conclusionis; scilicet, quod corpus Christi in sacramento habet ordinem partium in toto, et cetera.

PAGE 340

21 D'Ailli; E, fol. 253: Quod eadem anima intellectiva simul coexistat secundum se totam in toto corpore et in qualibet parte.

PAGE 344

13 D'Ailli; C, fol. 253: Quod Christus in illo triduo habuisset corpus in sacramento et non alibi, vel quod nullibi fuisset nisi sacramentaliter hoc enim est absolute possibile sicut probat. Scotus contra Tho.; Lib. IV., Dist. X. Quaest. IV.

PAGE 354

15 D'Ailli; Corpus; E, fol. 254:

Non valet: Quantitas continua Christi corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est sub specie panis, igitur ipsa ex vi conversionis est quantitas continua sub specie panis. Non valet: Substantia corporis Christi et eius quantitas idem sunt realiter, et substantia corporis Christi in sacramento est substantia; igitur est ibi quantitas continua sive corpus.

PAGE 356

2 Original text has Cap. IV.

9 Aug.; On the Trinity, Book V., Cap. X. Non is not in the text, but it is in the quotation.

17 Praedicamenta; Cap. V., 3^b.

PAGE 358

10 D'Ailli; Corpus; F, fol. 258:

Duo vel plura corpora non possunt naturaliter esse in eodem loco.

28 Ibid., F, fol. 258:

Sed dimensiones quae possunt naturaliter per se existere illae solae repugnant; sic quod naturaliter se expellunt de loco si sibi ipsi relinquantur quamvis per divinam potentiam quaecumque dimensiones possint esse simul.

Line

PAGE 384

1 D'Ailli; ibid.; C, fol. 258: Dico quod stat quod aliqua quantitas non est aliqua res distincta a substantia et quod quantitas est accidens.

PAGE 386

18 D'Ailli; ibid.; D, fol. 251; F, fol. 256:
The word, Sortis, used by D'Ailli, for Socrates.

PAGE 388

28 Opera Sancti Anselmi; Monologium, Cap. XXV., p. 14. Ed. 1721. The text has Cap. XXII.

PAGE 392

18 Ibid.; Cap. XXV.

PAGE 394

19 Ibid.; Cap. XXV.

PAGE 400

3 D'Ailli; Corpus; C, fol. 258:
Ad secundum rationem dico quod stat quod aliqua quantitas non est aliqua res distincta a substantia et quod quantitas est accidens. Unde ad declarationem huius secundum Ockam.

4 D'Ailli; ibid.; F, fol. 257:
Nullum accidens est substantia, omnis quantitas est accidens; ergo nulla quantitas est substantia. Maior videtur nota, quia accidens et substantia sunt opposita. Minor patet quia quantitas est unum de praedicamentis accidentis. Confirmatur, unum praedicamentum non verificatur de alio, igitur nulla qualitas, et cetera.

PAGE 402

10 D'Ailli; Corpus; F, fol. 258:
Unde multi Catholici ponunt in sacramento multa fieri a solo Deo ne evacuetur fidei meritum.

11 Ibid.; A, fol. 259.
Adam. tenens contra Ockam, quod corpus Christi in sacramento habet ordinem partium in toto, et cetera.

23 Ibid.; E, fol. 258:
Sequitur quod omnis quantitas est accidens secundo modo.

PAGE 406

2 Dialectica; Cap. XXXIII. The Dialectica and the Logica must be the same; for this quotation is found in the Dialectica, Opera Omnia; Patralogiae Cursus Completus. J. P. Minge, Paris, Vol. XCIV.

8 D'Ailli; ibid.; Art. III., E, fol. 256:
D'Ailli quotes from Johannes Damascenus; Cap. XXXIII: Quod numerus est accidens et tamen ponit quod numerus est ipse res numeratae. Sic etiam solet dici quod album est accidens. The text of D'Ailli has: et accidens.

Line

PAGE 408

4 De Trinitate; Lib. V., Cap. V., Ed. Lugduni, 1664.

PAGE 414

1 D'Ailli; Art. V; A, fol. 268:

Ad tertiam patet quod sic quia videmus ad sensum rarefiunt et condensantur sed tenendo opinionem quod quantitas non sit res alia a re quanta patet dici quod ibi est rarefactio et condensatio sine quantitate de novo acquisita. Ita quod rarefieri et condensari nihil aliud est, nisi tales species occupare locum maiorem vel minorem propter maiorem vel minorem distantiam partium sic, quod tres partes rari coexistunt tribus partibus loci, post ea per motum localem condensatae coexistunt uni parti loci. Et econtra de rarefactione sine acquisitione vel deperditione alicuius absoluti. Et sic potest faciliter salvari quod qualibet pars rari est rarior, et densi densior per coexistentiam in maiori vel minori loco.

20 De Trinitate; Lib. V., Cap. V. Omnia enim accidunt eis, qui vel amitti possunt vel minui, et magnitudines et qualitates, et quod dicitur ad aliquid, sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates, ff.

PAGE 416

18 Ibid.; Book V., Cap. V.
23 Monologium; Cap. XXV.
26 Ibid.; Cap. XXV.

PAGE 422

8 Lib. V.; Cap. X.

PAGE 424

28 Aug.; De Trinitate, V., Cap. X.
29 Anselmus; Monologium, Cap. XXV.

PAGE 428

19 Dialectica; Cap. XLIX., p. 626. Quin locus etiam aëris superficies est. Nam locus tuus superficies est; hoc est extremum aëris ambientis se, atque ut superficies est, reducitur ad communem quantitatem.

De Fide Orth.; The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers; Ser. II., Vol. IX., Book II., Cap. VII. "For place is the circumference of a body. But what is it that surrounds bodies but air."

PAGE 430

4 Ibid.; Book III., Cap. VIII. If any one asks concerning the natures of the Lord, if they are brought under a continuous or discontinuous quantity, we will say that the natures of the Lord are neither one body nor one surface nor one line . . . placed so as to be reduced to a continuous quantity. For these are the things that are reckoned continuously. Further note that number deals with things that differ, and it is quite

Line

impossible to enumerate things that differ from one another in no respect; and just so far as they differ are they enumerated, ff.

14 Based on Aristotle; Praedicamenta, Cap. IV., 2^a.

16 Dialectica; Cap. XXXVI., p. 602. "De decem generibus generalissimis. Sciendum est autem unumquodque horum generum genus esse generalissima. Horum porro decem praedicamentorum unum dumtaxat substantia est."

27 Augustine; De Trin., Lib. V., Cap. V.

PAGE 432

14 Damascenus; Dialectica, Cap. XXXVI.

16 Dialectica; Cap. XXXVI.

17 As in Aristotle; Praedicamenta, Cap. IV., 2^a.

PAGE 436

9 Scotus; fol. 37, ff.

18 Corpus; Decreti, Secunda Pars, Causa XXIV., Quaest. I., fol. ccccxlvii.

PAGE 438

5 Corpus; Decretal. Gregor. IX.; Lib. V., Tit. VII., De Haereticis, fol. ccccxlvii.

6 Gloss extra 'Quotiens': Corpus; fol. ccccxlvii.

8 Ibid.; Causa XXIIII., Quaest. I., De Haereticis; fol. ccccxlvii.

23 This is the exact gloss extra 'Quotiens,' as well as that extra 'Ad abolendum'; fol. ccccxlvii.

25 Ibid.; De Haereticis; fol. ccccxlvii.

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6 Gloss extra Quotiens; fol. ccccxlvii.

13 Corpus; Decreti, Prima Pars, Dist. LXXX., fol. cxxvii.

21 Gloss extra 'Quotiens' reads: Accusatus, et ut ibi aliter accepitur, et expone agitare in fide, id est, fideliter agitare.

23 Corpus; Decreti, Secunda Pars, Causa XVI., Quaest. I., fol. ccclx. Gloss on Frater Noster says: Sed dic quod mediocres causas possunt episcopi tractare . . . sed magnas non.

PAGE 442

4 Gloss on Cum Christus; fol. ccccxlvii.

27 Irenaeus; Ad Haereses III., Chap. XXX., 2; Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. I. Note: Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam.

PAGE 444

10 Corpus; Decretal., Greg. IX., Lib. I., Tit. I., Dist. IX.; fol. x.

15 Glosses on 'Negare' and 'Noli' refer several times to this weakness of Augustine: Corpus; Dist. IX., fol. x.

Line

PAGE 446

10 Corpus; Decreti, Prima Pars, Dist. IX., fol. x.
13 De Trinitate; Liber I., Cap. II.
16 Ibid.; Lib. I., Cap. III.
27 Corpus; Decreti, Prima Pars., Dist. IX., fol. x.

PAGE 448

5 Ibid.; fol. x.
12 Ibid.; fol. xi. There is a considerable break in the original between 'nesciat' and 'episcoporum,' and 'per' is inserted; but the sense is the same.
21 Ibid.; fol. x.

PAGE 450

2 Ibid.; fol. x.
3 A gloss on the text here states: Augustinus reprehendebat dicta quorundam peritorum de quo fortunatus eum reprehendebat. Nunc autem ei rescribit et dicit quod non vult adhiberi tantam fidem illis scripturis quanta adhibet canonicis: et licet eis honor debeatur tamen vult eas corrigere si quid invenerit in eis corrigendum. Idem vult fieri de suis scripturis. Ibid.; fol. x.

PAGE 458

22 D'Ailli; ibid.; D, fol. 266: Si autem dicatur utrum corpus minus corpore Christi possit in ipsum transsubstantiari ita quod habeat esse in illo loco circumscriptive puta in loco unius hostiae parvae. Dico quod hoc non implicat; sicut enim unum corpus potest esse circumscriptive in duobus locis ita posset esse aliquid in uno loco maiori et alio minori sine deperditione alicuis absoluti, et sic Deus posset facere absolute sine alicuius rei deperditione quod corpus Christi haberet ita parvum caput et alia membra ita parva quod esset circumscriptive in loco et hoc per condensationem. Etiam per oppositum posset Deus per rarefactionem facere ipsum esse in loco maiori quam nunc sit in caelo. Et istud esset facilius imaginari quam illud quod ponitur scilicet quod qualibet pars corporis Christi sit sub qualibet parte hostiae, et cetera.

PAGE 460

17 St. Augustine.

PAGE 464

5 Praedicamenta. Discussed in Cap. IV-VIII.

PAGE 476

28 Here Scotus discusses the problem at length: IV. and VI., fol. 150-159. Quia Deus statuit illas species manentes esse sine subiecto in Eucharistia praecise, et non alibi . . . quia si aliqua substantia redit, non alia quam illa quae potest illis accidentibus novis affici, quia alia substantia non esset capax.

Line

. . . Quod non redit immediate nisi a Deo, quia nullum aliud agens habet virtutem activam ad hoc sufficientem. Quaest. VI., fol. 159.

PAGE 482

5 D'Ailli; E, fol. 254: Non valet: Quantitas continua Christi corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est sub specie panis; igitur ipsa ex vi conversionis est quantitas continua sub specie panis. Similiter ista nam valet: Substantia corporis Christi et eius quantitas idem sunt realiter, et substantia corporis Christi in sacramento est substantia; igitur est ibi quantitas continua sive corpus.

8 D'Ailli; G, fol. 252: Praemitto igitur hanc distinctionem quod iste terminus corpus potest capi tripliciter. Primo modo prout supponit essentialiter pro substantia composita ex materia et forma substantiali, et sic pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae. Secundo modo prout supponit pro aliqua re sive sit substantia composita ex materia et forma sive sit materia sive forma substantialis vel accidentalis connotando tamen talem rem habere partem situaliter distantem a parte, et esse longam, latam, et profundam. Et sic pertinet iste terminus corpus ad praedicamentum quantitatis continuae, distinctae contra alias superficies; scilicet, linea et superficies quamvis istae species supponunt pro eaden re. Non enim teneo cum illis qui dicunt quod iste terminus corpus ut est de genere quantitatis supponit pro aliqua re quae non est substantia nec qualitas et quod istae species quantitatis linea superficies corpus supponunt pro diversis, et cetera.

Ibid.; A, fol. 255:

Tertio modo potest dici iste terminus corpus prout supponit pro materia sive sit quanta sive non connotando tamen aliquas qualitativas dispositiones materiae inhaerere. Et hoc modo dicimus quod ex anima humana, et corpore hominis fit unus homo, et quod corpus Christi in triduo iacebat in sepulchro, id est, materia Christi informata qualitativis dispositionibus aliquibus, et cetera. Et sic iste terminus corpus pertinere potest ad praedicamentum 'qualitatis.' Et ideo iuxta hanc distinctionem ut removeatur aequivocatio huius termini corpus in praesenti quaestione utar istis terminis corpus in genere 'substantiae,' corpus in genere quantitatis, corpus in genere qualitatis; vel quando simpliciter utar eo, capiam ipsum ut est de genere quantitatis quia haec acceptio magis erit ad propositum. Ex hac distinctione infero tria corollaria. Primum est quod licet idem si corpus Christi in genere 'substantiae' et in genere 'quantitatis,' tamen non est idem corpus Christi in genere 'substantiae' et in genere 'qualitatis.' . . . Secundo sequitur quod Christus semper habebit in sacramento Eucharistiae corpus tam in genere 'substantiae' quam in genere 'qualitatis' quandocumque erit hoc sacramentum. . . .

Line

Tertio sequitur quod Christus aliquando non habuit in sacramento Euchristiae corpus in genere 'substantiae,' sed solum in genere 'qualitatis.'

PAGE 484

7 D'Ailli; C, fol. 254: Secunda pars conclusionis probatur quia corpus Christi quod est in sacramento et quisquid est in ipso corpore Christi est totum in sacramento et totum in qualibet parte sacramenti, ut patet ex conclusione praecedente, et per consequens nihil tale habet partem distantem a parte in sacramento; sed constat quod omne illud quod est alicubi quantum corporeum habet ibi partem distantem a parte; ut patet ex quid nominis; igitur corpus Christi non est in sacramento; quantum corporeum, et cetera.

29 Ibid.; F, fol. 257: Quando aliqua sunt idem realiter ibicumque aliquod est unum illorum, ibidem est reliquum illorum, sed substantia corporis Christi et aliqua quantitas continua corporis Christi sunt idem realiter.

CRITICAL APPARATUS

This first portion of the text is based on the text of 1491. The following are but a few of the differences found in the MSS. and the texts.

B=Balliol MS. R=Rouen MS. A=Text of 1491.
M=Merton MS. P=Text of 1490. V=Text of 1504
C=Corpus Juris Canonici

Note: B, or B and M, or B, M, and R, followed by a colon means that the words following the colon are not found in P, A, and V.

Line

PAGE 2

5 V omits: veritatum—acerrimi
11 C: Argumentum infra est
18 C: Argumentum infra est

PAGE 8

8 A: phisicas

PAGE 10

10 P and A: accipiendo

PAGE 12

1 A and V: E/C: P

PAGE 22

19 V: quia, si esset aliquod indivisibile, est indivisibile in indivisibili
30 P: facere

PAGE 32

24 P: Tam effectus et accidens a causa a suo subiecto potest per divinam potentiam separari ab illo, nullo fortius, id est, non dependet ab alio nec tanquam totum nec tanquam accidens nec tanquam effectus ab alio potest Deus facere sine eo
A: tanquam effectus et accidens a causa a suo subiecto potest per divinam potentiam separari ab illo, multo fortius id quod non dependet ab alio nec tanquam totum nec tanquam accidens nec tanquam effectus ab alio
V omits: a suo subiecto

PAGE 34

9 V: punctum
24 P: legitur

PAGE 40

11 P: ratio/oratio: A and V

Line

PAGE 42

20 V: proprietatis

PAGE 46

18 V: terminum
27 P and A: puncti et loci puncti/puncti et loco differentiam: P: cum/eum: A and V

PAGE 48

8 P and A: Octavo VIII. et Sexto/V. et VI.: V.
10 P: medietarum

PAGE 50

22 V: sine omni

PAGE 52

16 P: ditalibus; P omits: sicut esse; V: ac si esset unum
23 P and V: tunc est aliquid

PAGE 54

10 P: sed proprietatem
20 V: discurrendo

PAGE 56

3 P: Cum similiter
9 V: vel sub tali, quando aliquid movetur, acquirit/vel tali movetur quando aliquid modo acquirit: P and A
19 V omits: terminus

PAGE 58

1 P and A: qui
8 P and A omit: quare

PAGE 62

26 P: recipiendi

PAGE 64

4 V: commitas; P: commitatus

PAGE 66

23 P: hoc non
28 V: sic formata

PAGE 68

1 P: aliud
2 A: quid nominus illius nominis unum, et illius nominis verum, et illius nominis bonum
P: quid nominis illius nominis 'verum,' et illius nominis 'bonum'
V: 'unum' et illius nominis 'verum,' et illius nominis 'bonum'

PAGE 72

18 P and V: ut gratia

PAGE 76

9 V: res distincta a re; P and A: res

PAGE 82

8 V omits: Et videtur

Line

PAGE 84

2 P and V: destruere
3 P: viuere

PAGE 86

25 A: quin sit; P: quia sint; V: quia non sunt

PAGE 88

12 V adds: vel alterius rationis
18 V adds: corpus et superficies

PAGE 90

5 V: unde/ante: P and A

PAGE 93

9 P: in mediativa
22 A: alia

PAGE 94

16 P and V: quid

PAGE 98

4 V omits: igitur—falsam
25 V: rationem

PAGE 100

20 V: substantiae
25 P: a non diversionem et habetur
26 A: secundum

PAGE 102

19 V: quia respectu
26 V: respectu

PAGE 104

4 P: ipsa distincta est
6 P: alterius

PAGE 106

1 P: et essent
28 V: dictu

PAGE 108

1 V: quia situs
5 P: partes/praesentes: A and V
15 V: Sed Deus
28 P: sive

PAGE 110

11 P: nullo non posset
16 V: non est

PAGE 112

2 P: substantia/subsistentia: A and V

PAGE 114

24 V: quod theologicae

Line

PAGE 116

5 P: esse/causae: A and V
16 P: fore/forte: A and V

PAGE 118

3 P: dictum
4 P: rationaliter

PAGE 120

16 P: substantia

PAGE 122

7 P: inter secundum

PAGE 124

3 P: importantem/importatam: A and V
15 V: homines/species: P and A

PAGE 126

3 P: concede
29 V: creatio/caro: P and A

PAGE 128

14 P: poteri

PAGE 132

3 P and V omit: et frequenter—de praesenti

PAGE 134

22 P: instautia/substantia: A and V

PAGE 138

23 P: praedicamento

PAGE 140

19 V: subicibilia

PAGE 142

10 P: coram/foram: A and V

PAGE 144

19 V: illarum

PAGE 148

3 P and V: distinctam/distantem: A

PAGE 150

1 P: quantum sine

PAGE 152

9 P: sit tibi
25 P: quantitas

PAGE 154

16 V: et ideo/et non: P and A
18 P: qua illas/qualitas: A and V
28 P and A omit: substantia

Note: This portion of the text is based on the Balliol MS.

Prologue

Page 158

Line
1 P: super
2 R: creatori
4 M, R, P, A and V: mortalitatis
8 B: humanum
9 B omits: iugis
14 P, A and V: non dedignatur
20 M and R: conscripturus

Page 160

1 B and M: inserenda/interserendo: P, A and V; R: interserta
2 B: id est/sunt: P, A and V
4 B: inquirendo
10 B omits: sed—ostendam

Page 162

Caption: P, A and V: Quod corpus Christi sub speciebus panis vere continetur
Line
12 M, P, A and V: transsubstantiatur
15 P, A and V: subsistentia

Page 166

19 B, M and R omit: vobis

Page 168

4 B and M omit: quod—datur
7 P, A and V: auctoritates—quae
8 P, A and V: conformiter
21 R: nihil aliud malos peius minus; Corpus: maius nihil a malo

Page 170

5 B and M: nobis/vobis: R, P, A and V; R adds: de coelo
6 C: ipse conviva et convivium ipse; P, A and V: conviva et convivium et ipse
14 B omits: fidelibus

Page 172

18 B: et hoc habetur
20 C, M, P, A and V: ut inciperet esse; R: ut esse incipiat quod
21 B omits: quanto

Page 174

7 M, P, A and V: transsubstantiatis pane
14 P, A and V: proprium
19 P, A and V: transmutatione; P: argumento

PAGE 176

Caption: 4. M omits: nec in sanguinem
5. B and M omit: substantiae

Line
4 B omits: nec—Christi
10 B: doctori/doctoribus, P, A and V; M: doctorum

PAGE 178

4 R omits: vel transsubstantiatur
8 M and B omit: potestate
13 B omits: non ibi inciperet
19 B omits: et—conversionis
28 B and R: esse dictum/est dicere: P, A and V; M and R: est dictum

PAGE 180

4 B omits: et—fuit; M: et—intellectiva
7 B: Si autem velent/Si omnino velis: P, A and V; M: velis
10 M, P, A and V: nolo tibi

PAGE 184

11 B and M contain the entire gloss
17 B and M omit: Istam—operis
20 M, P, A and V: concorditer
21 R: asserentes; P and V: medio

PAGE 186

3 P, A and V omit: substantia
6 B omits: et probant
14 B omits: alias and ipsas

PAGE 188

1 R places Chapter V before VI
9 R: nec singulos minimum sed totum in singulis
17 R, P, A and V: aliter
21 M: et includere
22 P, A and V: receptis

PAGE 190

10 P, A and V: mortua
11 B, M and R: existere/subsistere: P, A and V; P, A and V: innumerabilia
21 M, P, A and V: noscuntur

PAGE 192

1 P: coexistentem; B omits: alicui
2 B omits: ita—et cuilibet
3 P, A and V omit: nec—probari
9 B and M: quis fidelis
12 M, P, A and V: coexistere

Line
13 R: salvo
14 R: intravit
15 B omits: nulla—existant; P, A and V: quin duo corpora
21 P, A and V: coexistere
24 B omits: est impossible
25 B : quam intelligere illos intelligere facere potest quod; P, A and V: quam nos cogitare seu intelligere, facere; M: quam nos intelligere, facere

PAGE 194

2 B: de anima de angelo
20 B, M and R: operationes/rationes: P, A and V
22 B omits: dispositionis; B: sit/scilicet: P, A and V
29 M, P, A and V: distinctioni
30 B: non stat

PAGE 196

1 B omits: ad—toto et
13 R: studiosorum

PAGE 198

Caption: 2. B omits: oculo corporali
Line
2 R: incipere esse
9 C, M, P, A and V: invisibiles

PAGE 200

1 C adds: visibilis
11 R: esse
14 B: essentialis/aequalis: M, R, P, A and V

PAGE 202

3 M, R, P, A and V: conversionem
5 P, A and V: ostendam
15 M and V: alteratur; R, P and A: alterantur
19 P, A and V: ubi
20 P, A and V: corpus et sanguis
21 Gloss on B: Nota: qualem formam habet corpus Christi in sacramento altaris

PAGE 204

2 B omits: se
7 R: esse/aëre
13 R omits: sicut—accidentia
19 M, R, P, A and V: fatendum ea existere

PAGE 206

5 Gloss in Corpus, fol. ccccccxi: Continenti autem tria in hoc sacramento: forma visibilis panis et vini; veritas corporis et sanguinis Christi; et virtus spiritualis, id est, virtus unitatis et charitatis—Primum est sacramentum tantum et non res sacramenti; secundum est sacramentum et res sacramenti;

Line

tertium est res sacramenti tantum et non sacramentum; et hoc is quod dicitur extra De Cele. Mis., Cum Marthae: 'Distinguendum.'
9 M: veritatis; B, M, R and P: caritatis
13 P: divisibilis
16 B: quantitatem/qualitatem: M, R, P, A and V
23 R: quantitatem/figuram

PAGE 208

6 B omits: oculo corporali
11 B omits: est—Christi
21 C: 'Qui manducant'
24 C, B and M: 'Invitat'/'In vitat': P, A and V; B omits: Per partes, and in sacramento; C: Per partes manducatur in sacramento
26 C, B and M: in caelo; manet integer totus

PAGE 210

10 B: sine
15 M, P, A and V: properans
21 B and M omit: Propter—aliquorum

PAGE 212

3 R omits: Ut—dubitare
4 M: rationabilis; B omits: extensa
6 B omits: non—etiam
9 P, A and V omit: Sed—lignum
13 B omits: componitur; M: substantialibus secundum se totam nova generatur situ
17 M: distantiae
19 B, M and R: sine/cum: P, A and V

PAGE 214

19 R, P, A and V: habetur
26 B and M omit: habeat

PAGE 216

1 B omits: sicut—intellectiva
5 B, M and R omit: Dici—intentionales
8 M: materiales

PAGE 218

3 R: priorem potest Deus facere sine re posteriore
17 R: quod virtus divina aliquando suspendit actionem causae creatae et conservat causam sine effectu sicut
20 V: quod ignis forma succensa fornace
21 B, M and R: mittentes/ministrantes: P, A and V

Line

PAGE 220

2 V: inducit
3 B and M omit: et conservari
6 B omits: dependentia—obstante

PAGE 222

7 B omits: accidens; M: non est; P, A and V: non
8 B, M and R: substantiam/subiectum: P, A and V; B: cum/sine: M, R, P, A and V
9 B and M omit: substantia
10 B and M: subsistentiae/substantiae: R, P, A and V
15 B omits: fideli
16 B omits: manent sine subiecto
17 B omits: dubium
18 M and R: existere

PAGE 224

3 P, A and V: si aliud esse habeat
23 M, P, A and V: sit ostensum
25 B and M: creaturae/causae: P, A and V
27 M, P, A and V: manifesta ratione

PAGE 226

9 P, A and V: speciei accidentis demonstrati. Sed tanta est virtus imperfecta creata efficiae quod potest substantiam aliquam conservare sine aliquo individuo alicuius speciei, Ideo poterit infinita Dei potentia facere hanc substantiam sine aliquo individuo illius speciei accidentia demonstrati. Sequitur etiam quod ideo posset Dei omnipotentia facere hanc substantiam sine omni individuo illius speciei accidentis
19 B: qualitate tangibili/omni albedine non: M, P, A and V; B omits: nonne—tangibili
27 M adds: Deo
28 B omits: sibi and poterit
30 M, P, A and V: mirabiliora

PAGE 228

Caption: 1. B, M and R: quae est
2. R: localiter in se et omnibus partibus quamvis

Line

9 B and M: subiecto/substantiae: P, A and V
14 MSS and texts: non; R: mutatum seu motum. Ergo Deus potest conservare substantiam non motam localiter
16 B and R: voluerit; M: noluerit
20 P, A and V omit: Potest—agat; B: omne accidens/Deus

PAGE 230

3 B: destruere/destrui: M, P, A and V
4 B: pars/parte: M, P, A and V

Line

7 B: Tamen/Tum: M, P, A and V
13 B: Tamen vel/Tum quia vel: M, P, A and V
18 M omits: quam—punctum; B: ad unum quam ad alium, non; P, A and V: ad unum punctum quam ad reliquum; R omits: non—finem
27 B omits: albedinis

PAGE 232

2 B omits: pars
5 P, A and V: dare
14 B and M: ipsum/ipsam substantiam: P, A and V; R: illam substantiam; R, P, A and V omit: Substantia

PAGE 234

8 B: autem oportet quod sit praesens illo loco seipsa vel per aliquid aliud cui ipsa cui praesens ergo ipsa est praesens illi loco. Non enim loquor
10 P, A and V: praesens est loco vel per seipsum vel per aliquod aliud sibi praesens est praesens illi loco. Cum
12 P, A and V: aliquod cui ipsa est praesens. Quod etiam est
17 P, A and V: quia sicut sol facit lumen esse, ita facit eum praesentem loco; M: sicut vermis productus a sole—quia sol sicut facit vermem esse; R: sicut vermis est praesens loco per solem eo quia, sicut sol facit vermem esse ita facit vermem esse in loco

PAGE 236

10 B and M omit: substantia
14 B and R omit: substantia
15 B, M and R omit: illi—Praesens
21 B omits: aut—accidenti; R adds: accidens

PAGE 238

3 B: quando/quanto: M, P, A and V
7 B: et per partes
10 P, A and V omit: ita quod—illi; B omits: illi—praesens
13 M adds: extra partem et

PAGE 240

Caption

B and M omit the caption

Line

11 A and V: protestationem praemissam; P: praetestationem
17 B and M: recitando/recitanda: P, A and V
18 B omits: ratione; M, P, A and V: dandi; R: et causa veritatis investigandae

PAGE 242

7 M and B omit: partem—sive
12 B, M and R: impossibile/possibile: P, A and V
14 P, A and V omit: accidens

Line
22 M, R, P, A and V: circumscriptive
24 B and M: circumscribi/circumscriptive esse: R, P, A and V

PAGE 246

Caption
Not in M; P, A and V: In quo probantur quaedam conclusiones ad propositum; B omits: distincta, quantitas and res—realiter

Line
5 P: a quantitate; R: a substantia
8 B omits: qui vult
9 B omits: de genere
12 P, A and V: ille venerabilis pater Johannes Damascenus
15 B, M and R: praedicamentum/principium: P, A and V; B: ad/ut: M, P, A and V
16 B and M: Quidem manifestantia, quia/et quaedam mathematica: P, A and V
17 B, M and R: sub/ad: P, A and V
18 B: sunt ad aliud; enim magnum aliud parvum dicitur; P, A and V: quae ad aliud magnum enim et parvum ad aliud dicuntur, magnum enim ad parvum dicitur magnum et duplum ad dimidium; simpliciter/parvum: M and R
21 B: Corpus autem aliud secundum quod quoddam naturale est sub/Corpus quidem secundum quod naturali est, sub: P, A and V; M: quod quidem naturalis est sub

PAGE 248

1 B, M and R: sub/ad: P, A and V
2 B: et mensuratum/aut mensuratum ad quantitatem: P, A and V; R: mathematicum aut mensura ad quantum
3 B: sub quantum
8 R: accidentis
9 R: materialis
18 B, M and R: substantiam/subiectum: P, A and V

PAGE 250

5 R: substantia vel qualitate aut quantitate vel alterius praedicamentis

PAGE 252

1 M, P, A and V: generali
2 P, A and V omit: conclusiones
8 M, P, A and V: caloris
13 P, A and V: excludendum
15 B and M: in aqua et alia in aëre vel extra aquam, convertitur/in aëre et alia in aqua, convertitur: P, A and V
22 R: est unum lignum, quod est esse unum per
23 R: Sed hoc argumentum sive verum sit sive falsum exclusum est

Line

PAGE 254

2 R adds: illius accidentis
3 B and M: in instantia; B and M: adducta; P, A and V: adiecta
4 B omits: una—quantitatis
8 M: per se
12 R: per aggregationem
25 B omits: subiecto
28 B, M and R omit: pars
30 B omits: eadem—non manet

PAGE 256

10 B, M, R and V omit: pars
11 B: alia/una: P, A and V
14 R: falsum. Aut tota in toto et pars in parte; una et alia in alia, quod dari non potest, quia

PAGE 258

4 R: qualitas inhaereat distinctis quantitatibus
6 R omits: distinctarum a qualitatibus
8 R adds: ante—panis
10 R adds: post transsubstantiationem
12 R: quia tunc sequitur substantiam esse quantam quantitate distincta a quantitate qualitatum quarum est subiectum, quod est falsum; P, A and V: substantiam esse quantum; B and R: distincta
14 M omits: quanta
21 P and V omit: quantitatis

PAGE 260

1 B: quam duae/X. vel XX.: M, P, A and V
3 P and V omit: non
5 R omits: rationis
10 R: qualitas esset quantitate distincta quanta
15 B adds to this chapter the caption of the next

PAGE 262

3 B another hand: subiecta illius; R: subiectum
6 V: qualitates; B omits: in—subiective
8 M, P, A and V: indistincta
16 R: Si dicat
19 B, M and R: qualibet/qualitatibus: P, A and V

PAGE 264

5 P, A and V: non enim color est subiectum coloris, tunc enim color
6 M: caloris
19 P, A and V: ordinate
23 P, A and V add: aliquod—tamquam

Line

PAGE 266

12 R: subiecto dentur; R, P, A and V: fatendum; M: fatentur
19 B and M omit: non
20 M: non sint
21 B: fundamento/subiecto: M, P, A and V

PAGE 268

13 B: existens/subsistens: M, P, A and V; B, M and V: immediato/mediate: P and V
17 B: aut/ait: M, P, A and V
18 P: fideique
20 B, M and R: naturam/materiam: P, A and V
21 B and M: est/esse: P, A and V

PAGE 270

10 B omits: qualitas
31 B, M and R: subiecto

PAGE 272

15 B, M, R and V: quantitas/qualitas: P and A
20 B omits: non
29 B omits: ibi

PAGE 274

3 R omits: dun—occultatum
11 P and A omit: non
20 B and M: in subiecto

PAGE 276

2 B and M omit: ibi
24 M, P, A and V: nominando
25 P, A and V omit: semel
26 P, A and V omit: homini
29 C, B and M: esse/es: R, P, A and V

PAGE 278

11 B, M and R: id est/ibi: R, P, A and V
18 P: quantitatem; B and M: qualitatibus/qualibet: P, A and V
22 B omits: pondus
24 C, M, P, A and V: sensibus

PAGE 280

Caption

3. B, M and V: qualitatum/quantum: P and A

Line

7 B: esse proprie propria/dicit proprium proprie: P, A and V; R: est proprietas

PAGE 282

9 B omits: esset nova

Caption

PAGE 284

2. B omits: non—sacramento

Line

4 R: vel subiective in quantitate vel res
5 B omits: vel—quantitate

PAGE 286

Caption

3. B omits: realiter—panis

Line

5 R: vel praefuit una
13 B and R omit: situ; B and M: distinctio/distantia: P, A and V

PAGE 288

4 B omits: manet—panis non
5 P: qualitate
8 B, M, R and A: qualitate/quantitate: P and V

PAGE 290

2 B and M: superiora probare/superius dicta illa probare: P, A and V
21 B: cùm accidente/omni
22 B: inhaerentem/inhaerens: M, P, A and V

PAGE 292

4 B and M: Dei/divina: P, A and V

PAGE 294

2 M omits: Si—localiter
6 R: Item una pars illius substantiae vocetur A, de qua quaero aut A prae-existit illi parti loci, cui prius coexistebat, vel non
7 M: existit
8 B omits: loci
18 M: ita ista
24 M, P, A and V: theologice

PAGE 296

10 B, M, R and V: mundum; P: modum; A: medium
11 B omits: immo—loco
18 B omits: erit—diffinitive; M omits: erit—ex quo
22 P, A and V: oportet dicere consimiliter quod quaelibet pars eius est in loco diffinitive
26 B omits: circumscriptive in loco

PAGE 298

2 B omits: non est—est alibi
4 M, P, A and V: alicubi

Caption

PAGE 300

4. B omits: sine—sibi

Line

3 B omits: non
7 B omits: quam—substantiam
9 B omits: aquis; B omits: non—A et B
12 M: faciunt
15 M omits: si—ab omni
19 B: aquam Romae, usque hic vel istam aquam; P, A and V: aquam, est Romae usque huc vel illam usque Roman; B: hic
21 B: ibi eam; M, P, A and V: illam alibi
22 B and M: istam hic; B, A and V: illam hic; B omits: aeque; B omits: si—placeret

PAGE 302

11 V: aliter; A: alite
21 B: alias/illas: M, P, A and V
23 B: aqua addita sibi et/quantitate addita et: M, P, A and V

PAGE 304

1 M, B and R: substantiam/subiectum: P, A and V; R: substantiam subiectivam sine; B omits: accidentis—suae
2 B omits: conservare—locali
13 B and M: substantiam/subiectum: P, A and V
15 B and M: substantiam/subiectum: P, A and V
16 B omits: absolutum
22 B, M and R: panis; R: destrui sive corrumpi. Hoc enim dictum meum et doctorum catholicorum

PAGE 306

1 P, A and V: pane conficiatur et fiat; R: de pane fit corpus Christi vel conceditur
R: pane fit corpus. Corpus conficiatur et fiat; P, A and V: conficiatur, et fiat
4 B: Sic intelligitur, et cetera; sic intelligitur: fit, id est, transit, et expone sic, id est, sub
R: invenitur hoc de pane fit corpus Christi vel de pane fit; et cetera et consimilia intelligitur; fit est, transit vel expone fit, id est suo specie, et cetera
Corpus: sic intelligitur, id est, transit in corpus Christi, ut, id est, ea panis, vel expone sic, id est, sub
P, A and V: Sic intelligitur: fit, id est, transit in corpus Christi, vel ex pone fit, id est, sub
5 C: ut, id est, ea panis
13 B and M omit: id est—vini
15 Gloss on MSS B: Nota: quod est vera corruptio et nulla generatio
17 P: sit
18 B omits: corrumpitur and scilicet
19 P: prolatione

Line
20 R: monumentanens tamen est corpus
22 B omits: quod substantia

PAGE 308

1 B, P, A and V: Deus/panis: M
5 M omits: accidentis—medietatem
11 B omits: Ex—eam
28 B omits: Ex—sibi

PAGE 310

2 B: est/esse: P, A and V
3 B omits: quam-addita
4 M: sine omni re addita
9 B and M: corporea/incorporea: P, A and V

PAGE 312

B omits the Caption
4 P, A and V: illa propositio
11 B omits: sibi—adveniens
22 R: abstracto

PAGE 314

2 B and M: praesentialitas/praesentialitatis: R, P, A and V

PAGE 316

2 B and M omit: et—eam
6 R: quantitatis/substantiae
9 R: subiectum suum
24 M: tali

PAGE 318

Caption
2. R: essentiales
Line
11 M: et—quanta; P and V omit: et quanta

PAGE 320

1 V: qualitates
16 P, A and V: partium illarum
21 M omits: non

PAGE 322

15 M omits: extra—qualitatis
21 B and M omit: earum

PAGE 324

17 M: partes substantiae
21 P: sit/si
23 B and M: sicut/sit: P, A and V; B and M: finis/finalis: R, P, A and V

Line

PAGE 326

7 B: per aliud/pro nihil: P, A and V; M: per nihil; B omits: causas
8 B, M, P, A and V: finem
11 M, P, A and V: quare
15 B omits: a parte—situaliter
17 P omits: quare est illa est
22 B and M omit: erit—nec
27 B and M: sint/sicut: P, A and V

PAGE 328

3 B: quanta/quaedam tota: M, R, P, A and V
6 B and M: Romae et aliam hic/in Angliam, aliam autem hic in Roman: P, A and V; R: Romae et alteram sicut
10 M: sub/sunt ab
12 B: sicut est album per albedinem; M: per albedinem; P, A and V: sicut corpus est album albedine

PAGE 330

Caption

1. B: Probatur eodem conclusio/Probatio eiusdem conclusionis: P, A and V

Line

1 M: adiciendae; V: adiungendae; P and A: adducendae
5 B: quem probabilem/et probabile: M, P, A and V
7 M adds: possumus

PAGE 332

16 B, M and R: concedere/concedi: P, A and V
18 B omits: posito
20 B omits: speciei—coexistunt

PAGE 334

2 B and R: pars, et alia/pars eidem coexistit alia: P, A and V
14 B: finaliter
20 R: stare
26 B, M and R: addit/dicit: P, A and V

PAGE 336

1 B and M: certum/dictu: P, A and V
5 B omits: quantitatis; M: rationem
6 B, M and R: quanto/quantitate: P, A and V; R: quanto dispositione
13 B: extensio/coextensio: M, R, P, A and V
15 B: coexistentia/coextensio: R, P, A and V
24 B omits: et—toto
25 M: quod ad sit
26 B, M and R omit: partium
27 B omits: pars

Line

PAGE 338

7 B omits: est prius
8 R, M, P, A and V: non video
9 B: si—qui; P, A and V: importatus
25 R: sicut nunc est nec plus est una prior alia quam pars, quae nunc est pars alterius nec plus una causa alterius nec prior; P, A and V: non plus etiam est una pars nunc pars alterius nec plus est una pars causa alterius nec plus una pars prior; M: nec plus una pars prior

PAGE 340

10 B and M: subiectum/ipsum: R, P, A and V
12 B: Item tale quantum esset inextensum nisi
27 M omits: quantum; V: unitum
29 B omits: in and si—loco

PAGE 342

10 M: requiritur
13 R: sub/cum
14 B omits: panis
19 B, M and R: cum possit/nec posset: P, A and V
23 M: vel non propinque; B: remote/propinque: M, R, P, A and V

PAGE 344

4 B omits: quae—situalis (93, 1)
7 M and V: sit/fit: P and A
26 M omits: aut—loco

PAGE 346

15 M, R, P, A and V: tam fundamenti quam termini
17 B omits: qua—passiva
27 B, M and R: substantiae

PAGE 348

1 R: fundamenta
15 M: naturales
16 M: causae extrinsecae/causae intrinsecae: B, P, A and V; R: intrinsecales; B, M, P, A and V: finis

PAGE 350

9 P and A: relatio respectus
10 B: mediate/immediate: M, R, P, A and V
14 B: seu/sine: P, A and V
22 M: a substantia
27 B: quantitas/qualitas: P, A and V

PAGE 352

3 B and R omit: Non—esse; M: Nunc
4 R adds: requiri
9 M: in esse

Line

PAGE 354

2 B and M: proponendae/ponendae: P, A and V
4 B: theologicae/catholicae: P, A and V
11 B omits: Item—Christi; P, A and V: in quantitatem
19 B omits: sicut—est

PAGE 356

5 V: augeri
7 R adds: servitutes
8 B: c.13/c.31, M; P, A and V: X
15 P and V omit: non
17 R: 9 genera accidentium

PAGE 358

4 R: ostendo, nam
10 M: mutuae
14 R: et ita duae corporealites

PAGE 360

Caption

2. B omits: obiectiones; P, A and V: responsio ad praedictas obiectiones per sequentia capitula

Line

7 M: legitur/invenitur: B, R, P, A and V
21 R: secundum modernum

PAGE 362

3 R: vel logicalem homo quam humanitas
6 B omits: vel logicales
7 P: importarum; M omits: alibi—ostendi
14 B, M and R omit: significationis; M and R: virtute sermonis
19 R only adds: et catholicos

PAGE 364

3 B omits: esse—partem
10 B omits: Immo—et per consequens
13 P: facere; P, A and V: subiectum

PAGE 366

3 M: substantia panis
23 B omits: quia—parte
29 B omits: dat intelligere nec

PAGE 368

7 B omits: substantia est quantitas
11 M: hoc—natura
15 M, R, P, A and V: est similitudo dum scilicet duae albedines existunt; B: albedo et similitudo
19 M, R, P, A and V: albedo est similitudo; B: albedo est albedo, alba

Line

PAGE 370

10 B omits: haec—quantitas
18 R: Sicut igitur sanae mentis diceret quod omnes illi sint haeretici qui tenerent quod relatio non est alia res a suo fundamento et per consequens quod substantia panis convertitur in relationem cum hoc dicere non sit haereticum, sicut non haereticum dicere quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi et haec est falsa, substantia panis convertitur in relationem

PAGE 372

3 B, R and A: non/nunc: M
17 B omits: et—substantia
26 M omits: et—eodem

PAGE 374

2 B: albedinem/aliquem: M, P, A and V
25 B omits: quantitas—concedatur

PAGE 376

3 B omits: nec ex vi sacramenti
6 B: specie sub panis
26 M omits: convertitur—parte

PAGE 378

2 B omits: concedenda est
3 B and R omit: quamvis—a parte
10 M omits: nec—quantitatem
12 B omits: nec—consimilem
14 M, P, A and V: modernos sciam se mutuo reprobantes, et
24 B, M and V: pro quibus/propinquius: P and V
27 B omits: non—altaris

PAGE 380

3 P, A and V: potest duos angelos creare; R: duos
15 B: innumerale/innumera talia: P, A and V
23 M: tunc/post: B, P, A and V
27 B omits: quae non and a; M adds: et alia quae non est res alia a substantia, transeat

PAGE 384

Caption
1. M, R, P, A and V: ad ostendum

Line
10 R: proxime/largissime
11 B and M: sumendo/accipiendo: P, A and V
20 R, P, A and V: dico

PAGE 386

2 B omits: subiecto; B and M omit: a subiecto
22 B omits: propter—nigredine
23 M: Corpus/Sortes
27 B: propositio/primo: M, R, P, A and V

Line

PAGE 388

4 B and M: propositio/primo: P, A and V
9 V: est dictu
11 B omits: non
26 M: sed manifestum est tertium
29 B, M and R: XXV/XXII: P and A; V: XX

PAGE 390

2 C, B, M and R: posse
3 B: accidendo
4 P, A and V: contra
12 B: In palam
18 Source: aliquid dici aliquid
26 B, M, R and V: effectu/affectu: P and A

PAGE 392

1 B omits: posse
2 B omits: mutationem—faciunt
4 B: Color/Calor: P, A and V
5 B omits: Per—dicit
10 B, M and R: a subiecto realiter
19 B: Natura
20 P, A and V omit: non
21 B: esse/eius, M, P, A and V
30 B and M: scillicet/super: P, A and V; R: supra

PAGE 394

25 B omits: existente—Sorte

PAGE 396

2 P, A and V: Sortes incipit similis esse et tamen
6 P, A and V omit: Deus
22 B and M: evenire/advenire: P, A and V; R: accedere

PAGE 400

Caption

1. B, M and R omit: Caption

Line

3 B, M and R: stant/sunt simul: P, A and V
5 R: Vivendum

PAGE 402

2 P, A and V: quod non omnis quantitas est accidens quod est res realiter distincta a substantia
3 M omits: Et—quantitas
10 B omits: sicut—parte
19 B omits: et—parte
22 B and M omit: ita—immo
23 P, A and V: accidens secundo modo
28 R: posito enim quod Deus facere aliquam causam non habere partem

Line

PAGE 404

25 B omits: non

PAGE 406

5 R: dicit enim quod sub discretum; B and M: dicit sub discretum/discretione: P, A and V
6 B: autem dicimus haec/aut hic dicimus numerata; P, A and V; R: Ex quo patet quod numerata cum sit quantitas est accidens
11 R omits: etiam—ostendi

PAGE 408

Caption
1. P, A and V: Solvuntur auctorates—argumento

PAGE 410

Line
9 R adds: et qualitate rarefiat quo facto aut tunc quantitas; P, A and V: substantia in rarefactione aut praecedens
11 M: tota—corrumpitur
15 R omits: Cum—destructae
16 B, M and R: destructae/distinctae: P, A and V
21 R: substantia/alia
27 B, M and V: in actu/in tactu: P and A; R omits: in actu

PAGE 412

1 B, M and R: agens/accidens: P, A and V
2 B omits: generaret/conservaret: R
9 M adds: quae ponitur subiectum qualitatum
20 B and M omit: ignis vel
21 R, P, A and V: illa parte quantitatis
24 P and V: ratio/ pars: M, B, R and A

PAGE 414

6 B: rarescens/rarus: P, A and V
8 B and M: distinctas/distantes: R, P, A and V
12 M, P, A and V: sit
14 M: omne illud vocat/illud vocat: P, A and V
24 M, P, A and V: sine/cum
28 M, P, A and V: adveniat

PAGE 418

4 P, A and V: ponat plus accidens esse quantitatem et distinctam
6 B and M: et distinctae/substantia distincta; P, A and V
19 B: ab ea/ab esse, R

PAGE 420

17 B and M: multos/omnis: P, A and V
18 B omits: dictis—contrarium
20 B omits: dicere
27 B omits: non

Line

PAGE 422

8 B, M and R: V/X
13 B and M omit: magnitudine
16 B omits: est magnus
19 R, P, A and V: Deo
27 B and M: animus/angelus: R, P, A and V; P, A and V: qui angelus

PAGE 424

9 R, P, A and V: Quare
14 B omits: sic—substantia
19 B omits: accidens
31 B and M: participatio/participare: P, A and V
32 B omits: in—locis

PAGE 428

Caption
2. B omits: praedicamentum
4. B and M omit: In—praedicabilia

Line
7 P: dictum
14 R, P, A and V: quae distinctas res contentas sub re non habent, quam species dividi

PAGE 430

2 B and M omit: quantitatis
3 B, M and R: species
5 B and M: alteri/discretae: R, P, A and V
11 B omits: distinctum—sit
12 P, A and V: distincta
18 B omits: generalissima; B omits: simpliciter—quae
20 B and M: esse/dici: P, A and V
27 B omits: de aliqua substantia
30 B omits: et omnes—genere quantitatis

PAGE 432

7 M omits: interrogativum
15 B and M omit: c.XXXII
19 B: album magnum/et nigrum: P, A and V; M: album nigrum
20 M, P, A and V: ostensivum
21 P, A and V: ostensivum
23 B omits: Ex quo—uri

PAGE 434

7 P, A and V: praedicabilia
17 M adds: sint distinctae
20 B omits: significatae; P: res significare

Caption PAGE 436

2. B and M omit; contra—adducta
5. XXX/III

Line

1 B and M omit: videre et
6 B and M: dampnat/reputans: P
7 B: catholicas/philosophicas: M, R, P, A and V
9 B omits: esse
10 B omits: Dist.—fieri
12 B, M, P, A and V: Alius/Idem

PAGE 438

2 C, B and M: referre; R and A: referri; P and V: reservari
25 B omits: in—potest

PAGE 440

9 C: diffinitione/diffesione: R; praesidentes/primates
12 R: terminare, IV.
14 R: flammines; B and M: primileges; C, P, A and V: primi legis doctores; R: praelegis; B: primileges doctorum
18 P, A and V: respondere
22 R: referendam esse ut
24 C, B and M: expone/exponit: R, P, A and V

PAGE 442

15 B and M: ratione/rectae: P, A and M
24 M: depravant

PAGE 444

2 B omits: in brevi
11 M omits: super—capitulum
15 M, P, A and V: nisi ea diceret quae retractata sunt

PAGE 446

3 B and M: depravantes/damnantes: P, A and V
4 B: canibus latratibunt/caninis latratibus: M, R, P, A and V
5 B: facerant/lacerant: M, P, A and V; R: latrant
14 B, M and R omit: me; B, R, P, A and V: sicubi/sic ubi; M: sicuti
15 B, P, A and V: sicubi/si ubi
22 P, A and V: huius mei
24 B, M and R omit: Ego—cetera

PAGE 448

3 R: vitam/in tam
17 P, A and V: acutioremque
18 MS.M ends with per concilia
22 C omits: scripta—episcoporum
23 B omits: non
24 B: sic ubi/sicubi: P, A and V; Corpus adds: quam veritas postulat
26 B omits: nomis dictum

Line

PAGE 450

4 R: laudabilium
5 R: sine/salva: B, A and V; P: salus
8 B omits: veritas
16 R: supradictae/propositae
24 R, P, A and V: asserare
25 R: nisi quod Romana, Ecclesia sua auctoritate docuit hoc asserendum
26 R omits: quam—capacitas

PAGE 452

Caption

2. B omits: et—recitata
3. P, A and V: III./XXXI.: R

Line

3 B omits: substantia
5 R: Ita non potest
13 R: tota—quod
15 B omits: et—remanet
20 B omits: quod—corrumpatur

PAGE 454

2 B and R: dari/dare: P, A and V
4 B and R omit: falsum et
15 R, P, A and V: perditus

PAGE 456

5 R: quantitatis
6 B omits: nunc—manet
7 B and R omit: te
17 B omits: et immediati
21 B omits: est—experientiam

PAGE 458

10 B: quare nunc est minoris; R: qualiter nunc substantia minoris est; P, A and V: qualiter est nunc minoris
14 B: ad deitatem/ad invicem: R, P, A and V
18 R: Nihil aliud requiritur nisi
22 P, A and V: partes; et Deus per suam omnipotentia
23 B omits: speciei

PAGE 460

Caption

3. B omits: et—adducta
4. XXX/III.

Line

1 R: ostendum
10 B: praedicamento/genere: P, A and V
15 R: in genere

Line

PAGE 462

2 B omits: praedicamento—in
7 R: in specie
8 B: calor/color: P, A and V
9 B, R and V: qualitates/quantitates: P and A
10 B omits: distinctae—animam

PAGE 464

1 B omits: quantitatis
2 B omits: praedicamentis
8 R, P, A and V: tamen quantum ad propositum sufficit
11 B omits: sit—propositio
21 P, A and V: constantia

PAGE 466

7 B: nomen/praedictum: R, P, A and V
9 B: nomen/subiectum: R, P, A and V
11 B: nomen praedicatum/praedicatum: P, A and V
12 B and R: substantia/qualitas: P, A and V; B and R: qualitas est quanta/substantia est quantitas: P, A and V
20 B: subiecto/substantia: P, A and V

PAGE 468

2 B and R omit: et—accidens

PAGE 472

Caption

No caption in B

Line

1 B and V: qualitates/quantitates: R, P, A and V
13 B: auctores qui/auctoritates: R, P, A and V
16 B: loci/loquendo: R, P, A and V; R: per naturam
17 B and R: prima/pura: P, A and V

PAGE 476

11 B omits: situaliter
12 P, A and V: universaliter
27 R: per creationem

PAGE 478

7 B, P, A and V: subiective/subiecto: R

PAGE 480

1 B and R: ponendo/posito: P, A and V
2 R: existentes et subsistentes quamvis

PAGE 482

14 R: ergo ubicumque est substantia corporis Christi erit et qualitas ergo quantitas eius erit in sacramento altaris
15 B omits: per—altaris

Line

PAGE 484

10 P, A and V: consequentia
26 B omits: propositione

PAGE 486

9 B and R omit: vel—realiter. Et
14 B omits: in hostia et

PAGE 490

3 P, A and V: nominaverunt
20 B omits: loco
26 B omits: determinatione

PAGE 492

9 B omits: haec—falsa
24 B and R: quando/quantum: P, A and V
26 B and R omit: terminatur in tas .
27 B omits: sub

PAGE 494

5 B: contra alteram partem/contrariam: P, A and V; M: contra istam
9 B: ibi omne/ibidem vere: P, A and V; R: albedinem est album
14 R: est in sacramento altaris
15 B: quantitate/ea: R, P, A and V
16 B: quantitas/quantum: R, P, A and V
26 B omits: sed—res

PAGE 496

1 B: alia respectativa/alia res relativa: P, A and V; R: aliqua res
3 B: relativa/realissima alia: P, A and V; R: res aliqua relativa
5 B: quando/quanto: P, A and V
15 B: vel saltem ista/vel illa: P, A and V
16 R: per consequens
27 B omits: esse

PAGE 498

4 P, A and V: habet
14 B omits: simplicitur

PAGE 500

4 R: et—praedicati
5 B omits: nominibus
6 R: quia significat res connotando; P, A and V: quia hoc nomen quantitas significat rem connotando
10 R: quantam; B: explicit Benedicto Deo

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